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Abstract
JURGEN HABERMAS AND MARX:
CRITIQUE OF AN INCIPIENT PUBLIC SPHERE

by

Russell L. Rockwell

Adviser:

Professor Stanley Aronowitz

This study examines the relationship of Jurgen Habermas's ideas to
those of Marx. A close reading of Habermas's major works, in conjunction with
a close reading as well of the Marx texts he analyzes, comprises the
thematically first part. The Habermas texts include the following, with original
German publication dates: "Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as
Critique" (1960); Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962);
Knowledge and Human Interests (1968); Legitimation Crisis (1973);
"Reconstruction of Historical Materialism" (1975); and, The Theory of
Communicative Action (1981). These texts are shown to contain a two decadelong argument that, a) the relevance of Marx’s theories is severely restricted to
the period in which he lived; b) the original Frankfurt School Critical Theory (of
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Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and others) tacitly retained a Marxist orthodoxy
none the less; and, c) Habermas’s theory of communicative action and reason
first faces up to and successfully overcomes the problems associated with a)
and b).
The thematically second part identifies, delineates and examines a
public sphere—describing its motivation and content-concerning the practical
implications of Habermas's critique of Marx, while arguing that it was
deliberately shaped by Habermas, along with supporters. It is concluded that
this public sphere, Habermas's mode of critique of Marx's theories and of the
original Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, drew more attention and support
before the collapse of Communism than that part of it which continued in its
1990s aftermath. This can be partly explained with close attention to yet a
newer critique of Critical Theory, also from within that tradition-Moishe
Postone's Time, Labor and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx's
Critical Theory (1993). The latter both explains socially Habermas's theory,
and offers a better critical approach to post-Communism on the basis of a
reinterpretation of Marx's Grundrisse and Capital. However, important areas of
agreement with Habermas's critique of Mane, especially an assessment of the
lack of a contemporary relevance of Marx's 1844 Economic-Philosophic
Manuscripts, stands in the way of this new approach's break from Critical
Theory and improved prospects for the practical potential of Marx's humanism.
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INTRODUCTION
How Jurgen Habermas’s theory is related to that of Critical Theory's
founders, particularly Horkheimer, Adomo and Marcuse (as well as others) has
by now been widely discussed. In so far as a Critical Theory tradition retains
vitality today, there is little question concerning Habermas’s leading role during
the last three decades at least. Beginning only slowly in the 1960s and 1970s,
but accelerating in the 1980s, Habermas developed a sharp critique of his
predecessors. He increasingly delineated (in respect to the founders) his own
social theory. Preoccupation with the issue of the continuity or discontinuity of
the Critical Theory tradition has perhaps been at the expense of critical attention
to Habermas's direct confrontation with Marx’s ideas, ostensibly the inspiration
for what is afterall most often understood as a "neo-Marxist" strand of thought.
However, "neo-Marxist" Critical Theory perhaps too much assumes, and
attempts to ovecome deficiences of, the original. Considering the various types
of studies on Habermas's theory during the last couple of decades (which
include, besides comparison of the old and the newer Critical Theory, more
specialized studies on communicative ethics, law, etc) an inference must be
drawn that, in fact, there is a prevailing misperception which underestimates (or
undervalues) the large amount of attention Habermas paid to Marx’s theory
proper, its still controversial conclusions, and the relative importance that his
focus on Marx assumed in his own fully developed theory, all the way into the
1990s. But now a wide-ranging transformation has occurred in recent times.
The collapse of Communist states, the legitimacy for which was argued in terms
of Marxist ideology, is the type of epochal world transformation which can open
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up the potential for another look at ideas long thought to already be known, at
least in their essential features. For example, many of the world economies'
links to their respective states, and responsibility for social welfare on the part of
the state, have approached a point of dissolution. A significant part of the
attraction (and perhaps key presuppositions) of Habermas's theory followed
from existence of a Communist status-quo, and an apparently long-term, if not
permanent, “welfare state compromise" in the most capitalistically developed
countries.
If in the late 1970s and 1980s, coinciding with Habermas’s own attention
to the issue, several important studies analyzed his criticism (implied or overt) of
the older Critical Theory, much less attention has been paid to the even more
recent critique, which also comes from within the Critical Theory tradition itself.
This new level of critique, found in the Frankfurt-trained Sociologist Moishe
Postone's Time, Labor, and Social Domination has by no means achieved the
status of a tendency (as Habermas has purposely cultivated in respect to his
own theory, and which I bring to the fore in the following chapters).
Postone’s "remarkable study" (Jay 1993) builds a strong case for the idea
that Marx's "mature critical theory" (primarily the Grundrisse and Capital),
contain critical categories the development of which potentially explain today's
powerful social forces, which are, "far removed from personal experience"
(Postone 1993), and are more abstract than the traditional Marxist categories of
the market, property relations and labor. Labor, especially, has been
misunderstood as “transhistorical" (in both Habermas and the Critical Theory
tradition generally), with important consequences for both theory and practice.
Moreover, Postone argues convincingly that a reinterpretation of Marx's texts
can explain socially the original Critical Theory (and its limitations), as well as
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Habermas's revised version, which attempted to escape its pessimism and lack
of social relevance.
In light of Postone's radical suggestion (that the Critical Theory tendency
over a long period of time, and in the face of major economic, political and
social transformations has seriously misunderstood some of the concepts
crucial to an understanding of Marx’s theory), I closely examine Habermas's
investigations of Marx's texts, with some unexpected results. For example, I
argue that Habermas's second (though often thought of as his first) major work,
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, initially published in German in
1962, issued the outline of a textually-based systematic critique of Marx's ideas,
an assessment which clashes with the more typical view that it was a work
written when Habermas was "still a Marxist", or with even Habermas's own view
(Habermas 1990b), that "Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as
Critique", written in 1960 (Jay 1984, 469), represented this sort of approach. I
argue that "Marxism as Critique" essentially suggested a “revision" of Marx's
theory of value, while (perhaps more importantly) introducing (earlier than
previously noted) the concept of the lifeworld. The concept of the lifeworid
remained dormant in the several years following, yet it was already clear in
1960 that it would assume importance in any fundamental critique of Marx's
theory, especially in metatheoretical terms, as it eventually did in the often-cited
"paradigm shift" from a philosophy of consciousness to a theory informed by a
social analysis of language. I point out as an important cue that already in the
1960 “Marxism as Critique" Habermas highlighted passages in the Grundrisse
while sharply separating analysis of them from Marx's 1844 Economic
Manuscripts. Habermas interpreted the Grundrisse passages (in a revelatory
sense) as a possible basis of an immanent critique of Marx's theory. According
to Habermas, these passages provide evidence (which Marx later submerged)
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that Marx himself questioned the centrality of labor for a description of modem
society, and the possibility of its critique. Nearly a decade later, in the 1968
(German) publication of Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas returns to
the same Grundrisse passages, expanding and elaborating his prior argument,
but this time (with the crucial difference) on the basis of an analysis (in his
Chapter, "Marx’s Metacritique of Hegel: Synthsis Through Social Labor") of the
most important essay in the 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, "Critique
of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General". This then represents a
second, though conceptually more sophisticated, attempt at a comprehensive
critique of Marx, but still does not bring back in to focus a concept of the
lifeworid for the potential of a critical social theory more adequate than Marx's
(too dependent on labor) in view of modem society.
I attempt to demonstrate that Habermas's Knowledge and Human
Interests implicitly conceded that earlier works ("Between Philosophy and
Science: Marxism as Critique" and Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere), in underestimating the depth of Marx's concept of labor, compelled a
return to analysis of Marx's theory, perhaps contrary to his initial expectations.
Habermas's continuous returns to consideration of Marx’s theories seemed to
take on a life of their own, that is, despite what appeared to be Habermas's
early intent to meet what he believed was the need for an alternative theory.
Due to this internal dynamic, my analyses necessarily proceeds along
the route of closely following Habermas’s attention (which gradually diminishes)
to Marx’s texts, as well as a comparison of these texts with Habermas's
presentation and interpretation of them. This is especially warranted, and
therefore is presented in greatest detail, in consideration of Habermas's two
chapters on Marx in Knowledge and Human Interests, and in respect to
Habermas's 1990 summary article on the status of Marx's theory in the midst of
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the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Soviet
Union itself.
Against the background of a close reading of a variety of Habermas's
approaches to Marx's theory, including his systematic, textual critique, I analyze
how Habermas, at the very time of the initial publication of his Theory of
Communicative Action (1981) substantially contributed to the re-founding of the
Marxist Humanist, semi-underground dissident journal, Praxis. The latter
originated in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1960s, was eventually closed
down by the Tito government in the 1970s, and finally re-surfaced in 1981 (with
Habermas's active assistance) as Praxis International, published in London.
On one level, I look at Habermas's relationship to this journal in order to explore
the practical potential of Habermas’s theory from the vantage point of the late
1980s and early 1990s collapse of Communism and its aftermath, as well as the
disintegrating social welfare states, including in the United States, Europe and
elsewhere. On another level, I view Habermas's role in Praxis International as
constituting a critique of a certain sort of non-Communist, philosophically
dissident Marxism, apparently unimplicated in the previously ruling statist forms.
My intention is to bring into focus another type of Habermas's critique of Marx,
that is adequate to the standard of rationality developed in Habermas's now
mature theory, in a public sphere constituted on dialogical premises, open to
thinkers composing a variety of theoretical and political backgrounds-including
both "state socialist" and Westem-style social welfare states. Examination of
this historical moment is potentially productive in terms of analyzing the status of
Habermas's mature theory including (but not limited to) his self-understanding.
Generally, I analyze the trajectory of Habermas's theory construction in
respect to his critique of Marx, while simultaneously attempting to bring out the
full significance of the critique of Habermas's theory from within the Critical
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Theory tradition (Postone). I argue that Postone's critique, in contrast to what he
himself suggests, implies not simply a more critical Critical Theory, but a need
for a break from the Critical Theory tradition, if the socially useful aspect of this
type of theory is understood to be in its potential contribution to an overcoming
of capitalism.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE SEARCH FOR HABERMAS’S MARXISM AND HABERMAS’S PURSUIT
OF MARX
The first comprehensive study of Jurgen Habermas's thought to appear
in English had as its implicit standard Marx’s critique of capitalist society.
Thomas McCarthy's, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas (1978),
concluded that Habermas's work assumed a Marxist form of critique. Yet,
McCarthy's book contained only a sketchy and unsustained argument about the
nature of Marx's theory.
Although it was not readily perceived, by the time of publication of
McCarthy's book Habermas had finally rejected Mane's theory, or more
precisely, what he had come to understand Marx’s theory to be. With Habermas
(more so than with the early Critical Theorists Horkheimer and Adorno) it is
possible to draw out his analyses of specific texts and periods of Marx's
theoretical position. These can serve as the starting point for conceptualizing
the relationship between the two thinkers separated by an entire century.
McCarthy's book was published at a time when Habermas's theory was
at best half-way elaborated and still undigested; still it achieved a wide impact
in assigning a contemporary status to Habermas's (and indirectly) Marx’s
thought in the 1970s and 1980s. That status might be briefly described as
reflecting Habermas's notion that Marx's work contains, in the classical sense,
certain durable qualities capable of guiding critically oriented thought; but
Marx's theories (it is generally assumed even by those sympathetic to them) are
essentially so far removed from contemporary concerns and conditions that at
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best they are in need of, in addition to continued clarification, at the very least
radical reorganization and/or supplementation (Lohmann 1986).
McCarthy, while not offering much in the way of presenting Marx’s ideas,
concluded his work by arguing that Legitimation Crisis (Habermas’s work just
translated by McCarthy at the time) assumed a "Marxist form of critique". A
possible interpretation of this is that McCarthy believed that contemporary
critical theory (Habermas its principal representative) had fulfilled an intention to
update Marx's original theory, thus opening up new prospects for Critical
Theory generally. Chapters Two, Three and Four of this dissertation take up
Habermas's various approaches to Marx, inquiring whether any of them
suceeded in grasping the fundamental concepts relevant for a contemporary
critical theory of capitalism.
Martin Jay’s Marxism and Totality (1984) placed Habermas squarely in
the arena of Western Marxism; he argued that Habermas's theory, a potentially
viable form of Marxism, might represent the only sustainable development from
that tradition (Jay 1984). Still, the chapter on Habermas, concluding his
volume, which takes up the whole range of Western Marxism in this century,
offers limited explicit assessment of Marx's ideas as he developed them,
compared with those who interpreted them. The remarkable point to note here
is that as late as 1984 Jay's major work could still suggest that recreation of a
"Marxist" critical theory of society was Habermas's intent, and that his actual
attempt was more plausible than any other.
A major shift in perspective began in the mid-1980s--among Habermas's
most active (or vocal) supporters. Seyla Benhabib's, Norm, Critique and Utopia
(1986), again following Habermas's own thematization of the significance of his
work vis a vis Marx, 1) examined specific texts and periods of Marx's theoretical
development; 2) offered tightly argued perspectives on the origin and
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development of the modem concept of critique, in important ways shaped by
Marx and; 3) recognized and addressed Habermas's own self-understanding
that his theory, adequate to contemporary society in a way Marx's was not,
should "replace" the latter. Benhabib's work was the first since the full scope of
Habermas's writings became widely accessible in the United States to begin to
fully come to terms with the idea that Habermas had begun to argue, if only
implicitly, that a contemporary critical theory, without Marx, was possible and, in
fact, that his own might be seen as just such a theory.
In this respect, her study represented a radical break with McCarthy's
less than a decade earlier. But the similarity of the two consisted in their
following Habermas's rapidly evolving self-understanding of his own theory.
McCarthy's study was written in the wake of Habermas's presentation of himself
as engaged in the perhaps still conceivable "reconstruction of historical
materialism". Benhabib's book appeared at the moment Habermas was
focused on counter-posing the recent results of his work to the ideas of Marx, as
well as to contemporary Marxists (particularly the "praxis" philosophers with a
history of philosophical dissidence inside the East European Communist
countries). This effort to distinguish his ideas from Marx's "praxis philosophy"
included both theoretical and practical dimensions. While, in respect to
Habermas, no one would have difficulty recognizing the former dimension, the
latter is more subtle, and its peculiarity not well understood. Due to the role a
critique of Marxist Humanism (or "praxis philosophy") played in the crucial shift
in Habermas's understanding of his own theory, I will take this up in some detail
in Chapter Five where I analyze a year-long symposium in the journal Praxis
International.
In fact, McCarthy, Jay, Benhabib, and Axel Honneth (who will be
discussed shortly) were all key figures in exploring, along with Habermas, the
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prospects of a new Critical Theory minus a reliance upon Marx in the period
leading up to the epochal series of events culminating in the collapse of
Communism in East Europe and Russia. To be sure, such a radical
transformation of the political landscape was not anticipated at the time when ail
of the above authors focused on clarifying Habermas's 1980s theory in the
journal Praxis International (PI) (among others) which originated as a politicalphilosophical dissident Marxist humanist journal in Yugoslavia. The journal,
closed down by the state in the late 1970s, re-emerged in 1981 as an
international journal published in Britain. It did not survive long into the postCommunist period of the 1990s. (The new journal, Constellations, based at
Harvard and the New School for Social Research, continues with many of the
issues and concerns associated with the last several years of publication of PIJ.
Richard Bernstein's Habermas and Modernity (1985) documents the
theoretical and practical intent of Pi's focus on Habermas's social theory.
However, Bernstein's own introduction to the collection, on the eve of
Communism's and this Marxist Humanist tendency's collapse, failed to
anticipate Habermas’s decisive political/practical distancing himself from the
Marxist Humanist tendency (only subsequently theoretically justified in
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity). Bernstein, in fact, stressed Habermas's
affinity with the "praxis philosophy" of the Marxist Humanists, which was far from
non-controversial (Lichtheim 1971; Jay 1972; Dallmayr 1984; Wellmer, 1993).
Axel Honneth, one of Habermas's younger followers in Germany,
contributed considerably to the dissemination of Habermas's ideas, including
especially outside Germany. His participation was key in shaping the kind of
forum for Habemas's ideas consonant with Habermas's implict notion of
practical intervention in a world in which confidence in even "critical" Marxism
was fading. For Habermas, the latter represented a new situation, uncharted,
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perhaps even dangerous. Honneth's Critique of Power, while published in the
German in the mid-1980s, did not appear in English until 1991. By then his
several articles in Telos, New German Critique, and PI had already raised the
level of discussion of Habermas, particularly of Habermas's self-understanding
of the status of his own theory in relationship to that of Marx's, and as
differentiated from the older generation of Critical Theorists. In addition,
Critique of Power, divided between discussion of Foucault and Habermas,
helped respond to various calls, from the late 1970s onward, for Habermas to
engage more directly in dialogue with post-structuralist and post-modem
theories. The more than four hundred-page book has scarcely a reference to
Marx (though there is one calling "crude'' Marx's 1844 Economic-Philosophic
Manuscripts) seeming to imply by omission agreement with Benhabib's
conclusions, if not her method, following Habermas’s own self-understanding,
that Critical Theory now can, and should, develop without Marx. Honneth's
Struggle for Recognition (1996) contains an essay which argues for the
uselessness of Marx's theories for today.
To be sure, the more specific issue of whether Habermas's efforts could
even be seen to have aimed at achieving a critical theory of modem society
without Marx was by no means percieved to be a major one. There has been
considerably more discussion on whether Habermas had succeeded in making
a philosophic-historic break with the German idealist tradition (from which Marx
himself did not break completely, according to Habermas), a tradition seen as
integral to a discredited “philosophy of consciousness". Habermas
characterizes the "overcoming" of the latter as an “achievement of the age"
(Outhwaite 1994).
David Ingram's Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason (1987) even
argued that The Theory of Communicative Action represented a “return" to
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Marx. He identifies this in terms of Habermas's rethinking of the concept of
reification. In Ingram's reading, Habermas suggests the possibility of a "holistic"
overcoming of disorienting social phenomenon. The way for this might be
cleared through Habermas's concept of reification which was elaborated and
expanded, and at the same time refined, allowing for a distinction between
social shifts appearing in connection with an increasing rationalization of the
lifeworid, and those which are pathological expressions of the the type of
alienation described, but too narrowly, by Marx and some of his followers.
Ingram sees this theoretical direction primarily in terms of Habermas's new
reflections on “aesthetic reason".
The appendix to Fred Dallmayr*s earlier Polis and Praxis (1984), which
is one of the earlier reviews of the TCA (after the first volume's English
translation) had argued that Habermas, despite his intentions, remained bound
to the traditional oppositions endemic to Western metaphysics (Dallmayr 1984).
Indeed, it is precisely that continued connection (which Dallmayr also
associates with Habermas's current reflections on aesthetic reason), which has
finally turned Habermas away from his earlier committment to politics, or
political praxis, and toward a theory of the "social domain". (According to
Dallmayr, politics in TCA is conceived as a subsystem submerged in
bureaucratic controls, while having no clear place within the lifeworid either).
Yet, it is only from the late 1980s that at least two distinctive attitudes
crystalize around the critical discussion of Habermas's theory. The two
volumes, Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of
Enlightenment, and Cultural-Political Interventions in the Unfinished Project of
Enlightenment (1992), are edited by Honneth, McCarthy, Claus Offe and
Albrecht Wellmer. These latter might be fairly described as a significant part of
a tendency of critical support of Habermas's general direction, while
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disagreeing on particular issues. As is clear from the title to the two volumes
(and their dedication to Habermas on his sixty-fifth birthday) a sort of loose
Habermasian tendency had developed—apparently motivated by the idea that
what was needed was an increasingly active relationship to Habermas's ideas
(or at least those inspired by the latter).
Stanley Aronowitz's Science as Power (1988), Istvan Meszaros's Power
of Ideology (1989), Tom Rockmore's, Habermas and Historical Materialism
(1989) and Moishe Postone's, Time, Labor and Social Domination: A Re
examination of Marx's Crtical Theory (1993) represent later, more independent,
works which make strong cases (though to some extent implicit) for the
weaknesses of the first tendency's assumptions of a lack of contemporary
import and relevance of at least some of Marx's ideas for the possibility of a
genuine critical theory of society. Upon this basis, they tend to raise questions
concerning the general social relevance, and therefore the solidity, not merely
of Habermas's theory proper, but especially its "programmatic" quality.
Stanley Aronowitz's Science as Power (1988) is unlike McCarthy’s and
Jay's work in that it is not a systematic analysis of Habermas's theory. It
contrasts with the earlier studies in that it combined an explicit reading of Marx's
work (German Ideology, Grundrise, Capital) with discussion of Habermas's
theory. The latter is found to be regressive in comparison. In the broader
context of Aronowitz's study of science, in which Habermas's "post-Marxism" is
found to be inadequate, the problem of Habermas and Marxism is not meant to
be amplified, but rather dissipated. Still, the doubt cast on Habermas's
understanding of Marx's major theoretical work must have given pause to many
who might have too easily accepted the theoretical conclusions of McCarthy or
Jay.
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One of the aims of this study is to highlight the "project" (or
"programmatic") quality of Habermas’s theory. Inseparable from evaluation of
the content of varying theoretical positions in this, or at least one might deduce
from Habermas's own views, is the working out of a concept of the public
sphere and its relationship to Habermas's notion of a practical discourse.
From the perspective of the evolving status of Marx's ideas in
Habermas's theory construction, and the divergent opinions on this question,
the concepts of the public sphere and practical discourse begin to appear in a
new light. Consideration of the belated translation into English of the Structural
Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989), nearly three decades after its
German publication is relevant here. It was followed five years later by
Habermas and the Public Sphere (1992), a published symposium, edited by
Craig Calhoun.
In the long run, Habermas's approach to Marx’s theory is related to the
concepts of the public sphere and practical discourse which, in turn, are related
to the methodological questions of immanent and transcendent critique. The
public sphere and practical discourse, when Habermas links them to the
developing concepts of lifeworld and system, represent the diagnosis of
contemporary society, its increasing "rationalization." Hence, applying
Habermas's diagnosis of the times to his own theory formation, the changing
nature of society, and its conceptualization, might be illustrated by comparison
of what the "public sphere" represented in Structural Transformation of the
Public Sphere-historically, a spontaneous cultural phenomenon with strong
political implications-to what it reflectively refers to by the 1990s: highly
specialized discussion of the concept itself, theoretical self-reflection seen as
essential for a ressurection of the distinguishing (progressive) feature of
modernity, though now on a higher level of abstraction.
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McCarthy's work focused on Habermas's own confrontations with
competing methodologies, and diverse disciplines, on his way to a
distinguishable theory in its own right. McCarthy (though clearly aware of its
significance) scarcely elaborated Habermas's concept of a public sphere. Even
with the widely-recognized complexities of Habermas's theories, that concept is
still usually understood to be the animating one of his entire body of work. Yet,
Habermas recently remarked that-in respect to his early study of the public
sphere—he had "turned to other concerns" (Habermas 1992b, 421). McCarthy
did not particularly focus on the concept of the public sphere perhaps because
Habermas had not yet done so either. When Habermas returned to it (first in a
practical, then in a theoretical, sense) an important effect (if not intent) was to
mold the reception (including in the U.S) of his proposed replacement of Marx's
theory with his own.
One interesting perspective on this process can be developed through
examination of originally Marxist-oriented journals with a substantial following
among critical-theory oriented intellectuals. (I examine one of them in Chapter
Five). Through these journals Habermas and various supporters initiated a
process leading to a dissolution of a notion of the practical potential of Marx's
theory, the notable feature being the presentation as well of something to put in
its "place"~Habermas's by now mature critical social theory
It is important to see that this was not yet the situation when McCarthy
wrote and published his book. Moreover, it was probably the case that it was
McCarthy's (and other's) sort of mistaken conflation of Habermas's theory with
Marx's which probably spurred Habermas, over the course of the following
decade, in order to counter the impression that his theory was simply a variant
of Marxism, to focus on intervention in these "neo-Marxist" journals.
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The point of this intervention then was certainly not to argue for the
continuity of Habermasian Critical Theory with Marx's theory of capitalism.
Quite the opposite, the intervention was gauged to emphatically contrast
Habermas's theory with both "traditional" and (later) "critical" Marxism;
Habermas (with both philosophic and political intent) applied the concepts (and
distinction) of theoretical and practical discourse as a means of differentiating
his own theory.
Yet, as Moishe Postone (who will be discussed below) has recently
shown, Habermas himself retained basic assumptions of "traditional Marxism"
and thereby helped perpetuate them by failing to distinguish them (which would
have required a fundamental re-interpretation) from Marx's actual theory; due to
this, Habermas's work contains one of today's most relied upon articulations of
these traditional Marxist views.
In retrospect, McCarthy's questionable interpretation of the "Marxism" of
Legitimation Crisis generally miscalculated the book's long-term significance
when he seemed to argue that it represented an adequate justification of
Habermas's supplementation or "updating" of Marx’s social analysis. It was not
easy in the mid-to-late 1970s to anticipate the scope of Habermas's intentions
in respect to Marx and Marxism. At the time, Legitimation Crisis seemed to
represent a credible political diagnosis demanded by Habermas's long trek
through theoretical confrontation with competing methodologies. LC is indeed
a link in Habermas's diagnosis of contemporary society. It did not, it turns out,
encompass the full intent of the concept of practical discourse, a concept of
Habermas's that McCarthy, it should be noted must be credited with having
ushered into wider discussion (Held 1980).
What is not fully appreciated among most commentators, an essential
element of Habermas's theory development was his direct participation in
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molding the reception of his thought, including outside Germany. From the
moment (beginning in the mid-1970s) he began to assert and defend his own
(post- Marx) theory, a theory which he began to suggest was in need of
development as a contemporary (and vital) form of practice, Habermas, to a far
greater extent than his predecessors in the Critical Theory tradition, assumed
an active role in the debate about how his own ideas should be understood and
practically employed. This process peaked by the mid-1980s while important
theses in Legitimation Crisis seemed to become obsolete (White 1988).
Perhaps the most striking contrast in the literature is found in works
separated precisely by the decade of the 1980s. While McCarthy did little to
discourage the idea of some level of compatibility of Habermas's theory with
that of Marx's, Tom Rockmore convincingly demonstrated Habermas's explicit,
systematic, even even step-by-step, “replacement" of Marx's theory. He does
this with a close reading of Habermas's major theoretical works, excavating
those portions which refer directly to Habermas's method and decisions on the
way to "replacement" of Marx's “historical materialism (Rockmore 1989, 169).
Rockmore did not, however, notice a striking illustration of Habermas's
assessment of his fully developed theory's relationship to Marx's; Habermas
singles out a passage in the Grundrisse where Marx speculates on a maturing
capitalism (Habermas 1987, 402). Marx has already substantially worked out
his value theory and a concept of labor's specificity in capitalist society. He has
broken in two the classical political economic concept of labor. Marx now views
labor dialectically, a relation of abstract and concrete. Focusing on the labor
process itself, Marx describes capitalist labor and production of the value form
of wealth. In the capitalist production process labor in molded into an
increasingly standardized and relatively undifferentiated series of motions
dictated by the socially necessary labor time for the production of commodities.
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Marx notices that the United States exemplifies this stage of capitalism.
Due to the value integument of the capitalist mode of production, labor has,
"become a matter of chance and hence of indifference". As Habermas
describes the passage, Marx conceived this to be a “problem" for the workers.
With this perception, Marx constructed a theory adequate to the society he lived
in, and of the possibility of social transformation, because the crisis potential
specific to it, becoming problematic, could then be thematized.
The implication, following from the prior analyses in TCA , is that (more
than a century later) "interaction", or communicative action oriented to
understanding, faces a threat similar to what Marx identified in regard to labor
(seen as the relation of man to nature) and social meaning in the nineteenth
century. Habermas characterizes the contemporary problem, more abstract
than Marx's diagnosis, specific to contemporaneity, as a "colonization of the
lifeworld" (Habermas 1987, 355). He in fact argues that Marx had subsumed
the general (social life) under the specific (labor) (Habermas 1987, 342).
Turning to systems theory, Habermas analyzes this as an intrusion of systemic
imperatives, the strategic logic of the “steering" mechanisms represented
through the medias of money and power, into social, or necessarily symbolically
constituted, domains.
An implication of this is that Habermas's social theory (if not Critical
Theory generally) is oriented toward and, in fact, follows social practice
(perhaps in contrast to dogmatic Marxism). The colonization of the lifeworldanalogous to what he takes to be the systematization of labor in Marx’s day—
affords philosophy (re-worked in his version of Critical Theory) access to
previously unconceptualized phenomenon in the social world; a diagnosis of
the times discloses a cultural process of increasing abstraction. This is seen in
terms of an evolution of forms of human activity which achieved centrality in the
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developmental stages of modernization. The movement is from industrial labor
in incipient capitalism to communicative action in late capitalism.
Habermas traced an implication of this problematic to its incipient stage
in the writings of the early Hegel (Habermas 1973), who perceived the
bifurcation of labor and interaction, which he held distinguished the modem
world. An original unity thus broken apart could only be restored on the basis of
an intersubjectively achieved consensus. But Hegel then abandoned this
insight when he turned to a "monologic" conception, culminating in a
philosophy of history unfolding from Absolute Spirit. Marx, without awareness
of this early Hegel, independently recovered the dualism inherent in the specific
way of life defined as modernity, but in the end failed to separate himself from
Hegel's (later) logic, instead recasting the latter as a “synthesis through social
labor" (Habermas 1972).
Labor, progressively (and permanently) shorn of its variety of socially
integrating features-contrary to Mane's "romantic" notion of a future de
differentiation of society based on class consciousness—is instead pared down
into a solely instrumental activity. Labor's social prominence is dissolved, or is
now seen as a special case of a more general process. Modernity is
characterized by a decentered form of life in which the problem of meaning
shifts from the social repercussions of a new world, arising out of the metabolic
relation between the species and nature, to the more abstract processes
associated with the differentiation of the spheres of culture, society and
personality constitutive of a complex lifeworid which uncouples from the
subsystems of economy and state. "Labor", in short, is hardly a theoretical or a
practical problem in contemporary society. It has fallen in a process of
increasing "real" abstraction (Habermas 1987, 402).
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Just as Marx arrived (in a theoretical sense) at the United States when he
saw it as the harbinger of a new level of "real abstraction", Habermas, around
the time of the completion of TCA, turned considerable attention (including
outside Germany and perhaps especially to the U.S.) to molding a public
sphere in which the relation of philosophy and social theory was prominently
thematized. This process can be viewed as an attempt to apply the concepts of
theoretical and practical discourse to Marxism itself. This is rooted in
Habermas's diagnosis of the objectivity of interaction as the principal and
necessary (though endangered) ingredient for the continuation of "modem" life.
Modem society, while due to its complexity was not threatened by political or
social revolution (Habermas 1992a, 469), was vulnerable to collapse, an
alternative which Habermas left notoriously under-specified.
Moishe Postone's, Time, Labor and Social Domination: A
Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory (1993) identifies a Marxism sharing
certain traditional misunderstandings of some of Marx's basic categories,
spanning practically the entire twentieth century. In one chapter, Critical Theory
is examined in the 1930s and 1940s work of Horkheimer and Pollock. Later,
the analysis is carried through by inclusion of a chapter devoted to Habermas,
the only contemporary theorist whose work he takes up extensively.
Postone writes on Habermas's critique of Marx, constitutive of
Habermas's effort to revitalize Critical Theory while uncoupling it from the
pervasive pessimism of the founders of the Frankfurt School. While a large
number of Marxist theorists in this century are critically cited in the footnotes, the
fuller attention to Habermas’s critique of Marx is due to the fact that Postone
shares a grounding in the Critical Theory tradition, and to his judgement that
Habermas's theory depends in the most crucial respects on a critique of
traditional Marxism, thus amounting to a strawman argument, and shields from
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deeper probing the issue of the relevance of Marx’s theory for a new,
contemporary stage of capitalism.
Furthermore, Habermas's reading of Marx is constitutive of his own
theory. An inadequate interpretation of Marx shapes the theory which is
intended to replace it. In comparison, the reinterpretation of Marx Postone
proposes, specifically Marx's "mature critical theory", might, in its own right, be
shown to be more adequate to late twentieth century capitalism than
Habermas's theory. The latter both retains, intrinsic to it, questionable positive
features meant to negate elements falsely attributed to Marx's theory, and lacks
crucial conceptual insights found in Marx's theory.
Habermas defended his theory against theoretical positions he attributed
at various times to Marx (Habermas 1975), at others to "Marxists" (Habermas
1979), and still others to Marx and the Marxists (Habermas 1992a), fundamental
distinctions between the two at times implied (Habermas 1972), and at other
times apparently judged not to have major significance (Habermas 1973). As
Rockmore had noted, however, Habermas's later work tended to categorize
Marx's theory alone as representing a materialist theory in need of replacement
(Rockmore 1989).
The tension in this is exemplified in Habermas's later works which,
though quite different in form, single out for special attention a certain tendency
of Marxism, ie; “praxis philosophy", or what Rockmore (for example) deduces as
referring especially to the Marxist Humanism represented by "a group of
Yugoslav thinkers clustered around the journal Praxisf (Rockmore 1989, 107),
which drew inspiration from the 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts. (This
is especially interesting in light of a "post-Communist" dialogue between
Habermas and Adam Michnik in New Left Review, where the latter suggests
Habermas's history of a lack of critical attention to Communist regimes, and lack
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of support for the Solidarity movement in the early 1980s) (Michnik and
Habermas 1994, 29). I will develop this further in Chapter Six, the concluding
chapter.
There are critical references to Habermas's theory scattered throughout
Postone's work, but here (in concluding this introduction) I will briefly review the
chapter devoted entirely to him. The fact that his critical approach to
Habermas's understanding of Marx's theory comes from within the Critical
Theory tradition at a time when the latter is dominated by Habermas's work
makes Postone's work especially important in the following chapters.
Postone's Time, Labor, and Social Domination is not a detailed,
systematic appraisal of Habermas's theories. Yet, the critique achieves a
certain comprehensiveness. There is an astute selection of both Habermas's
texts and Marx's critical concepts traditionally misunderstood by even his
ostensibly most sympathetic readers. The concepts in question, already
discussed in Postone's earlier chapters, are then unfolded. A
misunderstanding of them is shown to be the principal influence in the trajectory
of both Critical Theory in general and, in specified ways, Habermas's theory-a
theory which attempted to encompass social developments in the post-World
War II period. Postone begins with "Marx’s Metacritique of Hegel: Synthesis
Through Social Labor" (Habermas 1972, 25-42), one of Habermas's most
difficult texts. In that work, Postone traces Habermas's understanding of the
concept of labor.
Habermas's first several pages ostensibly consist of a close reading of
the third and final part of Mane's 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts,
which has the title, "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General"
(Marx 1967b, 314-337). Marx's essay, in turn, represents his most explicit and
extensive attention to Hegel, primarily the latters's Phenomenology of Mind, but
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including as well the Science of Logic, and the Encyclopedia o f the Philosopical
Sciences generally. At this stage Habermas believes Marx's theory is an
advance, in one sense at least, over Hegel's: Marx's rejection of a "philosophy
of identity" (Habermas 1972, 25). Marx assumed the externality of nature. In
doing so, Marx was in a position to develop a radical critique of knowledge
which could have prevented the atrophy of epistemology, and the subsequent
predominance of Positivism. Habermas holds that Marx viewed labor as
regulating the material exchange with nature, and as constituting a world
around us~an objective nature for us. Thus, Marx viewed labor as synthesis. In
doing so, however, the "substratum" in which synthesis (of objectivity and
subjectivity) is expressed is a system of social labor, and not a connection of
symbols (Habermas 1972, 31). Symbolic interaction, in Marx's theory, is
ultimately subsumed, in a positive sense, in a system of labor.
Postone's critique of Habermas centers around an unfoldment of Marx's
analysis of concrete and abstract labor. Habermas, to begin with, fails to
distinguish these concepts. Habermas shares with traditional Marxism an
understanding of labor which is transhistorica! (the metabolical relationship
between people and nature) rather than catching the crucial dual nature it
assumes specifically in capitalism. Habermas fails to grasp the way in which
abstract labor molds interaction within capitalism-the way labor, in mediating
itself, constitutes a quasi-independent set of structures which exert an abstract
form of social compulsion (Postone 1993, 240). Marx, far from claiming a stake
in the instrumental type of action signified by a technical relation to nature as
Habermas appears to assume, instead demonstrates how this relationship is
connected to labor's peculiar form of mediation of social interaction as well,
specifically in capitalism.
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Habermas holds that due to Marx's commitment to the idea of labor as
synthesis-which took the place of a logic in Hegel-the distinction he
recognized in his material investigations (between the forces and relations of
production, for example) was not secured at the categorical level. Marx's
collapse of interaction into labor resulted in his theory lacking a sufficiently self
reflexive dimension, opening the way for further development of Positivism.
(The 'self-reflexive dimension" in question here refers to the problem of the role
of theory in social constitution. Habermas's much later critique of the Frankfurt
School (Habermas 1983; 1987) also identified aporias and the lack of a
standard by which to criticize a percieved gap between the ideal and the real.)
His placement of this presentation of Habermas's most philosophically
explicit consideration of Marx’s "metacritique" of Hegel is crucial to the
argument of Postone's entire study. It serves to reinforce the cogency of Part
Two of Postone's work. This Part reconstructs Mane's critique of the commodity
form of production. The unfoldment of this analysis in Marx's Capital is the
basis upon which to understand the specificity of labor (opposite of any
synthesis whether technical or dialogic) in this social formation—the function it
performs in mediating both itself and-as a "quasi-independent" set of
structures-social relations generally. Marx's concept of labor—the social
mediation specific to capitalism—discloses a specific kind of abstract social
domination which does not appear social at all.
Postone notes that Habermas takes over from Pollock and Horkheimer
the idea of labor as instrumental activity. Habermas focuses on a consequent
need to supplement this dimension with an understanding of interaction, which
escapes the technical (though synthetic) role of labor; this approach stems from
Habermas's failure to grasp the double nature of labor in capitalism as
expressed in the commodity—the value form of production and wealth.
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Value understood as the specific form of wealth intrinsic to capitalism is
the second concept-following labor-Postone shows the early Habermas failed
to comprehend. Rather than perceiving the internal opposition between value
and wealth increasingly manifested in technologically advanced capitalism,
Habermas equates value and wealth. Postone demonstrates Habermas's
misunderstanding of this relation specific to capitalism most clearly by reference
to the latteris early article, "Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as
Critique" (Habermas 1973, 195-252). Here Postone shows that Habermas
misinterprets the Grundrisse in a way consequential (in a negative sense) for
the development of his own theory proper. (It is interesting to note here that,
despite the order of Postone's presentation, Habermas's misunderstanding of
Marx's concept of labor follows his failure to grasp the distinction between the
material and value forms of wealth).
The value-fonm of wealth Marx develops in the Grundrisse and Capital is
a function of direct labor time, as wealth in general was for classical political
economy. Mane, however, already suggested in the Grundrisse that the rapidly
expanding productivity in industrial capitalism increasingly becomes a function
instead of science and its application to production, rather than the labor time
and, hence, direct human labor employed. The material wealth-creating
potential of industrial capitalism enters into a deepening contradiction with the
value form of wealth. The value-form, dependent on the amount of labor time
and hence the expenditure of direct human labor, is socially determinant in
capitalism; however it becomes increasingly anachronistic when it does not
lead to a reduction of labor time, or a positive transformation of fragmented,
alienated labor.
Postone, after reviewing this contradiction of the value form and material
wealth Marx had uncovered in the Grundrisse, quotes a relevant passage from
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that work, a passage upon which Habermas based his criticism of Marx's value
theory:
But to the degree that large industry develops, the creation of real wealth
comes to depend less on labor time and on the amount of labor
employed than on the power of agencies set in motion during labor time
(Postone 1993, 233).

In Habermas’s treatment of this passage Marx early on achieved this insight,
which logically demanded a reformulation of the labor theory of value. The
advance in technical knowledge needed to be incorporated into the concept of
constant capital. The implication of this is that theoretical knowledge already
available to Marx negated his notion of a salient contradiction between "dead"
labor and "living" labor; constant capital might now be seen as "socialized"-or
actualized, as stored up technical knowledge, dependent upon a type of social
interaction, and accessible to "social planning" of a rational distribution of
surplus value.
According to Habermas, Marx did not incorporate this early insight into
his final theory (Habermas 1973, 227). The assumption upon which
Habermas's criticism of Marx rests is that science and technology represent a
new basis of value (Habermas 1973, 226). Postone demonstrates that the
implication of this assumption is that Habermas conflates what Marx was
distinguishing—that in capitalism, a specific form of society, the potential of
material wealth creation is locked within the specific value form of wealth, a
function of direct labor time.
Postone acknowledges that Habermas's intention was to overcome the
limitations of traditional Marxism which tended to consider labor a
"transhistorical" source of wealth. Yet, in place of labor as the transhistorical
source of wealth, Habermas substitutes an evolutionary transformation of the
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basis of value itself. This indicates a failure to grasp the specific concept of the
centrality of the dual nature of labor, the basis for the commodity-form of value
production in capitalism. The value form of wealth develops in opposition to a
material form of wealth. Neither forms of wealth are "transhistoricar. The
increasing tension between the two forms within capitalism characterize the
latte^s historical specificity, serving as the basis for its immanent critique at
Marx's categorical level.
According to Postone, the basis of Habermas's mistaken interpretation of
the law of value is related to his having incorporated important assumptions
from traditional political economy, mistakenly atrtibuting them to Marx as well.
Marx was critical of labor; he develops a critical concept of it as the social
mediation specific to captialism. Crucially, Marx took great pains to criticize an
idea of "labor" as a transhistorical, a) source of wealth; and, b) relation of man to
nature. In capitalism (where things are reversed compared to previous history),
it was primarily neither.
Moreover, Habermas implies that Marx "witheld" evidence that would
have called into question elements of his final theory. Habermas suggests that
insights developed in the Grundrisse (which was not published in his lifetime)
most relevant for developed capitalism have gone largely unrecognized, partly
because Marx was aware that they were at variance with his own historicallydetermined theoretical and political agenda.
Yet, even within the valid (but covered up) theoretical insights he detects
in the Grundrisse (which Marx is said not to have incorporated into Capital)
Habermas levels what he regards as a salient critique: together with what
Habermas understands to be Marx's notion of the decreasing relevance of
direct labor in production, Habermas suggests that Mane "unofficially" (a term I
will explain later) believed that the transformation of science into machinery
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must lead to the liberation of a self-conscious general Subject. This
interpretation imputes to Marx an idea of emancipation as the result of a linear,
automatic development of material production, a materialist version of the
notion of the realization of Geist in Hegel's Phenomenology. Within the
Grundrisse, according to Habermas, Marx can be seen to have recoiled from
this conclusion; he then expressed another position, which recognized the
difference between the self-conscious control of social life and the, "automatic
regulation of the process of production that has become independent of the
producers" (Habermas 1972). Here, according to Habermas, is hardly
disputable evidence that Marx himself already questioned the analytic centrality
(for a social theory) he had accorded to labor. Postone, in response to this,
writes,
social constitution by labor in Marx's analysis...is not transhistorical but,
rather, a historically specific mode that underlies the automatic regulation
of social life in capitalism. This form of social constitution is the object,
not the standpoint, of his critique...(Postone 1993, 236).

While pointing to some shifts in emphasis in TCA, Postone regards the
work as basically continuous with themes and concerns evident in Habermas's
earlier work. Habermas’s reading of Marx, as in those earlier works, is
constitutive of his approach. While TCA, then, is importantly shaped by
Habermas's understanding of Marx, Postone recognizes a two-pronged critical
thrust, one aimed at social scientific theory, the other at Marx and Marxism. In
fact, Marx is hardly taken up directly in TCA; rather, as Habermas states clearly
in the beginning of the work, his is a "second attempt" from within the Western
Marxist tradition to appropriate Max Weber's theory of societal rationalization,
which Weber viewed as flowing from a world historical cultural shift. The first
attempt was Lukacs's History and Class Consciousness, basic insights from
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which the Critical Theory of Horkheimer and Adomo developed.

Postone's

book is structured around an immanent critique of Western Marxism. He had
already provided concise criticisms of Horkheimer, Lukacs and, to a lessor
extent, Adomo. These criticisms are grounded in a close reading and re
interpretation of what he calls Marx's mature critical theory, principally the
Grundrisse and Capital. None of the three men, he holds, completely escaped
what they thought was Marx's concept of labor. This they understood as the
relationship between man and nature, while it was actually the case, according
to Postone, that Marx's mature critical theory developed the concept of labor as
the general form of social mediation specific to capitalism. In place of a
transhistorical view of labor as productive activity, Marx over time sharpened a
two-fold concept of labor, concrete and abstract, which captured the ground of
the commodity--the basic element of the social life of capitalism.
The key point Postone notes here has to do with Habermas's approach
to Lukacs's reformulation of the conceptual relationship of Marx and Weber.
While in Weber the modem world view results in the instrumentalization of
reason and the concurrent loss of freedom and meaning, Lukacs grounds this
process in the historical, and hence transitory, form of the commodity when, in
becoming the characteristic feature of the economic life of society, it structures a
totality. Significantly, Postone points out that Habermas doesn“t attempt to
refute Lukacs's argument against Weber. Rather, Habermas takes strong
exception to Lukacs's solution to the problem. The early Lukacs, as is well
known, posits the proletariat as the identical subject-object of the historical
process. By virtue of the proletariat's position in society, a standpoint exists
from which to criticize reification, a type of social domination which, while
abstract, can be overcome. The coming into its own of a specific, but
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intrinsically universal, class re-integrates a totality, bringing it back within the
horizon of social action.
Lukacs's approach was overly "romantic" and relied on a concretist class
standpoint, leading to a Hegelian 'solution" to a problem Habermas says was
equally recognized by Marx and Weber. The respective critical theories of
Adomo and Horkheimer, who both explicitly rejected the Lukacsian Hegelian
logic of identity, focused on culture and supplementation of Marxism's orthodox
attention to the "economic base". Habermas attempted to shift social theory
from exclusive attention to instrumental reason, its causes and consequences,
to his notions of communicative action and reason.
According to Habermas (Habermas 1984, 180), Weber's concept of
rationalization, underlying modem society, was selective. It isolated
instrumental reason when the resources for another type of rationalization also
existed, based in social interaction. The symbolic reproduction of the latter type
of rationalization was not only necessary for modem society, but in fact provided
the basis for the rationalization Weber described. Habermas grounds
communicative reason (or rationality) in the movement from tradtional society to
modem society, from social integration based on normatively ascribed
agreement, to that based on communicatively acheived agreement (Habermas
1984, 70). This shift is based on the position that previous attempts—from within
Western Marxism-to conceptualize modem society were based on a
philosophy of consciousness (Habermas 1987, 390) which must fail to grasp
two levels of society-system and lifeworid-and their interaction.
In the context of the literature on Habermas as a whole, Postone
manages a rare breakthrough in respect to this issue. First, he demonstrates
that his own position shares certain ground with Habermas, mainly concerning
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a critique of the philosophy of consciousness, which Postone holds is related to
the traditional concept of labor (Postone 1993, 247).
Second, and most impressively, he begins to offer his own alternative,
based on a different reading of the late Marx. Postone identifies weaknesses in
Habermas’s theory. But--against the backdrop of the relationship of
Habermas’s theory and the traditional Marxism it assumes-Postone explains
both with reference to the contradictory nature of capitalism itself.
Habermas is critical of a philosophy of consciousness which Postone
then ties to the traditional concept of labor, that is, conceived as the relationship
between man and nature. Habermas holds that this philosophy, which he
rejects as exhausted, is retained in the older Critical Theory. Yet, Postone
maintains, Habermas himself fails to escape the old Frankfurt School thesis of
the one-dimensionality attributed to late capitalism. Habermas is obliged to turn
to a "quasi-ontological" separation of communicative action and labor, the
former a domain of social reality outside capitalism (Postone 1993, 252).
Habermas centers his theoretical attention here. Traditional Marxism tended to
rely on a future development of labor, or the coming into its own of the
proletariat based in modem industry. Habermas, in turn, trusted in a sphere of
interaction which would come into its own or "realize" itself.
Postone writes that Marx's “historically determinate approach", which is
found neither in the older Frankfurt School, nor Habermas nor, for that matter, in
any of the myriad strands of Marxism Postone includes under the category of
"traditional Marxism",
provides a framework within which the underspecified notions of system
and lifeworld can also be analyzed...Marx argues that capitalism's social
relations are unique in that they do not appear social at all. The structure
of relations constituted by commodity-determined labor undermines
earlier systems of overt social ties without, however, replacing them with
a similar system. Instead, what emerges is a social universe that Marx
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describes as one of personal independence in a context of objective
dependence. Both the abstract, quasi-objective structure of necessity
and, on the immediate level, the much greater latitude of interaction in
capitalist society than in a traditional society, are moments of the form of
mediation that characterizes capitalism. In a sense, the opposition of
system and lifeworld—like the earlier one of labor and interaction—
expresses a hypostatization of these two moments in a way that
dissolves capitalist relations into "material" and "symbolic" spheres. The
characteristics of the value dimension of the alienated social relations
are attributed to the systemic dimension. This conceptual objectification
leaves an apparently indeterminate sphere of communication which no
longer is seen as structured by a form of social mediation (inasmuch as
that form is not overtly social); rather, it is seen as self-structuring and
"naturally social." Within the framework of this approach, then, the
underspecification of lifeworld as well as system expresses a theoretical
point of departure that has retained the notion of "labor" (Postone 1993,
259-260).
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CHAPTER TWO
MARX AS INSIDER? "BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE: MARXISM AS
CRITIQUE" AND STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC
SPHERE

What is at Stake in the Habermas/Mam Relationship
Often the discussions of Habermas's theory formation, in so far as they
concern his assimilation of Marx and Marxism, begin from the premises that
Habermas conserved about all that was possible to conserve in what was
traditionally understood as Marx's thought; and that he, moreover, creatively
infused the tradition by supplementing it with recent achievements in the human
or social sciences (McCarthy 1979; Held 1980; Bernstein 1985). Some, but
less, attention is directed to his specific revisions of Marx's concepts in the light
of his interpretation of historical or empirical evidence, with the aim of of
suggesting new syntheses (Rockmore 1989; Ingram 1990).
While both of the above premises are to some extent sound, they do not
exhaust the possible approaches to the problem of Habermas, Marx and
contemporaneity. And, in so far as Habermas developed a theory distinct from
Marx's, an obvious question is whether his theory is compatible with Marx's
(Rockmore 1989). Postone (1993), for example, has shown how a
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"reinterpretation of Marx's critical theory", rather than following from Habermas's
theory situated later in time, can account for many of the tetter's original features
by demonstrating their dependence upon Habermas's inadequate presentation
of some of Marx's basic concepts. Such a reinterpretation points to a possible
revitalization of Marx's theory in the sense of its adequacy for a critical approach
to contemporary society. Postone's retinterpretation of Marx's "mature critical
theory" includes, but is not limited to, a discovery of the means to uncover
abstract forms of social domination which explain phenomenon of late
capitalism at a level deeper than that of the market and property ownership.
Thus, Postone opens to question Habermas's sense of modernity’s
configuration of labor, economy, lifeworld, the (social welfare) state, and critical
social theory itself.
Within Habermas's writings there is a pattern of attempts to both revise
and re-interpret various concepts, sometimes offering a description of how they
were developed in Marx's own texts (Habermas 1972), but more often as they
had become conventionally understood (Habermas 1975; Habermas 1990b).
What has become increasingly clear is that, in trying to understand Habermas’s
thought, distinctions should be drawn between his proposals for revisions of
Marxism (that is, the convential understanding of Marx's theory) and his own
attempts at re-interpretation, properly speaking. These distinctions are useful
for describing and assessing the meaning of Habermas's series of varied
approaches to Marx's theory, ranging through the decades of the 1960s-1990s.
An immanent critique of Habermas's theory demands focused analysis of
his confrontation with Marx constitutive of his own theory. The superiority of
Postone's approach implicitly relies on a distinction between the given
interpretation for which revision is proposed and re-interpretation. Postone's
mode of critique of competing interpretations (such as Habermas's) is an
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approach to Marx which seeks to demonstrate the intrinsic weaknesses of these
interpretations while convincingly explaining their social currency, even among
those wishing to develop a thorough-going critique of contemporary capitalism.
He thus incorporates into his own analysis an explanation for the plausibility of
what he nonetheless goes beyond. This is not a matter of "exposing" as mere
ideology those ideas which depart from what is held to be original, unique, and
true in Marx. To the contrary, the two-fold nature of Postone's type of critique
conserves the integrity, and individual quality, of a competing idea or theory
and, by also explaining it socially, grasps another dimension indispensible for a
conceptual advance pregnant with practical implications.
In the case of his treatment of Habermas, this other dimension is arrived
at with Postone's identification of the particular nature and import of abstraction
in our time. Theory as itself a form of abstraction is related to the letter's quality
involved in social mediation. In a word, one might argue that Habermas's
interpretation of Marx fails. Postone's critical breakthrough, however, consists
in a creative re-conceptualization of the incompatibility between the force of
abstraction immanent in labor as social mediation within capitalism and
Habermas's transhistorical theory of social evolution (or any theory in which the
role of abstraction itself remains underspecified). Postone clarifies an abstract
domination characteristic of capitalist society, specifically how it was conceived
by Marx, but never really digested by post-Marx Marxists. Postone's reinterpretation-in identiying a basic misconception common to a large part of the
tradition-points to the possibility of a revitalization of Marx's theory.
Postone restricts his study to several of Marx's basic concepts. These
concepts are shown not to have been fully grasped even within the tradition
which developed, if not always in Marx's name, at least in his spirit. Such a
situation leads to the question whether there remain yet other concepts, themes,
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or features of Marx’s thought which might prove fruitful through reinterpretation
along the lines opened by Postone. Postone’s placement of Habermas's theory
so centrally in his discernment and demonstration of the continuing cogency of
Marx's theory, warrants a close examination of Habermas's various approaches
to Marx (Chapters Two-Four), for it might disclose other concepts within Marx's
thought (other than those elaborated in detail by Postone) which remain
undigested but potentially fruitful for working out today's social problems and
concerns. Among these, at least touched upon at various stages in Habermas's
work, are the relationships of, a) normative and revolutionary concepts of social
organization; b) philosophy to social theory, and c) critical thought and social
change.
Such an examination will inform my study of an incipient public sphere in
which Habermas played an important role. Chapter Five, which seeks to show
the action dimension of Habermas's theory, will round-out my presentation of
Haberma's theory as the intended replacement for Marxist (or Marx's) theory.
The final Chapter Six will examine Habermas's own retrospective look at the
development of his theory, and its present and future relationship to Marx's
ideas in the context of a ''post-Communist" world.
Habermas's periodic “returns" to Marx were essentially driven by the
inadequacy of his comprehension of Marx's basic concepts on the one hand
and, on the other hand, a rapidly changing world which none the less
consistently drew new attention to various facets of Marx's thought. Whether or
not these returns have now come to an end, the question remains, in one form
or another, what relationship of social practice to theory has structured (or now
structures) Habermas's thought. On one level, while Habermas understood that
it was not impossible that "new” concepts, needed to develop a more adequate
relationship of theory to practice, might be found among the “forgotten"
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elements of Marx's thought (as well as in the thought of other classical
thinkers), his various approaches to Marx, through the 1960s-90s, contributed at
least as much to obscuring or confusing those elements as to providing access
to them.
Moreover, one of Habermas's central concerns, even as he approached
in various instances an immanent critique of Marx's theory, was to inquire at the
same time whether immanent critique of either contemporary society, or of
Marx's theory, was possible or potentially of much value. Thus, in so far as the
present chapter seeks to proceed through immanent critique of Habermas's
approaches to Marx, it would have to demonstrate not only Habermas's
misconceptions of Marx's ideas, but that those particular misconceptions played
an important, if not central, role in the constitution of his theory and its practical
implications, primarily as he understood them, but including as well his attempt
to draw others into his project. It is Habermas's belief that only his theory
remedied deficiencies in Marx, and was alone really capable of uncovering
them.
As Postone as shown, from a standpoint within the Critical Theory
tradition, Habermas's theory has reached a level of sophistication, and gained a
sufficient amount of credibility, such that development of a re-interpretation of
Marx's theory must have intrinsic to it the capability of explaining (socially) the
plausibility of Habermas's theory, while demonstrating that it is not adequate to
its object. While this chapter, then, remains for the most part at the level of
immanent critique of Habermas's theory, it also begins to suggest relationships
between contemporary developments and Marx's concepts which escape the
bounds of Habermas's positions. Among these are the disintegration of social
welfare states, the eclipse of Communism, the turn to unfettered market
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economies, and even the re-emergence of the question not only of global
capitalism, but of its potential collapse.
As his own theory developed, Habermas increasingly reacted against
"monologic" approaches to theory formation (Habermas 1989b). "Monologic"
refers back to a "philosophy of consciousness", as well as to the positivistic or
deterministic substance of various theories; on another level, it also points to the
limitations of social theory when it is not worked out and clarified through a
deliberately stylized mode of interaction, that is, dialogically. Far more than any
of the older generation of the Frankfurt School, Habermas actively sought out,
actively participated in, and actually attempted to shape discussions, or
dialogues, with the aim of clarifying not only the nature and role of social theory
generally, but his own theory particularly. Crucially, he saw this very process as
constitutive of an important part of the originality of his social theoretic
contribution, and perhaps even necessary for the type of social integration
demanded by the particular requirements of modem society.
A second important difference, connected to the latter, is Habermas's
very apparent concern with the reception of his theory (as a "critical theory")
particularly in the U.S., or the English-speaking world generally. This will be
examined in detail in Chapter Five, where I describe Habermas's intervention in
the journal Praxis International, published in English and drawing an
international readership. In order to explore the significance of this intervention,
it will be helpful to begin the examination of the variety of Habermas's
approaches to Marx and Marxism, what compelled them, and what resulted
from them, by comparing and contrasting two early theoretical pieces.
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The Relationship of "Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as Critique"
and Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere

At first glance, it might appear peculiar that by now, with the considerable
body of work accumulated on Habermas's thought, that the relationship
between two early works—"Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as
Critique" (BPSMC) and Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (STPS)
—has been so little analyzed. Neither Rockmore nor Postone—two writers with
different sorts of comprehensive critiques of Habermas—took up STPS at all.
Postone (who strongly criticizes Habermas's interpretation of Marx's theory)
participated in a symposium on STPS soon after it was published in English in
1989; yet, his comments, rather than focusing directly on early Habermas's view
of Marx's concepts, are aimed at defense of the intention of the study, which
Habermas later concluded was, “still at the level of ideology critique" (Calhoun
1992), and concludes with a somewhat oblique challenge to Habermas's
apparent long-standing assumption that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
represented some type of socialism connected to the inherent limitations of
Marx's ideas. Furthermore, he takes sharp issue with any suggestion that
Marx's critique of capitalism had lost relevance in regard to the most
technologically developed Western societies.
While I believe Postone makes a convincing case, in that he implicitly
rejects any notion that STPS has suddenly become more "relevant" because of
the way it counter-poses an idea of radical democracy against Marx's concepts,
my task here is more basic. In analyzing the works from a contemporary
perspective, one can see clearly the initial dualism, or contradictoriness, which
became endemic to Habermas's continuous returns to Marx. On more than one
occasion, Habermas seemed to indicate that he was finished with Marx, only to
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return again in response to new theoretical or practical issues. STPS
attempted to view Marx's ideas from within the perspective of radical democratic
theory. BPSMC (first written two years earlier), had sought to view democratic
theory (or a theory of democracy) from within the Marxist perspective.
(Habermas’s notions of "reciprocity" and dialogue can be developed in this
context.)
However, the dualism at issue here is not ultimately at the level of
Habermas's early "critical theoretic" approach to Marx and contemporary
society. More importantly, this dualism can be shown to be rooted in the
problems identified by Postone related to the social constitution of capitalist
society itself. Postone develops a concept of social mediation peculiar to
capitalist society, no easier to identify today than it was when Marx wrote. The
effects of this peculiar type of social mediation have not only become
increasingly problematic in a practical sense under the rapidly expanding
technological changes of recent decades. A conceptual grasp of this social
mediation tends to undermine interpretations of Marx's theory which concern
themselves primarily with the market and property relations. The
"concreteness" of Marx's theory lies in its identification of forms of social
constraint which are even more abstract than those typically traced to the
market or property relations. Viewing as economic opposites existing
Communism and advanced capitalist welfare states (as Habermas tended to)
discloses a conceptual inadequacy in the reliance on these terms.
Habermas's early approach to Marx in BPSMC followed by STPS can be
seen as preparatory for replacement of Marx’s theory (heretofore the presumed
foundation of contemporary critical theory) by another theory. STPS confirms
an interpretation of Mane's political theory, or better, Mane's theory of the
political, as exclusively merely a different (or more radical) theory of political
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economy. At the same time, it argues that certain debilitating limitations of
Marx’s theory are related to the horizon of theoretic critique. BPSMC, through a
proposed revision of a deterministic economic theory attributed to Marx, had first
attempted to expand conceptually the spheres of society (especially distribution
and consumption of commodities) amendable to public deliberation. Following
from this, on the one hand Marxism might be retained as a radicalization of,
though in essential continuity with, political economy; on the other hand, such
an approach also left open the option of rejecting both political economy and its
critique as insufficient or inadequate in respect to a social formation grown
increasingly complex.
In fact, the starting point of Habermas's argument, initially developed
explicitly in BPSMC, is that Marxists—no matter how "humanist", "dissident" or
"Westem"-cannot escape the fundamentally materialist nature of Marx's theory
(Habermas 1973). At the same time, he suggests in his opening paragraphs in
connection with this, that if both world power blocs have not completely
overcome strictly economic problems (or material scarcity) such an eventuality
is certainly not out of the question in the forseeable future. In this way he seems
to want to move the critical impulse—in so far as he believes it persists more or
less openly in "late capitalism", and perhaps underground in the Soviet blocaway from existing forms of Marxism and toward a different theory which,
however, he has yet to articulate.
His later analysis of Marx in STPS amplified Habermas's earlier
intimation that Marx understood his own theory nearly exclusively as an
economic theory with clear deterministic features. In the earlier BPSMC
Habermas describes how a variety of intellectual responses to history, and
empirical observation, included attempts to retain Marx under different but
untenable guises (Habermas 1973, 203). However, now was time, with the aid

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

42
of modem social scientific concepts, to confront head-on the materialistic core of
Marx’s theory, not in order to totally obliterate the latter, but to salvage its
rational element for a different, perhaps even more critical, theory of a society
seen as grown far more "complex” than when Marx described it.
A key feature of BPSMC is that Marx’s labor theory of value—in its original
conception—is ultimately not viable. Both empirical reality, and perhaps equally
convincingly (and more tellingly) Marx's own, albeit unpublished, research
support this position (Habermas 1973, 229). Habermas also indicates that such
a sober look at the facts alone leaves, irresponsibly, a yawning criticaltheoretical void. Marx's theory, while not tenable in its classical form, did
problematize aspects of social life unseen by theorists he successfully
discredited. Critical examination of Marx's labor theory of value, rather than just
concerning itself with his critique of political economy generally, leads to the
question of how to extend democracy to all areas of social life.
Habermas proposes that Marx's critique was basically an attempt to
resolve crisis. Against the background of the competition between two
nuclearly-armed superpowers, where the “class-struggle" is said to have been
displaced (Habermas 1973, 197), social democracy, the welfare state, should
be seen as the locus for attempts to bring under social control those aspects of
social life, especially the economy, theorized by conventional Marxism to
operate on the basis of a natural law conceived within a philosophy of history.
In the section titled, “Critique of Ideology and the Critical Appropriation of
Traditional Ideas", which directly follows Habermas's suggested revision of a
labor theory of value he criticized and attributed to Marx, Habermas describes a
general conception of Marx's theory:
the prejudgement of Historical Materialism, which grants priority to the
base over the superstructure..., Private property is considered to be the
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dark focal point at which the eclipsing of the world is concentrated, the
knots in which all the threads of compulsive social relationships are
drawn together and fastened (Habermas 1973, 236).

This depicts a theory of the transhistorical determination of society’s laws
and its ideological superstructure, attributable to Marx. Such a theory is rooted
in Marx's misunderstanding of his own thought as a "positive science". This
conception is clearly articulated by Engels without correction by a more
sophisticated Marx, who failed to reflect on “critique as such" (Habermas 1973,
238). The outcome was that all "spirit", including socialism, came to be
considered to be ideology, the correct distinguished from the false, "soley
according to the criteria of a realistic theory of knowledge" (Habermas 1973,
238).
Habermas continues his discussion with the claim that, with this, Marx
moved outside the object of his critique (society itself), issuing a standard
external to society. With this, theory lost its practical thrust. Habermas then
quotes the fourth of Marx's Theses on Feuerbach:
Feuerbach proceeds from the fact of religious self-alienation, the
duplication of the world in a religious and a worldly one. His work
consists in resolving the religious world back into its worldly basis. But
that this worldly basis elevates itself above itself and establishes itself as
an independent realm in the clouds can be explained only as a result of
the internal rupture and self-contradiction of this worldly basis. The latter
must thus be both understood in its contradictions and revolutionized
practically (Habermas 1973, 239).

In quoting this thesis, Habermas's purpose is two-fold: to illustrate Marx's
“ideology critique", and to subsequently propose, against this, a more effective
practical force of ideas.
In presenting Marx's fourth thesis on Feuerbach, Habermas suggests the
view that it is more (but not much more) than Feuerbach's own understanding of
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Hegel’s "negation of the negative", or religious consciousness (which,
Habermas adds, as though arguing with Marx) is “not nothing" (Habermas
1973, 239). The implication (following from the earlier references to Marx's
economic theory) is that theoretically Marx (even as late as Capital) did not
move significantly from Feuerbachian materialism, especially in a practical
sense. (I will return to this issue when I take up the chapter in Knowledge and
Human Interests which deals most extensively with Marx's 1844 EconomicPhilosophic Manuscripts).
Here Habermas tries to show through a partly appreciative, partly critical
reading of Ernst Bloch, how the "false consciousness of a false world includes
utopian elements which contain energies that at the same time, once instructed
about themselves, become critical impulses" (Habermas 1973, 239). Habermas
is trying to delineate a social sphere outside the instrumentalized social
relations he believes Marx captured but did not successfully point beyond.
In Bloch, Habermas finds a remarkable attempt to, "preserve within the
critique of ideology the tradition that is criticized" (Habermas 1973, 240). Ideas,
with a utopian excess that go beyond ideology, are said to, "lose their power of
transcendence to their degree of their instrumentalization" (Habermas 1973,
240). The only “utopian excess" remaining after the maturing of the bourgeois
form of society is that expressed in the "false consciousness of absoluteness, of
a divorce from practice" (Habermas 1973, 240), an apparent reference to Hegel,
as well as Marx's critique of the latter. Habermas writes,
On the lowest rungs of the ideological ladder, as in the case of the
fetishism of commodities, the estrangement of the theoretical elements
from the practical marks...only the "estrangement" of praxis from
itself...here ideology itself becomes practical, while its ideal claims,
contained in the idea of an exchange of equivalents, have departed
almost entirely (Habermas 1973, 240).
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Hence Bloch confined himself to the cultural tradition-myth, religion,
literature and music—with the understanding the more indirect the mediation
that relates them to social conflict the more readily ideas will reveal their
“utopian excess" (Habermas 1973, 240).
Habermas's discussion of Bloch repesents an introduction to a concept
of lifeworld, referring to social relations he conceives to be outside the "false
consciousness of absoluteness", theory's divorce from practice, thought's
instrumentalization. According to Habermas, Bloc's insight is derived from
Marx's concept of the "fetishism of the commodity", but takes it further.
Habermas elaborates this idea with an interpretation placing Marx's "fetishism
of the commodity" on "the lowest rung of the ideological ladder", because it is
said to merely describe how, "ideology itself becomes practical", but the
idealism previously intrinsic to it fades.
Habermas's brief discussion of Bloch (as well as a critical allusion to
Adorno's placing of art on a par with with Critical Theory) serve to suggest the
possibility of a Critical Theory (with incorporation of an understanding of the
lifeworld) making a new beginning from Hegel's Absolute Spirit. The latter,
conceived as the subsumption of practice by theory-or what is seen in Marx's
"translation" of Hegel-labor by capital. Habermas argues that a new beginning
was necessary for Critical Theory because though Marx's critique of political
economy amounted to a successful immanent critique of early bourgeois
society, crucial theoretical and practical changes, related to science and
technology, define modem society in contrast to the historical period with which
Marx's theory was intertwined.
Marx's critique is said to have demonstrated the separation of practical
life from the ideals constitutive of the theoretical sphere. The implication is that
theory (even if now reduced to "ideology"), is already literally "productive" of
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practical life, can be conceived as a "force of production", might contain
resources potentially constitutive of fundamental social change as well.
Habermas suggests (with some irony) that this potential might be
conceived as a realization of the Hegelian Absolute, or the unfolding of nature
from spirit. (In the next section, I will show that in constrast in the later
STPSHabermas conceives Marx’s original theory as suggesting a nearly
"automatic", materialistic realization of freedom with the abolition of private
property relations and planning of the economy according to the, "laws
discovered once and for all of political economy without extended
controversies" (Habermas 1989a, 140).
Marx's concept of "fetishism of commodities" (according to Habermas
representing the "lowest rung on the ideological ladder”) makes implausible
Habermas's notion that Marx's critique of capitalism was ultimately "positive",
and that the commodity form of production, as it unfolded, brought along with it,
but outside it, a non-instrumentalized sphere, potentially infused with the type
of social interaction constitutive of freedom. Marx did not take as his own an
analysis of the laws of political economy which put forward as the ground for
resolution of crisis recognition of a universal potential inherent in them in
dialectical opposition to the particularism of class interest. Neither did the
"fetishism" of the commodity signal a critique of the alienation of bourgeois
idealism in materialist interest. Marx's critique, did not simply counter-pose an
idea (“bourgeois" or "socialist") to a reality (an unequal distribution of social
wealth.)
Political economy itself, Marx concluded, was "true", not false. The
"material relations between persons, and social relations between things" (Marx
1977, 166) both constituted political economy and were constituted by it. Marx's
analysis of the "fetishism of the commodity", in Habermas's description, "the
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lowest rung on the ideological ladder", represents the "secret" of the capitalist
form not in terms of an opposite existent outside it, but a potential
transcendence dependent on a different relation of theory to practice within it.
Marx writes that only “freely associated" human relations, conceivable
exclusively on the basis of a new relationship of theory to practice, strips the
fetish from the commodity (Marx 1977, 173).
In this sense, there is an affinity with Hegel's Absolute in that, for
example, in Marx's most detailed treatment of Hegel—the 1844 "Critique of
Hegelian Dialectic"-Marx identified not only Hegel’s conceptualization of the
movements of an alienated totality, but as well the “other moment" (Marx 1967b,
323). This “other moment" involved the "inwardization" of these externalized,
alienated forms, what the young Marx believed to be most important in Hegel's
dialectical philosophy-transcendence as objective (Marx 1967b, 321). Hence,
Volume I of Capital, in showing the non-viability of a form of social relations
constituted as a dehumanized totality, presents the “Absolute" as a “collapse" as
well as prospective new beginning (Marx 1977, 929). Capital re-creates
humanist concepts introduced in 1844, especially “negation of negation",
Hegel's concept which had a potential greater than that understood in, eg;
Feuerbach's type of critique. (I will develop this further in Chapter Three).
Of fundamental concern here is what Habermas's remarks on the
"fetishism of commodities" can already indicate about his interpretation of
Marx's theory generally. Since, overall, Habermas attributes about equal
stature to the Grundrisse, and to Critique of Political Economy, compared to
Marx's fully worked-out Capital, it is noteworthy that the "fetishism of
commodity" had not been presented in the former works. The concept was fully
developed only after all the volumes (including Volume One, which was actually
written last) known as Capital were already written.
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In the section on Habermas’s Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere, I will analyze how he—in a clear departure from most of the Critical
Theory of the older generation—referred to Marx's texts directly and extensively.
All periods of Marx's intellectual legacy were represented, at least in outline. I
will argue that STPS, then, first suggested a detailed thesis concerning a
theoretical unity implicit in Marx’s work viewed in its entirety. Yet, Habermas’s
tendency was to merge, rather than distinguish, the ideas of Marx, unarguably a
highly original and creative thinker, with those of Engels. This alone might
have alerted readers, especially those who would have been aware of the
paucity of systematic interpretations of Marx's writings among Critical Theorists,
to the possibility that Habermas was as much concerned with identifying and
integrating within his own theory a "sealed" intellectual tradition than in re
interpreting, in Postone's sense, Marx’s theory.
I will also consider the striking omission-the Economic-Philosophic
Manuscripts--w\\hin Habermas's presentation in STPS of an essential continuity
in Marx's thought. One could approach an analysis of this omission by inquiring
into the nature of his subject matter, what about it justified precluding discussion
of an element of Marx's work already recognized for several decades in Europe,
importantly through the work of Marcuse, as central to his early thought, if not
his entire corpus.
In the opening pages of "Marxism as Critique" (Habermas 1973, 200202), written two years prior the publication of STPS, Habermas presents
several interpretations of the 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, rejecting
each one in turn, before proceeding to a direct approach to Marx’s economic
theory via an examination of the farter's "labor theory of value." Already the
implication might be seen to have been that while there might be elements in
Marx's theory still relevant to consider for the construction of a contemporary
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theory of society, Marx’s "humanism" was not among them. In addition, Marx’s
1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, not published in Marx’s lifetime, might
have seemed to Habermas to be expendable for the task of situating Marx's
ideas so that they were conceivable as constitutive of modem society despite
Marx's intentions.
But, whatever the possible reasons, the early Marx, and in fact the whole
of Marx's work, as presented in BPSMC, and more so later in STPS, appear
(from Habermas's contemporary perspective) as strikingly "non", if not "anti"
philosophical, non-revolutionary and, perhaps even in principle, unconcerned
about problems of social organization.

Stmctural Transformation of the Public Sphere

Turning to STPS, the most striking features in Habermas's approach to
Marx are his range of citation of the original texts, and the implicit case he
makes for the stature of Friedrich Engels in relationship to Marx.
In regard to the first, Habermas cites the 1843 texts, "On the Jewish
Question", and "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right"; the Communist
Manifesto (CM) (1848); The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852);
Capital, Volume Three (1894); The Civil War in France (1872); and Critique of
the Gotha Programme (1875). Here, then, is the primary text in Habermas's
attempt to formulate a systematic critique and/or appropriation of Marx's theory.
This early, Habermas appears not to have finally decided whether Marx is
"inside" or "outside" an adequate contemporary critical theory of society. Except
for perhaps Herbert Marcuse, in Reason and Revolution (Marcuse 1960) none
among the original Frankfurt School had supported his arguments so directly or
extensively with such systematic citation of Marx's texts. Habermas's originality
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in this is clear. Yet, given the range of citations, again it is important to notice
that he excludes any references at all to the 1844 Economic-Philosophic
Manuscripts. (I will return to this issue after describing, in regard to STPS, the
relationship between Habermas's approach to Marx, and the presentation of his
own argument).
Habermas's analysis of Marx's earlier texts proceeds from 1843 directly
to 1852 (though he later moves back to the 1848 Communist Manifesto).
Overall, Habermas attempts to periodize Marx as a means of explicating his
own concept of a public sphere; but, his range of selection of Mane's texts can
also create the impression of an exhaustive inventory of Marx's concepts,
shown as bound to an early stage of free market capitalism.
This can be seen in the opening paragraphs of his discussion of Marx in
STPS. First he presents an argument that Marx retained a crucial element in
Hegel's political philosophy. Hegel had already criticized the notion of public
opinion. For Hegel, public opinion represented only an appearance of
knowledge. Therefore, public opinion stood opposed to science (Habermas
1989a, 118). Marx, with Hegel, was critical of public opinion. Yet, he
developed a different sort of critique, which turned against Hegel's solution to
the tension inherent in the difference between public opinion and science.
According to Marx, Hegel advocated the politically forced integration of civil
society and the state. Pre-bourgeois estates would function as the link between
them. Young Marx "saw through this". Political estates of pre-revolutionary
society had "disslolved into merely social classes" (Habermas 1989a, 122).
Thus Hegel's solution amounted to an attempt at recision by "reminiscence"
(Habermas 1989a, 123) of the already factual separation of state and society.
(In Chapter Six, I will show that Habermas in a later critique tries to turn this
against Marx—Marx's 1844 writings were "romantic" because they looked
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backward to restoration of a lost totality; yet, according to Habermas, Marx's
critique, even in his own understanding, was specific to free market, private
capitalism).
At this earlier stage, Habermas quotes a long passage from Marx's, "On
the Jewish Question" (Habermas 1989a, 123). The passage contains a
description of a "political revolution" in which the "directly political" character of
civil life in feudalism was transformed by the separation of state and society.
The "general concern" of the people became, "in principle independent
from...particular elements of civil life" (Habermas 1989a, 123). Next, Habermas
focuses on the phrase, "in principle". He does so in order to identify Marx's
"ironic" intention. Marx's point, according to Habermas, was that the "political
revolution" which "shattered everything" (Habermas 1989a, 123), abolished the
political character of civil society, and replaced forms of direct social domination
with a more indirect, or abstract, form. Marx's "solution" to this development was
to confront the incipient form as in a mirror with the, "social conditions for the
possibility of its utterly unbourgeois realization" (Habermas 1989a, 124). This
implied a movement of the formal to the substantive, or the abstract to the
concrete. Further, in context, Habermas can be read to mean that Marx’s entire
program, from the 1843 "On the Jewish Question" through Capital, had as a
presupposition about which Marx was not fully aware, abstraction's
inadmissibility in the socialism that would follow capitalism, as well as its only
self-dissolving role on a theoretical level. Finally, the implication is that Marx
saw in the movement of modem society a universal (in a transhistorical sense)
potential, only presently distorted by particularistic interests.
in its emergence from feudalism, the self-understanding of bourgeois
society included a notion of its own basis being rational-critical debate, with the
result a society based upon reason, not power. However, this was actually
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among “property-owning" private people who viewed themselves, and others
like themselves, as nothing but autonomous human beings, the basis for a
"false consciousness" Habermas believes was Marx's primary object of criticism
all the way through to his completion of Capital.
Here, Habermas's presentation of Marx relies upon, on the one hand, his
view that Marx, with his critical attitude toward public opinion, was in accord with
Hegel and, on the other hand, radically departed from Hegel's position that
ideals of the "bourgeois" constitutional state were immanently realizable within
the existing "republic". This implies an essentially "political" difference-one that
might be explained in the movement from the monarchy to parliamentary
democracy in the eighteenth and ninteenth centuries.
In a shift with an important nuance which he does not explicitly note,
Habermas further characterizes Marx's attitude toward public opinion, drawing
a sharper distinction with Hegel, here not alone in connection with the tetter's
solution to the perceived "separation" of civil society and the state, but in regard
to the phenomenon of public opinion itself. Habermas writes that Marx
“denounced" public opinion, terming it "false consciousness" (Habermas 1989a,
124).
Hegel's view of civil society and the state is grounded in his analysis of
'science1' and "public opinion." In these, Hegel analyzed a concrete universal,
the historical realization of a unity of the particular and the universal. Public
opinion was adequate to the practical idea, science to the theoretical idea.
Habermas does not see that in Marx's view, these very types of oppositions
(whose tendency was toward increasing antagonism despite Hegel's forced
integration of them) were historically specific; eventually, Marx showed, they
drove the capitalist form of social development. Hegel believed historical
contradictions might be resolved within the modem form of society. With Marx,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53
science and public opinion were each necessary moments in the social
mediation of capitalism-a situation of "personal independence in a context of
objective dependence" (Marx 1973, 158). Thus Hegel's dialectic-historical as
was Marx’s-did not successfully specify the particular and universal and, in fact,
could not, absent an understanding of the peculiar role of labor in capitalism.
After his reference to, "On the Jewish Question", and a paragraph
explaining its implications for the overall theme of his study, Habermas moves
quickly to a discussion of "critique of political economy" in Marx’s Capital. This
initial discussion of Marx's critique of political economy proceeds with no textual
references. One reason for this is that it is inserted into Habermas's broader
discussion of Marx's early ideas relevant to understanding the bourgeios public
sphere in the context of Kant and Hegel. The long paragraph characterizing
Marx's "critique of political economy", with no textual references to it, is in fact
bounded by three references to, "On the Jewish Question" (Habermas 1989a,
123-125).
Before I analyze in more detail Habermas's procedure here, I shall first
present, and criticize, the substance of his remarks. As noted, he begins by
holding that Marx "denounced public opinion as false consciousness". Public
opinion "hid before itself" that it masked bourgeois class interests. Habermas
believes that this initial self-deception had far-ranging consequences because
the main thrust of the critique of political economy aimed to show that the
bourgeois society could not without crises reproduce itself as a "natural order"
(Habermas 1989a, 124). In short, the ideas of private property and the free
market (natural rights of "man") masked a class-divided society dependent on
the exploitation of the many, whose only commodity was their labor power. An
intrusion of political power-possible on the basis of this class-divided societyled to development of oligopoly, vitiating a supposed situation of an
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Independent formation of prices based on civil freedom of contract (Habermas
1989a, 124). Habermas summarizes, "This critique demolished all fictions to
which the idea of the public sphere of civil society appealed" (Habermas 1989a,
124). The fictions to which Habermas refers are "equality of opportunity",
individual freedom, and reason (Habermas 1989a, 124-125). He roots Marx’s
“demolition" of these bourgeois "fictions" in Marx's criticism of private property
and analysis of social class conflict, that is, the domination one class achieved
and maintained over others.
Following this, Habermas focuses attention on the historical struggle, "for
the realization of the bourgeois constitutional state", with an idea of the public
sphere-private individuals engaged in a public use of reason-as the central
principle of its organization. The public sphere is twice characterized with the
term dialectic; in the one case, the latter is "inherent" (Habermas 1989a, 127),
and in the other it is "immanent" (Habermas 1989a, 128).
Habermas refers to historical markers-electoral reform movements of the
1830s, and the 1848, "June uprising of the Paris workers". In juxtaposing these
historical phenomenon, Habermas makes a case for the continuity of Marx’s
early thought. Electoral reform, as a step in the bourgeois constitutional state's
struggle for realization, is related to a quotation taken from Marx's, "Critique of
Hegel's Philosophy of Right":
By really establishing its political existence as its authentic existence,
civil society ensures that its civil existence, in so far as it is distinct from its
political existence, is inessential. And with the demise of the one, the
other, its opposite, collapses also. Therefore, electoral reform in the
abstract political state is equivalent to a demand for its dissolution and
this in turn implies the dissolution of civil society (Habermas 1989a,
126).

The sense of Habermas's placement of the quotation involves a
suggestion that Marx saw electoral reform to be essentially a natural movement
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toward the re-integration of sundered, original totality. The demand for
expansion of the franchise, an apparent movement of "real" civil society into the
"fictitious” civil society of the legislature, was at bottom simply the striving of civil
society to “create a political existence for itself”, a qualitative feature of social
existence which had been lost in what Marx at this time called the "in principle
independent" status of the state. (Alternatively, negation of negation is the
movement of transcendence of a mediation constitutive of an antagonistic
totality, which results in a new beginning, not a search backwards for a lost,
original wholeness). Habermas then writes,
Before 1848 the young Marx gave a radical-democratic interpretation to
the tendency toward the expansion of the franchise; he anticipated a shift
in the function of the bourgeois public sphere which, after the June
uprising of the Paris workers, he would diagnose far more clearly...
(Habermas 1989a, 126).

According to Habermas, then, both the electoral reform movements of the
1830s and the 1848 "June uprising of the Paris workers", while arguably very
different types of social movements, served Marx mainly to progressively
confirm certain of his already held theoretical assumptions. (In Chapter Three, I
will argue that 1844 represented Marx's "break" with "bourgeois" society. This
makes unlikely that, if even "far more clearly", Marx saw the 1848 revolutions in
essential continuity with his pre-1844 view of the 1830 events).
The bourgeois constitutional state, with its underlying principle of a public
sphere (which actually consisted of autonomous private property-holding
individuals) was a self-contradictory, unsustainable historical "moment". Out of
this, Marx saw a possibility for an emergence of a social formation qualitatively
differering from feudalism or the capitalism of an incipient bourgeois society.
Habermas, however, suggests something quite different when he writes, in the

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

56
sentences quoted above, that Marx's theory relied upon and, "anticipated a shift
in the function of the bourgeois public sphere." In Habermas's view, the main
critical thrust underlying Marx's attitude to these different political phenomenon
was that the distinction between civil society and the state existing in the form of
of a depoliticized and concrete civil society of particulars and an abstract
universal represented by the state, was not a “natural" form.
What then would the "shift in the function" of the bourgeois public sphere
which Marx anticipated in 1843, and "diagnosed far more clearly" in 1852,
entail? If before the 1848 "June Uprising" an idea of the bourgeois public
sphere functioned as the, "central principle of the bourgeois constitutional
state's organization", after that event it was clear that the pressure of external
contingencies (the exploitation of it by non-bourgeois strata) could result in it's
self-abolition. The abstraction which became internal to realization of the
bourgeois constitutional state could be made to function as a weapon against
the latter. Habermas's essential critical point is that Marx’s basically misguided
theoretical presuppositions (which retained a kind of naturalism) led him to view
favorably a prospect of constitutional democracy functioning as a weapon
against itself.
Habermas follows out Marx's thought in "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy
of Right". Marx interprets the repoliticalization of civil society as disclosing the
inessentiality of its "civil" existence. With the demise of an inessential civil
existence, a particular kind of political existence (the state) which had
depended on it, also collapses. The "abstract political state" is founded on the
contradiction between the private and the public constituting capitalist society;
the internal transformation of the one side (civil society's demand for electoral
reform) suggests the transcendence of the internal tension constitutive of the
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whole. With the dissolution of the one side, its opposite dependent upon it, also
collapses.
It seems that two theoretical questions arise concerning this
transformaton: where to locate its origin and principle, in so far as it is other than
arbitrary and contingent; and, what then follows, what comes after, this kind of
dissolution? After the break-down of the constitutive forces of the market and
privatate property relations, theory itself must penetrate deeper. Habermas
approaches these questions solely through the application of the concept he is
in the midst of developing. The "public sphere" (where public opinion
developed), not a central theme in the young Marx’s writings Habermas
considers, is made to appear from Habermas's later theoretical perspective to
be the underlying crucial one—even if not understood as such by Marx himself.
This can be clearly seen in the analysis Habermas proposes after he quotes
Marx on the "dissolution" of the "abstract political state", which implies the
simultaneous collapse of civil society. There appears to be nothing remaining.
Habermas does not argue that Marx put forth something positive in connection
with this. Instead, Habermas proposes, "the democratically revolutionized
public sphere" (Habermas 1989a, 127) as the actual force which, in the words
of Marx he now quotes for the second time, "wishes to substitute" the real civil
society for “the fictitious civil society of the legislature".
But, Marx posed a negation-that of the "abstract" political state by the
politicized civil society-and a negation of that negation: negation of civil society
as civil society, which depended on the existence of the state. Nothing
"positive" appears here. Still, Habermas conceptualizes Marx's appropriation of
Hegel's negation of negation to be the basis for a "structural transformation of
the public sphere". In this, Marx's appropriation of Hegelian dialectic represents
a determinate link in the life of an idea co-extensive with the modem form of
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society generally. Marx-intending to expose the potential impotence of
abstraction in theory and its relationship to practice—instead (according to
Habermas) contributes to a restructuring of the social order in which abstraction
as such (public reason in the place of power) is a necessary part of its identity.
Abstraction as such functions to ground and perpetuate (at another level) a
differentiation of public opinion and science, society and state; the latter
differentiation (society and state)-in its conception and the permanence
attributed to it-becomes possible, and later develops even with a re-politicized
economy following classical free-market capitalism, the latter however already
exposed by Marx as actually determined by "power" instead of “reason"
anyway.
Habermas presents the idea that the "wish", idealistic and revolutionary
in a romantic sense, of civil society to substitute itself for the fictitious civil
society, expresses a dialectic of a public sphere as, eg; a quantitative
expansion leading to a qualitative transformation. More plausibly, Marx's intent
is to point to mystifications in Hegel's philosophy, and the non-viability of a
social formation to which it accomodated, while working out how the latter is
intrinsically related to the former.
Habermas argues that the "enlarged public" Marx attributed key
significance, the restructuring of the public sphere it entailed, simply expanded
the social terrain thought to be subject to the public sphere's interventions.
Habermas conceives this expansion to be absolute—"social life as such"
(Habermas 1989a, 127), and "direction and administration of every process
necessary for the reproduction of society" (Habermas 1989a, 127)-but sums it
up reductively as, "the enigma of a 'political society1that Marx posited with his
critique of the Hegelian doctrine of the state found its resolution a few years
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later in the phrase of a socialization of the means of production" (my emphasis,
RR) (Habermas 1989a, 127).
Up to this point, the key aspect of interpretation of Marx’s relationship to
Hegel involves Habermas's provision of a positive content to Marx's theory of
the non-viable, self-contradictory, transitory, nature of the incipient bourgeois
society. Habermas supplies this positive content primarily through a reading of
Marx's "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right". At the same time, however, he
implies both an essential continuity within the writings of the young Marx
(through quotations and citations of "On the Jewish Question", as well as
“Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right"), and a fundamental topos of all of
Marx's work. The latter is supplied through an interpolation which evokes,
rather than critically presents, a view of Marx's considerably later critique of
political economy, which was anticipated in (and can hardly be understood
without) his 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, never mentioned in
STPS.
The last two paragraphs of this section proceed from the view that Marx
presumed the "restructured public sphere" would be "able to realize in earnest
what it had promised from the start-the subjection of political domination, as
domination of human beings over human beings, to reason" (Habermas 1989,
128). These paragraphs feature references to the Communist Manifesto and
The Poverty of Philosophy and, for the first time in the work, to Capital,
significantly, however, to Volume Three, not Volume One. In addition, two
references to Friedrich Engels amount to an argument that the latteris
theoretical contribution was consistent with, equivalent to, or even, at least in
some respects, superior to Marx's. In one case, Habermas has Engels
supplying a supposedly cogent summation of the implications of Marx's work
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(Habermas 1989a, 128) and, in the other, has him anticipate its basis and
conclusions (Habermas 1989a, 129).
Generally, these final two paragraphs offer a view that Marx resolved the
internal tension of civil society and the state (recognition of a tension he shared
with Hegel), ending in the abolition of both sides of the totality (which Habermas
seems to obscure), merely into the material terms of economic class division.
From this, Marx is said to have suggested (wrongly) the inevitable resolution of
all social contradictions, which were thought (again wrongly) to be implied by,
and dependent upon, these terms.
In Habermas's view, then, the bourgeois concept of the public sphere, as
understood (in the critical sense) by Marx, logically encompassed and, in fact, in
its practical development, would lead to a classless society. Moreover, just this
political idea of a "classless" society exhausted the content and goal of Marx's
theory, from the earliest writings to the latest.
With the undermining of private property as the basis for participation in
the public sphere, political domination, always associated with class
distinctions, would be replaced by reason. This reason, in the absence of the
basis of political domination, that is, class-determined society, would amount to,
according to Habermas's interpolation of Engels, the administration of things
and direction of production processes taking the place of the rule over men.
Here there is a further development of Habermas's understanding of
Marx's analysis of the relationship between civil society and the state. In that,
rather than seeing a higher level of intensity of contradiction in theory emerging
from the analysis of the demise of civil society and the related collapse of its
opposite as well (the "abstract political state") Habermas attributes to Marx a
worked out resolution, or synthesis, which seems to have rid itself of internal
tension. The type of synthesis attributed to Marx entails an understanding of his
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departure from Hegel as associated with the difference between the critical
stance toward public opinion they shared, and the concept of “false
consciousness" attributed to Marx alone. "Unmasked" bourgeois public opinion
could not escape confronting its own particularistic character, and was obliged
to confront the possible consequences of its instrumentalizing, in the form of
ideology, the reason with which it had, in the first place, come into its own out of
the oppressive conditions of the old.
Habermas's idea is that Marx's critique, an expose of "false
consciousness", was itself constitutive of the process of the restructuring of the
bourgeois public sphere: It “demolished all fictions to which the idea of the
public sphere appealed" (Habermas 1989a, 124). Marx revealed the
vulnerability of an only apparently effective abstraction of reason (as ideology),
that is, its commitment to, and dependence upon, a universal already shown to
be bogus. The implication of Habermas’s analysis is that Marx merely aimed to
"concretize" the idea of a bourgeois public sphere; he aimed to remove
abstraction and integrate reason and practical life through class analysis. A
single transparent totality would replace class domination constitutive of and
dependent upon ideological occlusion. (As we shall see, Habermas will
conclude, however, that Marx's theory, while "demolishing ail fictions to which
the idea of the public sphere of civil society appealed", helped establish new
ones, as well as ultimately left standing the non-fictitious element of the old
bourgeois form).
In this study of the bourgeois public sphere, in contrast to that of class in
general, Habermas's analysis of labor is thin. In this early work, labor assumes
a strikingly subordinate place in his presentation of Marx. Labor appears first in
the analysis as a detonation of social class (Habermas 1989a, 126), next as the
non-recognized, or the object of social exclusion, subsequently integrated
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(Habermas 1989a, 127), and finally as the object of social planning writ large
(Habermas 1989a, 128). (Social planning, in Habermas's view, completes the
"reversal" of the public and the private first effected by Marx, in that what had, for
the bourgeoise, defined its position as "man", private property, or means of
production, while excluding the non-owners, now becomes the only object-as
subject to social planning--of the public sphere).
That “realm of necessity"-subject to "administration of things and
direction of production processes"~leaves to the private sphere those aspects
of social life free from the constraints of social labor, from the economic function.
(In the following section, I will return to Habermas's concept of labor. In
Knowledge and Human Interests he develops an original interpretation of
Marx's concept and offers his initial thoughts on the basic theoretical framework
required to render Marx's theory as an overall theory of social evolution).
Habermas supplements his analysis of Marx, for the second time, with
reference to Engels. He cites Engels's early “Principles of Communism"
(Habermas 1989a, 129). There, it is said, Engels identified private property
(and/or its absence) as the key to distinguishing social formations and their
transformations. However, neither the quotation itself, nor Habermas's own
focus here, is concerned with the general question of the relationship of private
property to the existence or maintenence of capitalism. (This is a significant
omission in view of the importance of this question in light of the rapid
ascendency of Communism, and its even more dramatic recent collapse).
Rather, the context of the citation is the notion he has already articulatedMarx's “peculiar reversal" of the classical relationship between the public and
private spheres. According to Habermas, this reversal was already clearly
presented in Marx's Communist Manifesto, especially in his anticipation of the
disappearance of class antagonism with the concentration of production in the
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hands of a "vast association of the whole nation" (Habermas 1989a, 128). This
would represent a power that was public, but not “political”, the latter depending
on the existence of social classes. With the removal of private property, and the
social classes rooted in its existence, the private sphere, as the realm of
freedom, would be greatly expanded (if not first fully realized), eg; removing
from the purview of "society" even the relationship between the sexes as in the
institution of marriage (Habermas 1989a, 129).
Now I want to examine these citations of Engels more closely. They
appear in two consecutive paragraphs of Habermas’s text. First, Habermas
makes a case that Marx's theoretical tendency was to subordinate the "political",
and the social generally, to the more strictly "economic". His statement
summarizing the movement from Hegel to Marx points in this direction: "The
enigma of a "political society" that Marx posited with his critique of Hegel's
doctrine of the state found its resolution a few years later in the phrase of a
socialization of the means of production" (Habermas 1989a, 127).
Because, apparently, Habermas cannot find a similar formulation in any
of Marx's own writings, he instead has Engels interpreting Marx such that, "the
administration of things and the direction of production processes would take
the place of the rule over men" (Habermas 1989a, 128).
The effect of this is two-fold: a) the uniqueness of Marx's critique of
Hegel, which Habermas had just expended considerable energy trying to
disclose, is suddenly dissipated. The forced integration of civil society and state
which Marx was said to criticize is simply transposed in the late Marx’s theory as
a "forced" economic integration. Habermas takes up Marx's early writings (from
the 1843 "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" to the Communist Manifesto)
as the theoretical ground from which both Marx and Marxists alike understood
as virtually automatic the transition from the "realm of necessity" to the "realm of
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freedom". Habermas offers an interpretation of the relationship between the
1843, "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right", and the 1848 Communist
Manifesto. In the former, the movement of the "real civil society" into the
"fictitious" civil society (of the legislature) results in a (theoretical) collapse of the
contradictory totality which defined the content of the bourgeois social form.
Habermas characterizes Marx’s interpretation as finally "functionalizing" the
principle of the public sphere. The latter was developed in practice and then
(self-consciously) conceived as a universal and non-instrumental form of
reason which distinguished the new society from the old. The public sphere,
including the movement of the concept of it, evolves from a practice with an
immanently universal character to a "role" in effecting the transition from one
form of society (civil society's antagonistic relationship to an abstract political
state) to another (free from social conflict rooted exclusively in private property).
For Habermas, the 1848 Communist Manifesto represents Marx's
"resolution" of an "enigma", which he had posed in 1843. The writings later
than Marx's CM, Marx's mature writings, then, are situated by Habermas as an
offer of 'scientific" proof of an original insight which already dismissed as
theoretically expendable entire spheres of sociality, eg; morality and law, or
practical life generally.
At this point, I will only note that the way Marx posed the relationship
between civil society and the state in "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right",
described as an "enigma" by Habermas, is far richer in theoretical implications
then Habermas's account suggests. For example, there certainly is a clear
relationship between, on the one hand, Marx's analysis of civil society and the
state, and his positing of production in the hands of a "vast association of the
whole nation" at the time he wrote the Communist Manifesto in one
organizational (both normative and revolutionary) context and, on the other
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hand, the fully worked out concept of the "The Fetishism of the Commodity and
its Secret” with its fundamental concepts of abstract and concrete labor at the
time he wrote the "Critique of the Gotha Programme", another “organizational"
document. I will develop a view of this relationship after taking up Knowledge
and Human Interests. (The document which offers the best opportunity for
initiating such a discussion is the 1971 article, 'Some Difficulties in the Attempt
to Link Theory and Practice", which served as the introduction to the fourth
revised German edition of Theory and Practice, and the first, English translation,
which apperared as an abridged version in 1973).
b) Marx's self-understanding of his own theory is put into question if,
indeed, Engels must be relied upon to draw such a fundamental conclusion
from it. (And, in fact, the text of Engels Habermas cites was written very late in
Marx's life. Marx indicated no interest in it.)
The second citation of Engels implies that Engels's important conclusion
regarding Marx's anticipation of the radical effects of the abolition of social
classes rooted in private property might have had its very origins in a text of
Engels own, written prior to his and Marx's famous Communist Manifesto.
Habermas cites Engels's The Principles of Communism in connection with the
relationship of private property, man/woman relations, and the family, written in
1843, before Engels met Marx. With the effect of reinforcing the "identity" of
Engels and Marx, Habermas next cites Marx in an 1842 article for the
Rheinische Zeitung. "If marriage were not the basis for the family, it would not be
subject to legislation, just as friendship is not". Habermas concludes, "Both
Mane and Engels considered a relationship to be actualized as “private" only
when it was no longer saddled with any legal regulations" (Habermas 1989a,
129).
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This might appear to be a narrowly focused statement of fact; however, in
the context of Habermas's analysis, the statement aims to fundamentally
challenge the position he attributes to Marx developed in response to his
confrontation with Hegel, in “Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right", and in his,
"On the Jewish Question". While, remarkably, Habermas never mentions the
terms "alienation", or "abstraction", these were principal issues in these texts.
Habermas's characterization of Marx's position, which in this section and
the one following, cites texts of Marx ranging from 1842-1875 leads one to the
view that Marx understood the bourgeois social formation and the negative
features endemic to it--ideology, “false consciousness", exploitation, and social
exclusion-as growing out of, and determined by, private property, especially in
the "means of production". According to Habermas, “legal regulations",
apparently inimical to Marx's "realm of freedom", are understood by Marx to be
an abstraction destined for dissolution along with the "abstract political state"
generally; both belong to the superstructure dependent upon private property.
Socialism is essentially a concretization of bourgeois ideals, already alienated
in materialist interests.
The second chapter in STPS involving Habermas's analysis of Mane
begins from the conclusion that the, "dialectic of the bourgeois public sphere
was not completed as anticipated in the early socialist expectations" (Habermas
1989a, 130), a formulation which collapses Marx not only into Engels's
positions, but into an altogether broader political tendency. This was because,
"the extension of equal political rights to all social classes proved to be possible
within the framework of this class society itself" (Habermas 1989a, 130). While
the bourgeois public sphere was successfully exposed as "ideology", leading
even its "social-philosophical representatives" to nearly deny it in principle, the
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socialist expectations of the dialectic of the public sphere completing itself in the
establishment of a classless society were not met.
This interpretation implies that “Marx and the socialists" were the most
consistent in their attachment to the "principle" embodied in the bourgeois
public sphere, dependent on a theory of natural law, or a philosophy of history.
Habermas concludes that liberalism, gathering strength from the mid-19th
century, virtually abandoned the principle, even as it continued to be
celebrated, in favor of a "common sense meliorism" (Habermas 1989a, 131).
Habermas, then, first judges the socialist critique to be superior to the
self-understanding of the bourgeois public sphere. In exposing the idea of the
public sphere as bourgeois ideology the socialist critique forced its
representatives into an ambiguity concerning the theoretical understanding of
the social order for which they tried to account.
The general outcome--in this battle of ideas--was, however, different.
What Habermas calls the “liberalist apologetic" (Habermas 1989a, 130)
managed to retreat from its principle of the public sphere. The developing
ambiguity of its attitude led to its questioning the “fundamental presuppositions"
common to both "models" of the public sphere—its own and the socialist. The
basis common to both was the idea of a “natural" basis for society, tied to a
philosophy of history. In abandoning these presuppositions, in becoming
"realistic", the liberal apologetic was, "superior to the socialist critique"
(Habermas 1989a, 130). Habermas notes that this is not to say that liberalism's
ambiguity admitted the "structural conflict of society whose very product it was"
(Habermas 1989a, 130).
Before returning to Marx at the end of this second chapter concerning the
bourgeois idea of the public sphere and its socialist critique, Habermas outlines
the evolving liberal views, particularly of Tocqueville and Mill. Both are shown
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to have retreated from the original idea of the public sphere. The latter, as it
expanded to include masses~a diversity of social classes and therefore social
interests-resulted in a growth of the state. There was a decline of the public
sphere's critical function-aimed at replacing power with reason. Instead Mill,
for example, conceived of public opinion as just one power among others. It
was seen to function primarily to limit state power, rather than as having the
potential to dissolve power in favor of the general interest, that is, to replace
political power with reason, the original ideal (Habermas 1989a, 136).
In the return to Marx, after discussing the evolving liberal view of the public
sphere and the state, Habermas makes three central points.
First, liberalism, particularly Tocqueville, was ahead of Marx in criticizing
the implications of the "centralization of government power". Also, in Marx's
“belated" recognition of its dangers, he instead (for the first time in 1852) called
for it to be "smashed". And, thirdly, in following the “liberalist warning" about the
"centralization of government authority", Marx none the less returned to the idea
of a "socialistically emancipated public opinion" as an insight into the natural
order (Habermas 1989a, 140).
Habermas supports his position here by arguing that Marx's analysis of
the Paris Commune entailed the notion that the replacement of bourgeois
parliamentarianism with a “system of workers councils" would strip public
authority of its political character. Habermas, returning to Engels's words while
discussing Marx's views, asserts that the socialist idea was that public authority,
divested of political content, would be concerned only with, "the administration
of things and the direction of production processes". These could be "regulated
by the [natural] laws (discovered once and for all) of political economy without
extended controversies" (Habermas 1989a, 140).
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Conclusion

Now, after this description of Habermas's presentation of Marx, and in
conclusion, I want to return to the beginning in order to examine his approach
more closely. One obvious issue, which Habermas does not explicitly raise, is
the continuity of Marx's thought. Yet, the sense of his overall argument is that,
firstly, there was a fundamental continuity in Marx's theoretical position from the
1840s through the 1870s, and that this could be fully disclosed through
examination of a concept of a public sphere, which was conceived increasingly
inclusively. Secondly, a detectable shift in Marx's view of "centralization of
governmental power“—whi!e not affecting the essential quality of Marx's theorywas wholly contingent on certain empirical evidence, principally in the political
sphere. (This is only conceivable in the absence of an analysis of the 1844
Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts). Finally, Habermas indirectly puts forth the
position that Marx failed to fully understand the presuppositions and, indeed,
the social consequences of his own theory.
Habermas's analysis implicitly includes a thesis involving Marx's work as
a totality. It argues that early writings of Marx, which Habermas selectively
specifies, were, in a way, at least as weightly as the "mature" works. The
argument indirectly states that, however ironically, Marx's critique of Hegel, and
therefore of bourgeois society's understanding of itself, while on the basis of a
more penetrating understanding of political economy, nonetheless remained
grounded in, and dependent upon, categories Habermas distinguishes as
uniquely associated with the universal elements of the bourgeois sociohistorical form of society.
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But, a problem with this is that it is possible that Marx did not consider
Hegel's philosophy merely representative of bourgeois thought.

Rather, Marx

seemed to have viewed Hegel as a seminal thinker who lived within bourgeois
society, but one whose thought in a unique way transcended that society.
Characteristics of Hegel's thought pointed to replacement of the existing social
form, despite the "solution" Hegel offered to antagonisms he identified in the
Philosophy of Right. This explains the seriousness with which Marx
approached Hegel's ideas, and the kind of critical attention he devoted to them.
A conventional way of explaining the relationship of the ideas of Marx
and Hegel is to assert that while Hegel's approach to “reason" was abstract,
Marx was concerned with the "concrete". Now, on occasion Mane did criticize
Hegel's use of, or the way he situated, abstraction. Yet, Marx, of course, did not
categorically dismiss abstraction. Marx attempted to grasp abstraction
constitutive of a particular set of social relations unique to capitalist society.
Marx's notion of the concrete cannot be grasped outside the constituting
element of abstraction internal to the capitalistic social form. Therefore,
Habermas's unusual implication that Marx's critique of political economy was
little more than an expose of the non-inclusive structure of the bourgeois public
sphere, that is, lacked concreteness, and consequently was essentially
reformist and "naturalistic" (despite the committment to revolution) demands
closer scrutiny.
Marx's 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts contain crucial
conceptual developments highly relevant to theoretical issues raised in STPS.
Habermas's later analysis of the young Marx in "Marx's Metacritique of Hegel:
Synthesis Through Social Labor" (1968), takes up the third and final Manuscript
from 1844. I shall show how Habermas's later essay, while not exactly
superseding issues he raised in STPS, represented another, different approach
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to Marx. The new approach can be explained with reference to the relationship
between the emerging coherence of Habermas's own theory, and the
dependence of the latter on an interpretation of Marx, including earlier ones of
his own, later recognized as inadequate.
The analysis of Marx in STPS stands out as the first step in the validation,
stamped with the imprimatur of a rigorous analysis from within the anti-capitalist
Critical Theory tradition, of the essentially materialistic-and therefore
problematic-nature of Marx's theory in the context of contemporary theoretical
and practical developments. The cogent insights of Marx's theory are tied to a
specific historic period, that of classical free market capitalism. The materialistic
determinism of the theory is judged to have been, all at once, a mere product of
the time, a contributing factor in the inability of Marx to fully comprehend his own
intellectual contribution, and a key element in shaping the entire post-Marx
historical problematic of the relation of ideas and social reality.
In STPS, Habermas argued that Marx's theory—in the form of an
exclusively immanent critique of bourgeois political economy-understood itself
as having proved that the expansion of the public sphere to include non
bourgeois strata would inevitably lead to a classless society. Marx conceived
the possibility of fundamental social change on the basis of a planned economy
in which the rational allocation of resources could be achieved without political
domination. In actuality, Habermas observed, at the very stage of free-market
capitalism to which Marx's theory was tied, the public sphere absorbed non
bourgeois strata without its fundamentally altering the class nature of society.
(Even later, as the economy again became "politicized", this class nature of
society even lost its primacy).
The sense of the earlier BPSMC can be clearly seen to have been an
attempt to come to terms with a situation in which Marx's theory, as understood
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by himself, and as the intellectual basis for one of the two poles (though both
discredited) of world power, retained some sort of not completely accounted for
status. Habermas believed that clarification of this status might open the way for
progress toward a more adequate relation between theory and practice within
modem society hence seen more soberly. From this perspective, STPS (while
not always clear to commentators, followed BPSMC by two years) tends to be
viewed as Habermas's first basically (though anti-orthodox) Marxist work. As I
have shown, it actually initiated a systematic, comprehensive critique of Marx.
STPS served, in a fundamental way, as a transition to a type of theory thought
to be needed in order to replace Marx and Marxism.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE PROBLEM OF THE CONTEMPORARY RECOGNITION OF MARX
Although I will only later take up LC and, in the next chapter, the Theory
of Communicative Action, Habermas develops an idea in those works which
might help orient the present focus on KHI. He develops an early implication
that Marx failed to take seriously enough the systemic features of contemporary
society.
In BPSMC, Marx's section in Capital on the "Fetishism of the Commodity
and its Secret" was utilized by Habermas in a demonstration that Marx identified
a subsumption of practice by theory, which implied for Habermas the
"practicality" (as opposed to the technical potential) of theory itself. This (1960)
was prior to the decisive importance for a critical theory (and in distinction from
Marx's theory) Habermas was soon to attribute to the difference betwen the
practical and the technical.
Recall that the "secret" (of the commodity)~which Habermas did not
mention in BPSMC, but analyzed in the second chapter on Marx in his later KHI
(which I will analyze below)--was that, according to Marx, the product of labor in
the form of the commodity which had become generalized was a social
relationship not readily perceivable as such; but even in KHI Habermas did not
note that Marx's further (and main) point was that in capitalism labor, in a
peculiar relationship to its product, constituted a dehumanized society. To the
contrary, Habermas developed an argument, based primarily on a reading of
Marx's German Ideology, that labor, seen as transhistorical, was a "mechanism
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of evolution", the latter depicted (by Marx) as a process of "humanization"
(Habermas 1972, 29).
Since it is already linked to the intital, basic unit of Marx's critque of
political economy in Chapter One of Volume One of Capital, a work which
Habermas suggests is analogous to (or a materialist appropriation of) Hegel's
Science of Logic, Habermas interprets the element of Marx's description of the
fetish to mean that labor's essence is concealed, and thus represented the
"lowest rung on the ideological ladder"; this interpretation has the commodity
paralleling Being, determined as the other of an essence, in Hegel's Logic.
(Later, in KHI, Habermas distinguishes Marx from Hegel primarily in the former's
rejection of "identity philosophy", and hence reconceptualizes, at least
provisionally, the relationship of Hegel's Logic and Marx's Capital).
In BPSMC, and consistently in several later works, Habermas's analysis
does not take into consideration that Marx's concept of fetishism of the
commodity was a unique theoretical result of his several decades of
development of a critique of political economy, beginning as early as 1844 and,
in fact, flowed from his writings of that year; crucially, this "result", or conclusion,
was in the form of a "return" to the beginning--in the Hegelian dialectical sense—
to the concept of humanism he had first generally outlined in the 1844
manuscripts as a whole. In analyzing the fetish, Marx suggested that "freely
associated" human relations in respect to material production was a necessary
condition for overcoming the social domination in which abstract forms
prevailed, uniquely characterizing capitalist society.
The dialectical "height" of the conceptual is not to be found merely
through results following sequential development of a text (such as Hegel's
Logic), or through a series of Marx’s texts. Marx’s fully developed "fetishism of
commodity", while appearing in the first chapter of Capital, was conceived (and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75
was only conceivable) much later than this suggests, only after the many drafts
(including the one finally published) of what became Capital, were completed.
The concept marks the completion of Marx's immanent critique of political
economy and constitutes the real genesis of his own theory proper.
Every stage of Marx's analysis (in respect to his mature theory)
presupposes the fully unfolded theory (Postone 1993). From this perspective, it
is difficult to to even accept a conception of an ideological "ladder" of concepts,
or a hierarchy, either within Marx's thought generally, or within Capital,
(unarguably his greatest work).
At this stage of his thought, a clear ambiguity, which I will examine further
in Chapter Four (where he finally decides for the identity in the most crucial
respects of the thought of Hegel and M arx) consists in the fact that though
Habermas's main argument is that Marx's theory amounts to a "metacritique" of
Hegel, he finds more relevant a basic affinity between the two thinkers when he
apparently views hierarchial characteristics as integral to Hegel’s philosophy as
well, particularly the relation he assigns to Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, a
"first" work (seen as akin to a “lifeworld" perspective on knowledge
development) and the Philosophy of Mind, the final work (seen as the realm of
“formal", “pure" and/or systematic thought) (Habermas 1972, 22).
It has been suggested (see Chapter Six) that, in respect to the latter work
of Hegel's just mentioned, the final three paragraphs, added to the text only in
the last year of Hegel's life (Dunayevskaya 1989, 39) are especially important
for this issue. These paragraphs are not consistent with Habermas's
interpretation of Hegel, or the relationship of the latter to Marx's theory. These
final paragraphs, in departing from the syllogistic form, undermined an apparent
conceptual continuity of key concepts such as "transition" and "mediation"; most
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importantly, they open to serious question any interpretation which views the
closure of a system constituting the outcome, or “result", of Hegel’s philosophy.
In contrast to Habermas's suggestion in BPSMC, Marx’s analysis of the
"lowly" commodity (supposedly the lowest rung on the ideological ladder)
already contains the absolute, not as a "closure", but as a new beginning, when
Marx posits "freely associated" social relations’ impact on material production
relations. In contrast to Habermas’s analysis in KHI, Marx's "absolute" in
Chapter One of Capital (especially the section on the fetishism of the
commodity) was not a “ground" (nature), but a recreation of the Hegelian
dialectic itself, from "Hegel's revolution in philosophy to [Marx's] philosophy of
revolution" (Dunayevskaya 1991, 188).
In Marx's conception, commodity fetishism marks the highest rung of the
ideological ladder of an historically specific social formation, or “bourgeois"
society. It exemplifies the "absolute" in the true Hegelian sense of containing
the greatest opposition within itself. With this simplest unit of the capitalist social
form, Marx once again depicts the non-viability of "bourgeois" society itself—
suggesting that its characteristic, universalist, forms of thought must also meet
their historic barrier. As Hegel had already intimated in his own "Absolutes", the
highest form of the development of the idea includes the greatest opposition
within (Hegel 1976, 824). In this sense, the product of labor in capitalism-the
commodity-has its basis ("absolute ground") in the opposition between abstract
and concrete labor. In order to see how the "highest" form (developed capitalist
society) contains the greatest opposition within and whether Habermas's failure
to recognize this is relevant for an explanation of Habermas's various
approaches to Marx, it is necessary to keep in mind Habermas's intital
sequence of steps.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

77
In the literature on Habermas, Marx and Marxism, which is surprisingly
sparse (Rockmore 1989, 18), there is little careful analysis of the relationship of
BPSMC and STPS. But these are works wherein Habermas might have
recovered from Marx's thought the theoretical direction for a release from the
older Frankfurt School's thesis of contemporary society as imprisoned in a onedimensionality, now lacking an internally generated, potentially revolutionary
opposition.
For example, at least in the English language discussion there is virtually
no serious analysis of the way Marx is taken up in STPS (even since its
translation into English). It is often seen as such a different kind of study,
primarily distinguished by historical description, the serious critical intent of its
portrayal of Marx is scarcely recognized (Calhoun 1992, 39-40). Nor does there
even now seem to be an awareness that significance might be found in the fact
that STPS followed by two years the writing of BPSMC. (This is partly explained
by the circumstance that BPSMC (in the original German) did not appear in
book form until after STPS was published in German in 1962; also, when STPS
was finally published in English translation (1989) it was often described as
though it were Habermas's earliest “major" theoretical work). Thus, it may have
been difficult to see that STPS, in important ways, represented Habermas's first
(and only) attempt at a comprehensive and systematic critique of Marx, quite
unlike BPSMC; or, in other worlds, that the initial trajectory of Habermas's
theory (from BPSMC to STPS) was already toward a rejection of Mane's
theoretical and practical relevance for the establishment of a viable
contemporary critical theory.
BPSMC, seen as contemporaneous with, or even following from STPS,
might have seemed directed toward revitalizing Marx's thought by dispelling a
characteristic Marxist assumption of crisis narrowly imbedded historically
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contingent conditions grasped by political economy, specifically by what
Habermas presented as merely particular (and perhaps outdated and
dispensible) critical elements developed by Marx, such as his labor theory of
value and the law of the falling rate of profit. Habermas clearly associated this
traditional Marxist assumption with Left intellectual stagnation; relatedly (and
perhaps ironically) the later STPS clearly argued that there was intrinsic to
Marx's thought the impulse only fully developed later for a misguided activist,
technocratic approach to practical problems.
It should not be overlooked that the aporias Habermas attributed to a
critical theory still (clandestinely) wedded to Marx importantly shaped
Habermas's diagnosis of contemporary society. The lack of vitality of public
democratic deliberation was ascribed not so much to "late capitalism" as to
"modernity", closer to Weber's sense than Marx's. STPS, in contrast to his
positing of a dogmatic Marxism (which Habermas will increasingly only
ambiguously distinguish from Marx), attempted to demonstrate the past (and
therefore possibly future) efficacy of a non-dogmatic idea (including Marx's) in
furthering emancipation. In this, Habermas meant to uncover the socially
integrative potential of an abstraction effective as a social organizing principle
(and with it to indicate the historical boundedness of the contemporary Marxist
hypostatization of labor seen, in continuity with the older Frankfurt School, as a
transhistorical relation of man to nature). In also recalling the historical
negation of the efficacy of an implicitly universal idea (reason in place of power)
unable to escape its particularism in practice as exposed in theory, the need for
reflection on the "dialectical" next step in linking theory and practice in the
context of a human "interest" in social change was to be made apparent.
Partly because of Habermas's purpose in respect to Marxism, which
included redirecting critical theory away from a "hidden orthodoxy" (Habermas
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1973, 203), there is an evident lack of reflection on a concept of labor in these
two important early works. In Habermas's view, labor and concept are often
viewed as opposites. Labor is asumed to be “labor" (as Postone characterizes
the traditional Marxist view), the instrumental relation of man to nature. At this
stage of his writings, there is little indication on Habermas's part that a concept
of labor might be seriously problematic.
A reinterpretation of Marx’s basic concepts (such as Postone has
acheived) proved necessary in order to convincingly demonstrate that
Habermas did not, as he claimed at important theoretical junctures, understand
Mane better than Marx understood himself (Habermas 1973, 212; Habermas
1972; 62; Habermas 1989b, 383) and, in fact, failed to understand, in the first
place, Marx's basic concept of labor.
In BPSMC, labor appears as a presupposed and minor, or particularistic
element of a more central concept of crisis pulled by Marx from out of the entire
Western intellectual tradition. This way of analyzing the "crisis" element in
Marx's theory, from a broadly cultural, even theological, standpoint attributed to
Marx, opens the way for Habermas's developing critique of Marx. Later, he will
write that Marx slighted the need for examination of socially effective,
ameliorative institutional features regarded by Habermas as permanent, and
through which a developmental logic, or social evolution could be discerned.
In posing the issue of "crisis", Habermas refers to the question of the
stability of the economic system; he only includes the status and function of
labor as a subordinate element within it. This empirical stability-considered as
a "test" of the viability of Marx's more general theory-the critique of political
economy, or the aim to resolve crisis—is implied to belie the continuity of Marx's
age with contemporaneity, but not yet Marx's theory as such.
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In addition, without discussion of a possible intrinsic relation of crisis to
other than empirical systemic features. Habermas also relates crisis to the
"doctrine of ideology" (Habermas 1973, 222); he asks whether "critique"-in the
form given it by Marx--sti!l contained a practical potential (Habermas 1972,
239). Not yet here, but by the second chapter on Marx in KHI Habermas has
decided that Marx's form of critique is not adequate to contemporary conditions.
He then suggests it is necessary to reconstitute the idea of critique under the
diagnosis of a dualistic concept of modem society. Moreover, the problem of
the relation of labor and interaction, which Habermas identifies as the key
problem, demands a concept of theory, at variance with Marx's, which allows for
an altogether different form of critique. Prior to KHI, recall that in STPS, the
writing of which followed BPSMC by two years, labor initially appears as a
detonation of social class, next as a proxy for the socially excluded, the "non
citizen" (subsequently integrated), and finally as the object of social planning
writ large. There are a number of important things to note here. It is difficult to
disentangle-especially in STPS-what concept of labor Habermas is attributing
to Marx, what exactly is supposed to be seen as the given interpretation of
Marx’s concept, and/or what is specifically Habermas’s contribution, based on
the results of the (possibly) promising originality of his analysis of the bourgeois
public sphere.
In the earlier BPSMC, the concept of labor in itself (and aside from the
labor theory of value which he tended to situate on a transhistorical systemic
level) is hardly an object of Habermas's reflections. It does not appear that the
greater part of an explanation of this is that Habermas's idea was that labor
could only be explicated by imbedding it in "higher" categories, eg; “crisis", and
"the philosophy of history." Rather, it seems more likely that he believed labor in
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Marx’s theory was, in the most important respects, non-controversial, and
required no specific theoretical focus.
Due to the same lack of attention to the conceptual problematic, labor in
STPS receives more attention, but it is presented as not having a single known
meaning; it assumes a variety of roles in the analyses. Habermas does not
reflect on the process of their succession, or comment on how or why these
metamorphoses were possible. Moreover, he does not indicate that he is
aware of them in his own analysis.
Knowledge and Human Interests
However, the two chapters on Marx in KHI offer an indication that
Habermas reached some awareness that labor, particularly Marx's concept,
needed far closer examination. "Marx's Metacritique of Hegel: Synthesis
Through Social Labor" should be seen as an especially important shift in
Habermas's approach to Marx. This shift coincides with his first specific
examination of a concept of labor, despite his several years of previous work
analyzing Marx.
The circumstances of the evident compulsion to return to Marx once
again might have led Habermas to ask himself whether Marx intentionally
embedded the "lowest" forms of cultural life in the highest refinement of the
conceptual. (The "lowest" explained the "highest".) Habermas's initial failure to
consider this (he does take it up in KHI) contributed to his relatively late
examination of the possible depth of the concept of labor.
An especially potent example of the conceptual relation of the "high" and
"low" (or dialectical social theory and labor) in respect to his approach to
modem society is the way Marx analyzed the commodity, the fetish and de
humanization as peculiarly capitalist, especially how the relation of the three
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were possible through the particular (degraded, but none the less socially
determining) form labor assumed only in "developed" capitalism. At the same
time, analysis of the relation of the three could yield a potentially opposite future
based on free, and fully developed, human relations definitely not attainable
within the confines of the old.

Marx's Metacritique of Hegel: Synthesis Through Social Labor

Habermas had already sifted a wide range of concepts and periods of
Marx's theoretical work. But he focuses only now, in KHI, on the potential of a
reinterpretation of Marx's concept of labor. The most immediately striking
feature in the approach to Marx in Habermas's late 1960s chapter on “Marx’s
Metacritique" is the textual starting point, a location hardly in sight in his early
1960s approaches in the two earlier texts I considered in Chapter Two.
Some, including many in the Marxist tradition, commented upon what
they observed as Marx's procedure in turning Hegel "right- side up", which was
supposedly capable of explaining the greater part of the originality, such as it
was, of Marx’s theory. Habermas approaches this issue at its source.
He begins his analysis by citing three passages, two in Hegel's final work
that is, in the Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (Hegel 1971), and one in
the last part of Marx's third and final manuscript from the collection known as the
Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Marx 1967b). The comparison,
then, is between works only thirteen years apart: Hegel's Philosophy of Mind,
including the important addition of the final three paragraphs (which neither
Habermas nor Marx discussed) was completed in 1831.
In beginning with and focusing on the afore mentioned passages,
Habermas seems to want to quickly distinguish himself from traditional Marxism
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by stating plainly that what Marx opposed to Hegel was, "no coarse materialism"
(Habermas 1972, 26). The starting point for his analysis of the relationship
between Hegel and Marx is the most "mature" Hegel and a work of the young
Marx not cited in his earlier studies I have already discussed. In this, however,
there is some continuity with STPS, where Habermas juxtaposed some of
Marx's even earlier (pre-1844) works with Hegel's "mature" Philosophy of Right
Recall that a range of humanist interpretations of Marx (often focused on
1844) were already rejected by Habermas in the opening pages of BPSMC.
Two years later, in STPS, where a wide spectrum of periods of Marx's writings
were cited, those writings which are usually classified under the category of the
young Marx were instead represented by "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of
Right" and "On the Jewish Question". No reference was made to the 1844
manuscripts. Now, in 1968, with the consideration of a concept of labor,
missing in the earlier works, 1844 becomes central; in addition, here there is an
implication that not only an understanding of Marx, but a grasp of social theory
generally, depends in fundamental ways on coming to terms with a section of
Marx's 1844 manuscripts.
The crucial aspect of Habermas's approach to Marx in "Marx's
Metacritique of Hegel" is directly related to his overall theme, stated in his
Preface to KHI. There, in the opening sentence, Habermas writes,
I am undertaking a historically oriented attempt to reconstruct the
prehistory of modem positivism with the systematic intention of analyzing
the connection between knowledge and human interests (Habermas
1972, vii).

His two chapters on Marx then argue that Marx while identifying, and even
elaborating, the elements necessary for an emancipatory social theory failed to
appreciate and therefore satisfactorily develop his own achievement, and
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thereby point a way out of a philosophical position (positivism) which acheived
hegemony (Habermas 1972, 5). Just this failure of self-recognition was
historically effective in diverting succeeding generations. In chapters Five and
Six I will discuss how the theory Habermas developed as an alternative to
Marxism relied significantly on what he viewed as his own separation from a
typical mode of social theory which seriously lacked a "dialogic" dimension.
This missing dimension, Habermas often implies, might have precluded the
most serious--and historically consequential-misinterpretations of Marx's
thought, even by Marx himself.
At this stage, the form of Habermas's argument borrows directly from
Marx's critique of Hegel found in the very text of Marx Habermas examines.
However, there is no indication in Habermas’s own text that he is aware that his
critique of Marx is indebted in this way.
Marx, in his "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General",
writes that Hegel’s Phenomenology is,
concealed and mystifying criticism, unclear to itself...all the elements of
criticism are implicit in it, already prepared and elaborated in a manner
far surpassing the Hegelian standpoint...(Marx 1967b, 320-321).
Yet, in the paragraph directly preceding the above, Marx had written,
Hence there is already implicit in the Phenomenology as a germ,
potentiality and secret-despite its thoroughly negative and critical
appearance and despite the actual criticism it contains which often
anticipates later developments-the uncritical positivism and equally
uncritical idealism of Hegel's later works, the philosophical dissolution
and restoration of the existing empirical world (Marx 1967b, 320-321).

It is clear that Habermas’s argument contains the same type of criticism
against Marx-that the philosophic foundations of his thought (Habermas 1972,
42) held within them an opening for a non-emancipatory strain of social theory
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when fully developed is modem (unreflective) positivism. The full potential of
Marx's achievements in his actual socio-historical investigations lie dormant, an
outcome that could be attributed in some measure to a "peculiar disproportion"
between theory and practice in his intellectual inquiry. Yet, Marx, in his social
inquiry, equally emphasized "critical abolition of ideologies", and the synthetic
quality of social labor. Habermas traces Marx's self-understanding of his
theory, however, to a philosophic framework that was conceived too narrowly to
include the ideology critique (Habermas 1972, 42).
Interestingly, in the very text of Marx Habermas examines, it can be seen
that his critique of Marx here is simply opposite of how Hegel was said by Marx
to have developed within his philosophy (the Phenomenology) all the elements
of critique, but failed to apprehend his own achievement as evidenced by, in his
later works, "the philosophical dissolution and restoration of the existing
empirial world" (Marx 1967b, 320-321).
In Habermas's view, Marx (from the standpoint of practice) critcized
Hegel for philosophical dissolution and (subsequent) restoration of the existing
empirical world; Marx (seen from the standpoint of philosophy) abolished
"ideologies" only to play a constitutive part in the triumph of postivism, or the
subsumption of social theory by the natural sciences, a turn of events which
constituted a formidable barrier in respect to development of a critical theory in
the context of late capitalism.
Besides the fact that Habermas borrowed directly from Marx's critique of
Hegel (without saying so) in order to criticize Marx, of further interest is the
obvious difference in the two critiques. Marx intimated that he would set about
uncovering the “lie" (Marx 1967b, 329) of Hegel's underlying philosophic
principle. I have already alluded to Habermas's key point (what seems a sort of
parallel to Marx's critique of Hegel) in BPSMC. Habermas argued that in the
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Grundrisse Marx had already expressed a theoretical reservation in respect to
the labor theory of value on which Capital, written several years later, none the
less depended.
In KHI, the second article on Marx titled, "The Idea of the Theory of
Knowledge as Social Theory", Habermas returns to and develops this analysis.
There, eight years later, he characterizes Marx’s problem in the Grundrisse as
"indecision", that, “has its foundation in Marx’s theoretical approach itself
(Habermas 1972, 52). (In order to clarify the difference between Marx's critique
of Hegel and Habermas's critique of Marx, which it resembles, I will return to the
Grundrisse after my consideration here of "Marx’s Metacritique.")
In the opening paragraphs of "Marx's Metacritique of Hegel" Habermas
describes the last of Marx’s 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts: Marx is
"coming to grips” with Hegel's Phenomenology, "especially the last chapter on
Absolute Knowledge" (Habermas 1972, 25). Habermas writes,
Marx follows the strategy of detaching the exposition of consciousness in
its manifestations from the framework of the philosophy of identity. He
does this in order to bring to light the elements of a critique that often "far
surpasses Hegel's standpoint", elements that are already contained,
though concealed, in the Phenomenology (Habermas 1972, 25).

In this specific passage, Habermas attributes to Marx primarily “strategic"
intentions; Habermas amalgmates, in a confusing way, his interpretation of
Marx with his presentation of the text he is examining. In the full passage from
Marx, which I quoted above, Marx emphasizes that he finds in Hegel all the
elements of criticism, prepared and elaborated (also emphasized), "in a
manner far surpassing the Hegelian standpoint."
Hegel's "standpoint", according to Marx in the same text, is "modem
political economy" (Marx 1967b, 322); below, I will discuss the doubt this casts
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on Habermas's view that Marx's own "standpoint" was political economy, at
least in so far as Habermas understood it to include a "materialist appropriation"
of Hegel.
The above comparision of the full passage from Marx with Habermas's
paraphrase of it suggests that Marx is not only granting a higher status to
Hegel's thought than Habermas suggests. The uniqueness of Hegel's
philosophy is such that a category of "return" to it (as an indispensibe source for
critical social theory) will become central to grasping Marx’s own theory.
The form of Marx's 1844 presentation of a critique of Hegel is "dialogic" in
an eminent philosophic sense. Specifically, "all"~the word with which
Habermas's text dispenses—is the word needed in order to grasp the meaning
of the passage. In context, the word "all" indicates that Marx's intention was
already to bring out the full revolutionary potential of Hegel's dialectic. Hegel's
achievement (even in the face of a critique of it at the deepest level) remains for
Marx the vital source of critical ideas.
Similarly, in Habermas's KHI the word "often" qualifies Marx's statement,
that “all" these elements are, "already prepared and elaborated in a manner far
surpassing the Hegelian standpoint." Even though subtle, these divergences
raise a question of just how circumscribed Marx was in deciding his own
originality vis a vis Hegel. Habermas's underlying thesis, that Marx's intention
involved a global contradiction of Hegel based on a simple reversal of the
ground of an Absolute, already appears suspect.
Habermas's text introduces a subtle revision, which then creates an
opening for wide critical latitude. As I will demonstrate below, the apparently
small “revisions" are the basis for Habermas's eventual claim that Marx's
theory-indeed the very process of its formation-hid within it a potential, actually
developed by Marx himself, for the non-democratic, repressive features
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associated with later Marxist-oriented political organizations' relationship to
ideas.
Following what might be called an amalgamation of textual citation,
interpretation and revision of the opening pages of Marx's "Critique of Hegelian
Dialectic and Philosophy in General", Habermas moves to its penultimate
paragraph, Marx's quotation of paragraph 381 of Hegel's Philosophy of Mind.
(Habermas directly cites Hegel's Encyclopedia, not Marx's text. There is no
indication he has moved from the beginning to the end of Marx's manuscript).
Habermas reproduces only this part of paragraph #381 of Hegel's
Philosophy of Mind (not as it appeared in Marx's manuscript) as follows:
For us the mind has nature as its presupposition; it is the truth and thus
the absolute ground (Erstes) of nature. In this truth nature has
disappeared, and mind has emerged as the Idea existing for itself; both
object and the subject of the Idea is the notion (Habermas 1972, 25).

Immediately following this, Habermas concludes, "For Marx, on the contrary, it is
nature that is the absolute ground of Mind" (Habermas 1972, 25).
This conclusion functions to magnify the effect arising from the alterations
of Marx's text Habermas had initially introduced. In the first place, by
substituting, "the elements of a critique" (for "all the elements of criticism" in
Marx's text), and, "often 'far surpasses Hegel's standpoint'" (for "already
prepared and elaborated in a manner far surpassing the Hegelian standpoint"
in Marx's text) Habermas at least minimizes (or perhaps makes it impossible to
see) the specific moments (and their lasting import) of Marx's self-understood
identity with Hegel; with these moments eliminated, Habermas then posits Marx
(in his understanding of himself) to be schematically opposite of Hegel,
especially in respect to assessment of the potential of philosophy in
transformation of social relations.
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Habermas, at the outset of “Marx's Metacritique of Hegel", drew attention
to the fact that Marx, at the end of his manuscript, quoted two paragraphs from
Hegel's Philosophy of Mind. Here it is necessary to bring to the fore the
following sequence of references to Marx and Hegel in Habermas's text: First,
Habermas quotes a part of what Marx quoted from paragraph #381 of Hegel's
Philosophy of Mincf, next, in the course of his discussion concerning Marx's
interpretation of Hegel involving this paragraph, and paragraph #384, he
quotes Marx, not on these paragraphs (which involve, as Habermas correctly
states, the transition from nature to mind) but rather a passage taken from the
beginning of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature Marx includes in his 1844
manuscript. Before presenting it, Marx clearly stated that the passage had to do
with, "the transition from Logic to Philosophy of Nature" (Marx 1967b, 334).
Hegel's concept of "transition" is perhaps the critical distinguishing
feature of his dialectic. If so, it is hightly controversial to analyze his work in a
way which ignores the specificity of the actual transitions, eg; from the
Phenomenology, to the Logic, to Nature and to Mind. This issue is relevant in
approaching Marx's "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", especially the "interior"
section which, as I have pointed out, was not taken up by Habermas. I will
consider this section of Marx's manuscript below (see p. 111 ff).
Finally, in "Marx's Metacritique" Habermas characterizes while
paraphrasing, rather than quoting, Hegel's paragraph #384 as, "the idealist
sense of a mind that, as Idea existing for itself, posits a natural world as its own
self-created presupposition" (Habermas 1972, 26).
Habermas had already rejected humanist interpretations of Marx
(Habermas 1973, 200-201). They were seen as incompatible with
contemporary standards of social theory, including its "critical" strand, on the
basis of Habermas's view that Marx's "mature" theory could be understood
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virtually without reference to elements within Marx to which these
characteristically referred. Habermas does not probe further into the quality of
Marx's humanism after his initial focus on Marx's relationship to Hegel. His
interpretation of "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General"
instead moves ahead and actually pivots on what he understands as Marx's
later (1845), limited critique of Feuerbach, the impact of which, he seems to
believe, outweighed Marx's 1844 critique of Hegel in specifing what was
characteristic of Marx's fully developed social theory. (This was not
unprecedented. One need only recall the in other ways excellent translation of,
The Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society (Easton and Guddat
1967), which situated Marx's 1844 text of Marx under the heading,
"Feuerbachian Criticism of Hegel"). Note that this work appeared in the year
before Habermas's "Marx's Metacritique of Hegel."
Later, in “Marx's Metacritique", Habermas returns Hegel to his analysis,
but only through what he argues is Marx's appropriation of Kant, after Marx
developed a more critical attitude to Feuerbach: Hegel's residual influence on
Marx's theory is hastily related to the "something general" which Hegel saw as
accumulating in "the tool" (Habermas 1972, 29). Habermas's argument ties this
to historical materialism as a theory of evolution in Marx. Several years later he
develops this idea in his, "Reconstruction of Historical Materialism" (Held 1980
326), first presented as a talk at a German Hegel society
Here it is necessary to quote Habermas's summary paragraph of his
analysis of the source of Marx's philosophic relationship to Hegel. Habermas
views this relationship as materialized through the context created by the
reflection of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind in the the Philosophy of Mind, the
third and final part of Hegel's later Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences,
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(and therefore through Marx's analysis of the relation between the "first" and
"last" stages of Hegel’s philosophy):
This seal placed on absolute knowledge by the philosophy of identity is
broken [by Marx] if the externality of nature, both objective environmental
and subjective bodily nature, not only seems external to a consciousness
that finds itself within nature but refers instead to the immediacy of a
substratum on which the mind contigently depends. Here the mind
presupposes nature, but in the sense of a natural process that from within
itself, gives rise likewise to the natural being man and the nature that
surrounds him—and not in the idealist sense of a mind that, as idea
existing for itself, posits a natural world as its own self-created
presupposition (Habermas 1972, 26).

Though I have not found recognition of this elsewhere in the literature,
the above reinvokes the theme Habermas developed in STPS; Habermas's
analysis here can therefore be seen as a summary of his work on Hegel and
Marx, a summary preparatory for the genesis of his own, different theory.
In STPS, Habermas found an "enigmatic" quality in Marx's relationship to
Hegel—specifically where I earlier noted Marx had, without explicitly saying so,
reintegrated Hegel's philosophically unique, "negation of negation" into a
historically derived problematic-the relationship of civil society to the state.
Habermas had noted that Marx implied (in "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of
Right") that, according to the dialectic developed by Hegel himself, Hegel's
"recision by reminiscence" of the already factual separation of civil society and
the state unnecessarily left philosophy at an impasse. Therefore, in 1844 (one
year later) it can be deduced that Marx is now more sharply posing that critique-that Hegel's philosophy, up against such an impasse, was not viable in the
form lent it by Hegel.
However, the real reason 1844 is key, and not 1843 (Critique of Hegel's
Philosophy of Right) or 1845 (Theses on Feuerbach) lies in the way Marx
abstracts Hegel's strictly philosophic uniqueness (the concept and method of
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negation of negation) and connects it to 1) humanism; and, 2) an early
intimation of a two-fold concept of labor. The first idea is explicitly rejected, the
second not noted, in Habermas’s analysis in "Marx’s Metacritique". Yet,
precisely these two concepts represented the beginning of what has been
called a transformation of Hegel's revolution in philosophy into a philosophy of
revolution (Dunayevskaya 1991, xxiii); this did not negate the unique character
of dialectic found in Hegel, it recreated it.
Marx, in specifying socially "negation of negation", defined the particular
contemporary sociopolitical problematic--the relation of civil society and the
state-identifying a movement from within the practical sphere of society as on a
par with, if not in advance of, the theoretical sphere represented both by Hegel's
Philosophy of Right and the young Hegelians. Marx developed a critique of the
latter in his own break (1844) from "bourgeois" society, the latter now seen as
historically specific. In contrast, the young Hegelians, though critical of the
"master's" (Hegel’s) accomodation (to the state), still did not grasp the "lie" of the
"master’s" principle which compelled (and explained) the accomodation (Marx
1967c, 60-61). In other words, in not grasping the method implied in negation
of negation, their approach to (and departure from) Hegel retrogressed to the
level of simple “critique", or a first negation.
In STPS, recall that Habermas concluded that Marx, in taking Hegel’s
abstraction (recision by reminiscence of the separation of state and society) to
its limit, aimed to demonstrate the "illusion" (or non-viability) of abstraction in
social life (thus Marx's later underestimation of society's systemic dimension),
as well as its self-dissolving quality in theory. According to Habermas, contrary
to Marx's own expectations, this none the less contributed to the institution of
abstraction in the form of a scientistic conception of natural law applied to
society, a conception Habermas claims Marx on some level shared. Among
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other things, this constituted a barrier to identifying normative structures as a
precondition for renewing, as the foundation of social life, the emancipatory
potential of the public use of reason.
KHI represents a different approach to Marx, that is, through
philosophical reflection on the concept of labor. Yet, this does not lead
Habermas to abandon an understanding of Marx which attaches to him an
unwarranted partiality for a conception of the "natural". Habermas proposes an
interpretation of Marx's concept of labor which he then embraces while implying
it required supplementation. In important respects, this concept of labor
remains one-dimensional. The thrust of Habermas's argument is to root Marx
(even more so than usually) deeply in materialism, only a materialism with
some unique turns. While Mane's materialism was not "coarse", it was
essentially materialism nonetheless. As I have noted, within the first two pages
of KHI's chapters on Marx Habermas offers two observations: 1) In Hegel, mind
has nature as its presupposition; mind is the absolute ground of nature. 2) In
Marx, mind presupposes nature. In Marx, mind “depends" on the nature it
presupposes. In Hegel, nature, "could only exist (my emphasis, RR) as mind
reflexively remembers it while returning to itself from nature" (Habermas, 1972,
25)--nature "depends" on mind.
Though Habermas does not make the connection himself, this further
illuminates the "enigma" Habermas first noted in STPS; he saw in Marx's earlier
(1843) critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right that Marx exposed Hegel's
approach to the separation (and opposition) of civil society and the state as
amounting to an attempt of "recision" (of this separation) by "reminiscence".
It can be seen in tracing the evolution of Habermas's view, Marx's
"metacritique" of Hegel (quite likely without Habermas explicitly intending it to)
revisits the theme in STPS, which cited Hegel's belief that civil society,
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could exist only as the mind [state in STPS ] reflexively remembers it
while returning to itself from nature [civil society in STPS ].

Mind and Nature are simply substituted for State and Civil Society, the concepts
of interest in STPS.
I have already pointed out that Habermas's analysis of Marx's 1844
“Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", in so far as that analysis directly concerns
Marx's critique of Hegel, is mainly restricted to the opening pages of Marx's text,
and to its last pages—two quotes Marx includes from Hegel's Philosophy of
Mind, and one from the Philosophy of Nature (a textual location Habermas fails
to identify). That is, Habermas refers to a passage in Marx which is concerned
with Hegel's analysis of a transition from the Logic to Nature. But his reference
is for the purpose of characterizing Marx's concern with Hegel's analysis of the
transition to Mind from Nature. Habermas describes how Marx objected to the
"disappearance" of nature. In the passage Habermas quotes, Marx objects to
the "elimination of Nature" by the, "abstract thinker [for whom] nature must
eliminate itself, because it has already been posited by him as a potentially
eliminated being" (Habermas 1972, 24). Yet, on the preceding page,
Habermas made clear that he was considering Marx's analysis of paragraphs
381 and 384 of Philosophy of Mind, where the "transition from the philosophy of
nature to the philosophy of mind is delineated" (Habermas 1972, 25). Both of
these paragraphs appear in the Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (the final
part of Hegel's Encyclopedia).
It is in connection with the latter that Marx subseqently makes clear that a
"defense" of nature is not his primary intention. In comments focused on the
issue of the transition in Hegel's Encyclopedia from the philosophy of nature to
the philosophy of mind (Habermas’s own ostensible focus) Marx promises to
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explain as well why Hegel’s philosophy, "separates thinking from the subject"
(Marx 1967b, 335). Here Marx's principal concern is not the elimination of
nature by the abstract thinker, but the "elimination" of even the abstract thinker
by absolute spirit.
Marx’s later theory-in Capital-w ill develop the idea that the power of
abstraction is laid bare in Hegel’s revolution in philosophy, and is indispensible
for penetration of the transcendence inherent in capital. Marx demonstrates that
"transcendence" of capitalism (including its own transcendent features) is not
conceivable without Hegel's concepts; yet, unless these concepts are effectively
developed in association with a dialectics of social organization, no abolition of
capitalism is possible. In short, Marx aimed to work out the relationship of
philosophic critique to social relations which have become dehumanized. This
can be researched as the relation of dialectics of philosophy to dialectics of
organization (Dunayevskaya 1991).
Limiting his account, for the most part, to the beginning and the end of
Marx's text, Habermas now introduces the argument that Marx, as late as 1844,
was involved in little more than, "renewing the naturalism of Feuerbach's
anthropolgy" (Habermas 1972, 26). This is only qualified by granting that Marx,
in contrast to Feuerbachian materialism, emphasized, "the adaptive modes of
behavior and active expressions of life as an active natural being" (Habermas
1972,26). Habermas continues,
But as long as he attributes to “objective activity" the still unspecific
meaning that man, like every organism, "can only express his life through
real, sensuous objects", Marx remains caught in the realm of naturalistic
ideas. The first thesis against Feuerbach, however, already goes beyond
this...(Habermas 1972, 26).
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The conclusion that might be expected to be drawn from this is two-fold:
1) that Marx, in "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", by presenting an alternative
interpretation of the relation of nature and mind, directly opposite of Hegel,
rejected the idealistic features of the latter's thought; and, 2) embraced
Feuerbach’s naturalism, or at least granted to it a higher status than the
originality of Hegel’s dialectic. If this were indeed the case, 1844 (particularly
the final manuscript) should be viewed as ony slightly important, even when
assessed against earlier and later writings of Marx himself. In fact, its
contemporary importance, then, according to Habermas's account, is restricted
to Habermas's own abstraction of certain of its elements useful for piecing
together with theoretical statements derived from Marx’s later writings. From
this perspective, there are disparate insights scattered through Marx's texts
which Marx was unable to unify, unified indecisively or, at worst, unified in bad
faith. Nonetheless, according to Habermas, contemporary theorists (with the
aid of more useful social scientific concepts) ignore at their own peril Mane’s
individual insights in their attempt to work out a contemporary critical theory.
The primary import of Habermas's analysis here is by no means the
issue of Marx’s assessment of, or identification with, Feuerbach’s thought.
(Habermas, in later writings, never returns to Marx/Feuerbach; but he does
continuously return to Hegel, Marx and their relationship). Rather, the central
contention put forth by Habermas is that Marx himself, in the 1844 manuscripts,
particularly their last part, separating from Hegel's "identity philosophy" while
only marginally going beyond Feuerbach, led not much later to his practical
rejection, if not particular aspects of, then the basic philosophical orientation,
the 1844 manuscripts attempted to establish. The outcome of this is that
Habermas's earlier rejection of humanist interpretations of Marx is now implied
to be immanent to Marx's own philosophical development, or lack of it: Marx's
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own recognition of his failure to successfully “renew" Feuerbach's philosophical
anthropology.
For support of the underlying contention that characteristics which specify
Marx's thought are exclusively located outside the 1844 manuscripts,
Habermas cites, in consecutive footnotes, two passages from the same page of
Marx's 1844 text. Quotation of these passages is supposed to further
demonstrate that Marx's critique of Hegel was essentially of his "idealism", and
that Marx was "for" materialism as opposed to idealism (Habermas 1972, 2829). Yet, these two passages directly precede and follow respectively this notso-easily interpreted passage:
We see here how a consistent naturalism or humanism is distinguished
from both idealism and materialism as well, and at the same time is the
unifying truth of both. We also see how only naturalism is able to
comprehend the act of world history (Marx 1967b, 325).

Habermas, in passing over just this paragraph (while quoting from the
one which precedes and the one which follows) avoids confronting the question
of the uniqueness of Marx's thought in 1844, at least in as much as Marx began
to seek to come to terms with it. This weakens Habermas's own immanent
critique of Marx, and is especially noticeable in view of Habermas's explicit
judgment, discussed earlier, which attributed to Marx a lack of self-reflection,
which was then assessed to be at the core of a Marxism, developed across
generations, the effect of which is said by Habermas to have diverged so far
from its original intention.
The paragraph just quoted above directly addresses the issue of Marx's
self-understanding of his thought. It clearly signals Marx's intention-in the
greater part of the manuscript ahead-to develop a philosophic conception
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identical with neither Hegel's nor Feuerbach's, though related in some way to
both.
Nevertheless Habermas does intend to develop an idea which attributes
unique features to Marx's philosophic thought. But it is important to keep in
view the question of whether these features are the same ones Marx
understood to be his own or are the more eccentric (and one-dimensional) ones
attributed to him by Habermas. It is significant that Habermas makes, only
implicitly, a case that these are to be found mainly outside, "Critique of Hegelian
Dialectic and Philosophy in General."
Habermas, in moving to Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach", next develops
an interpretation of Marx's originality in which elements of Kantian
epistemology, though reflected through Hegel's critique, are given prominence.
While "objective activity" is said to be given only an "unspecific" meaning in
1844, by the time of Marx's critique of Feuerbach in the next year this same
concept is given, “the specific meaning of constituting the objectivity of possible
objects of experience" (Habermas 1972, 27). Habermas suggests that it is this
movement from the unspecific (in 1844) to the specific (1845) which underlies
the cogency of Marx's identification of the "main flaw" in all previous
"materialisms" (including Feuerbach's) (Habermas 1972, 27).
Previous materialisms (unlike the one noted by Habermas to have been
first discovered by Marx in his critique of Feuerbach) did not apprehend reality,
"as sensuous human activity, as practice, subjectively." Here, then, Marx's
discourse is seen as referring to practical as well as theoretical dimensions; in
fact, Habermas’s implication is that from the perspective of German idealism
(particulary Hegel) Marx prematurely, and in some instances exclusively so,
oriented toward the Practical Idea, underestimating in various ways the need for
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self-reflection in respect to the Theoretical Idea, the responsibility of philosophy
in critical social theory.
In Marx's "superior" form of materialism, according to Habermas,
elements of Kant's transcendental philosophy reappear in his developing
critique of the young Hegelians, including Feuerbach. Habermas writes,
On the one hand Marx conceives of objective activity as a transcendental
accomplishment; it has its counter-part in the construction of a world in
which reality appears subject to conditions of the objectivity of possible
objects of experience. On the other hand, he sees this transcendental
accomplishment as rooted in real labor processes (Habermas 1972, 27).

Marx's concept of labor, understood in a certain way (epistemologically) can be
viewed, according to Habermas, as the necessary ingredient in Marx's
movement from the unspecific to the specific, from natural being to human
activity specified as labor transhistorically understood. This accounts for Marx's
originality in comparison to Feuerbach, and to Hegel as well.
Habermas's analysis here raises questions internal to his own argument
because already in “Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" Marx had criticized Hegel
thusly: from Hegel’s standpoint, that of "modem political economy", Hegel
views, "labor as the essence, the self-confirming essence of man; he sees only
the positive side of labor, not its negative side (Marx 1967b, 322).
Habermas, in furthering his argument concerning potentially fertile
consequences of Marx's break with a "philosophy of identiy" does not notice
that the critical break in question does not lead directly to "labor” or "labor
processes" (a synthesis of man and nature in oppposition to "idealism"), but
instead applies with equal cogency to a one-dimensional concept of labor-itself
idealistic as well as mistakenly conceived transhistorically. Marx's own view in
1844 does not include the fully developed concept of labor worked out in his
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mature theory, but it is already conceived in at least two dimensions—the
"positive" and the "negative".
Habermas, in trying to demonstrate the potential productiveness, were it
to be conceived adequately, of a more sophisticated concept of labor in Marx's
thought, that is, one which could be accounted for epistemologically without
dilluting its "functional" character, is propelled away from full examination of the
uniqueness of Marx's 1844 critique. Thus, at this point Habermas makes it
appear that Marx's 1844 manuscripts were a stillbirth, and Marx's "progressive"
theory (only fully apparent in later work) relied upon a (unspoken) direct "return"
to Kant, although taking in to consideration Hegel's and Fichte's critique of Kant.
In thus moving away from a full examination of 1844, and any possibility
of finding the uniqueness of Marx's thought grounded there, and constitutive of
the conceptual creativity of his developing theory, Habermas, after introducing
the argument about Marx's return to Kant, also contrasts Marx to the latter.
While the "productive" (or progressive) difference between Hegel and Marx was
earlier argued to be based on Marx's rejection of "identity philosophy", Kant's
epistemology (taken account of Hegel’s critique of it) is transformed by Marx
such that in place of "transcendental conciousness in general", the "concrete
human species" (rooted in "real labor processes") is the subject of world
constitution. Then, in order to show that the epistemological characteristic of
labor, made possible to see by Hegel's radicalization of Kant (consciousness as
a historical process of self-formation) is the basic insight of Marx in 1844, and is
carried all the way through to Marx's mature theory, Habermas here cites two
passages from Volume One of Capital. In the first passage Habermas quotes
Marx stating that labor is a,
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condition of human existence that is independent of all forms of society, a
perpetual necessity of nature in order to mediate the material exchange
between man and nature, in other words, human life (Habermas 1972,
27).

Habermas also quotes Marx in a later passage of Capital where Marx
writes,
Labor is above all a process between man and nature, a process in
which man through his own action mediates, regulates and controls his
material exchange with nature. He confronts the substance of nature
itself as a natural power. He sets in motion the natural forces belonging
to his corporeal being, that is his arms and legs, head and hand, in order
to appropriate nature in a form usable for his own life (Habermas 1972,
27-28).

Recall that these are the passages I referred to earlier (Chapter One) in
regard to which Postone, in criticizing Habermas's interpretation of them, also
questioned whether they were not problematic in themselves.
Now a range of interpretations at issue can be seen more clearly:
Postone argues for a fundamental development (at least in regard to a concept
of labor) from 1844 to Marx's mature theory in the Gmndrisse and Capital. He
recognizes, however, that Marx retained a concept of “alienated labor".
Habermas wants to show no difference in Marx's concept of labor in 1844
compared to the definition Marx gave it in Volume One of Capital more than two
decades later. In doing so, Habermas practically limits the importance of 1844
to Marx's rejection of "identity philosophy", a rejection (which leads Mane back to
Kant) he understands as only later made relevant for Marx's, as well as later,
social theory.
Now, within the text of "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" it is not clear that
Marx conceives the "concrete human species" to be "the subject". In the first
place, it is difficult to see how Habermas can attribute to Marx a notion of a
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concrete human species, "rooted in real labor processes", as the subject of
world constitution, without discussing Marx's concept of alienation. Already, in
"Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", although he had not yet investigated "real labor
processes" (fully doing so only later in Capital) Marx had criticized Hegel for not
seeing the "negative side of labor." The subject of Marx's 1844 text was a
specific aspect of Hegel's philosophy-negation of negation as the ungrasped
but revolutionary element of the dialectic. Marx refers to labor, but it is not his
central focus, and he attributes to Hegel the standpoint of political economy in
which "labor" was seen only from its "positive" side. Marx suggests that the
elements (in Hegel's philosophy) which far surpass political economy are
related to concepts whose intrinsic potential lie in achievement of social
revolution.
In a very obvious departure from Marx’s own emphasis in 1844,
Habermas disregards Marx's ideas (which were even more fully developed in
other parts of the 1844 manuscripts) concerning alienated labor. "Alienation"
(and "abstraction") were for Marx key in overcoming the philosophical impasse
reached both by Hegel and his followers (including Feuerbach).
Habermas connects Capital most clearly to his analysis of Marx's later
(1845) relationship to Feuerbach, not to 1844. But after the two quotes from
Chapter One of Capital (on the metabolic relationship of labor and nature) he
does return to 1844, offering another passage from "Critique of Hegelian
Dialectic":
Man is not only a natural being, but a human natural being: that is a
being that exists for itself and is therefore a species-being and must
confirm and activate itself as such both in its being and its knowledge.
Thus human objects are not natural objects as they are immediately
given. Nor is the human mind in its immediate, objective form the same
as human sensuousness. Nature is not immediately present adequately
to the human being either objectively or subjectively (Habermas 1972,
28).
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This then amounts to an analysis of Mane which includes two of social
theory’s most controversial texts--"Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" and Chapter
One of Capital-stripped of several concepts (alienation, fetishism, abstraction),
a critical, historically specific approach to which, in Marx's own view, was
central to his distinctive contribution concerning both "world" constitution and
self-constitution.
This point can be summarized as follows: according to Habermas, first
the 1844 "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" is said not to go substantially beyond
Feuerbach's naturalism. It was only with his critique of Feuerbach's naturalism
a year later that Marx fully understood activity as praxis, that is, subjectively,
wherein "objective activity" acquires the "specific meaning of constituting the
objectivity of possible objects of experience," and hence appreciated, as well,
the "active side" idealism had developed in distinction from materialism.
Next, to show that the "activity" to which Marx refers is the idea of labor
which informs Capital as well, Habermas next cites the two passages from
Capital I reproduced above (see p. 101). The passages from Chapter One of
Capital are intended to make clear and direct the specific meaning of activity, or
practice, which Marx discovered only in his critique of Feuerbach. Habermas
limits the significance of these passages to an attempt to show that external
nature is objective for us only through processes of "social labor": only insofar
as "extemalization" is mediated by the subjective nature of man, a subjectivity
confined to an instrumentalist relation. Habermas writes,
The system of objective activities creates the factual conditions of the
possible reproduction of social life and at the same time the
transcendental conditions of the possible objectivity of the objects of
experience (Habermas 1972, 28).
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But now the emphasis is on the activity of a species being for whom nature
constitutes itself as objective only through its subjective nature, that is, mediated
by "processes of social labor."
Habermas here refers to man as a “tool-making animal", which, "signifies
a schema of both action and of apprehending the world" (Habermas 1972, 28).
Man as a "tool-making animal" has not been introduced by Marx in any of the
texts Habermas has so far cited. None the less, from this perspective Habermas
concludes this part of his argument by returning to “Critique of Hegelian
Dialectic", which he had ostensibly left behind in favor of Marx's "progress" in
his Theses on Feuerbach. He interprets Marx as seeing in labor a natural
process in so far as it regulates a "material exchange with nature", but also as
more: it, "constitutes a world."
But the passage Habermas quotes here at length (see p. 102) does not
refer to labor. Rather, it continues a critique of the solely abstract quality of
Hegel's dialectic. Following it (and continuing with the preceding exposition
which moved from 1844 to 1845, and to Chapter One of Capital, then back to
1844) Habermas concludes, "Thus in materialism labor has the function of
synthesis" (Habermas 1972, 28).
This is a turning point in Habermas's theoretical work on Marx and
Marxism. At this stage of his analysis, which has included piecing together and
presenting passages from the 1844 "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic", the
Theses on Feuerbach, written a year later, and Volume One of Capital, Marx is
presented such that it should be clear he made a more or less precisely
identifiable potential contribution to modem social theory-social labor as
evolutionary mechanism. Yet, according to Habermas, just as important, Marx
can equally be held responsible for ensuing misunderstandings. Habermas
illustrates this point in the form of a critique of several contemporary individual
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thinkers and theoretical tendencies whose ideas, due to the fundamental
misconception they shared, helped make possible Habermas's own pinpointing
of what in the first place may and may not be appropriated from Marx in the
interest of contemporary critical theory. Habermas criticizes the more or less
Marxist theorists Herbert Marcuse, Jean-Paul Sartre, Karel Kosik and Gajo
Petrovic from the standpoint of a "different" Marx he is just now in the very
process of establishing (or re-establishing) from the perspective of examination
of the possibility of a contemporary critical social theory.
Synthesis, "denuded of its idealist meaning" [in Marx], that is, established
as social labor, creates a, "danger of a transcendental logical
misunderstanding” because, "the category of labor then acquires unawares the
meaning of world-constituting life activity in general" (Habermas 1972, 28).
In a digression from the immanent theoretical investigation I have so far
attempted, a couple of important historical facts must not be ignored. They are
important in themselves but also for making clear the theoretical ground
Habermas is now claiming. Herbert Marcuse's 1932 review of Marx's
Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts (Marcuse, 1972), the final part of which is
the center-piece of Habermas analysis, was the first to bring them into the public
domain after they remained virutally untouched, even by an already long
tradition of Marxism, in the near century following their writing. Habermas does
not make this directly evident; he only cites his own 1958 work, Literaturbericht
Zur Diskussion Um Mane und den Marxismus, which included a critical analysis
of Marcuse's review. Habermas states that at the time Marcuse's review was
written, the latter was "under the influence of Heidegger", and Marcuse's
thought represented an example of a “phenomenological strain of Marxism"
(Habermas 1973, 29). However, even as late as today it is not difficult to find
contention precisely on the question of whether Marcuse's review instead
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exemplified the decisive and fruitful break with Heidegger; in any case,
Marcuse's analysis certainly holds up as an important and lasting contribution
to a critical (though undoubtedly diverse) strand of Marxism which seriously
challenged not only the repressive regimes ruling in its name, but all previous
interpretations of Marx developed without access to the 1844 Manuscripts
themselves. Interestingly, it should be considered whether Habermas in his
prior attempt at a comprehensive critique of Marx in STPS (which by-passed
1844) failed due in part to retrogression behind the point when Marx's 1844
writings entered the public domain.
The twist here is that Habermas, evoking the authority of Marx against
Marcuse, criticizes the latter (and the others) for what he implies is the
"conservative" result of their "phenomenological" appropriation of Marxwherein the labor process is seen as the, "foundation for the construction of
invariant meaning structures of possible social lifeworids" (Habermas 1973, 29).
In fact, in addition to Marcuse and Sartre, this view is said to "govern the
interpretaion of Marx in several socialist countries" (Habermas 1973, 29).
Habermas refers to the 1967 German translation of Karel Kosik's, Dialectic of
the Concrete (which he does not note contains criticisms of both Marcuse and
Sartre) and to the Yugoslavian Gajo Petrovic’s, Marx in the Midtwentieth
Century, also published in 1967.
Now it was, and is, not difficult to see that Kosik's book, although,
remarkably, published in Czechoslovakia at the time, represented a bold
critique of totalitarian Communism (socialist countries, in Habermas’s terms)
identifying itself as "Marxist." Both Kosik himself and Petrovic's tendency-the
Marxist Humanists-were hounded out of political life, importantly on the basis of
their view of the contemporary import of an interpretation of Marx's theory as
revolutionary and humanist. This was seen as a threat to the stability of the
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Communist state. A case can in fact be made that the works to which Habermas
referred were integral to the revolutionay upheaval of 1968, which was followed
by Communism's invasion of Czechoslovakia. I recount these well-known facts
because they provide the necessary prespective for asking various questions
about just what was politically at stake, and might still be, in Habermas’s
examination of Marx and Marxism. For example, given the facts as stated
above, what should one think of Habermas's description of Kosik's and
Petrovic’s views "governing the interpretation of Marx in several socialist
countries?"
Were these countries socialist in any way except ideologically? In the
context of a cri*ical examination of Marx and Marxism it seems odd that this be
taken for granted, rather than something that first needs to be demonstrated.
KHI took it as its task a new beginning of a critical approach to ideas, including
examination of the question whether ideas might still be potentially constituitve
of a changed, improved social life; certainly "socialism" has been one of the key,
contentious ideas of recent times. But, according to Habermas, not only could it
be assumed that these Communist states were socialist, but some of those
dissident thinkers whose social positions were most tenuous, due to their
dissident, Marxist ideas, are said to have "governed the interpretation of Marx."
Charitably, Habermas might have been saying that while the "Marxists" running
the state had all the power, at least the dissident Marxists, "govern the
interpretation." Yet, it still should be remembered that KHI was written in the
West, where much was known about the extreme repression of intelletuals (and
workers) in the "socialist" countries. Despite the availability of much information
about the opposition (including theoretical) within these states, Habermas's
analysis amalgamates the Communist state and its dissident Marxists.
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In any case, Habermas's present theoretical concern here is to delineate
the function of labor given it by Marx. In mediating objective and subjective
nature, the category of social labor, "designates the mechanism of the evolution
of the species in history" (Habermas 1973, 29). In contrast, in the
phenomenological interpretation of Marx labor is regarded as, "the foundation
for the construction of invariant meaning structures of possible social lifeworids"
(Habermas 1973, 29).
Once Habermas has, in his view, convincingly identified Marx's
"metacritique" of Hegel, he indicates that several things should become clear,
and hence subject to theoretical, and perhaps even practical, resolution: Marx,
strongly influenced by the times in which he lived, believed "philosophy" could
and should be replaced with "science." According to Habermas, far from the
young Maw (“discovered" long after the "mature" Marx) casting doubt on such a
conclusion long since drawn by many (especially those with some amount of
sympathy for governments ruling with a "Marxist" ideology) Marx's 1844
“metacritique", when carefully examined, is precisely what compels this
interpretation.
When Habermas implicitly concludes that no fundamental distinction
should be drawn between the “coarse materialism" of ideological Marxism
(such as was in power in East Europe) and the dissident Marxism which
attempted to make relevant the 1844 themes of alienation and humanism, he is
actually making a case for the affinity of Marx and ail (or practically all)
Marxisms in that the latter shared with Marx an understanding of labor as
transhistorical, exclusively determinant of possible interpretations of society at
the categorical level. Habermas concludes that in so far as something might be
retrieved from Marx's theory, it can be found neither in Marx's own selfunderstanding, nor the contemporary Marxism which had established state
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power. The alternative posed by Marxist dissidents is hardly distinguishable
from the latter.
Habermas, in an oblique (if not ironic) criticism of humanist Marxism in
particular, instead singles out a, "mechanism of humanization" (Habermas
1973, 24) (certainly not to be mistaken for the concept of humanism I showed
that Marx named as his philosophic contribution) as a category designating the
mediation of objective and subjective nature, which refers to the evolution of the
species in history.
What might be easy to lose sight of here is that Habermas’s argument
relies on two concepts not found in the text of Marx to which he refers. Rather,
these concepts belong to Habermas and are subtly introduced in the course of
his argument. Now, from this, I intend to pose the possibility that all the terms in
the title to the article under consideration here ("Marx's Metacritique of Hegel:
Synthesis Through Social Labor") have little or no basis in the texts to which
Habermas mainly refers.
First, the idea that Marx's "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic” amounts to a
"metacritique" of Hegel would imply that one could not find through an
immanent investigation of Marx's theory a continuous return to Hegel's
dialectical philosophy as constitutive of Marx’s "mature" critical theory. Yet,
there is evidence of a remarkable series of returns to Hegel at key points in the
development of Marx's theory.
Second, Habermas himself writes that Marx did not "arrive at" an explicit
concept of synthesis, that he had only a "vague conception" of it, and that he
would have found, "the very concept of synthesis suspect" (Habermas 1973,
30).
Finally, I have already mentioned that labor, in "Critique of Hegelian
Dialectic", while occasionally discussed by Marx, is not the main focus. At the
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least, this early critique of Hegel does not rely on an explicit, developed concept
of labor, and certainly not, as Habermas's argument attempts to demonstrate,
one which emerged essentially unmodified in 1867, compared to 1844 to 1845.
In the course of this examination of Habermas's relationship to Marx the
latter’s myriad returns to Hegel will become evident. The first return, which I will
consider now, already occurs within “Critique of Hegelian Dialectic". This
“return" is to be found in the "interior" section of the article, a part to which
Habermas does not refer. Marx does not name Hegel here, but the conceptual
return to his dialectical categories is not difficult to see.
In the early part of the article Marx had praised Feuerbach for his "critical"
relationship to Hegel, how he, unlike all the other "young Hegelians", had
established a “naturalism", which was capable of both criticizing and explaining
Hegel's abstractions. For example, Feuerbach had criticized Hegel's negation
of negation which "re-establishes abstraction" as theology after the
transcendence of religion by philosophy. Marx writes,
Feuerbach views negation of negation as merely a contradiction of
philosophy with itself, as philosophy which affirms theology (the
transcendent, etc.) after having denied it, thus affirming it in opposition to
itself (Marx 1967b, 317).

The implication is that Marx has a view of the real meaning and import of
Hegelian dialectic (its distinguishing feature being negation of negation)
different from, and explanatory of, both Feuerbach's and Hegel's ideas. Marx,
in fact, writes,
We shall explain both the abstract form of this movement as conceived
by Hegel and, in contrast, by modem criticism in Feuerbach's Essence of
Christianity, or rather the critical form of this movement which is still
uncritical in Hegel (Marx 1967b, 318).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

111
The implication is that Feuerbach, though alone among the young Hegelians in
adopting a genuinely critical stance toward Hegel, is himself to be criticized:
Marx intends to demonstrate that negation of negation is not merely a
contradiction of philosophy with itself or, in other words, is not merely formal.
This can be seen after the section of Marx's manuscript containing the
passages Habermas cited to tie Marx to Feuerbach's materialism; Marx, turning
to the, "positive moments or aspects of the Hegelian dialectic", writes,
...Transcendence as an objective movement reabsorbing extemalization
into itself...This is the insight into the appropriation of objective being,
expressed within alienation, through the transcendence of its alienation.
It is the alienated insight into the actual objectification of man and into the
actual appropriation of his objective nature by the destruction of the
alienated character of the objective world, by the transcendence of the
objective world in its alienated existence, just as atheism which
transcends God is the emergence of theoretical humanism, and
communism which transcends private property is the vindication of actual
human life as man's property, the emergence of practical humanism. Or,
atheism is humanism mediated through itself by the transcendence of
private property. Only through the transcendence of this mediationwhich is however a necessary presupposition-emerges positive
humanism, humanism emerging positively from itself..., (Marx 1967b,
331).

The above passage in Marx's "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" is clearly
germane to Habermas's argument, but an interpretation of it is not included in
his analysis. It cannot be taken into consideration, for one reason, because
Habermas disregards the enitre section in which it is situated. (Of the four
references Habermas actually makes to "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", three
are situated within the first half of Marx's manuscript, the fourth on the last page
of an approximately twenty-five page manuscript).
I want to consider the passage from the interior of Marx's manuscript in
some detail. It represents an especially creative moment not only of "Critique of
Hegelian Dialectic", or the 1844 manuscripts generally, but of the entirety of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

112
Marx’s theory. Moreover, such an analysis need not detour from an immanent
critique of Habermas’s approaches to Marx.
In fact, the passage in question begins with the concept ("objective
activity”) Habermas identified as providing the great divide between Marx's
mere “renewal” of the insight of another thinker (Feuerbach) and his own
originality (see p. 95). This originality of Marx-distinct from Hegel’s idealism
and Feuerbach's naturalism-must be found, according to Habermas, not in
1844, but only later in the 1845 Theses on Feuerbach. There Marx is said to
have stressed the “active” side idealism had developed in comparison with
materialism. This idea of activity, though gaining in conceptual power in its
movement from an unspecific to a specific meaning, as so argued by
Habermas, was still insufficient when Marx confined it to "social labor."
Habermas's argument does not take fully into account the problematical nature
of the "objective", as it refers to both being and knowledge (through activity, or
labor).
According to the passage in Marx, Hegel's is the fundamental insight into
the "objectification" of man. Hegel's true insight precedes a proper
understanding of objective activity, translated by Habermas as "social labor."
According to Marx, from within the perspective of a universalizing alienation
characteristic of developing capitalist society, man's "objective" being itself is
not given but is "appropriated" only by an act of of negation, "the destruction of
the alienated character of the objective world, by the transcendence of the
objective world in its alienated existence..." (Marx 1967b, 331).
Hegel, himself "within alienation", developed negation of negation
through the opposite of alienation, the latter seen as just as objective as the
existing reality. It is this movement of extemalization and re-intemalization
which Marx, early in his essay, promised to explain and develop. This
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movement, more abstract compared to "labor", is also instrinsic to man's social
"nature". According to Marx, appropriation of this "nature" is achieved through
the negation (the destruction) of a world attribute—not objectivity itself, but its
alienated character.
According to Marx's analysis, Hegel's "insight" cannot be "transcended"
by only another idea, even conceived as "metacritique." Rather, Marx describes
Hegel's insight to be “just as" (Marx 1967b, 331) what Marx later summarizes as
the dual movement of theoretical and practical humanism. Feuerbach's critical
approach to Hegel is descriptive of one of the moments of this movement—
atheism which transcends God....the emergence of "theoretical humanism"; the
other moment is specifically "Marxian"-"communism which transcends private
property, or the vindication of human life as man's property, the emergence of
practical humanism."
Here, Marx is holding in tension Hegel, Feuerbach and the "results" of his
current investigation. As Habermas remarks, Marx of course did not argue for,
“invariant meaning structures of possible social lifeworids", or some
transhistorical concept of human nature. What can be seen in the above
passage is the "sublation" of Hegel in the form of a negation of Feuerbach's
negation, or Marx's particularization of negation of negation. Marx's real thrust
is the recovery of the revolutionary character of Hegel's dialectic-the theoretical
and practical idea as each a moment of the fullest development of the concept.
Thus Marx arrives at the point where, rather than resolution or "synthesis", the
greatest tension resides.
Earlier in this section I had noted that in his introductory remarks in
"Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", at the same time he affirmed Feuerbach's
genuinely critical approach to Hegel, Marx indicated that the first negation
Feuerbach represented was not sufficient; Marx was preparing the ground for
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passing beyond him. This was seen in his seemingly matter-of-fact statement
that Feuerbach viewed Hegel's "negation of negation" as “merely" a
contradiction of philosophy with itself. It was not obvious from this off-hand
remark that Marx viewed Feuerbach's critique of Hegel (or any successful
materialist critique) while an advance, was still incapable of "burying" Hegel
once and for all.
In contrast, what seems readily identifiable as specifically "Marxian" is
Marx's description of "practical humanism" in this later passage: "...communism
which transcends private property is the vindication of actual human life as
man’s property, the emergence of practical humanism. Or, atheism is
humanism mediated through itself by the transcendence of private property...".
However, it is possible to grasp the meaning of this passage only in reference to
what Marx has already forewarned in regard to the two opposing concepts at
issue here: private property and communism.
Notice that the whole passage, as I quoted it (see p.111) is divided about
equally between a description of Hegel's "transcendence" of alienation and
Marx's own recreation of this moment as a "humanism". The two "halves* of the
passage are connected with the phrase, "just as": Marx's concept of "movement"
is (in his words) "just as" Hegel’s. Contrary to the position Habermas often
attributed to Marx, including in "Marx's Metacritique of Hegel", this passage
does not express a decision for "materialism" over "idealism", which in turn can
be traced to a notion of nature as the “absoute ground" of mind.
Already in the first manuscript of 1844, titled, "Alienated Labor" (Marx
1967a), Marx's first dozen pages consisted of an immanent critique of political
economy (to which he later directly tied Hegel as well), the main result of which
was that rather than alienation an effect of private property, it was its cause.
Marx writes,
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...alienated labor is the direct cause of private property (private
ownership of the means of production). The downfall of one is
necessarily the downfall of the other (Marx 1967a, 299).

Therefore, it cannot be the case that Marx, in the passage under consideration
here, is, eg; counterposing the concrete materialist overcoming of property
relations to Hegel’s abstract, "idealist" transcendence of alienation.
Nor can it be the case that Marx is suggesting that the overcoming of
private property relations as the establishment of communism exhausts the
dialectic of negation of negation or, in other words, represents for theory the
materialist appropriation or “subsumption" of Hegelian dialectic. This is already
made evident in the passage that closes the second Manuscript of 1844,
"Private Property and Communism":
The position of communism is the negation of the negation and hence,
for the next stage of historical development, the necessary actual phase
and dynamic principle of the immediate future but not as such the goal of
human development-the form of human society (Marx 1967d, 314).

What this makes clear is that the specifically "Marxian" dialectic, or the
outcome of his explicit critique of Hegel wherein he also classifies and explains
modes of thought (including Feuerbach's) emerging in the latteris shadow, is a
humanism which only fully emerges in opposing, or transcending, not mere
atheism or simple private property as such, but the "mediation" of social
individual and collective self-development by the opposition of atheism and
communism to, respectively, religion and private property. Atheism "depends"
on religion, as communism "depends" on private property. Even with the
establishment of atheism and communism, their opposites remain constitutive of
social reality. The "transcendence" of these oppositions, the necessary second
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negation, first makes possible, "positive humanism, humanism emerging
positively from itself." Marx, in tracing the movement of thought after the
revolutionizing impact of Hegel's philosophy, demonstrates how a recreation of
Hegel's dialectic as a humanism is the only way out of the impasse reached by
political economy and the young Hegelians.
Marx's fundamental cirtique of Hegel involves the fact that the
revolutionary element in Hegel's philosophy remains bottled up in the individual
philosopher, lacking dissemenation through social relations. This is so despite
the fact that Hegel's critique of Kant aimed to overcome just this limited
idealism. Marx, for his part, does not accept the abstract negation of "nature" by
the abstract thinker and, moreover, how ultimately Hegelian dialectic "separates
thinking from the subject" (Marx 1967b, 335). This refers to a (philosophical)
attitude which opposes itself to the "non-theoretica!" character of the lifeworld,
but even to the philosopher, or Hegel himself. Marx is not merely critical of this.
He also promises to explain it.
"Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" established the ground of a humanism
which incorporated the revolutionary element in Hegel's philosophy. Now I will
try to develop a perspective following from this argument by viewing "Critique of
Hegelian Dialectic" from the vantage point in the manuscript where Marx
identifies the, "closing chapter of the Phenomenology on absolute knowledge-a chapter containing the pervasive spirit of the whole book..." (Marx 1967b,
321). Marx begins his exposition of the last chapter of the Phenomenology by
remarking that, “objectivity as such is regarded by Hegel as an alienated human
relationship which does not correspond to the essence of man" (Marx 1967b,
322).
Marx indicates at the outset that this is the fundamental error of not only
Hegel's greatest work, the Phenomenology, but its final chapter, which contains,
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"the pervasive spirit of the whole book." Because he equates "man" with selfconsciousness, the "question" for Hegel is the surmounting of the object of
consciousness. "Man", in Hegel's view, is a spiritual being. Therefore, the
objective appearances, or phenomenology of mind, are the coming to be of
man's true self, the overcoming not only of alienation from spirit, but of
objectivity itself. Marx criticizes this as precluding from the beginning, and in
principle, the self-overcoming of forms of alienation intrinsic to man's objective
"nature", an example for which he offers is man's "suffering being" (Marx 1967b,
335). Marx writes,
Suppose there is a being which is not an object itself and does not have
one. First of all, such a being would be the only being; no other being
would exist outside of it; it would be solitary and alone (Marx 1967b,
326).

What is intriguing in the above is that Marx, in analyzing the general
movement of the last chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology, does not indicate in
his text that Hegel himself seemed to recognize just such a problem in the last
couple paragraphs of the work. In the last couple of paragraphs of the final
chapter of the Phenomenology Hegel describes Golgotha in terms of Absolute
Spirit-the crucifiction and resurrection necessary for the birth of the new.
Absolute Spirit, as a goal, finds its pathway in a process of recollection of
spiritual forms, seen from the side of their free existence, "as they are in
themselves" (history, or the form of contingency), and, "looked at from the side of
their intellectually comprehended organization" (science) (Hegel 1977, 808).
Hegel writes that, "both together form at once the recollection and Golgotha of
Absolute Spirit, the reality, the truth, the certainty of its throne, without which it
were lifeless, solitary and alone" (Hegel 1977, 808). This is an evocation of the
suffering of a revolution in philosophy which has not found social,
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organizational form. From this emerges Marx's perspective, the direction and
meaning of his own concept and practice of organization. The various forms
they assumed (hardly mentioned by Habermas) are related to the revolutionary
element in Hegel's philosophy Marx made his own.
The beginning of Marx's concept of organization (not just his "critique" of
political economy) is rooted in the 1844 "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic." It is
necessary to see such a concept of organization, as it developed through the
1840s-1880s, in order to grasp the meaning of Marx's relationship to Hegel’s
thought, a theme to which Habermas constantly returned. I want to keep this
question of Marx's idea of organization in view, not only for analysis of
Habermas's second chapter on Marx in KHI, to which I will now turn, but
because it is among Marx's most misunderstood concepts. Such
misunderstanding occurs among both Marx's supporters and his detractors,
including Habermas. Thus, the concept is in need of special investigation.

“The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory"

The second chapter on Marx in KHI, which I will take up now, can be
shown to proceed on the basis of Habermas's view of a concept of labor
constituted by, and constitutive of, Marx's relationship to Hegel. But as I just
uncovered in a consideration of "Marx's Metacritique of Hegel", "organization" is
an equally critical concept, though not made nearly explicit as labor. I will now
show that, in fact, "The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory", the
continuation of Habermas's immanent critique of Marx, begins with Mane's
concept of labor, and its historical, supposedly mostly negative consequences,
as well as its effects on the potential for a contemporary critical theory. But the
chapter's "result" actually moves social "organization" to the center. Ironically,
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just when Habermas finally focuses on Marx's concept of labor (toward which,
when not ignoring it, he often indicated suspicion) he largely agrees with what
he interprets Marx's concept to be. In doing so, however, Habermas "discovers"
an absence of a concept of social organization. It is the latter which then
strongly influences the direction of his future work, not only in respect to Marx
and Marxism, but in its entirety, ultimately self-understood as a necessary
alternative to Marx and Marxism, that is, as adequate to the conditons of a
changed capitalism.
Just at that point where Habermas understands Marx's concept of labor,
such that it demands to be thoroughly criticized on the basis of its exclusion at
the categorical level of a concept of social organization, Habermas no longer
refers to works of Marx he had earlier taken up, works he had already brought
up for discussion in connection with “organization". For example, in STPS
Habermas discussed the Communist Manifesto, Critique of the Gotha
Programme and The Civil War in France (on the Paris Commune). These works
(and a recognition that they might be importantly related to a concept of
organization) are inexplicably missing in KHI.
(Interestingly, three years after the completion of the latter work,
Habermas acknowledged, and responded to, criticism on this very basis. In the
1971, "Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Practice", which
served as an introduction for the second German edition (and first English
translation) of the collection of essays known as Theory and Practice,
Habermas confronts the challenge by, 1) informing his readers that he, unlike
Marx, no longer “depended" on Hegelian dialectics; and, 2) indicated that
Georg Lukacs's philosophic concept of the Party was essentially identical with
Lenin's practice of it, and both could find their justification, or basis, in Mane's
own theory).
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In KHI, Habermas begins his second chapter on Marx, "The Idea of the
Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory", with quotation of another passage from
Marx’s 1844 "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic."
The greatness of Hegel's phenomenology and its end result-the
dialectic of negativity as motive and productive principle—is this...that
Hegel grasps the self-generation of man as a process, objectification as
de-objectification, as aiienation...and the overcoming of this alienation; in
other words, that he grasps the essence of labor and
comprehends objective man, who is true because of his reality, as the
result of his own labor (Habermas 1972, 43).

Presentation of this passage serves to anchor the next several pages of
conclusions following from "Marx’s Metacritique of Hegel". In that article (as I
have just shown) Habermas was concerned to make clear the philosophic
argumentation implicit in Marx’s position without which the meaning for
contemporary theoretical problems and possible relevance for construction of a
contemporary theory could not be discerned. In contrast, Marx's “metacritique"
of Hegel now established, Habermas, in "The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge
as Social Theory", returns to Mane's "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" from a new,
more explicitly critical standpoint. Now, all of Marx’s work, beginning with the
passage I just reproduced, is posited as unified under the category of an
"instrumental" appropriation of Hegel. (Recall that already in the beginning of
"Marx's Metacritique" Habermas characterized Marx's approach to Hegel as
'strategic"--"Marx follows the strategy of detaching the exposition of
consciousness in its manifestations from the framework of the philosophy of
identity..." (see p.86).
In view of the alternative interpretation of Marx's 1844 "Critique of
Hegelian Dialectic" I have so far indicated in conjunction with a reading of
Habermas's first article on Marx in KHI, it is not difficult to see that Habermas's
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conclusions, which he constructs as an introduction to his second article on
Marx, contain the potential for extensive controversy in regard to specific texts,
but also the relevance of Hegel, Marx and the relationship of their ideas for a
critical theory which departs from the older Frankfurt School of Marcuse and
others.
Following from my discussion thus far, the context must be seen as
defined on the one hand by Marx's promissory note in his introductory remarks
to explain both Hegel's conception of negation of negation (as the abstract form
of the movement of history) and the difference between it and the critical form it
assumes in Feuerbach and, on the other hand, the passage Habermas quoted
in the opening sentences of his "Marx's Metacritique of Hegel", that is, where
Marx sees "a//the elements of criticism" in Hegel's Phenomenology. (I
previously questioned whether Habermas's treatment of this passage in Marx's
"Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" amounted to a misleading "amalgamation" of
textual citation, interpretation and revision.)
The passage from Marx's "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" which opens
the second article on Marx in KHI, then, appears in Marx's text in the paragraph
directly following the one in which Marx recognizes "all the elements of
criticism" in Hegel's Phenomenology. What characterizes both these passages
is a fundamental affirmation of elements in Hegel's philosophy, though not yet
fully defined by Marx. Simultaneously Marx intimates that a genuine critical
grasp of these elements can only be demonstrated with a conceptual
development which re-creates them as a “humanism".
Now the form of Habermas's presentation-in which his second article on
Marx in KHI flows from his opening quotation of Marx’s passage-implies that
there is something very much like a linear development, which Marx
consciously constructs, from Hegel's idealism to "historical materialism".
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Habermas's characterization of this is in the sentence opening, "The Idea of the
Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory":
The interpretive scheme set forth by Marx for the Phenomenology of
Mind contains the program for an instrumentalist translation of Hegel's
philosophy of absolute reflection...(Habermas 1972, 43).

The remainder of "The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory"-with
all but a very few of its references to the Gmndrisse and Cap/faA-argues that
from the very first pages of "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", through the writing of
Capital, Marx's nearly single-minded purpose was an "instrumentalist
translation" of Hegel’s philosophy.
Now, Marx's aim -as he stated it-was to "explain" negation of negation
through its appearances in Hegel and "modem criticism" (Feuerbach). By
contrast, Habermas's opening description of the research problem as Marx
supposedly understood it is also posited as the conclusion; from the point in
Marx's text with which Habermas opens his second chapter on Marx, the
conclusions from the several decades of Marx's theoretical work were already
decided. The remainder of "The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social
Theory" consists in an attempt to prove this thesis.
The major parts of Habermas's argument consist in discussions of, 1) a
combination of references to the 1844 Manuscripts, and to the Epilogue to the
second edition of Capital, in which an "astonishing" conflation of the human and
natural sciences is said to have been affirmed by Marx; 2) the Grundrisse,
wherein, "there is a model according to which the history of the species is linked
to an automatic transposition of natural science and technology in to the selfconsciousness of the social subject" (Habermas 1972, 48; 3) "communicative
action", as neglected in Marx, and as in need of decoupling from “self
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constitution through labor", and which refers to "individuals and the organization
of their interrelations" (Habermas 1972, 53); 4) Capital, by way of return to, and
development of, Habermas's own previous analysis of "fetishism of commodity",
in light of the thought of the young Hegel, that is, the Hegel prior even to the
Phenomenology. I will briefly summarize these four discusssions and the way
in which Habermas connects them in order to establish the ground of his own
theory, which he implies incorporates and passes beyond Marx's
instrumentalist “translation" of Hegel.
First, it is important to point out that the last discussion enumerated above
actually constitutes the material for the philosophic ground of Habermas's entire
interpretation of the relation of Hegel and Marx in the chapters on Marx in KHI,
at least in so far as Habermas claims originality for his own view in connection
with this. The "beginning" is placed at the “end." Such a presentation, then,
demands an explanation.
The concluding section to “Labor and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's
Jena Philosophy of Mind" (1967), written in the year before KHI, contains the
same quotation which began "The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social
Theory" (see p. 120).
However, in “Labor and Interaction" the first few lines appear as:
What is great in Hegel’s Phenomenology and its final results is that
Hegel comprehends the self-generation of man as a process..."
(Habermas 1973, 168).

The actual passage, even as it appears one year later in KHI, is the
following:
The greatness of Hegel's phenomenology and its end result—the
dialectic of negativity as motive and productive principle~is this...that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

124

Hegel grasps the self-generation of man as a process...[my emphasis,
RR] (Habermas 1972, 43).
In Habermas's earlier "Labor and Interaction" (which I will argue is the
material for the philosophic ground of Habermas's approach to Marx in KHI), the
key phrase is missing from the one passage of Marx’s 1844 EconomicPhilosophic Manuscripts, which Habermas selects as characteristic of Marx's
philosophic relation to Hegel, and as defining the point of departure for
Habemas's original contribution toward overcoming the aporias of German
Idealism. Moreover, there is no ellipsis indicating any part of the quoted text
had been excluded. The missing "dialectic of negativity as motive and
productive principle" (which is several times in Marx’s text referred to as
“negation of negation") was precisely the philosophic concept the young Marx
set out to explain in his investigation of Hegelian dialectic. Even when this
missing phrase re-appears in KHI, it has no effect on Habermas's argument. He
still pays no attention to the concept. Rather, he interprets Marx’s intent as to
translate the Hegelian dialectic as "labor", or the instrumental relation of man to
nature. Clearly, the sentence which directly follows in Marx’s text casts doubt
on Habermas's reductive interpretation. Marx writes,
The actual active relation of man to himself as a species-being or the
confirmation of his species being as actual, that is, human, being is only
possible so far as he actually brings forth all [my emphasis, RR] his
species powers-which in turn is only possible through the collective
effort of mankind, only as a result of history-and treats them as objects,
something which immediately is again only possible in the form of
alienation (Marx 1967b, 321).

Marx's next two paragraphs indicate that the preceding passages (on all
the elements of criticism and dialectic of negativity) were meant to delineate the
lasting value, but limited social specificity, of Hegelian dialectic. The two
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paragraphs in Marx’s 1844 text which follow next, however, single out one
particular chapter of the Phenomenology—its final one--in order to , "indicate in
detail Hegel's one-sidedness and limitations" (Marx 1967b, 321)

Marx writes,

Provisionally, let us say this much in advance: Hegel's standpoint is that
of modem political economy. He views labor as the essence, the self
confirming essence of man; he sees only the positive side of labor not its
negative side (Marx 1967b, 322).
Despite this, Habermas interprets Marx's passage, “that he [Hegel]
grasps the essence of labor and comprehends objective man, who is true man
because of his reality, as the result of his own labor", such that Marx, “discloses
the mechanism of progress in the experience of reflection, a mechanism that
was concealed in Hegel's philosophy" (Habermas 1972, 43). Habermas
continues,
It is the development of the forces of production that provides the
impetus to abolishing and surpassing a form of life that has been
rigidified in positivity and become an abstraction. But at the same time,
Marx deludes himself about the nature of reflection when he reduces it to
labor.

In the two consecutive paragraphs of Marx's text (the first from which
Habermas quoted about half, and the one following which Habermas didn"t
cite) a critical distinction should be drawn. On the one hand, Marx discerns that
Hegel, in a distinctive mode, "grasps the essence of labor." On the other hand,
Marx critically notes in the following paragraph that Hegel, "views labor as the
essence, the self-confirming essence of man; he sees only the positive side of
labor, not its negative side." It should also be re-emphasized here that in Marx's
essay there has been no discussion of the “forces of production". Therefore, it
must be concluded that a characterization of Marx's view as being that
development of the forces of production "provides the impetus to abolishing and
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surpassing a form of life that has been rigidified in positivity and become an
abstraction" is dependent upon Habermas’s previous interpretation (or virtual
reconstruction) of the full range of Marx's writings presented in his previous
chapter, "Marx's Metacritique."
None the less, Habermas approves of the way in which Marx is said to
have disclosed labor as a "mechanism" which was concealed in Hegel's
philosophy. However, he is critical of Marx's "delusion" which, according to
Habermas, reduces the nature of reflection to labor. Habermas offers as the
basis for identification of this "delusion" another quotation from Marx's "Critique
of Hegelian Dialectic". This appears in the sentence immediately following
Habermas's passage (on forces of production) I quoted above (p.125).
...[Marx] identifies "transformative abolition... as objective movement
which absorbs extemalization", with the appropriation of essential
powers that have been externalized in working on material
(Habermas 1973, 43-44).

As can almost be seen just from the above construction, Habermas's
conclusion again consists of a confusing amalgamation of textual citation,
interpretation and revision. First of all, Habermas does not indicate where, or in
which, of Mane's text appears the phrase, "transformative abolition as objective
movement which absorbs extemalization". It, in fact, follows ten pages after
Marx's comments on "essence of labor" to which Habermas directly ties it. In
the absence of such an indication, it might seem that Habermas's argument—
while critical-respects Marx's originality as it is presented in "Critique of
Hegelian Dialectic".
Clearly, this not the case. As I have already shown (see p.111)
Habermas, in the prior "Mane's Metacritique", glaringly disregarded the specific
passage in which Marx commented on "transformative abolition as objective
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movement which absorbs extemalization." This really was not difficult to
observe because Habermas's analysis did not reach that far in to Marx's text; it
began with the final pages, followed by a few quotations from the first half of the
text. Crucially, the particular passage in which Marx comments on
"transformative abolition as objective movement which absorbs extemalization"
(and which Habermas does not provide reference to) is the one in which Marx
describes his philosophy of negation of negation as "humanism" which is only
conceivable on the basis of the ovecoming of the mediation of religion by
atheism and private property by communism. As I discussed in the previous
section of this chapter, this means religion and private property constitute a
negative relation with atheism and communism, a first negation. In this sense,
Marx views humanism as a second negation, that which first begins (represents
a new beginning) out of the specified mediation (religion by atheism and
private property by communism). Since “humanism" was a "philosophy" long
before Hegel or Marx, Marx uses the term here for the specific pupose of
designating his understanding of the originality of his conception of dialectic in
contrast with Hegel's and Feuerbach’s.
As I have indicated, early in his text Marx reports his insight that Hegel
“grasps the essence of labor". Immediately following this observation, Marx
indicates that he departs from Hegel in so far as Hegel's "standpoint" is that of
modem political economy, and Hegel, "views labor as (my emphasis, RR) the
essence, the self-confirming essence of man..." (Marx 1967b, 322).
Here the difference is expressed as that between "essence of labor", and
labor as essence. The further development of Habermas's presentation of
Marx in "The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory", including his
first argument in the chapter concerning Marx's alleged "astonishing demand"
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for a "natural science of man", proceeds on the basis of Habermas's failure to
recognize this difference.
Aside from Habermas's analyses which proceed on the basis of a
questionable reading and presentation of "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic” in
particular, there is an additional peculiarity in his general mode of presentation
of Marx's texts. In the first place, it is difficult to trace Habermas's argument in
both chapters on Marx (Two and Three in KHI) simply because he fails to note
in the references the particular essay of the young Marx (1844) to which he
refers. Ail citations to the young Marx are simply to MEGA (Marx-Engels
Collected Works), and a volume and page number.
Habermas opens "The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social
Theory" with a quotation from Marx's "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic."
Habermas’s ensuing argument implies that Marx’s “strategic" re-interpretation of
Hegel's Phenomenology was the basis of his entire social theory. I have just
shown, from a perspective within Marx's argument in "Critique of Hegelian
Dialectic", that Habermas's position, in so far as it proposed a textual basis for
its acceptance, was not viable.
A further difficulty now consists in the way in which “The Idea of the
Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory" opens with a quotation of a passage
from “Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", and proposes from it to explain not only
the entirety of Marx’s theory when it was fully developed, but its motivating
principle as well. However, in order to support his argument that a "program" of
an instrumental translation of Hegel explained Marx's demand for a “natural
science of man", with its "positivist overtones”, Habermas offers a quotation of a
passage not from "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", but from the essay in Marx's
1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts which proceeded it, “Private Property
and Communism" (Marx 1967d, 301-314). Habermas writes,
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...For Marx as for Kant the criterion of what makes science scientific is
methodologically guranteed cognitive progress. Yet, Marx did not simply
assume this progress as evident. Instead, he measured it in relation to
the degree to which natural-scientific information, regarded as in
essence technically exploitable knowledge, enters the process of
production... (Habermas 1972, 45).

Habermas then presents the following, including his bracketed material, from
Marx's “Private Property and Communism".
The natural sciences have developed an enormous activity and
appropriated an ever growing body of material. Philosophy has
remained just as foreign to them as these remained to philosophy. Their
momentary union [criticizing Schelling and Hegel] was only a fantastic
illusion.Jn a much more practical fashion, natural science has
intervened in human life and transformed it by means of
industry...Industry is the real historical relation of nature, and thus of
natural science, to man (Habermas 1972, 45).

What Habermas excludes, indicated by the ellipsis, is necessary in order
to grasp Marx's meaning. One of Marx's sentences Habermas left out, following
the one stating that the momentary union of science and philosophy was a
fantastic illusion, criticizes historiography because it, “only occasionally takes
account of natural science as a moment of enlightenment, utility, some
particular great discoveries" (Marx 1967d, 311).
With this observation included, it can be seen that Marx's point is that in
contrast (but certainly not with his endorsement) natural science (apparently
immune from the critical attention of the cultural life of society) proceeded to
reconstruct (or undermine) the practical life of millions. This critical approach,
contrary to Habermas's interpretation, is made clear in Marx's sentences which
follow in the same paragraph from which Habermas quoted:
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But natural science has penetrated and transformed human life all the
more practically through industry, preparing for human emancipation
however much it immediately had to accentuate dehumanization (my
emphasis, RR). Industry is the actual historical relationship of nature, and
thus of natural science, to man. If it is grasped as the exoteric
manifestation of man's essential powers, the human essence of nature,
or the natural essence of man can also be understood. Hence, natural
science will lose its abstract material~or rather idealistic—tendency and
become the basis of human science as it has already become, though in
an alienated form, the basis of actual human life. One basis for life and
another for science is in itself a lie (Marx 1967d, 311).

Here Marx is commenting on a new, expansive science which
understands itself as an abstraction from practical life. Its specificity consists in
the detachment of its thought as thought from its historical concretization in the
form of "industry." Describing this situation, perhaps the most telling sentence
among those I just quoted, left out by Habermas, is the one wherein Marx
indicates the moving together of (and thus the difficulty in distinguishing
between) materialism and idealism. This alienation develops at a time when
natural science is coming to so directly "determine" practical life; at the same
time, the socially established "thought" of the society so determined does not
regard the process (practically or philosophically conceived) as within its
domain. In criticizing this Marx is also staking a claim in what he identifies as
the historically conditioned need for a new relationship of ideas to social reality.
Marx's analysis demonstrates a peculiar reversal. "Nature", the object of
the emerging science, is materialist at its core. Yet, because this science
abstracts from human natural attributes their natural objects, and in doing so
adopts a passive attitude toward the relation of the two forms of "nature" as it
develops (importantly as following from science's own achievements) in
"industry", its materialistic mode of knowledge is "abstract", transforming itself
into an abstract materialism, or an idealistic tendency. As I have noted, Marx
describes his own philosophic originality in terms of a humanism which gets at
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the root of idealism's and materialism’s aporias, the impasse reached in the
shadow of Hegel's Absolutes. This is the basis upon which Marx describes the
process of development of natural science and industry as "dehumanized", the
description which is indispensible for understanding the passage at issue here;
and, it is this description which Habermas's quotation of the text ignores.
When Marx writes that, “however much it [natural science through
industry] had to accentuate dehumanization", clearly he is not affirming the
process. Instead, he is disclosing a process which, in his view, is not even
critically approached by society's existing phiiosophies—idealist or materialist. I
have already shown that Marx, in the final part of these 1844 manuscripts, and
thus in something like a "summation", describes his own philosophy as
"humanism". Here, in "Private Property and Communism", Marx is clearly
searching for a divergence—particularly in thought-from a powerful historical
tendency in which thought (natural science applied in industry) is uncoupling
from life, not unlike the description of Hegel’s Absolute as a separation of
thinking from the subject, including the philosopher (Hegel) himself, I recounted
in the first part of this chapter.
Following his questionable presentation of a part of a paragraph from
"Private Property and Communism", Habermas quotes a Russian reviewer of
Capital, in order to reinforce his argument concerning Marx's, "program" for an
instrumentalist translation of Hegel's philosophy of absolute reflection, in which
Habermas holds Marx identifies "labor" as the "mechanism" of "progress" in the
experience of reflection, and in which this progress is measured, "in relation to
the degree to which natural-scientific information, regarded as in essence
technically exploitable knowledge, enters the process of production."
The features of the passage he quotes include the reviewer's reference to
Marx's demonstration,
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through "precise scientific investigation", and to how Marx, "considers the
movement of society as a process of natural history, governed by laws
that are not only independent of the will, consciousness and intention of
men, but instead, and conversely, determine their will, consciousness,
and intentions... "(Habermas 1972, 46).

In the epilogue to the second edition of Capital, Marx is said to quote with
approval this passage from the Russian reviewer,
Marx's Capital did analyze historically specific features of capitalist
society-fomns of abstract social domination specific to capitalism of which the
Russian reviewer's description is accurate. However, Marx's theory pointed to
the possibility of overcoming precisely the historically specified society of which
this form of domination was characteristic.
Obviously, this interpretation is not congruent with Habermas's
presentation. Following the quotation from the Russian reviewer, Habermas
returns to "Private Property and Communism", and quotes a sentence from the
paragraph directly following the one he quoted (see p. 129 this chapter) before
citing the Russian reviewer of Capital.
Natural science will eventually subsume the science of man just as the
science of man will subsume natural science: there will be a single
science (Habermas 1972, 46).

Since Habermas has already excluded the important context in which
Marx poses the challenge of bringing the knowledge attained in natural science
to the point where its results are not imposed on life, he is able to then argue
that from 1844 to 1867 (completion of volume one of Capital, what motivated
Marx's theory construction was an endorsement of the "subsumption" of the
human sciences by natural science.
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More generally, Habermas's argument implies that all of Marx's work was
intentionally molded into a preconceived framework already set in the 1844
manuscripts. (This raises a different problem in that earlier I showed that in
"Marx's Metacritique" Habermas's argument implied the contrary, that 1844,
because it remained for the most part, within the naturalistic realm of
Feuerbach, still lacking a specified epistemological dimension, was relatively
unimportant in his more mature theory).
Habermas's ensuing argument aims to demonstrate that Marx only
recognized the real consequences of his early intentions when confronted with
problems in his later working out of the Grundrisse. In this connection,
Habermas returns to his conclusion in "Marx's Metacritique" wherein it is said
the philosophic framework of Marx's thought was too narrow to include all the
elements his actual theory admitted. Thus, it is precisely at this point, that is, in
his consideration of the Grundrisse, where Habermas first proposes
"communicative action" (organization of social relations) as the "second
dimension" necessary in order to grasp the meaning of "dialectic" of forces and
relations of production, supposedly Marx's essential finding. Hence now I will
consider how Habermas relates his analysis of 1844 to the Grundrisse,
including his initiation of “communicative action", related to the impasse Marx is
said to have reached (the transposition of natural science into a self-conscious
subject).
First, recall that in BPSMC, Habermas had already found in some of the
same passages in the Grundrisse an economic argument which contradicted
Marx's "labor theory of value." Habermas had concluded from this that Marx
chose to ignore the finding, suggesting that this was perhaps because Marx's
preconceptions were at odds with rigorous social theoretic concerns.
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Similarly, in “The Idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory",
Habermas finds that Marx identified how development of the forces of
production, the direction of which was toward the reduction of necessary labor
time to a minimum, leads to a qualitative change, wherein the worker takes a,
“place alongside the process of production instead of being its chief agent".
The Grundrisse also indicated that such a state of affairs (an automatic
regulation of social production) was not in itself a sufficient condition of social
emancipation; yet, in view of Marx’s “metacritque of Hegel", which emerged as
an idea of "synthesis through social labor", Marx's hypothetical example in the
Grundrisse depicted the limits intrinsic to Marx's philosophical selfunderstanding. Hence, Habermas in effect claims that the philosophical
foundations of Marx's thought, traced directly from the 1844 "Critique of the
Heglian Dialectic" to the Grundrisse, are thrown into serious doubt not primarily
by the opposition to them of another theory, but by the logic and development of
Marx's own investigations. At this point, Habermas understands his critique of
Marx's theory as immanent. If, however, contemporary theory is unable to
understand Marx better than Marx understood himself, and thereby “rescue" the
theory, the obvious alternative would be to reject Marx's theory, assuming that a
better theory was available or was in the process of development.
Habermas notes that in the Grundrisse Marx, "very precisely
distinguishes the self-conscious control of the social life process by the
combined producers from an automatic regulation of the process of production
that has become independent of these individuals" (Habermas 1972, 51).
Yet, according to Habermas, this was only one of the two versions Marx
presented. The important feature of Habermas's analysis consists in the idea
that Marx presented in the Grundrisse two separate models: one according to
which there is, “an automatic transposition of natural science and technology
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into a self-consciousness of the social subject"; and another according to which
(in Habermas's view), “the self constitution of the species takes place not only in
the context of men's instrumental action upon nature but simultaneously in the
dimension of power relations that regulate men's interaction among
themselves" (Habermas 1972, 51). It is on the basis of his detection of two
different "models", or "versions" that, Habermas concludes, "makes visible an
indecision that has its foundation in Marx's theoretical approach itself”
(Habermas 1972, 52).
Before considering Habermas's Grundrisse argument in detail, it is
important to make clear the way in which he links the 1844 Marx to it. Recall the
passage Habermas quoted from "Private Property and Communism" in which,
"natural science will eventually subsume the science of man just as the science
of man will subsume natural science: there will be a single science." In
interpreting this as an "astonishing demand" for a natural science of man, "with
its positivist overtones", Habermas views this passage as Marx's “selfunderstanding of economics." Moreover, he understands it as an "abbreviated
methodological self-understanding...nevertheless a logical consequence of a
frame of reference restricted to instrumental action" (Habermas 1972, 46).
Habermas argues that 'synthesis through social labor" or, in other words,
acceptance of his interpretation of Marx's "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" as a
“metacritique of Hegel", leads to a science of man analogous to natural science,
both under categories of "knowledge for control" (Habermas 1972, 47).
Earlier I found that the context of Marx's passage Habermas quoted did
not support Habermas's interpretation. Now, by reference to a long passage in
the Grundrisse, Habermas proposes to reinforce and extend further into the
"mature theory" Marx's supposed early, non-critical approach to the natural
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sciences, an approach with which Habermas argues Marx ’subsumes" the
‘science of man":
To the degree...that large-scale industry develops, the creation of social
wealth depends less on labor time and the quanity of labor expended
than on the power of the instruments that are set in motion during labor
time and which themselves in turn—their powerful effectivenessthemselves in turn are in no proportion to the immediate labor time that
their production costs. Rather they depend on the general level of
science and technological progress, or the application of science to
production. (The development of this science, especially natural science,
and all others along with it, is itself in turn proportional to the
development of material production.) For example, agriculture becomes
the mere application of the science of material exchange as it is to be
regulated most advantageously for the entire social body. Real wealth
manifests itself rather-and large industry reveals this—in the tremendous
disproportion between labor that has been reduced to a pure abstraction
and the power of the productive process that it oversees. As man relates
to the process of production as overseer and regulator, labor no longer
seems so much to be enclosed within the process of production. (What
holds for machinery holds just as well for the combination of human
activities and the development of human intercourse.) The laborer no
longer inserts a modified natural object between the object and himself.
Instead he inserts the natural process that he has transformed into an
industrial one as a medium between himself and inorganic nature, of
which he takes command. He takes his place alongside the process of
production instead of being its chief agent. In this transformation what
appears as the keystone of production and wealth is neither the
immediate labor performed by man himself nor the time he labors but the
appropriation of his own general productive force, his understanding of
nature and its mastery through his societal existence-in a word, the
development of the social individual...
Therewith production based on exchange value collapses, and the
immediate material process of production sheds the form of scantiness
and antagonism. The free development of individualities and therefore
not the reduction of necessary labor time in order to create surplus value,
but rather the reduction of society's necessary labor to a minimum, which
then has its counterpart in the artistic, scientific, and other education of
individuals through the time that has become free for all of them and
through the means that have been created (Habermas 1972, 48-50).

In respect to Habermas's transition from Marx's 1844 manuscripts to the
Grundrisse, quotation of the above passage is intended to show the obvious
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limits of Marx's early notion, as interpreted by Habermas, that "synthesis
through social labor" potentially characterized an emancipatory theory of
society. Habermas presents a nearly seamless theoretical progression from the
short passage in "Private Property and Communism" to the passages he then
quotes in the Grundrisse. However, the alternative interpretation I suggested—
that the context of "Private Property and Communism" rendered Marx's
observations unambiguously critical of what Habermas argues they affirm~is
supported as well in the long passage from the Grundrisse Habermas selects to
illustrate his argument.
Although I intend to summarize (though briefly) in more general terms
Habermas's argument concerning the Grundrisse, first it should be noted that
the ellipsis in Habermas's quotation of Marx's Grundrisse refers to a passage
that seems to be relevant in respect to Habermas's investigation. As a matter of
fact, the several sentences Habermas does not quote, from a passage he
reproduces covering nearly one and a half pages, are the only ones containing
phrases Marx emphasized. Beginning at the ellipsis, and ending where
Habermas continues his quotation, Marx writes,
The theft of alien labor time, on which the present wealth is based,
appears as a miserable foundation in face of this new one creatd by
large-scale industry itself. As soon as labor in the direct form has ceased
to be the great well-spring of wealth, labor time ceases and must cease
to be its measure, and hence exchange value of use value. The surplus
labor of the mass has ceased to be the condition for the development of
general wealth, just as the non-labor of the few, for the development of
the general powers of the human head (Marx 1973, 705).

Marx develops his analysis of alienated labor, here as the basis of a
contradictory relationship of value and wealth constitutive of capitalism as a
historically specific social formation. The specificity of this formation is made
vivid by way of a demonstration of self-abolition immanent in the categories
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adequate to their object. It is a way of making a point Marx emphasized on
many occasions: that a specification of the unique features of a social formation,
or demonstration of its particularity, is the ground for conceiving that formation
as transient. Obviously, the “particular" features thus identified could be held to
be bound up with the "absolute", or universality as such. Here, Marx's analysis
of the contradictory relation of value and wealth specifies the relation of the
universal (value) to the particular (form of wealth) as pointing to the "end" of
capitalism intrinsic to its constitutive feature (labor as mediating itself and social
relations generally).
The last sentence is most directly relevant in the present context, that is,
for the particular issue of the importance of the part of the text not quoted by
Habermas in his connection of the theoretical basis of 1844 to the Grundrisse:
The surplus labor of the mass has ceased to the condition for the
development of general wealth, just as the non-labor of the few, for the
development of the general powers of the human head.

The idea in “Private Property and Communism", that the relation of
natural science and industry was the dehumanized but "real historical relation"
of nature, and thus of natural science, to man", is developed here in the
Grundrisse as the division between mental and manual activity (labor)
constitutive of the capitalist social form, its abolition immanent in the
contradictory relationship of value and wealth. The idea of the relationship of
the development of the "general powers of the human head" to "the non-labor of
the few" as its condition is akin to the relation of natural science to industry Marx
had analyzed in 1844 as a mode of alienation constitutive of a historically
specific social formation. Marx's analysis does not imply a transhistorical
concept of labor, a "non-theory" of knowledge which conceives nature as an
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"absolute" ground of mind. Rather, it suggests a socio-historical theory of
knowledge, in which the mediation of labor by labor, and of social relations by
labor, characterizes only modem (capitalist) society.
While the interpretation I just suggested makes clear that Marx viewed
his investigation in the Grundrisse as making more concrete his earlier criticism
of the relation of natural science and industry, Habermas argues that the same
investigation, to the contrary, rendered Marx's philosophy as the ground for
social theory non-viable. Habermas indicates that the significance of this
section of the Grundrisse lies in a dead-end Marx reached in his attempted
narrow, materialistic appropriation of Hegel. This is expressed as the idea that
in order for Marx's attempt to have succeeded, the end of direct labor as the
source of value, and labor time as its measure, would have to include an
"automatic transposition of natural science and technology into a selfconsciousness of the social subject (general intellect)..." (Habermas 1972, 48).
Habermas concludes that the Grundrisse contains evidence that Marx
recoiled from such a notion. The section of the Grundrisse containing the
passage Habermas quoted at length (see p.136) marks, for Habermas, the end
of a line of thought he had traced, originating in "Marx's Metacritique of Hegel".
Noting that the Grundrisse was only a "rough sketch" (Habermas 1972, 50) of
Capital, Habermas now brings to view that his entire preceding expositon, of the
movement of Marx's thought over the period 1844-1858, was of only the "nonofficial" version of Marx's theory, a version based on an appropriation of Hegel
on a relatively narrow scale, that is, "production as the "activity" of a selfconstituting species" (Habermas 1972, 51). Habermas writes,
Even in the Grundrisse we find already the official view that the
transformation of science into machinery does not by any means lead of
itself to the liberation of a self-conscious subject (Habermas 1972, 51).
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Without commenting on it, much less providing an explanation,
Habermas now cites passages (which he says articulate Mane's "official
version") appearing more than two hundred pages prior to those he has just
analyzed and consigned to the non-official version. These earlier passages
(Marx 1973, 470), which Habermas characterizes as a departure from an idea
of a self-constitution of the species through instrumental action upon nature
only, are said to recognize another dimension, that of "power relations" that
regulate men's interaction among themselves" (Habermas 1972, 51):
...so that the aggregate labor as a totality is not the work of the individual
worker, and is the work of the various workers together only insofar as
they are combined and not insofar as they relate to each other as
combining of their own accord...(Habermas 1972, 51).
...In its combination this labor [of scientized production] appears just as
much in the service of an alien will and an alien intelligence, which
directs it. It has its psychic unity outside itself and its material unity
subordinated to the unity of the machinery, of fixed capital, which is
grounded in the object. Fixed capital, as an animated monster,
objectifies scientific thought and is in fact the encompassing aspect. It
does not relate to the individual worker as an instrument. Instead he
exists as an animated individual detail, a living isolated accessory to the
machinery (Habermas 1972, 51-52).

Now, the passages do not indicate a possibility (and therefore any
necessity at the categorical level) of separating labor (insturmental action) in
capitalism from "interaction" (power relations). Rather, Marx's observation is
that intrinsic to the specific mode of production with which he is there
concerned, not only is the individual subsumed by the general. The general
itself has its unity outside itself. This insight is the basis of Marx’s distinction
between abstract and concrete labor, or more precisely, the mediation of labor
by itself, constitutive of captialist social relations generally. In the passage
which appears later in the Grundrisse, specifically those sentences Habermas
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excluded, Marx held that, "As soon as labor in the direct form has ceased to be
the great well-spring of wealth, labor time ceases and must cease to be its
measure, and hence exchange value of use value" (Marx 1973, 705).
Here Marx is describing an abstract form of social compulsion (and its
transience) which is not captured through an uncovering of "power relations"
alone, or in an evocation of the concreteness associated with characterizations
such as "class domination". The more abstract type of social domination is
rooted in the process whereby labor mediates itself, and also mediates social
relations generally, captured at the categorical level through the concepts of
value, commodity, captial, etc. In capitalist society the instrumental and social,
which might exist as two different dimensions in other forms of society,
constitute in a historically specific relationship a single contradictory social
totality.
Habermas interprets as Marx’s "official" version the above passage
(p. 140) in the Grundrisse, and another he next quotes from the same text.
Habermas's view is that Marx was forced by his own investigation to recognize
a critical second (differentiated) dimension of social constitution not only in a
general historical sense, but even with capitalism specifically.
Following this, Habermas next explains Marx's idea of class struggle in
terms of the, "institutional framework that resists a new stage of reflection"
(Habermas 1972, 52). In other words, from the perspective of development of
science and technology, wealth (which Habermas conflates with Marx's concept
of value), when losing its basis in labor time, does not automatically lead to “self
conscious control of the social life process" (Habermas 1972, 52).
According to Habermas, the "distinctive feature of capitalism" (Habermas
1972, 52) is that the "power relations" at the basis of class struggle are defined
economically, not politically (Habermas 1972, 52). Habermas then concludes
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that Marx‘s attempt to develop an emancipatory social theory as self-constitution
through labor intended to escape, but in fact necessarily compelled, labor's
distinction from social interaction. In fact, it became clear there was a need to
directly confront the former's primacy.
One more peculiarity in Habermas's citation of Marx's texts should be
noted here. As I mentioned earlier, Habermas's argument begins with an
analysis of what he eventually designates as only one of two versions of Marx's
appropriation of Hegel. His attention first to this "unofficial version" relies on
passages in Marx’s Grundrisse which appear much later in the text than those
he subsequently cites to ground his analysis of Marx's "official" version, which is
said to recognize the centrality of "interaction", and is connected to a much
broader materialist appropriation of Hegel. Yet, Habermas's final citation of the
Grundrisse, offered as conclusive support of his idea of Marx's second, "official"
version, reverts to the same page he initially cited for support of his idea of the
existence of a first, non-official version:
On the one hand it [capital] thus calls to life all the powers of science and
of nature as of social combination and social intercourse, to make the
creation of wealth (relatively) independent of the labor time expended on
it. On the other, it wants to take the gigantic social forces generated in
this way and measure them against labor time and confine them within
the bounds required in order to preserve as value the value already
created (Habermas 1972, 52).

In short, for textual support of his thesis of two versions or models,
characteristic of Marx’s attempt to develop a social theory, Habermas relies for
his reconstruction of the later officiated version on portions of the Grundrisse
preceding by hundreds of pages the paragraphs he maintains describe the first
(or earlier) non-offical version. Moreover, while on the one hand implying that a
comprehensive reading of the Grundrisse brings to view "two versions” of
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Marx's attempt at a critical social theory not otherwise easily accessible,
Habermas ends his treatment of the Grundrisse by citing the same page in
Marx's text to support the "official" version he had already cited to support the
non-official version. I point this out to suggest that while it is in principle
possible to argue that Marx offers two mutually exclusive versions (or models) of
a possible social theory on a single page, this does not appear to have been
Habermas's intent. None the less, for support of an idea of a second, "offical"
model, Habermas inexplicably quotes from the textual evidence he offered for
his assertion of the first, non-official model.
This in itself does not demand a rejection of an idea that two (or more)
versions of the conditions for social theory might be found in Marx's Grundrisse.
Neither, however, does it provide convincing support for Habermas's major
thesis, originating in "Marx's Metacritique of Hegel", that Marx embarked on a
futile quest (over nearly two decades) to construct a social theory on the basis of
the idea of "synthesis through social labor."
Predominately on the basis of his tracing a sort of subterranean line of
development found in a pair of texts Marx never published (both of which
remained unpublished for several generations after Marx's death) Habermas
next characterizes Marx's theoretic originality. From Marx's broad, evolutionary
perspective, a new stage of reflection connected to objective changes following
from the relationship of man to nature are met by resistance of an "institutional
framework...not immediately the result of a labor process" (Habermas 1972, 52).
Habermas connects this to a broader, materialist appropriation of Hegel.
In light of this broad, evolutionary context Habermas, then, pinpoints
Marx’s specific theoretical contribution-identification of the distinctive feature of
capitalism, which consists of grasping "power" and/or class-struggle (apparently
common to all societies) as economically instead of politically defined. The
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implication is that Marx, as his material investigations unfolded, was forced to
take account of both labor and interaction, despite the fact that he never revised
the metatheory of “synthesis through social labor.“ Habermas writes,
While instrumental action corresponds to the constraint of external nature
and the level of the forces of production determine the extent of social
control over natural forces, communicative action stands in
correspondence to the suppression of man's own nature (Habermas
1972, 53).
Habermas, continuing an apparent paraphrase of Marx's “official"
version, describes, on the one hand, a transhistorical concept of labor in which,
“society owes emancipation from the external forces of nature to labor
processes, that is to technically exploitable knowledge (including the
'transformation of natural sciences into machinery’") (Habermas 1972, 53).
On the other hand, "the revolutionary activity of struggling classes
(including the critical activity of reflective sciences") (Habermas 1972, 53),
needed for emancipation from the compulsion of internal nature, and the
replacement of institutions based on force by an, "organization of social
relations that is bound only to communication free from domination", occurs in a
different medium that that of "productive activity" (Habermas 1972, 53).
Habermas emphasizes that Marx sees both categories of social practice
connected in the system of social labor. Yet, as Marx was led to see by his
investigations found in the Grundrisse, constitution of the species in the
dimension of labor, a supression of the constraint of external nature, finds its
limits none the less in the “organization of society itself as an automaton"
(Habermas 1972, 55). In the other medium, the "social formative process",
communicative action is set free as communicative action...the organization of
society linked to decision-making processes on the basis of discussion free
from domination" (Habermas 1972, 55).
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Following these observasions (among others)-which sen/e the purpose
of defining the limits of Marx’s attempted materialist appropriation of Hegel on
the narrow scale of self-constitution of the species through social labor, and
moving the intial outline of his own theory of communicative action into the
philosophic vacuum thus identified-Habermas concludes the chapter with a
discussion linking the young Hegel's theoretical-practical synthesis (not
incorporated into his system) to Marx's concept of commodity fetishism in the
first chapter of Capital.
As Habermas describes it, the basis of the synthesis, found only in the
early Hegel, is the "dialectic of the moral life" in Christianity (Habermas 1972,
56). Hegel construed crime as a destruction of the moral totality which negates
the complementarity of unconstrained communication, placing the individual
over the (social) totality. After struggle there is reconciliation between the
criminal and the other when they experience the common ground of their
existence through a dialogic relation of recognizing oneself in the other.
Here, Habermas returns to the question of the specificity of contemporary
capitalism. Habermas sees Marx's “mystery of the commodity form" as a
description of ‘ objective illusion", wherein the object of social conflict is
unrecognizable for both parties (Habermas 1972, 59). The significance of this,
according to Habermas, is that it restricts the communication of the conflicting
classes while bringing, "ideologies from the heights of mythological or religious
legitimation of tangible domination and power down into the system of social
labor" (Habermas 1972, 60). This is "unmasked by the critique of commodity
fetishism" (Habermas 1972, 60).
From this, Habermas argues for two consequences for the
methodological status of social theory. The "science of man" includes the 'self
reflection of class consciousness in its manifestations" (Habermas 1972, 61),
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and as self-consciousness, knows, "itself to be involved in the self-formative
process that it recollects", in order to free itself from "objective illusion"
(Habermas 1972, 61). Marx does not distinguish between a "science of man"
as critique of ideology and the natural sciences:
By equating critique with natural science, he disavowed it. Materialist
scientism only reconfirms what absolute idealism had already
accomplished: the elimination of epistemology, in favor of unchained
universal scientific knowledge—but this time of scientific materialism
instead of absolute knowledge (Habermas 1972, 63).

The meaning of "The idea of the Theory of Knowledge as Social Theory",
the title to his second chapter on Marx in KHI, only becomes clear in view of the
difficult conclusion I just outlined. The idea in the title does not ultimately refer
to Hegel, to Marx, or to Marx's attempted "materialist appropriation" of Hegel.
Rather, it proposes a new ground for a contemporary critical theory, dependent
upon a reconfiguration of not only the elements of labor and interaction, but of
philosophy and natural science. The implication is that Hegel substantially
worked out, but abandoned, a dialectic of morality intrinsic to which was the
dialogic relation missing in his absolute knowledge. The negative historical
effects of Hegel's abandonment of this dialectic are equated with Marx's refusal
to separate natural science from critique as the principle of a science of man.
Habermas, in contrast, proposes the task of a reconstruction of forms of class
consciousness which would include "self-consciousness" in the form of critique,
the only way to escape "objective illusion", his characterization of what Marx
identified with his analysis of "fetishism of commodity."
In view of "Marx's Metacritique of Hegel", this amounts to the idea that
both Hegel's absolute ground (of nature) as mind, and Marx's metacritical
absolute ground (of mind) as nature, not only were both perhaps constitutive of
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the state of affairs in which a non-refiective positivism prevailed; equally
importantly, these "absolutes" proved not to contain within them the resources
for an emancipatory critical theory of contemporary society. I will conclude this
section with some brief critical comments on Habermas's conclusion.
In Habermas's interpretation, Marx's section on "Fetishism of the
Commodity and its Secret" analyzes a phenomenon of "objective illusion". He
traces this sort of illusion to the historical condition wherein class domination
(and conflict) shifted from a more or less direct political form to an imbededness
in the economic relation, defined by the free labor contract, or the, "justice of the
exchange of equivalents inherent in exchange relations" (Habermas 1972, 60).
It is precisely "self reflexive critique" (of ideology), then, which would dissolve
the fetish of the commodity. Just as labor as the relation of man to nature has
historically created the material conditions free of scarcity (constraint of external
nature) "critique" as specific to "science of man" has its purpose in the freeing of
people from "ideological delusion" (Habermas 1972, 55).
As I have previously emphasized, Marx's analysis of capitalism
developed a concept of a specific and, in crucial respects, unique form of social
relations. Apparently, with similar close attention to nuance, he also remarked
on the indebtedness of his own theory to previous thought, and reflected on its
unique features. This is especially so in regard to the section on "The Fetishism
of the Commodity and its Secret." In fact, in the first edition of volume one of
Capital, this section was not even included as a separate section of Chapter
One (Anderson 1998).
In the "Fetish of the Commodity" Marx appears to be at pains to dispel
any possible illusion that capitalism's social fetish is any sort of illusionobjective or otherwise Marx writes,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

148
In other words, the labor of the private individual manifests itself as an
element of the total labor of society only through the relations which the
act of exchange establishes between the products, and, through their
mediation, between the producers. To the producers, therefore, the
social relations between their private labors appear as what they are (my
emphasis, RR) ie; they do not appear as direct social relations between
persons in their work, but rather as material relations between persons
and social relations between things (Marx 1977, 165-166).
In addition, Marx does not root this dehumanized social form (which is
not an illusion) in the “justice of the exchange of equivalents inherent in
exchange relations", but rather in the “two-fold character of labor itself" (Marx
1977, 166). Marx is referring to the abstract domination characteristic of
capitalism, the mediation of labor by itself, and of social relations generally.
Next, Marx proceeds to argue that no amount of “ideology critique" can
alter the basic form of dehumanization that has been identified at the basis of
the capitalist social formation. Marx writes,
The religious reflections of the real world can, in any case, vanish only
when the practical relations of everyday life between man and man, and
man and nature, generally present themselves to him in a transparent
and rational form. The veil is not removed from the countenance of the
social life process, ie; the process of material production, until it becomes
production by freely associated men, and stands under their conscious
and planned control (Marx 1977, 173).

Legitimation Crisis

Legitimation Crisis (LC) is comparable to the earlier works of Habermas I
have already considered in that it too depends on an approach to Marx in order
to ground its inquiry into the possibility of a contemporary critical theory. In
contrast to the previous studies I have considered, however, there is little
evidence of an increasingly close reading of Marx in any way constitutive of
Habermas's work. To the contrary, Marx's theory is presented as largely
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assimilated and classifiable within the history of critical thought. Habermas, in
fact, classifies it, on one level, as belonging to one of four social formations,
intrinsic to each of which is a typical crisis potential. Marx "belongs" to the
liberal-capitalist social formation while, by implication, the emerging theory of
which LC itself is a groundwork, “belongs" to a qualitatively changed "advanced
capitalism".
KHI could be interpreted to have suggested that, from a contemporary
perspective, and in recognition of the particular problems to which it must
respond, Marx's theory was inadequate in the form in which he presented it.
The inadequacy was rooted in Marx's own ambiguity and indecision, and also
tied to Marx’s own theoretical principle concerning dependency of theory on
historical specificity.
According to Habermas, the theory itself, however, might still, on the
basis of a process of reconstruction, be supplemented in such a way as to make
plausible its contemporary relevance. None the less, in the previous section my
close reading of Habermas's text raised questions concerning Habermas's
methodology and mode of appropriation of Marx's ideas upon which one would
be expected to evaluate what might be relevant for a contemporary critical
theory. The importance of this challenge to Habermas's approach to Marx is
two-fold: if Habermas's immanent critique of Marx fails, and that proposed
critique's specificity is judged by Habermas to be a necessary step toward
overcoming the predominance of a traditional, non-emancipatory form of theory,
then it might be concluded that a different approach to, and interpretation of,
Marx demands a different orientation than that which is found in Legitmation
Crisis and in later works which follow. In other words, yet another rethinking of
Marx's theory might be necessary in order to accomplish Habermas’s goal (a
contemporary emancipatory social theory which has settled accounts with
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Marx’s theory), a rethinking that might also, however, open to very close scrutiny
as well Habermas’s various claims for the status of his own, emerging theory.
Arguably,Habermas's claims are substantially based on overcoming limitations
he claimed to disclose but did not credibly demonstrate in his close examination
of Marx's theory.
Upon close examiniation, Habermas's presentation of Marx was weakly
executed. This can be seen in the examples I provided concerning what has to
be frankly described as inaccuracies in key textual citations of Marx's work. On
the theoretical level, I demonstrated that Habermas's interpretation of Marx led
not to reasonable prospects for its possible supplementation and/or
reconstruction, but rather to a necessity for its rejection.
In LC, Habermas's dual form of approach to Marx's theory continues. On
the one hand, and in the most affirmitive sense, Marx's theory is presented as
adequate, though bound, to liberal capitalism. In a negative sense, the
presence of Mane’s theory is extremely tangential to Habermas's attempt to
conceptualize what has succeeded the form of capitalism to which he has
confined the problematic identified with Mane. The exception to the latter is
Habermas's couple of reminders to the effect that Marx, besides his
development of an economic theory (or a theory of society as basically
economic) was also the author of political works, such as The Eighteenth
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Habermas 1975, 31; 114). However, he does
not attribute contemporary importance to the political orientation of those works.
Rather, he suggests that their current significance lies in how Marx (not even
fully consciously so) felt compelled to link the systemic theory of crisis he had
worked out with the law of value to actual historical events; in other words,
Habermas implies that Marx's economic theory of society as a crisis theory was
not intrinsically related to actual social relations but, as he holds Marx's shows,
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was capable of offering a certain type of explanation of them, through a
basically external standpoint. However, it is precisely this form of theory
Habermas proposes to overcome with an increasingly invoked theory of
communicative action.
My consideration of LC will not be in the form of a close reading of the
text, unlike in previous sections. In earlier sections, a careful reading of
Habermas demanded a close reading of Marx's texts. Much more than was the
case with the first generation of Critical Theorists, Habermas made his
interpretation of Marx's texts directly accessible, and deliberately rendered
transparent his evaluation of the consequences flowing from his reading. In
doing so, he thus consistently attempted to illustrate the importance of preparing
the ground for, and thus making it possible to practice, critical self-reflection.
Here, "critical self-reflection" refers to the type of "dialogue" Habermas invoked
in KHI, where he proposed to uncover abandoned stages of reflection from Kant
to Marx in order to reorient a contemporary critical theory characterized by its
own pessimism and apparent lack of social relevance.
Yet, to re-emphasize, in contrast to Habermas's earlier studies, LC quite
clearly is not based on any further close reading of Marx. Rather, Marx's theory
is quickly relegated to the background, as Habermas proposes a framework for
a theory of social evolution, the inspiration for which, ironically, is attributed to
Marx. In respect to this, Habermas implies his willingness to learn from Marx.
The primary lesson he recognizes derives from his interpretation of Marx's
notion of the specificity of capitalism. This specificity is defined primarily in
terms of property relations and the market, or the legitimating function of the
latter for the former. In addition, Marx's concept of crisis is thought to describe
the "deep" structure underlying their surface complementarity.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

152
In Habermas's view, capitalism according to Marx is distinguishable from
other social formations in that its “principle of organization” is defined
economically, through wage labor and capital, a relationship of classes, the
initial expression of which however is not directly political. The idea of the
exchange of equivalents in the market is the legitimating ideological form said
to be the target of Marx's "unmasking" critique. Thus, very early on in LC
Habermas attributes to Marx, "the first social-scientific concept of system crisis"
(Habermas 1975, 2). Yet, in what sets the basic tone for the remainder of the
study, Habermas writes,
But I do not wish to add to the history of Marxian dogmatics yet another
elucidation of his crisis theory...My aim is rather to introduce
systematically a social scientifically useful concept of crisis (Habermas
1975, 2).

Hence, Habermas defines the context as essentially set by, on the one
hand, "dogmatic" crisis theory rooted in an idea of the contradiction between the
social production of wealth and its private appropriation, the systemic effects of
which turn back on and threaten that which is socially integrated. On the other
hand, in consideration of possible basic changes in the social formation since
Marx, the potential for a social-scientific concept of crisis has emerged. In
counter-posing these two perspectives-the one dependent primarily on an idea
of economic integration of society, the other mainly systems theoretic,
dependent on an idea of political integration (Habermas 1975, 5)—Habermas
highlights the originality, and suggests the superiority, of his own theory, in so
far as it offers a salient critique of both positions. He analyzes the socio-cuiturai
sphere as the locus of crisis potential integral to specifying the contemporary
social formation in contrast with early captialism.
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Legitimation in late capitalism has been re-politicized in that the state
plays a major role in the distribution of obligations and rewards, thus rendering
Marx's "scientistic economism" obsolete: Politics has been introduced into the
foundation of value theory. In view of Weber's research on rationalization,
autonomous forms of reason-science, art, and morality-characterize a
modernity wherein demands for legitimation of decisions uncouple from purely
market mechanisms. Functionalist systems theory, in attempting to
conceptualize the integration of society at only the political level, ignores the
problem that, according to Habermas, “there is no administrative production of
meaning" (Habermas 1975, 70). Habermas argues that "meaning"-bound up
with the intersubjectivity central to the practical, moral domain—must be socially
generated.
The dessication of the public sphere, and its substitution with "formal
democracy", is concurrent with civil privatism (Habermas 1975, 75) and certain
traditional values and meanings whose very resilience lied in their not being
problematized, or thematized, a situation upon which the development of early
capitalism parisitically fed (Habermas 1975, 76). Yet, with the politicization of
the economy, and the need for legitimation of decisions which followed, the civil
privatism upn which its administration of power depended become increasingly
endangered. Habermas sees the greatest crisis potential located in the socio
cultural sphere, where the purely traditional basis of motivation to perform the
roles required by the political and economic systems are eroding, leading to the
possibility of a revitalization of a public sphere. H ie latter is conceived as the
rational potential alternative to tradition, the market, and power. At this stage of
Habermas's theory formation, the public sphere is conceived as containing a
potential for a needed "discursive redemption of validity claims" (Habermas
1975, 89) upon which motivation and legitimation increasingly depends. Such
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a revitalization, however, must upset the requirements of the merely formal
democracy prevalent in “late capitalism.”
Even with this brief overview of the thrust of Habermas's argument it is
not difficult to see that while it seems to bracket Marx's theory (following his view
of Marx's own insights concerning what specified capitalism) Habermas
ultimately must rely on a specific interpretation of Marx's theory. I will now
consider Habermas's interpretation, in LC, of several of Marx's basic concepts.
This is both in the sense of in light of competing interpretations and in view of
any possible alterations compared to his works I have previously taken up.
Value, abstract labor, and commodity fetishism are three fundamental
concepts, most fully worked out in Marx's Capital. Therefore, these concepts
are characteristic of what Postone has specified (through a reinterpretation) as
Marx's "mature critical theory." The reinterpretation is primarily (though far from
exclusively) as against the positions of early members of the Frankfurt School,
but with the heaviest emphasis on Habermas-understood to be the most
important contemporary representative of the Critical Theory tradition.
In connection with this it is important to recall here that Postone's
"reinterpretation", though proceeding through critique of individual founding
members of the Frankfurt School, as well as of Habermas, still situates himself
within the tradition. Not only his selection of theorists for critical attention are
predominately from within this tradition, but his very characterization of Marx's
thought as "critical theory", indicate theoretical affinity at some basic, but
perhaps not easily identifiable level. My intention here, then, is to assess the
status of Marx's theory reflected through the stage Habermas has reached with
LC, suggest the extent to which Habermas's claims depend on an interpretation
of Marx, and what effect a successful critique of that interpretation might have on
the viability of Habermas's own theory. Central to Postone's critique of
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Habermas is his position that Habermas misconceived Marx's concept of value.
His misconception led to an inability to grasp Marx's “mature critical theory".
This in itself would be a substantial topic for analysis. However, Postone's
intent is not limited to singling out a figure of classical social theory (Marx) in
order to measure the depth of the understanding of his theory by an important
contemporary thinker, even one, such as Habermas, who happens to be
perhaps the most closely followed within the so-called neo-Marxist tradition.
Rather, that Habermas did not grasp Marx's concept of value (and the
categories unfolded from it in Marx's Capital) is linked to a demonstration that
this misunderstanding was constitutive of the form and content of Habermas's
own theory formation. Postone’s critique is with the awareness that Habermas
believed his own theory to be original in the sense it avoided internal defects in
Marx's theory, while also taking into account the historical contingencies
external to Marx's horizon.
Following from this, it is clear that a critique which confined itself to
contrasting with another thinker one's own understanding of an “original"
concept really proposes at most a delineation of three observations for the
purposes of comparison. The crucial second step, however, consists in
showing that the attributed misconception was constitutive of a divergent theory,
and that that (perhaps incompatible) theory itself could be explained in
reference to the characteristics of the social formation it did not (and could not)
specifiy. After executing this second step, Postone then provides arguments to
support his claim that Marx's mature critical theory, when interpreted through a
critique of important strands of Marxism which succeeded Marx, grasps the
essential features of contemporary (post-Marx) society, including the problem of
a contemporary recognition of Marx. In LC, Habermas's starting point is a
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heuristic question posed in combination with a critical summary of Marx's
"theory of value". He writes,
...the theory of value is...directly a systems analysis of the economic
process of reproduction. The fundamental categories of the theory of
value are thereby set up in such a way that propositions that follow from a
theory of contradictory capital accumulation can be transformed into
action-theoretic assumptions of the theory of classes. Marx holds open
for himself the possibility of retranslating the economic processes of
capital utilization, which take place within the bounds of class structure
into social processes between classes-after all, he is the author of the
Eighteenth Brumaire as well as Capital. It is precisely this sociological
retranslation of an economic analysis that proceeds immanently that
gives rise to difficulties in the altered conditions of organized capitalism. I
would like to take up the not yet satisfactorily answered question Has
capitalism changed? (Habermas 1975, 31).

It is clear from his starting point that Habermas's understanding of Marx's
value theory has not substantially changed in comparison to his analyses in
earlier works. For Habermas, Marx's theory of value constitutes an "economic
analysis" dependent on a view of labor--the instrumental relation of man to
nature-and the division of classes on the basis of distribution of a surplus. A
result of the changed conditions of capitalism is to make increasingly
problematic the character of Marx’s "indecision" concerning the emancipatory
potential of the instrumental relation of man to nature, or of scientized
production, versus the need to recognize "power relations that regulate men's
interaction among themselves" (see 135). Habermas had already argued that
this problem lie at the foundation of Marx's philosophy seen as a "metacritique"
of Hegel. The interesting difference is that, unlike KHI, there is a specific
reference to political (or historical) investigations (The Eighteenth Bmmaire), but
with the implication that even if granted such a study was "successful" in
translating an instrumental labor-determined value theory into interaction terms,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

157
it is precisely that type of "translation" which developed capitalism has made
increasingly improbable.
Habermas’s implication here is that Marx understood his own theory of
value such that it explained capitalism's distinction from prior social formations.
In capitalism, class relations assumed a non-political form, that is, through the
labor-capital relationship and the supposed exchange of equivalents in the free
market. In respect to this, Habermas sees the cogency of his question, "has
capitalism changed?" Once the state intervenes directly in the economic
process (Habermas 1975, 52), class domination can no longer be conceived as
"non-political." This is a variation on Habermas's critique of a theory of value on
the basis of his “traditional Marxist" transhistorical concept of labor.
Marx's "value theory" depends on an understanding of a mode of labor
specific to capitalism, not on property relations or the existence of the market.
Labor in capitalism, as analyzed by Marx, possesses a dual character, concrete
and abstract. It is the fundamental contradictory nature of labor in capitalism
which determines the dual character of the basic unit of its mode of production,
the use value and exchange value of the commodity.
Marx's value theory entails a demonstration of how quasi-independent
structures (such as the commodity and capital), related to structured forms of
practice, exercise a form of domination on a different, higher level of abstaction
than that which Habermas argues Marx needed to empirically demonstrate
through "translation" in the concrete relationship between classes. In crucial
respects, Habermas's analysis in LC simply fails to grasp these fundamental
concepts of Marx's "mature critical theory." In not demonstrating that he has first
grasped them, there is no way for him to supply a valid criticism.
Thus, also in Part II (Chapter Six on "Theorems of LC"), which composes
his analysis of "crisis tendencies in advanced capitalism", Habermas writes,
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....class domination can no longer take the anonymous form of the law of
value. Instead it now depends on factual constellations of power
whether, and how, production of surplus value can be guaranteed
through the public sector, and how the terms of class compromise look.
With this development, crisis tendencies shift, of course, from the
economic to the adminstrative system. Indeed, the self-containment of
exchange processes, mediated only through the market, is destroyed.
But after the liberal-capitalist spell of commodity production is broken
(and all participants have become, more or less, good practioners of
value theory), the unplanned, nature-like development of economic
processes can re-establish itself, at least in secondary form, in the
political system (Habermas 1975, 68).

Recall that in the final pages of "The Theory of Knowledge as Social
Theory" Habermas discussed the meaning of the "Fetishism of the Commodity",
and the conditions for dispelling the "objective illusion" he interpreted it to
describe: Habermas believed it required a certain type of "self-reflective"
critique. Here, in contrast, the implication is that the systematic development of
"private" capitalism into "state" capitalism was itself a sufficient condition for
dispelling what Marx analyzed as commodity fetishism. Such a radical shift in
the formulation of the relationship between "system" and social theory, and their
respective efficacies, is due primarily to yet a third treatment of a concept of
Marx Habermas offers in Part II of LC.
Habermas never discussed the dual character of labor Marx understood
to be his sole original contribution to political economy. If this is the case, in all
the works I have considered to this point, when he took up Marx's concept of
fetishism of commodity, it could not have been on the basis of how Marx
understood labor in capitalism. Thus, in Chapter Five of LC, a couple of pages
before he implied that the systematic development of capitalism itself led to the
unraveling of the "objective illusion" at the core of Marx's concept of commodity
fetishism, Habermas writes, "...in connection with the functions of the public
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sector, there arise occupational spheres in which abstract labor is increasingly
replaced by concrete labor, that is, labor oriented to use values" (Habermas
1975, 66). And, again, in Chapter Seven, "Motivation Crisis":
...tendencies that are weakening the socialization effects of the market,
especially, on the one hand, the growth of those segments of the
population who do not produce their lives through income for
labor...and...the spread of areas of activity in which abstract labor is
replaced by concrete labor (Habermas 1975, 83-84).

Now, in Marx's analysis of capitalism, which brings into focus an
historically specific social formation, no concept is more fundamental than that
one and the same labor assumes a contradictory form of both a concrete and
abstract character. Marx's concept of abstract labor does not refer to one type of
labor in capitalism. Rather, abstract labor describes the specificity of labor in
capitalism only in its contradictory relationship to concrete labor as one and
same labor. In contrast, what I have quoted above clearly indicates that
Habermas misconceives Marx's concept of labor in capitalism. He cannot then
explain Marx's concept of commodity fetishism, and is not able to account for
Marx's concept of value production as unique to the capitalist mode of
production.
Thomas McCarthy (1978), in the comprehensive treatment of
Habermas's theory up to and including LC, argued that the latter assumed, a
Marxist form of critique (McCarthy 1978, 358). It was, however a Marxist form of
critique, "with important differences" (McCarthy 1978, 358). By the time of
Moishe Postone's study (1993) a decade and a half later the tables had been
turned completely. For many, the issue had rather become whether Marx's
theory belonged in the Critical Theory tradition, despite its "important
differences".
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After a brief consideration of Habermas's ostensible attempt at a
"Reconstruction of Historical Materialism", I will take up The Theory of
Communicative Action and its aftermath, the real beginning of Habermas’s
theory proper, in so far as he and his supporters conceived of it as “instead o f
Marx.
"Reconstruction of Historical Materialism"
In part, Habermas seems to have conceived his exercise in LC to
represent a practical demonstration of how one might experiment with, or test
for, the possibility of an immanent critique of Marx's theory. The basis of such a
critique presupposes identification of what Marx regarded as capitalism's
specificity. The formation and clarification of concepts is necessary for
determining whether the specificity so identified still defined contemporary
society. If features Marx identified with capitalism's specificity were no longer
dominant in contemporary society then, immanent to Marx's theory, a different
social formation might be said to have emerged. Since, according to
Habermas, Marx's theory was essentially a theory of crisis, or a “crisis theory",
immanent critique of Marx's theory should either affirm the crisis potential of
contemporary society on the basis of the original theory, re-identify it for the
possibly changed conditions of what was heretofore understood as capitalism
or, finally, reject the idea that contemporary society is best understood in terms
of "crisis" potential.
LC still held out the possibility that the specific features of capitalism
identified by Marx (characterized by the displacement of class domination from
the political sphere to the economic sphere, where it was veiled) might still
inhere and be connected to contemporaneity by a concept of a displacement of
their crisis potential into the socio-cultural sphere. Marx's directly "economic
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crisis", mediated politically (overtly) reappears in the form of a “motivation
crisis". In other words, it was clear to Habermas that what defined "organized
capitalism" (as opposed to private property/free-market capitalism) was the
overt politicization of economic conflict (or opposed interests) in the state.
Furthermore, on the basis of a class compromise at the heart of this form of
capitalism, it was not inconceivable (in fact was conceived by systems theory)
that this type of crisis could also be "managed". A potential system-threatening
political, as opposed to economic crisis, should be conceived on essentially the
same model as Marx's original economic conception, where crisis proved
resolvable within capitalism itself.
The move, then, to a consideration of a theory of social evolution is
implicitly conceived by Habermas on the basis of a proposal for an investigation
into the question of whether empirically-identifiable changes in the social
formation-which came about without the kind of overt social revolution Marx
assumed to be intrinsic to the formation's basic contradictory character-might
offer clues to the possibility for the development of a contemporary critical
theory of society which, rather than rejecting Marx's ideas wholesale, would
reconstruct them at a higher level of abstraction. As opposed to basing a
refutation of Marx's theory on historical contingencies to which Habermas
believed Marx tended to tie his own theory, Habermas proposes to examine
whether the theory (as Habermas understood it) might be reconceived on a
higher level of abstraction. One purpose of such an attempt would be to
theoretically unlock the unrealized potential of certain social learning processes
(which Habermas began to identify in LC) accompanying the social alteration
(the object of Habermas's question, “has capitalism changed?") in relation to
which, according to Marx's own understanding, Marx's analysis (bound up with
too specific concepts of what constitutes capitalism) should no longer apply.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

162
It is important that Habermas in "Reconstruction of Historical Materialism"
assumes for his starting point what he had at several points in LC explicitly
noted. In the earlier work he emphasized that Marxism (as opposed to a re
engagement of abandoned stages of reflection represented in part by the
original Marx) was trapped within its own dogmatism. While Marx, for example,
could still "hope" that what he had discovered at the level of a systems theoretic
approach as the law of value might still be directly translated into sociological
terms ( The Eighteenth Brumaire), today "meaning" itself (in the face of eroding
tradition and the problematizing of previously taken-for-granted world views) is
precisely the problem. The dogmatism characteristic of Marxism, however, is
still ultimately (if only implicitly) traced to Marx and, in a different way, to Engels.
This becomes clearer, and assumes more importance, in "Reconstruction of
Historical Materialism".
First, in relationship to Marx, Habermas identifies only two texts where
Marx is said to have, “expressed himself connectedly and fundamentally on the
materialist conception of history" (Habermas 1979, 130). Outside the first part of
the German Ideology and the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy, it is Habermas's view that the materialist conception of
history, as a theoretical framework, served Marx to interpret particular historical
situations or developments. However, since in "Reconstruction of Historical
Materialism" Habermas does not analyze Marx's historical interpretations, the
appropriateness of his declaration that he will treat historical materialism as a
theory, "indeed as a theory of social evolution" (Habermas 1979, 130), can only
be assessed on the basis of his interpretation of the two texts.
A complication of the matter consists, on the one hand, in Habermas's
reference to a current work of Lawrence Krader "on the relationship of the
assessments of historical materialism by Marx and Engels" (Habermas 1979,
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225) (a notation which doesn"t give away whether they are assessed to be
fundamentally divergent, complimentary, or identical) and, on the other hand,
positively linking Marx, Engels and "Marxist theoreticians", as well as the
"history of the labor movement" (Habermas 1979, 130). All these are said not to
have understood "historical materialism" simply as a "heuristic". Importantly,
Habermas does not say, to the contrary, that they understood historical
materialism as a theory.
Rather, Habermas's position is that since Marx and Marxists generally, as
well as the labor movement he apparently identifies with them, did not
understand historical materialism as a "heuristic" but, to the contrary, in respect
to a particular content, the motivating aspect of the latter needs to be examined.
But more importantly, Habermas's central focus will be the prospective viability
of Marx's historical materialism in respect to its potential contribution to a
general theory of social evolution. This should be understood against the
background of LC wherein Habermas’s analysis already "included" Marx's
theory. This was mainly polemically; it implied that Marx's economic theory, at
least, was unable to stand independently-to capture categorically the essential
features of contemporary society.
As might already be apparent, the opening paragraphs of
“Reconstruction of Historical Materialism", while phrased rather matter-of-factly,
contain controversial implications which, in some ways, are more informative for
understanding Habermas's approach to Marx (and Marxism) at this stage than
the ensuing arguments for which they supposedly provide only the general
perspective.
For example, Habermas states, in effect, that just the fact that in only two
places Mane reflected on historical materialism might constitute the predominant
factor in an explanation for a divergence between practice and theory in much
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of recent history. Yet, Marxism is stiil accorded reflective status, and hence
Habermas deems it socially useful in terms of political action; it, “can under
certain circumstances be connected with the theory and strategy of revolution"
(Habermas 1979, 130). But, Habermas, in the course of his argument never
returns to and explicitly develops precisely how this might be so. Perhaps his
argument, which I will consider below, that Marx regarded the economic base
as determinant for the superstructure only in the transition from one social form
to another, is indirectly related to this.
From the perspective of these opening statements and the earlier
writings I have already considered what stands out most clearly is Habermas's
rather uncharacteristically polemical statement in the early part of LC. There
Habermas wrote that though Marx's was the first social scientific theory of
system crisis, he did not intend to offer yet another exposition of Marx's "crisis
theory." In contrast, he intended to offer a "socially useful" discussion of crisis.
In comparing this with the opening paragraphs of "Toward a Reconstruction of
Historical Materialism", it becomes clear that while Habermas regarded Marx's
economic theory, or a fundamentally economic theory of society to be
exhausted, and hence not "socially useful", the more general concept of
historical materialism, though (or perhaps because) not substantially developed
as theory (and hence adding to the weight of his earlier charge that Marx's
"unofficial" synthesis through social labor lacked a self-reflective dimension),
potentially contained resourcs valuable for developemt of a contemporary
critical theory. Habermas sums up this "second chance" he is willing to grant
Marx's theory in the single sentence concluding the first paragraph of, "Toward
a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism": "The theory of capitalist
development that Marx worked out in the Grundrisse and Capital fits into
historical materialism as a subtheory (Habermas 1979,130).
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If only briefly, it should be recounted that Habermas's most substantial
discussion of Marx's theory prior to this statement occurred in the chapters I
analyzed in KHI. There, in an interesting mode of presentation, he traced what
he described to be Marx's "unofficial" appropriation of Hegel on a narrow scale.
This was rooted in what he viewed as a simple reversal of terms in reference to
an "absolute". For Hegel, mind was the absolute ground of nature; for Marx, to
the contrary, nature was the absolute ground of mind. From this reorientation of
an absolute Marx developed a "metacritique" of Hegel, or a synthesis through
social labor, rather than through a Logic. Yet, already in the Grundrisse Marx is
said to have reached an impasse, which led him to an "official" position
characterized by recognition of the distinctiveness of social interaction
compared to social labor. Habermas uses for illustrative purposes the
"Fetishism of the Commodity" section from the first chapter of Capital. There
Habermas sees in the dispelling of "objective illusion" (said to describe the
meaning of identification of commodity fetishism) Marx's practical move to
appropriation of Hegel on a much broader scale. Thus Habermas's mode of
appropriation of Marx in KHI (where he attempted to reconstruct Marx's position
primarily with the resources available in the latteris writings not published in his
lifetime) is in contrast to "Reconstruction of Historical Materialism". In the latter
he tests the ability of Marx's theory to "absorb" later research. Habermas's
procedure here-testing the possibilities of appropriating Marx's theory- might
be seen as analogous to Marx's "narrow" and "broad" attempted appropriations
of Hegel.
It is also important to recall, however, that Habermas ends his discussion
of Marx by drawing the conclusion that, in retrospect, seemed inevitable, given
his starting point. The mere transposition of nature and mind—when from either
of which is accounted the unfoldment of an absolute-does not result in a very
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consequential distinction in terms of an interest in the development of a
contemporary critical social theory. Habermas, in fact, concluded that Marx
merely reconfirmed the "elimination of epistemology" in a scientific materialism
Hegel had already accomplished as "absolute knowledge".
Thus, his earlier consideration of Marx’s theory, particularly the
movement from the Grundrisse to Capital, pivoting on the addition of "Fetishism
of Commodity", strongly distinguished Marx’s two works, only the latter
published in Marx's lifetime. Now, in contrast, the Grundrisse and Capital
together represent a subtheory of capitalist development within a theory of
social evolution; the categories internal to Marx’s analysis of capitalism, then,
are not to be seen as constitutive of the specificity of Marx's theory, or at least of
its potential utility.
In connection with the above, it should also be kept in mind that
"Reconstruction of Historical Materialism" is but one piece in a collection
representing a series of occasional writings devoted largely to elaborating
Habermas's own incipient theory. I have already described, in the section on
KHI how Habermas’s intervention at a point where he had concluded that
contemporary critical, or dissident Marxist, theory had failed to grasp (on the
basis of the ideas of the young Marx) labor as a "mechanism of evolution".
Habermas proposed an alternative to a phenomenological approach to labor,
where labor was considered to be the, "foundation for the construction of
invariant meaning structures of possible social lifeworlds". It is precisely there
where Habermas seemed to put a stamp of approval on what he understood to
be Marx's own concept of labor, not grasped adequately, that is, as a
"mechanism of evolution", even by "critical" Marxists.
In LC, Habermas suggested that the "dynamic" of contemporary societyin so far as it might be conceived in other than the pessimistic terms of the older
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Frankfurt School, or the “romantic" terms of a "resurrection of nature" (Habermas
1972, 32)-resided in the socio-cultural sphere as a potential "motivation crisis".
Now Marx's analysis of capitalism was to be taken as relevant only in its place
of a subtheory within a broader theory which had yet to be satisfactorily
elaborated.
This could be viewed in at least two different ways. Writings of Marx
preceding the Grundrisse and Capita/, such as the German Ideology, were the
basis for explaining the former and pointing to elements necessary for a
contemporay critical theory or, alternatively, assessed not to possess the
necessary resources out of which a theory adequate to contemporary
conditions might be developed. If the latter were the case, this reflected a shift
in the social formation's identity, and the focus should shift to Habermas’s
nascent theory.
Now, t is Habermas's contention that the prospects for the substantial
contemporary relevance of Marx's theory depended on the very element of
Marx's methodology which Habermas had heavily and consistently criticized
over the course of many years and in various texts. Habermas often contended
that Marx's theory lacked a self-reflective dimension, the absence of which
proved historically consequential. He now locates Marx's theoretical self
reflection in sparse comments confined to the German Ideology and the Preface
to a Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy. The full import of this
emphasis is only seen in his next comment:
In 1938 Stalin codified historical materialism in a way that has proven of
great consequence...the historical materialist research since undertaken
has remained largely bound to this theoretical framework. The version
set down by Stalin needs to be reconstructed (Habermas 1979,131).
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This emphasizes Habermas’s position, made clear practically from the
start of his theoretical writings, that Marx’s social theory, while perhaps
adequate to the times in which he lived, both lacked a critical self-reflective
dimension and, in so far as the latter could be discovered retrospectively, was
not in itself adequate to contemporary social conditions. Most remarkable here,
however, is Habermas's assertion that, whether or not it was possible to
"reconstruct" Marx's historical materialism, due to Marx's own failure to
adequately reflect on it, Stalin's version was in need of “reconstruction."
According to Habermas, to reconstruct a theory,
signifies taking a theory apart and putting it back together again in a new
form in order to attain more fully the goal it has set for itself (Habermas
1979, 95).

Since Habermas's lengthy discussion briefly refers to Stalin on only two
other occasions, one possible interpretation of this is that a re-interpretation of
Marx's theoretical self-reflections might prove productive in formulating an
adequate theory of historical materialism. In the context of the collection to
which this proposed reconstruction belongs, however, this would require a new
attempt equipped with theoretical concepts so far developed by Habermas,
often to either supplement perceived deficiencies in Marx's theory, or as a
means for critical departures from it.
In respect to this issue, Rockmore, for one, in an otherwise excellent
study, is not able to adequately explain Habermas's references to Stalin. He
decides, based on his notice of only two references to Stalin (there are in fact
three) that the evocation of Stalin and theory was merely "tactical" (Rockmore
1989, 84) But he does not clearly explain toward what end the tactic was
employed.
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Habermas’s important discussion in the third German edition of the
collection of essays titled, Theory and Practice, is relevant for this issue. The
first English translation of the work was of this edition, and the 1971
introduction, "Some Difficulities in the Attempt to Link Theory and Practice", was
written for it. In this introduction, Habermas summarizes criticisms directed at
his earlier KHI. He then directly responds to these criticisms.
In one instance, Habermas acknowledges Oskar Negt's criticism that
Habermas, in KHI, failed to consider a concept of organization in his discussion
of the conditions for the possibility of an emancipatory social theory.
Habermas's response is broader even than was perhaps necessary in order to
answer the particular question. In what might have sounded somewhat jarring
to some at the time, in the course of somewhat lengthy remarks on the subject,
Habermas wrote,
We no longer find, in dialectical logic, as in a certain way Marx still did,
the normative basis for a social theory constructed with practical intent
(Habermas 1973, 16).
Following this comment, he proceeds with a lengthy discussion of the
problem of organization, viewed from within the Marxist tradition. He refers to
Lukacs's relatively little discussed, "Toward a Theory of Organization", an essay
included in History and Class Consciousness (Lukacs 1971). He criticizes it for
recapitulating at a philosophical level Lenin's practice of Party organization in
which scientific (theoretical) discourse is not separable from perceived
organizational requisites. Habermas's argument suggests that his own
supersession of Hegelian Marxian dialectics provides a standpoint capable of
critically linking Lenin's practice of subordination of theory to organization
through Lukacs's Hegelian Marxism to, finally, Stalin's totalitarianism.
(Habermas 1973, 36).
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It is difficult to overstate the importance of this discussion. It mediates the
movement of Habermas’s thought from KHI to his ostensible attempt to
reconstruct historical materialism. This is especially so in light of the, eg;
otherwise unelaborated observation in “Reconstruction of Historical
Materialism" that, while various Marxists interpreted differently the
"superstructure theorem" (consideration of which is central to Habermas's
attempt at a reconstruction of historical materialism and to which I will therefore
soon return), “Among Hegelian Marxists like Lukacs, Korsch and Adorno, the
concept of the totality excludes a model of levels" (Habermas 1979, 143).
Habermas does not elaborate the significance of this remark. But in the
context of his then recent introduction to Theory and Practice, and a
presentation to a German Hegel society (for which "Reconstruction of Historical
Materialism" was prepared) it reinforces the importance Habermas now
attributes to his own efforts to construct his own theory-and the concomitant
need he sees to separate Marx from Hegel (which Stalin certainly did).
Moreover, through the allusion to Adorno as a Hegelian Marxist whose concept
of totality excluded a “model of levels", Habermas strongly hints at the possible
benefits of a break from the very (Critical Theory) tradition with which he himself
was hitherto associated.
Recall that at the outset of LC Habermas disqualified Marx's theory of
crisis, while declaring that he was interested only in a "socially useful" concept
of crisis. With this in mind, it seems even the more remarkable that he now
makes a reference to Stalin's theory as potentially useful, at least in the sense it
was one from which an adequate reconstructed theory might emerge. Stalin's
theory of historical materialism as a theory of evolution, not Hegelian Marxism
which excludes levels, was relevant to Habermas's current efforts.
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I interpret Habermas's approach to Marx here, then, as motivated by the
increasing urgency (and the potential efficacy) he attributes to a need for
grasping the distinctiveness of the domains of labor and interaction. Habermas
has not conceived capitalism's specificity (as does Postone) in terms of
structured forms of practice constituted by, and constitutive of, quasi
independent structures. According to Postone's re-interpretation, Marx
analyzes these as exerting a social compulsion which is not overt, and as such
explain not history generally, but capitalism's trajectory as dynamic, directional,
and inevitable. Habermas implies that a break up of the hegemony of
traditional Marxism (which largely shares his basic concept of labor as the
transhistorical relation of man to nature, but not his view of the emancipatory
potential of communication) could be effective in releasing the potential of
society "outside" the sphere of labor, or instrumental action.
That Habermas in this new approach to Marx has not re-specified what
constitutes capitalism (though he does pose it anew as a system-theoretic
problem) is seen in his characterization of the form of its evolution as economic
(the dialectic of forces and relations of production) in distinction from other
social formations. This, however, is not substantially different from his previous
specifications wherein class domination, a situation in which socially produced
wealth is privately appropriated, is legitimated through an ideology of an
exchange of equivalents.
Habermas, in another attempt at focusing on Marx's specifications,
supplements his interpretation of the "base" as economic only in capitalism with
an observation that the context of Marx's articulation of historical materialism in
the Preface to the Critique of Political Economy leads to the conclusion that the
dependency of the superstructure on the base was intended only for the critical
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phase in which a society passes into a new developmental level (Habermas
1979, 143).
After drawing out these specifications, which he attributes to Marx and
indicates are often overlooked, Habermas next proposes the insertion, at its
own level, of his incipient theory of communicative action. The significance of
this is two-fold. On the one hand, it implicitly refers back to the opening
paragraph where historical materialism was said to be potentially useful for
purposes of political action, and even for the "theory and strategy of revolution".
On the other hand, it proposes a crucial place for his own theory in a possible
“reconstruction of historical materialism" in opposition to technologistic
conceptions attributed to the young Mane, Engels, Plekhanov, Stalin and others.
The dialectic of forces and relations of production, in order to be reconstructed,
must separate out the, "level of communicative action from that of the
instrumental and strategic action combined in social cooperation” (Habermas
1979, 145). Habermas's proposed “reconstruction", then, hinges on the
separability within capitalism of a domain of strategic and instrumentalist action
from one of communicative action.
The critical perspective of a differentiation of the level of communicative
action, in which, "knowledge of a practical and moral sort" (Habermas 1979,
146) is required, is apparently able to unify thinkers as diverse as Marx and
Stalin as against Habermas's emerging theory. Such a prespective harbors the
potential of a new form of social integration—or principle of organization—which
must be conceived more abstractly than can be the case with a concept of an
evolution of modes of production alone. The latter is incapable of explaining
evolutionary innovation. While,
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the rules of communicative action develop in reaction to changes in the
domain of instrumental and strategic action.Jn doing so they follow their
own logic (Habermas 1979, 148).
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE THEORY O F COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: CRITICAL THEORY'S
THEORETICAL EXILE OF MARX?
Habermas on several occasions in the Theory of Communicative Action
orients his attention to Marx with a succinct description of its circumscribed
purpose. He writes that his is a second attempt from within Western Marxism to
appropriate Max Weber for a contemporary social theory (Habermas 1989,
302). Lukacs, and later Horkheimer and Adomo, were key figures in the first
attempt, an attempt which failed, in Habermas's view, due to aporias identifiable
only in light of a theory of communicative action once it had reached a certain
level of maturity. Perhaps the key conceptual advance Habermas sees here is
in his analysis of the rationality implicit in language, and its even greater
potential--a basis and prospect unrecognized by Weber, but hinted at in the
later years of the older Critical Theory (Habermas 1984, 390). In an elaboration
fully his own, Habermas analyzes this potential as preceding and underlying
the societal rationalization elaborated by Weber (Habermas 1984, 342, 343;
Habermas 1989, 318).
Among the implications to be drawn from this are the following: in spite of
the "neo-Marxist" status generally ascribed to it, contemporary Critical Theory's
stake in (let alone reliance upon) Marx's theory should no longer be assumed
as it might have been in the past; since the early Lukacs himself, apparently, no
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interpretation of Marx has provided a convincing explanation of contemporary
society. Rather than the test of the theory of communicative action lying in its
ability to bring Marx's critique of capitalism to bear on contemporary problems,
the idea now was to show that the possible continuing relevance of Marx's
theory necessarily depended on the positive development of Habermas's own
communication theory, the potential of which he now attempts to demonstrate
through a critical appropriation of Weber and a consignment of Marx to
essentially an historical interest. The potential relevance of Marx's theory is
confined to a function of a historic/theoretic marker from which the theory of
communicative action gets its bearings.
This, of course, contrasts very sharply with Lukacs's "first attempt" at an
"appropriation" of Weber. Lukacs's attempt is inextricably bound to a certain re
interpretation of Marx's “mature critical theory" (principally commodity fetishism)
which then gained power and credibility when publication of Marx's early
writings, previously unknown to him, confirmed the reconceptualization of
Marx's theory he initiated. He demonstrated that Marx’s theory of overcoming
capitalism was dependent on philosophic concepts, without which it would not
be possible to specify capitalism, and therefore how to oppose it. Lukacs's
approach (contradicting existing Marxism's self-understanding that its own
genesis was from the overcoming of philosophy) was necessary for an
uprooting of modem, fully developed capitalist social relations, in as much as
he correctly identified them.
The sharp contrast of Habermas's "second attempt" (which might be
more accurately described as a Weberian appropriation of Marx) with the first
attempt (Lukacs's Marxist appropriation of Weber) raises the following
questions: Can Habermas's attempt be defended as a second from within
Western Marxism? Were there, in any case, serious flaws with the very
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conception of Western Marxism from the beginning (see Chapter Six), such that
its “revival" (even for, arguably, Habermas's purpose of dissolving it) could
provide a basis for no more than a strawman argument, in so far as it
developed, in the first place (in the wake of Lukacs's History and Class
Consciousness) as a stand-in for Marx’s "outmoded" theory?
As I have discussed, Habermas's preparation for replacing Marx and
Marxism had already progressed over the decades. He then in fact leaves it
behind in TCA. How dependable is Habermas's allusion to Lukacs’s History
and Class Consciousness in support of his argument which attributes
considerable significance to Lukacs's positive relationship to Max Weber's
theories, while under-emphasizing, or even disregarding, its more central
critical thrust? This is not the place to take up these questions in detail. While
keeping them in mind, however, it is important to also remember that among
Lukacs's strongest theoretical motivations was to explain, and thus point a way
to overcome, the fact that the 1917 Russian Revolution, seen (not only by
Marxists) as a beginning of a process of world-wide uprooting of capitalism, was
not extending to Western Europe. This is not just an historical issue. Habermas
himself often appealed to historical or empirical facts in order to support an idea
of the need for his theory in place of Marx's (Habermas 1973, 195-198; 1990,
11-13).
In short, after at least two decades of publications in which Habermas
occasionally invoked the implications of a theory of communicative action for
purposes of critical evaluation of the entire German philosophical tradition from
Kant to Marx, without being able to offer recourse to the actual theory itself, he
draws a necessarily controversial parallel. He now compares his own theory to
Lukacs's, an earlier thinker whose primary goal was an end to capitalism; given
this, it was necessary that Habermas more carefully specify capitalism (which
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he began to do in LC), and the distinctiveness of his own theory in relation to
Marx's.
Even at this late date Habermas had not made his goal vis a vis Marx
and Marxism crystal clear. Though it certainly differed from Lukacs's (Dews
1992, 81) his presentation assumed an obligation (like Lukacs's) to include
consideration of the problem of understanding the potential effects of his own
theory on the comprehension and molding of the meaning and purpose, not
alone of critical theory, but social theory generally. But while Lukacs evidently
believed that his Marxism was uniquely qualified to explain the limitations of
social theory generally (within capitalism) Habermas, to the contrary, argued
that his own theory (particularly in its appropriation of classical social theory)
revealed the limitations of Marx and all of Marxism. In connection with this, a
detailed discussion of its metamorphoses from Marx to Lukacs to Horkheimer
and Adorno would provide a valuable perspective on Habermas's muted but
potentially telling allusions to a concept of revolution, arguably what he implies
is constitutive of the boundary marking off Marxian dogmatics from social
scientific theory, including that of Mead, Durkheim, Weber, and his own. In
Habermas's argument, dogmatism, while not strictly attributable to Marx's own
theory, was traceable to it none the less, and not obviously to other forms of
social theory. Moreover, according to Habermas, Marx set a damaging
precedent when he insisted upon certain practical/political applications of his
theory (Habermas 1989, 339-340).
Yet, Lukacs's theory, in its approach to Kant, Hegel and Marx, not unlike
what Habermas uncovered in his examination of Mead, Durkheim and Weber
(and Parsons's analysis of them) disclosed undigested features of classical
thought and, in doing so, rescued them from a dogmatism of a sort. Lukacs's
essays in History and Class Consciousness were suggestive of the notion that
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philosophy itself had a revolutionary potential and was a missing dimension in
Marxism. This dimension was indispensible for any conceivable revolution
abolishing capitalism, establishing essentially different social relations;
Habermas's “second attempt* required mainly acceptance of his own self
consciously normative social theory-a "social theory" which none the less
criticized someone of the stature of Parsons for the "non-philosophical"
character of his strictly social theory (Habermas 1989, 200). But the ground of
this philosophic critique was Habermas's break with Hegelian Marxian
dialectical logic, a break he thought to be necessary in large part due not
merely to the fact it was philosophy (which he held still contained metaphysical
qualities) and not social theory, but precisely because the Hegelian Marxian
dialectic contained philosophy and revolution as importantly linked
(Dunayevskaya 1989), a link Lukacs insisted upon and succeeded, to some
extent, in specifying in the historical circumstances.
With respect to Marx, it is useful to recall that Habermas's major critique
of Marx and Marxism, immediately prior to the TCA, suggested a "reconstruction
of historical materialism". As he often experimented with ways of placing Marx
and Marxism in the history and development of social theory generally, several
notable features of this particular attempt are relevant to recall here: 1) His
ostensible theoretical appropriation of Marx found no continuity with earlier
thinkers within the Critical Theory tradition; 2) As I pointed out in the previous
chapter, it contained suggestive, fundamentally critical allusions to both
especially the young Marx and Hegelian Marxism specifically; 3) Rather than a
refutation, it implied (with no direct reference to Hegel) the possibility of an
appropriation of a different Hegel (along the lines of rational reconstruction) on
what he conceived as necessarily a higher level of abstraction than that
attributed to previous Hegelian Marxian attempts; 4) Finally, a very large part of
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“Reconstruction of Historical Materialism" delineated an area of socialityspecifically a moral domain—and presented it, on the one hand, as basically
inaccessible to any theory still committed to Hegel's logic (dialectic), effectively
and lastingly appropriated in Marx's "coup de main" (Habermas 1989, 334) as
development of the species through social labor; on the other hand, the moral
domain was suggested to be the key contemporary problem area for a critical
social theory.
Hence, Habermas's "Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism",
as the title indicates, did not actually carry out the reconstruction in question
(Rockmore 1989); Habermas offered suggestions for such a project, but one, it
turned out, which might (ironically) dispense with Marx, and instead proceed
primarily on the basis of concepts Habermas introduced in the context of his
own incipient communication theory. The implications, often ignored, were that,
1) Habermas's theory was adequate to contemporary society in a way which
disclosed the inadequacy of Marx's, and 2) an adequate social theory was in
the interest of, in fact was essential to, the current stage of social development;
its capitalist element was a deformation of a pre-established universal potential,
"tameable" with the development of social, primarily moral, domains.
Already, then, in "Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism",
Habermas's analysis implied a fundamental criticism of the Critical Theory
tradition with which he was heretofore identified. This was, however,
overshadowed by a confusing, only ostensible direct return to Marx, along with
a barely noticeable new type of appropriation of Hegel, which he extended in
TCA (Habermas 1989, 383). His explicit criticism of Critical Theory is
elaborated only in the later volumes (of TCA) as well. Yet, in respect to the
theories of Horkheimer and Adomo, Habermas eventually understands his own
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theory, in the aftermath of an elaboration of basic differences with them, as still
just the re-establishment of a viable "critical" theory (Habermas 1989, 401).
For one thing, there now comes into its own (with Habermas's theory) a
firm “convergence" of, a) heretofore presumed non-official, or only quasiinstitutionally based, theoretical forms with, b) social theory generally. The latter
(Habermas would agree) is for the most part driven by, and shaped within, a
("split-off") culture of experts (Habermas 1989, 330; 397-398) who are certified
and pass on certification.
Recall that "Critical" as opposed to "Traditional" was the distinctive
characteristic Horkheimer attributed to Marx's philosophy, tying to it a
requirement of some degree of autonomous status not only from political party
organization or the state, but vis a vis even, eg; the University as such. It was
mainly (if not alone) Lukacs who earlier was seen to have managed to some
extent to restore this element of Critical Theory's specificity, extracting it from its
submergence in the institutionalized forms of the Marxist Second International,
which was in (or on its way to) state power. It is difficult to see how Habermas's
approach to Weber, Marx and contemporary social theory tries to return,
particularly in this practical sense, the "critical" edge to Critical Theory.
Charitably, it naturally goes without saying that it must remain open to question
whether, substantively, Habermas’s interpretation of Marx (if not Weber) was in
fact regressive compared to that of Lukacs.
It is often remarked that Lukacs's basic achievement consisted in his
conceptualization of the historical specificity of the processes of societal
rationalization (as described by Weber). Lukacs tied them to a particular, that is,
a commodity, form of production which had become generalized; but just as
crucial (and more problematic) was his simultaneous radical universalization
as "reification" of thought what Marx had carefully circumscribed in his analysis
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of the capitalist mode of labor and production as a self-contradictory, nonviable ground of "bourgeois society”. According to Marx, materialization of the
non-viability of this mode involved, besides uncovering, forming a theoretical
(as well as practical) relationship with, a certain type of subjective opposition,
and self-development, of workers in capitalist production, as well as with other
types of revolutionary subjectivity (Dunayevskaya 1991). The limited extent to
which Lukacs captured the latter can be measured in terms of the weakness of
his theoretical approach to organization (though not limited to it) (Lukacs 1967,
295-342) which hardly departed from Lenin's 1903 concept of the vanguard
party-to-lead, a concept (peculiar in Lukacs's case) singularly antithetical to
dialectical philosophy.
None the less, assessments of Lukacs's attempt, rather than simply
requiring an abandonment of Hegelian Marxian dialectic, have instead often led
to further examination of the latter, and thus to new possibilities of theory in the
context of contemporary capitalism (Anderson 1995). In any case, it is hardly
disputed (including by Habermas) that early Lukacs's theory was a deeper
penetration of Marx's thought than that achieved by tendencies within the
Second International, traditional social sceince, or the "actually existing
socialist" states and their supporters, and therefore than among all post-Marx
Marxists. Lukacs's interpretation has served as something of a model of
creativity if only in the sense that it went some distance in explaining both the
continued existence of capitalism and an institutionalized form of Marxism as its
psuedo-opposite. Habermas noted the latter point, but did not elaborate
(Habermas 1989, 332). A key question lost in his not doing so is whether
Lukacs's theoretical attempt contains a viable argument that social science
generally, as well as post-Marx Marxism (possibly implicating Habermas
himself), was constitutive of what it ostensibly opposed.
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Lukacs's central essay in History and Class Consciousness develops
his concept of reification from an analysis of the commodity fetishism section of
the first volume of Capital. Along with this he did not have available to him the
young Marx's detailed analysis of Hegel's concept of alienation and its
transcendence, the meaning Marx gave it in terms of his concept of revolution,
the uprooting of capitalist social relations. The later (1932) publication of Marx's
1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts confirmed in crucial respects
Lukacs's direction by highlighting the theoretical features of Marx's "mature"
critique of capitalism which were hardly comprehensible unless considered as
recreations of certain unique aspects of Hegel’s dialectic, most explicitly
investigated in Mane's early (1844) writings. Thus, the brilliance of Lukacs's
"anticipation" of the young Marx via close philosophical investigation of the
"mature" Marx (commodity fetishism) represents one type of proof of the
indivisible concepts of alienation and “law of value" intrinsic to Marx’s theory of
capitalism. Unfortunately, as the historical situation changed, Lukacs never
gave Marx's 1844 writings (when they became available) the attention his own
theory implied was eminently warranted. Consequently, there are theoretic
strands, especially in Marx's 1844 essay, “Private Property and Communism",
which Lukacs did not anticipate, and never felt compelled to address, despite
their obvious relevance to developments of the the post-World War II realities
(Dunayevskya [1998]).
In TCA, it is the denial of a unity of the concept of alienation and the law
of value in Marx's own understanding from which Habermas builds his critique
which amounts to a theoretical exile of Marx from the terrain of contemporary
critical theory. This unity might be sought not so much in any single example of
Marx's study of Hegel's dialectic as by attention to Marx's continuous return to
the latter as a practically inexhaustible source of the notion of philosophy as the
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key revolutionary dimension in the context of socio-historical features which
were only coming to be understood as specifically capitalist. In this sense,
Marx's earliest articulation of his theory (1844) “anticipated" the situation to
which Lukacs's theory responded, a situation in which those most committed to
Marx's ideas tended to reduce them to "economics", or a "critical political
economy", or (as to some extent in Habermas and definitely in Postone's case)
to "social theory".
Another perspective I intend to develop in the following contrasts with
Habermas's analysis in TCA wherein it is presupposed that the basic resources
for a contemporary critical theory were not to be found in any reinterpretation of
Marx, practically consigning the theoretical significance of Lukacs's attempt to
recover Marx in this way to the unintentional side effects of vitalizing the
discussion of Weber. Lukacs is thus classified as an essentially transitional
figure. He is positioned as unintentionally contributing to bringing Weber’s
theses to the point where they could eventually be made fruitful for what was an
epochal task when viewed from within the Critical Theory tradition, and which
only Habermas was to carry out--a social-theoretic break from Hegel and Marx,
sometimes characterized as from a "Hegelianizing philosophy of history"
(Habermas 1989b, 332). Hence, according to Habermas, the lasting (though
unintended) effect of Lukacs's work was that it stimulated a turn to "serious"
social theory proper, that is, a grounding in its own proper element, without the
“philosophic balfast”~autonomous in respect to metaphysical residues of
idealist philosophy (Habermas 1989b, 383).
In the TCA, then, it seems Habermas is quite concerned to avoid an
identification of his latest revisitation of Marx with his encounter with Weber,
Mead, Durkheim or Parsons. In this work, Habermas develops a direct re
interpretation of the theories of the latter four. In contrast, in TCA the opening
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sentence of his section on Mam explicitly proposes a different sort of approach.
Habermas writes,
There are a number of reasons for going back to Marx, or more
precisely, to the interpretation of Marx stemming from Western Marxism's
reception of Weber (Habermas 1989, 332).
This detached justification clearly contrasts with his apparent enthusiasm in re
interpreting the theories of Mead, Durkheim, and even Weber in light of, and as
constitutive of, a first fully articulated theory of communicative action. In
contrast, here he could, in fact, be taken to mean that a re-interpretation of
Marx's theory was neither of interest nor possible. With his "going back" to a
previous interpretation (rather than working out a re-interpretation) Habermas
tends to emphasize that the only Marx of consequence was the one constituted
by the predominant influence Weber is judged to have achieved in the
movement from Lukacs to Horkheimer and Adomo, culminating in Habermas's
own theory. In short, the end of Marx (as in Horkheimeris and Adorno's
Dialectic of Enlightenment) would constitute the condition for the beginning of
contemporary social theory proper, even if unclear to itself at the time.
However, keeping in mind results of the close reading of Habermas's
earlier considerations of Marx's theories, it is not difficult to discover that, aside
from Habermas's characterization of his current concern with Marx (which
focuses away from, or precludes the need for, a direct re-examination of his
theories), his actual analysis of Marx breaks new ground, not in comparison
with Marxism generally, but surely in relationship to Habermas's own earlier
studies. The most obvious example in this regard consists of his new
dependence on a description of the "dual character” of the commodity,
understood to be the concept characteristic of the originality and even
"superiority" of Marx's theory.
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Thus, Habermas tends, in the explicit justifications for his return to Marx,
to evoke the “taken for granted” (including by him) Marx. Yet, in the actual
course of his analysis it becomes clear that he has substantially revised and/or
updated his own view of the characteristic substantive and methodolgical
aspects of Marx’s work, and especially the relationship of the two. He begins
the section, "Marx and the Thesis of Internal Colonization" by suggesting that a
plausible justification for his current preoccupation with Marx could be that
"dynamics of class opposition" (and thus Marx),
might explain the inner dynamics of bureaucratization—the hypertrophic
growth of media-steered subsystems, resulting in the encroachment of
administrative and monetary steering mechanisms upon the lifeworld
(Habermas 1989, 332).

Habermas sees Lukacs (who differed from Marx, in that Marx supposedly could
not anticipate the emergent structures of "late capitalism") responding to
Weber’s competing interpretation of this, the latteris diagnosis of modernity in
terms of a societal rationalization which is "class unspecific".
However, Lukacs's aim was far from primarily an appropriation of Weber
in the interest of a more adequate social theory generally. Rather, his aim was
to explain the existence of Marxism and overcome the philosophic void in the
Marxist revolutionary movement in particular. Only with the filling of this void
could the deep structures of capitalism (the ground of a social domination no
less pernicious for its abstract character), as analyzed in Marx's mature critical
theory, be recognized by contemporaneity. (At the same time, Lukacs is
responsible to some extent for Habermas’s type of interpretation of his theory,
because Lukacs did not extend to the Marxist concept of organization his wellknown challenge to the traditional, "orthodox" Marxist idea of the passive role of
philosophy). In respect to this, in so far as neither of them extended their
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development of Hegelian dialectic to a fundamental critique of the vanguard
party, Habermas's coupling of Lenin and Lukacs (Habermas 1973, 35; 1984,
364-367; 1990, 12-13) is not far off the mark; however, neither Lenin (despite
his "return" to Hegel's Logic and Critique of the Gotha Programme) on the eve
of the 1917 Russian Revolution nor Lukacs (despite his recovering the
importance of the "Fetishism of Commodity" section of Capital, in its aftermath)
extended their rethinking of Hegelian Marxian dialectic to new probings in to
Hegel's and Marx's own concepts of "organization" (Dunayeveskaya [1998]),
that is, what follows labor's mediation of capitalism's social relations.
Instead, Habermas confines the significance of Lukacs the Marxist to an
idea of a certain expansion of complexity of what Habermas sees as Marx's
basic and characteristic "class theory". Only with this expansion (as opposed to
a deepening) Habermas argues, could a "supplemented" Marxism even hope to
claim some explanatory power in regard to increasingly apparent social
phenomenon (societal rationalization processes) which were recognized only
in their incipient form by Marx, according to Habermas, under the category of
the "realm of necessity", as opposed to the "realm of freedom" represented in
the lifeworld (Habermas 1989, 340). They became a predominant concern to
social theorists after their twentieth century expansion was analyzed by Weber.
As described by Habermas, Lukacs's contribution is centered on a view
of class unspecific "side effects" (Habermas 1989, 332) seen (unlike in Weber)
as a "result" of “underlying class conflict". While this may seem adequate in
respect to a goal of appropriating Lukacs for social theory proper (even its
"critical” persuasions) it excludes (or at least minimizes) consideration of
Lukacs's internal challenge to Marxist thought which had become
institutionalized in such a way as to be inimical to philosophy. This issue is
important because it touches directly on the question of an alternative to
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Habermas's thesis that Marx's societal critique rested upon a view of the
primacy for capitalism of private property and the market, and their external
analysis by a theoretical avant garde committed to exposing and thereby
eliminating their inequities. Habermas's view on this radically departs from the
genesis and structure of Marx's theory I examined in earlier chapters. Even
more seriously, it precludes from the start consideration of the part Habermas's
more or less typical interpretation of Marx's theory possibly played in producing
the reification effects he sets out to isolate from, "structural differentiations"
necessary for, or common to, "every modem society" (Habermas 1989, 340).
Habermas's interpretation of Marx's theory is naturally incapable of
providing a critique of Communist societies. Communist states eliminated
private property and markets, but not capitalism in the sense of its deep defining
structures analyzed by, eg; Postone. In this, it is clear that critique involves the
need to take into consideration the effects of failed revolutions, revolutions
which, identified with Marx's philosophy as the radical critique of capitalism,
turned into their total opposite. This rendered deeply suspect (including down
to the deepest layers of society) even the idea of existing society as a particular
from of social relations, and therefore transformable, since attempts at a
revolutionary alteration proved not only misguided and therefore spurious but
apparently destructive of even any semblance of freedom. Lukacs’s idea of
proletarian class consciousness as in principle capable of grasping the social
totality in counter-distinction to bourgeois society's endemic dualisms seemed
to at least point in the direction of potential forms of opposition to capitalism
which, from practice, demanded a new relationship (or unity) of philosophy and
revolution.
Habermas argues that Lukacs's Marxism amounted to something like a
concession. It conceded the importance of "class unspecific" modem social
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phenomenon. (This, of course, assumes that "class analysis" specified Marx's
own claim to critical, revolutionary theory). From these class unspecific
phenomenon outliving adherence to the idea of revolutionary proletarian class
consciousness, it was a “small step" (Habermas 1989, 333) on the part of
Horkheimer and Adorno to a more complete turn to Weber and beyond, to a
theory of instrumental reason and a totally administered society. It is only from
this definition of the situation, Habermas makes clear, that in his pursuit of a
contemporary social theory there is still a warrant for discussion of Marx. This
means that Marx’s theory, at its deepest level, might today still be characterized
as exhausting itself in the aim of explaining merely the distribution of negative
social phenomenon in a class specific manner.

Marx, the "Thesis of Internal Colonization", and Habermas's Appropriation of
Geora Lohmann's "Original Interpretation" of Marx's Capital

The title of the one section of TCA devoted to Marx, "Marx and the Thesis
of Internal Colonization", should not then be interpreted to mean that Habermas
was suggesting that the "thesis of internal colonization" could still have its basis
in Marx's theory. To the contrary, the title summarizes the form of Habermas's
critique of Marx in which he proposes to translate a theory of reification (Lukacs
derived from Marx) in to the fundamental concepts of his own incipient social
theory. The central idea here is to test what (if indeed any) residual explanatory
power Marx's theory of value (after its merely tacit retention in Horkheimer and
Adorno despite their dropping of the early Lukacs's theory of class
consciousness) retains for a contemporary critical theory. Accordingly,
Habermas sets the ground for his discussion of Marx in the following:
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Horkheimer and Adomo were unable to appropriate the systematic
content of Weber’s diagnosis of the times and to make it fruitful for social
scientific inquiry, because...they did not take seriously enough Weber's
studies on the rationalization of worldviews, or the independent logic of
cultural modernity; but also because they were uncritical in two
directions...vis-a-vis Mane in that they held fast to the basic assumptions
of the theory of value as the core of their tacit orthodoxy, and in this way
blinded themselves to the realities of a developed capitalism based on
the pacification of class conflict through welfare state measures...
(Habermas 1989, 333-334).

Habermas then proposes to examine, "what Marx's theory of value can
contribute to a theory of reification translated in to system-lifeworld concepts..."
(Habermas 1989, 334). He writes that he will point out its weaknesses, in order,
"...to see how we might explain the pacification of class conflict in welfare-state
mass democracies and how we could combine the Marxian view of ideology
with Weber's reflections on cultural modernity" (Habermas 1989, 334).
While it will be necessary to follow the declared synthetic intent here, I
also want to avoid departing from the question of Habermas's approach (or
various approaches) to Marx specifically. As I have already demonstrated
through analysis of several of Habermas's earlier works, specific interpretations
and criticisms of Marx's thought were clearly constitutive of the direction of
Habermas's theory formation. The resulting theory is first fully articulated in
TCA. Yet, some of Marx's basic concepts, neglected or simply not grasped by
Habermas in his two decade-long examination of the theory, now suprisingly
serve as the starting point for an argument he carefully characterizes not as a
return to a consideration of Marx's theories, but in crucial contrast, "the
interpretation of Marx stemming from Western Marxism's reception of Weber"
(Habermas 1989, 332).
Reading Habermas in the way Habermas himself suggests here pulls in
a direction opposite of what my investigation demands. My aim has been a
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critical interpretation of Habermas’s various approaches to Marx, attempting to
demonstrate that they were strongly constitute of his own theory. Due to his
unsatisfactory accounts of Marx's theories, there are grounds for serious
concern with the viability of Habermas's own theory, or at least the claims
Habermas makes for it.
With TCA, it is easy to see that there was a turning point from which
Habermas understood his theory, if not a replacement for, then something of an
alternative to, Marx's theory. This presents a problem of consistency in terms of
fulfilling the intentions of an immanent critique of Habermas's approach to Marx.
A tension arises between, on the one hand, Habermas's new attempt here to
circumscribe in advance the content and meaning of his current return to Marx
and, on the other hand, the critical requirements of an assessment of a theory
that, at least up until this point, had internal to it a principle of reflection on the
formative steps of this theory. Habermas now seems to direct scrutiny of these
steps to only the volume (TCA) principally devoted to elaboration of his own
theory, which up until now he had not fully presented. This moves in a direction
opposite from and, in fact, a priori excludes, a possibly more viable and
convincing alternative of "reinterpretation" of Marx's theory, which Postone
indeed later produced.
The notes to Habermas’s section (of about fourty pages) on Marx
(Habermas 1989, 332-373) illustrate the different quality of this approach to
Marx. Unlike his previous analyses of Marx, these notes contain no references
to Marx's writings; also, Habermas does not refer to his own previous analyses
of Marx. In contrast, there are plentiful textual references in his TCA studies of
the other classical theorists, Mead, Durkheim and Weber, as well as of Parsons.
Among possible interpretations of this might be that Habermas is, in effect,
arguing that, once and for all, the notion should be discarded that there was
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separate (or competing) potential in research in to Marx's ideas in the wake of
his own new appropriations of other classical theory, principally Weber.
Another problem, which will emerge in the analysis which follows, is that
the negative rationale Habermas offers for his return to Marx-that it is justified
mainly (or even only) from discoveries resulting from the productive relationship
of his own maturing theory and classical social theory-does not hold up in so
far as it is clear that Habermas not only must give an account of Marx's ideas yet
again (as opposed, for example, to dropping consideration of them altogether)
but also shift his own interpretations, compared to earlier texts I have already
considered. On this last point, it is peculiar that Habermas fails to note, even
indirectly, that his approach to Marx substantially differs from his earlier ones, let
alone reflect on the significance of this.
From the beginning of this section, the new approach to Marx is clear.
For the first time, after extensive analyses of Marx's work in STPS, BPSMC, KHI,
LC and "Reconstruction of Historical Materialism", right from the start Capital is
presented as containing analyses of both labor and interaction, and/or the later
re-conceptualization of lifeworld and system, and as representing a credible (in
a contemporary sense) attempt to "combine" them. For example, as late as the
mid-1970s--in LC and "Reconstruction of Historical Materialism“--while
Habermas recognized that Marx investigated both dimensions in his work as a
whole, he held that Capital contained the "scientific" exposition of the theory of
value, while he located in separate volumes the "historical" writings (Habermas
1979, 130), or the "political" writings (Habermas 1975, 30). Following from this
re-srtuation of the problem of a conception of systematic and social integration
by his late recognition that it was already realized and taken up by Marx within
Capital (obviously Marx's central work of social theory) Habermas, yet again,
revisits the concept of labor.
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Recall that earlier I criticized his failure to analyze Marx’s concept of the
dual character of the commodity, or the further step Marx takes in rooting it in the
two-fold character of the labor which produced it, an understanding of both of
which was crucial for grasping what Marx saw as capitalism's specificity. For
example, in LC Habermas employed the terms abstract and concrete labor in a
way which indicated that he understood them, in Marx’s analysis, as two
different kinds of labor. In his new approach in TCA Habermas combines his
familiar (and inadequate) formulation of Marx's idea of capitalism's specificity
with a nod to the crucial element of Marx’s theory expressed in the idea of the
"double character of the commodity":
...Marx starts from the idea that the form of the conflict bred in all class
societies by the priviliged appropriation of socially produced wealth had
changed in a characteristic way with the establishment of the capitalist
mode of production. Whereas the dynamics of class in politically
constituted, stratified societies were manifested directly on the level of
conflicts of interest between social groups, in bourgeois society they are
objectivistically concealed and objectivated through the medium of
exchange value. The mechanism of the labor market, institutionalized in
private law, takes over functions that had previously been performed by
politically institutionalized relations of social force and economic
exploitation. The monetarization of labor power becomes the basis of
class relations. The analysis of these relations has to begin therefore
with the double character of the commodity (my emphasis, RR)
(Habermas 1989, 334-335).

The familiar portion of this passage expresses Habermas's basic idea that the
specificity of capitalist domination lies in the non-overt character of the
determination of its class relations, wherein a mechanism of actual unequal
distribution of social wealth is masked as equal exchange. The unfamiliar
element (compared to Habermas's earlier texts) expressed in the last two
sentences seems to pay closer attention to Marx's Capital in its tracing
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specifically capitalist social domination to unique features of one commodity
among all others—labor power.
Yet, on closer examination it is not intrinsic characteristics of the
commodity "labor power" despite being a commodity like all others which
Habermas posits as unique to capitalism, but rather monetarization of labor
power. This latter suggests that capitalism's specificity is grounded in a
relationship of labor to something outside itself. Habermas complicates this
analysis by, while identifying the necessity of beginning with the "double
character" of the commodity (due to a particular commodity's "monetarization"),
presenting a passage from a work of Claus Offe (Habermas 1989, 355). The
latter describes Marx's understanding of the features of the commodity labor
power which differs from all others; it is a "living" labor power that, 1) does not
arise for the purpose of salability; 2) cannot be separated from its owner; and, 3)
can be set in motion only by its owner. From these, Offe concludes an,
inextirpable subject-rootedness of labor power [which] implies that in
wage labor the categories of action and functioning, of social and system
integration are inextricably intertwined (Habermas 1989, 335).

In citing this passage, Habermas means to develop his argument that Marx was
preoccupied with the contradiction between a complete abstraction of
monetarization versus an "inextirpable subject-rootedness" of labor power
determinant of a synthetic function—a duality suggestive of a return to a Kantian
formulation of the problem he had developed in KHI.
Offe, and Georg Lohmann as well, two thinkers, like Habermas (and
Postone, who I have discussed on several occasions), associated with the
Critical Theory tradition, are cited in support of his analysis of Marx's "theory of
value”, identification of strengths and weaknesses of which is supposed to
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compel a turn to Habermas's own theory. Citation of two contemporary thinkers
within the tradtition (as opposed to directly confronting Marx's "mature critical
theory") has the effect of down-playing that his own analysis in the end implies
an argument for the vitality of Marx for contemporary social theory. Habermas,
in yet another approach to Marx's theories, and without directly saying so,
supports his argument with two contemporary Critical Theorists already heavily
influenced by his own social-theoretic concepts.
Habermas begins by asserting that analysis of class relations when their
basis has become the monetarization of labor power, "has to begin with the
double character of the commodity". In line with this proposal, Habermas next
associates expenditure of labor power in "concrete actions” and its absorption
as an "abstract performance" with, on the one hand, imperatives of social
integration and, on the other hand, system integration (Habermas 1989, 335).
Habermas writes,
...as an action it [labor power] belongs to the lifeworid of the producers,
as a performance to the functional nexus of the capitalist enterprise and
of the economic system as a whole. Marx was concerned to uncover the
illusion that labor power is a commodity like any other (Habermas 1989,
335).

This seems to imply that Marx conceived transhistorical "labor" in a functional
sense, that it served to underpin the "unity" of society (in opposition to the
individualistic, privatistic outlook of the bourgeioise) and, furthermore, Marx
affirmed this uncritically. Yet, Marx's analysis, to the contrary, draws a crucial
distinction between labor and labor power; only the latter is capable of
assuming the commodity form. Marx's analysis in Capital proceeds to
demonstrate that the very recognition of a distinction between labor and "labor
power in capitalism" reflects the value form, intrinsic to capitalism's particular
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form of wealth. Living labor (concrete labor "shaped" by abstract labor), not
"labor power", is the source of value, capitalism's "substance" (Postone 1993,
75). Capital's drive to absorb living labor and to reduce the socially necessary
labor time for the production of commodites lies at the heart of the non-viable
ground of a social formation based on value, that is, constituted as a
contradictory totality. It is just as accurate to say that Capital was concerned to
show that in capitalism "labor power", alienable from the person, and, in fact,
antithetical to him or her, was a commodity like any other. Then, in addition to
the unique value producing capacity of living labor I identified, Marx's
description referred to in the passage from Offe, would not indicate merely
Marx's "concern" to uncover an illusion, but his attempt to closely specify with
the concept labor power the contradictory nature of capitalism, pointing to its
non-viability. Seen in this way, Marx's specification of the commodity labor
power is not ultimately concerned with "uncovering an illusion". Marx
dispenses with the efficacy of this procedure already in Chapter One of Capital);
rather it aims at analyzing a subjectivity intrinsic to which is a dynamic tension
between concrete labor “shaped", or subsumed, by abstract labor (the ground of
the "automatic" regulation of social relations in capitalism) and freedom. Critical
revolutionary theory must connect to this type of subjectivity in order to not
merely oppose capitalism, but contribute positively in its abolition to the
creation of the new. The latter represents the domain of second negation,
which Marx took from Hegel. Marx identified it as the thoroughly revolutionary
element of Hegel's dialectic. The non-viability, expressed at the level of the
contradiction between living labor and labor power (rather than a synthetic
feature), at the core of the capitalist mode of production, is disclosed in Marx's
analysis with his examination of a situation in which, immanently, "labor power"
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is a commodity like all others and, from the perspective of the possibility of
transcendence of capitalism, is unique among all others.
In the interpretation immediately following the quotation he takes from
Offe, Habermas begins to attempt a more precise explanation of “abstract labor"
in the framework of his theory of communicative action. Following Offe,
Habermas analyzes abstract labor in terms of its role in an explanation of the
necessity of the concepts of system and lifeworld for an adequate categorical
interpretation of modem society. Habermas employs a peculiar mode of
expression for this. Under conditions of the wage labor relation (which he has
already translated with the underspecified "monetarization" of labor power),
wage laborers declare their general willingness to expend their labor
power as a suitably programmed contribution to maintaining the capitalist
enterprise (Habermas 1989, 335).

In this it is difficult to distinguish the metaphorical from the theoretical.
Attribution to "wage laborers" some sort of "declaration" (pro or con) concerning
the "capitalist enterprise", is certainly not a conventional view. Habermas
continues,
It is this monetarized labor power which is appropriated as a commodity
and alienated from the life context of producers, that Marx calls "abstract
labor" (Habermas 1989, 335).

However, "labor power" is not alienated from the life context of producers, it is
the life context of producers.
But then at the same time (though in sharp contrast to the "general
willingness to expend their labor power as a suitably programmed contribution
to maintaining the capitalist enterprise"), Habermas, quoting Georg Lohmann
(whom I consider below), describes a process wherein abstract labor makes
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highly unlikely a wage laborer's concern with capitalist enterprise or, for that
matter, anything else:
It [abstract labor] is indifferent to the natural-material object of use and to
the need it satisfies; it is indifferent to the particular kinds of activity, as
well as to the working individuals and their social situations. These
marks of indifference find expression in the determinations of labor which
produce exchange value; it is characterized as "human labor" that is the
'same", "without difference", "without individuality", "abstract", "universal".
These same features continue on in the relations of indifference that
mark the workers" behavior toward others and himself [my emphasis,
RR] (Habermas 1989, 335).

Habermas, then, before assessing the strengths and weaknesses of "this
theoretical approach" (which he holds describes Marx's "theory of value")
summarizes it as Marx's explanation of a process of real abstraction (Habermas
1989, 336). In line with his proposal to translate into system-lifeworld concepts
a theory of reification (which Lukacs was the first to trace, and describe as a
central feature of Capital) Habermas argues that Marx (while not employing
social-theoretic terms developed later) referred to,
objectification of socially integrated contexts of action, which takes place
when interactions are no longer coordinated via norms and values, or via
processes of reaching understanding, but via the medium of exchange
value. In this case, participants are primarily interested in the
consequences of their actions. Inasmuch as they orient themselves to
"values" in a purposive-rational manner, as if the latter were objects in a
second nature, they adopt an objectivating attitude to each other and to
themselves, and they transform social and intrapsychic relations into
instrumental relations. In this respect, the transformation of concrete into
abstract labor power is a process in which communal and individual life
become reified (Habermas 1989, 336).

At this point, Habermas merely makes an argument that Marx's analysis of
capitalism, when "translated", describes a process following from
(transhistorical) labor's intrinsic means-ends rationality when, via the market, it

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

198
is transformed from its "natural" concrete form in to a socially abstract form with
potentially expansive societal effects. What Habermas sees as a form of reason
(associated with a transhistorical concept of labor) spreads beyond its proper
place in the relationship between man and nature, and tends to assume a
function of coordination of social interactions generally.
Habermas, then, in his initial remarks on the "strengths" (attributed
primarily to its specification of "rules for the fundamental interchange relations
between the economic system and the lifeworld") of Mane's analysis (Habermas
1989, 336), writes that the transformation of concrete into abstract labor is a
"metaphor", tied to a "basic intuition" (because the differentiation of lifeworld and
system only became an explicit "problem" with Parsons) (Habermas 1989, 336).
This "basic intuition" (presumably the requirement of a bi-level concept of
society) is involved in Marx's attempt to make clear how action theoretical
statements (concerning class interests, concrete labor, etc.) can be “translated"
in to systems-theoretical statements (concerning "abstract labor" and "value")
(Habermas 1989, 336).
It is necessary to emphasize several points before describing in greater
detail what, at this stage, Habermas understands to be the "strengths" of Marx's
law of value. 1) All of Habermas's arguments which follow this refer back to and
depend on an understanding of Marx's theory as only an idea of transformation
of concrete labor in to abstract labor, 2) Yet, Marx's analysis involves the dual
character of the commodity and the two-fold nature of the labor embodied in it.
Analysis of the transformation of one in to the other (of concrete into abstract) is
therefore one-sided; 3) The other way around, the problematic of a
transformation of abstract labor in to concrete labor (though itself only equally,
not more than, a moment of the social constitution of a dynamic social totality
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which includes the transformation of concrete into abstract labor) is perhaps
more crucial for understanding "late capitalism".
In so far as the very constitution of value (though not material wealth)
remains dependent upon expenditure of direct human labor, and value's
magnitude on the quanity of labor time abstracted from specific labors, at the
same time value (and surplus value) is dependent on the reduction of socially
necessary labor time, the shaping of concrete labor by abstract labor becomes
telescoped and increasingly effective (socially manifest). Postone, for example,
recognizes the increasing importance of the transformation of abstract labor in
to concrete labor (in fact the "determination" of the latter by the former). But he
seems to avoid discussion of the ramifications in terms of a potentially
revolutionary subjectivity intrinsic to this type of labor. Instead, Postone
(significantly in the chapter on Habermas) argues for the potentiality of "dead"
labor opposed to "living" labor.
Habermas writes that he intends to review the strengths and weaknesses
of Marx's theory of value in the context of his previous accounts of the current
status of Weber's action-theoretic framework and Parson's functionalism. He
attributes to Marx's theory an attempt from a "basic intuition" (Habermas 1989,
336) to connect the two methodological approaches:
Viewed methodologicalfy, the theory of value had for Marx a status
similar to that which the action-theoretical introduction of steering media
had for Parsons. From a substantive perspective, however, Marx's
connecting of systems theory and action theory had from the start a
critical sense that is absent in Parsons: he wanted to denounce the selfmaintainence of the economic subsystem as a dynamics of exploitation
made unrecognizable under the veil of objectification (Habermas 1989,
337).

There are at least two controversial implications in this. First, I have already
shown in several places where Habermas analyzed Marx's theory not as
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essentially critical of the "self-maintainence of the economic subsystem" but to
the contrary, as affirmatory toward it and as comprehensible in terms of a
natural law theory. For example, as early as STPS, Habermas implicitly
criticized Marx for an idea of a return of social life to the "private" sphere where
the only "public" function needed (after the full maturation of private capitalism)
was, "the administration of things" (Habermas 1989, 128). Marx is said to think
that this could be done on the basis of natural law discovered once and for all in
political economy. Moreover, Habermas's theoretical trajectory was directed on
the basis of these assumptions concerning Marx and Marxism (Habermas 1972,
55).
Habermas's description of Marx's denunciation of the "self-maintainence
of the economic subsystem as a dynamics of exploitation made unrecognizable
under the veil of objectification" differs from his earlier approaches to Marx's
theory both in its reference to "self-maintainence" as the aspect toward which
Marx is unambiguously critical, and in his placing this criticism as "from the
start", and within Capital. Remarkably, then, prior to the TCA Habermas's own
twenty-five year study of Marx's theory had not yet discerned a hermeneutic
dimension within Capital. This is clear from the mode of presentation here, not
from any explicit self-criticism on the part of Habermas.
Next, two paragraphs summarize Georg Lohmann's 1980 "original
interpretation" of Capital, an interpretation more influential in Germany than in
the U.S., one which happens to have appeared in the interregnum between
Habermas's LC and TCA. In Lohmann's analysis, rather than strictly a political
economy, or a critique of political economy, as Capital has previously been
understood by Habermas, Lohmann provides an original interpretation of the
intention, "behind Marx's 'critical presentation'" (Habermas 1989, 338).
Lohmann's achievement, as Habermas sees it, pivots on his explanation of the
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relation of "historical excursuses" to "economic passages" (Habermas 1989,
338), akin to the lifeworld/system problematic. With this approach, according to
Habermas, Lohmann in interpreting Capital as a critique of the destruction of
pre-capitalist forms of life views the Hegelian concept of the whole, not as the,
“move toward more developed categories" being, "at the same time an advance
in the manifestation of 'truth1..R a t h e r , according to Lohmann,
for Marx the further conceptualization of the whole is an advance in
uncovering the truth about Capitat that, as a whole, it is something
"negative", something that is historically changeable (Habermas 1989,
338).

The end of a full-page summary of Lohmann marks the beginning of
Habermas's remarks on the “weaknesses of the theory of value" (Habermas
1989, 338).
As indicated, Habermas analyzes concrete/abstract labor such that they
refer to a virtually uni-directional transformation of the former in to the latter-a
qualitative change of the one in to the other which can then be viewed as
determinate of the passage from one form of life to another, a radically different
conception than one which specifies capitalism as having internal to it a
contradiction, which points to the non-viability of the form of labor itself.
According to Marx’s analysis, what is at issue in this is the inseparability of the
two in capitalism--not only the "transformation" of concrete labor in to abstract
labor, but also the “transformation" of abstract into concrete: in capitalism, labor
mediates itself (Postone 1994,169). In contrast, common to otherwise very
disparate thinkers such as Lukacs and Habermas (or whom can be seen,
respectively, as the genesis and the dissolution of a critical theory of capitalism)
is a concept of labor which implies a "one-dimensionality". Such a concept
(even if internally consistent) is not adequate to its object.
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The above passage (and Lohmann's analysis generally) is important for
marking Habermas's apparent recognition that an interpretation of Marx at
variance with his own offered a credible argument that Marx, within Capital, not
only seriously considered both system and social integration, but also put forth
a critical perspective concerning their actual relationship that challenged
Habermas's very understanding of Marx's theory over the course of at least two
decades. A closer look at a part of Postone's argument in Time, Labor and
Social Domination (next section) will make it easier to see that Lohmann’s
argument (and the way Habermas confronts it) is important in a full
consideration of a critique of Habermas understanding of Marx, particularly in
TCA. This is so partly because through Lohmann Habermas re-encounters the
issue of whether Marx’s Capital represented a socio-historical interpretation of
Hegel’s Absolute, and if so, the theoretical soundness of it. At issue is
assessment ofLohmann’s type of approach to philosophy which, in contrast to a
discredited materialist appropriation of Hegel, understands itself as successfully
integrating Hegel's Absolute in toto (“explaining1' it) in the constitution of a
critical social theory.
Habermas seemed to refer affirmatively to Lohmann's reinterpretation
(from within the Critical Theory tradition) of Marx's Capital where it uncovered
and "explained" the, "relation of the 'historical excurses' to the economic
passages in the narrower sense" (Habermas 1989, 338). Paraphrasing
Lohmann's argument, Habermas writes,
The farther it consolidates the production of social wealth into a system
steered autonomously via the medium of exchange value and has, in that
respect, become an end in itself, and the further the social reality of the
sphere of social labor thereby gets adapted to the basic catgegories of
system theory, all the more does the "whole" reveal itself to be the
"untrue" (Habermas 1989, 338).
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But Habermas concludes that, even granted Lohmann's point that Marx's
Capital develolped a "lifeworld perspective" broader than the "narrow
economic" perspective with which he is more often associated, and therefore
recognized as a problem, and dealt seriously in a contemporary sense with,
how to relate action-theoretic concepts to system theoretic concepts, Lohmann
in the end confirms Habermas's more fundamental thesis first fully developed
in TCA, that is, that Marx's limitation for social theory might be explained by his
"inability" to escape the bounds of Hegel's Logic. After paraphrasing and
quoting Lohmann on Marx's Captial, Habermas writes,
At this point we can see a first weakness in the theory of value. My
reconstruction tacitly began with the problem of connecting the
action/lifeworid and system paradigms-a problem that became explicit
only with Parsons. This was a marked stylization. Marx does move at the
analytical levels of “system" and "lifeworld", but their separation is not
really presupposed in his basic economic concepts, which remain tied to
Hegelian logic. On the contrary, the interconnection between the two
types of theoretical statements could be explained through a semantic
explication of the shifts in meaning involved in using these basic terms
only if it is assumed that there is a logical (in the Hegelian sense)
connection between the development of the system and the structural
transformation of the lifeworld. It is only under this assumption that Marx
could hope to grasp a totality comprising both moments at one blow, so
to speak, by means of a theory of value that proceeds in terms of
semantic analysis. Otherwise, it would have been necessary to engage
in empirical investigations of real abstraction, that is, of the transformation
of concrete into abstract labor (Habermas 1989, 338-339).

But even if only indirectly, perhaps the most important point Habermas attempts
to make in this passage has to do with the extent to which Marx's theory of value
may have been driven by unwarranted assumptions, not unlike those
Habermas (in KHI) had described in connection with Hegel's critique of Kant.
Hegel's critique was said to derive much of its power from demonstrating that,
despite Kant’s intention of a presuppositionless philosophic inquiry, the most
important features of Kant's philosophy were inextricably tied to fundamental,
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even conventional, assumptions. Habermas, without explicitly recalling his
description of this sort of critique, employs it here with the purpose of re
inforcing his obviously controversial (at least from within Critical Theory) claim
for the central relevance of Talcott Parsons' theory, even perhaps at the direct
expense of that of Mane's.
The "presupposition" at issue here is the idea of a social totality derived
from Hegelian logic which, in culminating in an Absolute, presupposes it as that
from which it unfolds. The course of the Logic describes only so many abstract
moments of an implicit, unfolding totality, which becomes concrete only in its
culmination. To the contrary, Habermas's bi-level concept of society, in which
system and lifeworld develop according to their own logics (Habermas 1979,
148) is perhaps the fundamental thesis in the TCA. This thesis of autonomous
logics is the basis for his "negation” of Marx's only “hope” (based upon an
assumption that there is a logical-in the Hegelian sense—connection between
the development of the system and the structural transformation of the lifeworld)
to, “grasp a totality by means of a theory of value..." (Habermas 1989, 339).
Habermas next outlines the consequences following from what he insists
is Marx's "economistic" appropriation of Hegel's Logic. First, in an unusual
comparison of the young Marx with the young Hegel, both are said to have
conceived, "the unity of system and lifeworld...on the model of a ruptured ethical
totality whose abstractly divided moments are condemned to pass away”
(Habermas 1989, 339) Then, in a single paragraph, he combines his analysis
of Marx and Hegel as he developed them first in KHI, and then in
"Reconstruction of Historical Materialism". Following from KHI, the transposition
of class domination from an overt politcal form to an embededness in economic
processes,
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literally amounts to an illusion~the capitalist system is nothing more than
the ghostly form of class relations that have become perversely
anonymous and fetishized...Marx is convinced a priori he has before him
[in the “system"] nothing more than the mystical form of a class relation
(Habermas 1989, 339).
And, following from "Reconstruction of Historical Materialism", Marx's
interpretation,
excludes from the start the question of whether the systemic
interconnection of the capitalist economy and the modem state
administration do not also represent a higher and evolutionarily
advantageous level of integration by comparison to traditional societies.
Marx conceives of capitalist society so strongly as a totality that he fails to
recognize the intrinsic evolutionary value that media steered subsystems
possess. He does not see that the differentiation of the state apparatus
and the economy also represents a higher level of system differentiation,
which simultaneously opens up new steering possibilities and forces a
reorganization of the old, feudal class relationships. The significance of
this level of integration goes beyond the institutionalization of a new
class relationship (Habermas 1989, 339).

Hence, Lohmann's new critical theoretical approach to Marx's Capital
does no more than delineate and spell out Marx's, "move at the two analytical
levels of 'system' and 'lifeworld'"; it does not succeed in moving Habermas from
his long-held position that the fundamental barrier to critical theory's
appropriation of Marx for an adequate contemporary social theory lies in Marx's
failure to separate himself from Hegelian logic.
Habermas terms a "misperception" (Habermas 1989, 339) Marx's view of
the systemic quality of modem society in that Marx viewed its "automony" as
temporary or false, condemned to pass away, rather than as a possibly
desirable advance over pre-capitalist, particularly feudal, social formations.
Hence, Marx's hands are tied theoretically, because he cannot appreciate the
significance of this possible evolutionary advance for a further challenge to, or
development of, social theory, particularly the potential of what Habermas
develops as communicative reason.
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Tied to this circumstance, but perhaps even more ominous, was the
consequences for Marx's theory of revolution (Habermas 1989, 339), because
the effect of the latter perhaps unlike the implications for “merely" social theory,
was clearly practical. Marx was not satisfied to theoretically criticize, "capital's
self-realization, the subsumption of labor power under the commodity form", or
the way it, "uproots feudal modes of existence in a plebian fashion, and then
shapes them into proletarian forms" (Habermas 1989, 339). Rather, "he
projects a practical-political perspective for action..." (Habermas 1989, 339).
In a perspective opposite of systems theory (and with a sort of reliance upon it),
Habermas writes,
Marx has in view a future state of affairs in which the objective semblance
of captial has dissolved and the lifeworld, which has been held captive
under the dictates of the law of value, gets back its spontaneity. He
forsees that the forces of the industrial proletariat, at first merely in revolt,
will under the leadership of a theoretically enlightened avant-garde, form
themsleves into a movement that seizes political power for the purpose of
revolutionizing society. Along with the private ownership of the means of
production, the movement will also destroy the institutional foundations of
the medium through which the capitalist economic system was
differentiated out, and will bring the systematically autonomous process
of economic growth back again into the horizon of the lifeworld
(Habermas 1989, 340).

An important point to note here is that if Habermas's account of Marx's theory is
correct, then Marxism itself, for example the form which existed in eastern
Germany, east Europe and Russia up until the late 1980s, represented a more
or less adequate practical expression of that theory. In any case, this
assumption seems to ground Habermas's reflective criticism of Marx's
"misperception" I cited earlier, that,
...an accumulation process that has broken away from orientations to use
value literally amounts to an illusion-the capitalist system is nothing
more than the ghostly form of class relations that have become
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perversely anonymous and fetishized. The systemic autonomy of the
production process has the character of an enchantment (Habermas
1989, 339).

Thus, these Marxist "experiments" could be said to have failed perhaps
primarily as a more or less direct result of Marx's inability to adequately
distinguish philosophy from social theory. Habermas's principal point, then, is
that Marx failed to distinguish between his own concept of the relationship
between lifeworld and system, and that concept's ability-or even the
advisability of its doing so—to overcome the diremption of an original totality it
presupposed.
Habermas's view here suggests a peculiar affinity, despite obvious
differences, of Weber's and Marx's thought. Weber traced a process of cultural
"disenchantment" in Western society's rationalization, and suggested a
resulting inevitable loss of meaning and freedom; Marx classified capitalism
itself as "pre-rational". According to Habermas, Marx attributed capitalism's
social cohesion to, "the systemic autonomy of the production process [having]
the character of an enchantment" (Habermas 1989, 339).
By hinting at an important measure of affinity between the two in how
Marx and Weber dealt with modernity Habermas attempts to strengthen the
case he makes that Parsons later confronted directly and consciously in theory
what in Marx, at least, was still an "intuition". Furthermore, both Marx and
Weber judged the rationality potential of society from an (intrinsically limited)
action-theoretic point of view (Habermas 1989, 342). This amounts to an
elaboration of Habermas's opening argument that previous critical theory
(Horkheimer and Adorno),
...solved the problem of connecting Marx and Weber by leaning all the
more heavily on Weber. If, following Weber, one conceives of the
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rationalization of life's orders as the institutionalization of purposive
rational action, it is only a small step to generalizing the reification of
consciousness in to an expression of instrumental reason (Habermas
1989, 332-333).

According to Habermas, fundamental to Marx's theory was the
supposition that private ownership of the means of production (Habermas 1989,
340) was the basis for what Weber conceived as the "iron cage of modem
industrial labor", and determined the type of revolutionary expectations attached
to political action Marx advocated, latter carried out under the Marxist banner.
These expectations were not met, confirming "Weber's prognosis". Habermas
writes,
System and lifeworld appear in Marx under the metaphors of "the realm
of necessity" and "the realm of freedom". The socialist revolution is to
free the latter from the dictates of the former. It seems as if theoretical
critique has only to lift the spell cast by abstract labor (subsumed under
the commodity form). The intersubjectivity of workers associated in large
industries is crippled under the self-movement of capital; theoretical
critique has only to free it of its stiffness for an avant-garde to mobilize
living-critically enlivened-labor against dead labor and lead it to triumph
of the lifeworld over the system of deworided labor power...
...As against these revolutionary expectations, Weber's diagnosis has
proven correct: the abolition of private capitalism would not at all mean
the destruction of the iron cage of modem industrial labor. Marx's error
stems in the end from dialectically clamping together system and
lifeworld in such a way that does not allow for a sufficiently sharp
separation between the level of system differentiation attained in the
modem period and the class-specific forms in which it has been
institutionalized (Habermas 1989, 340).

Habermas, concluding his discussion of the "first weakness in [Marx's]
theory of value", attributes it to Marx's failure to, “withstand the temptations of
Hegelian totality thinking" (Habermas 1989, 340). This is similar to the
argument he presented in the second chapter on Marx in KHI (see above,
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Chaper Three). But here he refers not to that analysis, but to Lohmann's
"original interpretation" of Capital, which I cited above.
However, as Habermas characterizes Lohmann's study, the latteris idea
was of a reversal of the manifestation of a relationship between "truth" and
"totality". According to Lohmann, in Hegel there is a positive relationship
between the two; in Marx's analysis of capital there is a negative, inverse
relation. Thus, here Habermas seems to obscure the spirit of Lohmann's
argument, or at least his summary of it, after having introduced it as central to
the presentation of his new, updated approach to Marx. While Lohmann
described "capital" as the Hegelian totality Marx rejected, Habermas remains
focused on an interpretation of Marx's relationship to Hegel which substitutes
the proletariat (or the lifeworld) for the Hegelian Geist.
A closer look reveals that Habermas's emphasis is on the "totality
thinking" itself, not whether the totality in question is a manifestation of “truth" or
"untruth", represents capital or the proletariat. Hence, while at first appearing to
endorse Lohmann's analysis of the Hegelian basis of Marx's Capital as fruitful
for social theory, the actual implication is that Lohmann's analysis cannot alter
Habermas's earlier view in K&HI that,
Materialist scientism [Marx] only reconfirms what absolute idealism
[Hegel] had already accomplished: the elimination of epistemology in
favor of unchained scientific knowledge—but this time for scientific
materialism instead of absolute knowledge (Habermas 1972, 63).
The conclusion of Habermas's discussion of, "the first weakness in
[Marx's] theory of value" is as follows:
Marx did not withstand the temptations of Hegelian totality thinking; he
construed the unity of system and lifeworld dialecticaliy as an "untrue
whole". Otherwise he could not have failed to see that every modem
society, whatever its class structure, has to exhibit a high degree of
structural differentiation (Habermas 1989, 340).
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Habermas begins the passage with a seemingly unconscious, but
obviously controversial, identification of Marx with the "Marxist tradition".
Habermas writes,
In Marx and the Marxist traditon the concept of "alienation" has been
applied above all to the wage laborer's mode of existence. In the Paris
Manuscripts it is still the expressivist model of a creative productivity, in
which the artist develops his own essential powers as he shapes his
works, that furnishes the standard for criticizing alienated labor
(Habermas 1989, 340-341).

While "Alienated Labor" and "Private Property and Communism" (the first two
Paris Manuscripts) may be characterized as studies of labor and alienation,
implicit even in those works is the "alienation" of the "mode of existence" of
theory itself. In contrast, as I recounted in the earlier chapter (Three), Marx's
third and final Paris Manuscript, "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy
in General", explicitly analyzes the alienated mode of existence of the individual
philosopher, as well as philosophy itself. While the essay contains some
analyses of labor, clearly the focus of the concept of alienation here is not on
the laborer's mode of existence, but rather the philosopher's, or the theorist's.
(In the present context, it makes no difference). “Critique of Hegelian Dialectic
and Philosophy in General" is not only the lengthiest of the three Paris
manuscripts, it is also the most difficult, and the least analyzed. Moreover, just
on the basis of the fact that it contains Marx's only explicit, detailed analysis of
Hegel's philosophy would be enough for arguing that it is the most important of
the three. In any case, Habermas clearly mischaracterizes Marx (though not
perhaps the "Marxist tradition") with the opening sentence of his argument for
the “second weakness" of Marx's theory of value.
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After this dual mischaracterization of Marx's 1844 Manuscripts, as well as
relationship of Marx to Marxists, Habermas's critique of Marx here is basically in
two steps. The first is immanent, in that he argues that Marx himself, "broke free
of this ideal of self-formation...when he moved on to the theory of value"
(Habermas 1989, 341). In counter-posing this, Marx’s supposed fundamental
revision of his theory, to the "more strongly phenomenologically and
anthropogically oriented versions of contemporary praxis philosophy"
(Habermas 1989, 341) where the original model was retained, Habermas
implies that no fruitful distinction might be drawn within the Marxist tradition, at
least in terms of the potentialities of an adequate social theory. In other words,
Habermas argues that Marx, the Marxist tradition generally, as well as those
tendencies often associated with political and philosophic dissidence within the
tradition, whatever differences in their various approaches, had in common a
conception of alienation and labor inadequate to contemporary society. With
his suggestion that in his analysis of labor Marx "broke free" from an aesthetic
model of productive activity Habermas attempts to both further secure his initial
position that Marx’s 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts were directed
primarily at a description of alienation as concerning wage laborers' "mode of
existence", as well as align Marx himself with the overcoming of the "romantic
idealism" which grounded such a model. According to Habermas, this
“breaking free" consisted in development of an idea of an "exchange of
equivalents" in which the theory of value, "retains only a formal perspective of
distributive justice from which to judge the subsumption of labor power under
the commodity form" (Habermas 1989, 341). Habermas, consistently
developing his one-sided view of concrete/abstact labor, concludes,
With the idea of transforming concrete into abstract labor, the concept of
alienation loses its determinancy. It no longer refers to deviations from
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the model of an exemplary praxis, but to the instrumentalization of a life
that is represented as an end in itself...
...This concept of alienation remains indeterminate insofar as there is no
historical index for the underlying concept of a life that is reduced in its
possibilities as a result of violating the ideal of justice inherent in the
exchange of equivalents. Marx speaks in the abstract about life and life's
possibilities; he has no concept of a rationalization to which the lifeworld
is subject to the extent its symbolic structures get differentiated. Thus, in
the historical context of his investigations, the concept of alienation
remains peculiarly ambiguous (Habermas 1989, 341).

Habermas's assessment of the movement of Marx's theory consists of the
criticisms that, on the one hand, the early concept of alienation is not
"sufficiently selective" to distinguish in the, “repressive uprooting of traditional
forms of life between the aspect of reification and that of structural differentiation
of the lifeworld" and, on the other hand, the theory of value, "provides no basis
for a concept of reification, enabling us to identify syndromes of alienation
relative to the degree of rationalization attained in the lifeworld" (Habermas
1989, 341).
The "third and decisive weakness" of Marx's theory of value (which
Habermas later develops as an immanent critique at the conclusion of TCA in
such a way as to argue for the replacement of Marx's theory with his own)
consists in Marx's, "overgeneralization of a specific case of the subsumption of
the lifeworld under the system" (Habermas 1989, 342). In other words, in
Marx's identification of the reduction of concrete labor to abstract labor social
theory is restricted to an analysis of only the media of money, and treats other
media, such as power, as “derived" phenomenon. Habermas writes,
The Marxian approach requires an economistically foreshortened
interpretation of developed capitalist societies...As opposed to the
monism of the theory of value, we have to allow for two steering media,
and four channels through which the two complementary subsystems
subject the lifeworld to their imperatives. Reification effects can result in
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like manner from the bureaucratization and monetarization of public and
private areas of life (Habermas 1989, 343).

It should be emphasized that Habermas’s section, "Mane and the Thesis
of Internal Colonization", specifies the contemporary theoretical highpoint in
analysis of Marx's theory as worked out in the Critical Theory tradition in an
"original interpretation" (Lohmann) of the relation of Marx's, "economic analysis
to the historical excurses". Habermas then structures his entire presentation in
“Marx and the Thesis of Internal Colonization" on Georg Lohmann's "new"
approach to Marx, quoting at key points in the section three long passages from
Lohmann's work.
However, it is clear that if Lohmann's analysis is really considered
original, and that Marx, contrary to all of Habermas's previous analyses,
integrated within Capital concepts of "system" and "lifeworld" in an attempt to
combine them in a single social theory, and there is ongoing controversy within
Critical Theory concerning the meaning (and success) of this attempt, then
surely a document such as Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme, which both
forcefully focused on his value theory and recapitulated the principal themes in
his 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, must be relevant in this
discussion. Yet, none of the three-Habermas, Lohmann, or Postone (whom I
consider in more detail below)~recognize its relevance for their respective
arguments. Written eight years after the completion of Volume One of Capital,
the essential point of Critique of the Gotha Programme is negation of the unity of
the two major tendencies of German Social Democracy, one of which identified
itself with Marx's theory presented in Capital. In the initial part of his critique,
Marx writes that the Gotha Programme botched the concept of labor. In the
concept, as it was wrongly presented in the Programme, Marx saw, in the
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supposed socialist future represented by the new Party, the subsumption yet
again of the individual by the social. In Marx's criticism of the Programme it was
not only a question of the subordination of the individual to the "social" state
(where "equality" meant the reduction of all to what was common to them—the
ability to labor-all else being ignored), but the subordination of philosophy, the
sacrifice of the uniqueness of Marx's philosophy, in the service of Party unity. In
the following passage Marx clearly understands his mature theory as fulfilling
the potential of his early, humanist concepts:
...after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of
labor, and with it also the antithesis between mental and physical labor,
has vanished; after labor has become not only a means of life but life's
prime want, after the productive forces have increased with the all-round
development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth
flow more abundantly-only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois
right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: From
each according to his ability, to each according to his needs! (Marx 1972,
17.

This is the "post-Capitat Marx (not the young "humanist" Marx). The themes of
alienation and “law" of value are combined here in such a way that at the least
they must lead to a rejection of Habermas's thesis that Marx's law of value—
supposedly a replacement for Marx's previous theory of "wage laborers mode of
existence"-restricted critique to a "violation of justice in the exchange of
equivalents". The 1875 Critique of the Gotha Programme indicates that the
revolutionary humanism Marx posed in 1844 as the "transcendence of
[capitalism's] mediation" (which he specified even then) had internal to it
Hegel's concept of second negativity, a concept Marx re-created at key turning
points in his theory.
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Moishe Postone's Self-Limiting Critique of Habermas's Theoretical Exile of
Marx
Postone's section on abstract labor in his book, Time, Labor and Social
Domination can be read as a criticism of all previous interpretations of Marx's
mature critical theory, Habermas's specifically, though the latter is taken up in
detail only in his following chapter. Here I will call attention to, on the one hand,
the structure of Postone's presentation and, on the other, an aspect of the
substantive interpretation, that is, where it refers to Marx's Capital, particularly
Chapter One. First, it is important to consider the overall structure of Postone's
investigation, at least in so far as it situates itself in respect to the Critical Theory
tradition. Postone writes,
This reinterpretation both has been influenced by, and is intended as a
critique of, the approaches developed by Georg Lukacs (especially in
History and Class Consciousness) and members of the Frankfurt School
of critical theory-they remained bound...to [a] transhistorical conception
of labor. I intend to appropriate the critical thrust of this interpretive
tradition by reinterpreting Marx's analysis of the nature and significance
of labor in capitalism (Postone 1994,15-16).

Postone's book is divided in to three parts. Part I (A Critique of traditional
Marxism) criticizes a range of interpretations of Marx. This initial part concludes
with a Chapter 3, "The limits of traditional Marxism and the pessimistic turn of
Critical Theory", in which the theories of Friedrich Pollock and Max Horkheimer
are shown to share a concept of labor erroneously attributed to, or at least
thought to derive from, Marx.
"Toward a Reconstruction of the Marxian critique", then, is divided over
the other two Parts of the book-Part II taking up the commodity, Part III
analyzing capital. Thus, while Pollock and Horkheimer are considered under
Postone's "critique of traditional Marxism" in the initial Part, Habermas is
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accorded a separate chapter in Part il ("Toward a reconstruction of the Marxian
Critique: the commodity”). This division should not be seen as a result merely of
the fact that Habermas belongs in a different historical context than the earlier
representatives of Critical Theory. Rather, it reflects the circumstance that
Habermas directly criticized certain basic theoretic assumptions and their
presumed ramifications for critical social theory shared by founders of the
tradition, such as Pollock and Horkheimer. At the same time, Postone indicates,
with his placement of Habermas, that Habermas's departure from Pollock and
Horkheimer (including Habermas’s erroneous assumption that their positions
were largely congruent with Marx's) is appropriately considered at the early
stage of Marx's analysis of the commodity, as opposed to Marx's further
development of his critique in its treatment of capital.
This is not to say that "Habermas's Critique of Marx” (the final chapter of
Part II of Postone's book) judges Habermas's approach to Marx to be adequate
to the level of the commodity (unlike the early Critical Theorists) but only proves
inadequate in the further determination of Marx's theory at the level of the
concept of capital. Postone, in his theoretic location of Habermas indicates that
because Habermas's critique of Marx (and indirectly, or implicitly, of Pollock and
Horkheimer) fails to grasp the concepts already basic to the commodity (such as
abstract and concrete labor) it cannot be adequate to an appropriation of their
further determination as capital, the analysis of which composes Part III.
But here, where I intend to show my points of agreement with Postone's
analysis, as well as provide an immanent critique of his position, it is necessary
to point out that Postone himself emphasized that Marx's presentation in Capital
is such that each stage presupposes the whole of his theory. For example,
Marx does not present the commodity as it historically appeared before it
constituted what he describes as the basic unit of the capitalist mode of
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production. He unfolds it as the material result of the dual character of laborabstract and concrete—which, in its function as a mediation of social relations
generally, specifies capitalism.
Postone’s re-interpretation of Marx's view of abstract labor relies on a
two-stage theory of Marx’s concept of alienation (which he understands as two
inconsistent appropriations of Hegel’s view of "objectification") (Postone 1993,
159). Postone then explains how this evolved concept of alienation figured in
the later development of commodity fetishism. In fact, Postone holds that Marx's
early theory of alienation, which he later abandoned, was essentially a
philosophical anthropology. Only with Marx's develoment of the two-fold nature
of labor in its function of a social mediation specific to capitalism allowed him to
ground socially his concept of alienation, and thereby explain and surpass
Hegel's thought (Postone 1993, 159). Yet, as I have already argued in earlier
chapters, examination of Marx's progress in socially grounding his early
appropriation of Hegel's concepts does not exhaust the question of the
relationship of the early Marx's thought to Hegel's dialectic (or its contemporary
potential) whether or not one accepts the idea that Marx’s early articulation of
his theory is best described as a "philosophical anthropology".
In respect to this, Postone's contrast of Marx's 1844 EconomicPhilosophic Manuscripts and Capital takes a crucial turn. In the text (Postone
1994, 74, 159) Postone indicates that he understands Marx's early concept of
labor to be “transhistorical”: he argues that such a misconception was involved
in Mane’s “well-known" criticism of Hegel for, "not having distinguished between
alienation and objectification" (Postone 1993, 159). Postone writes,
Yet how one conceptualizes the relation of alienation and objectification
depends on how one understands labor. If one proceeds from a
transhistorical notion of "labor”, the difference between objectification
and alienation necessarily must be grounded in factors extrinsic to the
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objectifying activity-for example, in property relations..., rather than as,
intrinsic to the character of that labor itself.

Postone then argues that in Marx's “later writings", only after he has worked out
the “double character of commodity determined labor", another approach to the
question of the difference between objectification and alienation was possible.
Postone writes,
This difference, in Marx's mature works, is not a function of what occurs to
concrete labor and its products; rather, his analyis shows that
objectification is indeed alienation—if what labor objectifies are social
relations... (Postone 1993, 160)

The paragraph which follows this, then, argues that the difference
between the mature Marx's and the young Marx's theory is rooted in the social
appropriation of Hegel as opposed to, for example, a "materialist" appropriation.
Just as a "materialist appropriation" of Hegel's thought based on an
undifferentiated notion of labor leads to an understanding of Hegel's notion of
an historical subject as a social grouping instead of a “suprahuman structure of
social relations" (Postone 1993, 160), a failure to grasp Hegel's notion of
objectification as alienation, specific to capitalism, can also be traced to an
inadequate understanding of labor in capitalism.
Now, after having traced inadequate versus adequate understandings of
labor, and materialist appropriations of Hegel, versus a social appropriation, to
the difference between the young Marx's and the mature Marx's theory, Postone
writes in a footnote:
Marx's discussion of alienated labor in the Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844 indicates that he has not yet fully worked out the
basis for his own analysis. On the one hand, he explicitly states that
alienated labor is the core of capitalism, and is not based on private
property, but that, on the contrary, private property is the product of
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alienated labor. On the other hand, he has not yet clearly worked out a
conception of the specificity of labor in capitalism and, hence, cannot
really ground that argument: his argument regarding alienation is only
fully worked out later, on the basis of his conception of the twofold
character of labor in capitalism. This conception, in turn, modifies his
notion of alienation itself (Postone 1993, 160).

Earlier (see Chapter Three) in a detailed analysis of Habermas's
interpretation of Marx's 1844 Manuscripts, I referred to Marx's explicit criticism of
Hegel, where he linked the tatter's thought to political economy on the basis of
the undifferentiated notion of labor Hegel shared with it. Marx already instead
split the concept of labor in two, the positive and negative, indicating the special
importance of the latter dimension. This is not to argue that Marx's concepts did
not develop from the beginning of the 1840s through the late 1850s. It signifies,
however, that the uniqueness of Marx's theory, which was perhaps fully
grounded socially in its later articulation, was intrinsic to his early critique of
Hegel's dialectic. Furthermore, "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" was not
exhausted by Marx's progress in socially grounding it. "Critique of Hegelian
Dialectic and Philosophy in General" retained the transcendent element
intrinsic to Hegel's philosophic thought, and continued to develop that, even in
works later than Capital. This interpretation suggests caution in (and the distinct
possibility of) overemphasizing the capacity of "social theory" to one-sidedly
"explain" philosophy, a tendency in Postone, which he actually attributes to
Marx as well.
Postone's argument that, "the difference [between objectification and
alienation] in Marx's mature works is not a function of what occurs to concrete
labor and its products" is even more problematic because it implies that this (in
a pivotal sense) is in contrast to Marx's earlier analysis of labor, which
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supposedly was not only undifferentiated, but referred immediately and
narrowly to the relationship of humans to nature.
As I considered in some detail in earlier chapters, in “Critique of Hegelian
Dialectic and Philosophy in General" Marx's approach to labor involved (even
primarily) his attempt to "explain" Hegel's philosophic concept, "negation of
negation". Marx first evaluated positively Feuerbach's critical relationship to
Hegel in comparison to other "Young Hegelians", who adopted what they
believed was a thoroughly critical attitude toward everything, without noticing
this was except the "master", meaning Hegel's own dialectic. More difficult to
see in that analysis was that, after Marx affirmed aspects of Feuerbach's
thought, he criticized Feuerbach's notion that Hegel's negation of negation
merely represented the re-establishment of theology after the negation of
religion. I suggested that Marx, instead (and as opposed to Feuerbach),
grounded a conception of a relation of philosophy, labor and social
organization, shaped by a "return" (in the same manuscript) to Hegel.
Considering this, it is questionable whether Postone's analysis of Marx's "social
appropriation" of Hegel, which he distinguishes from the more typical idea of a
"materialist" appropriation, itself fully captures either Marx’s own relationship to
Hegel or that relationship's potential for a contemporary critical theory of
capitalism, which encompasses a potential for overcoming it.
There are several instances in which Postone demonstrates his
contention that an important dimension of Marx's theory can be explicated in
reference to a "social appropriation" of Hegel, which at the same time discloses
severe limitations in practically the entire range of post-Marx Marxism. While
this is so, it is questionable whether such a conception of Marx's relationship to
Hegel exhausts either Hegel's own potential relevance for contemporaneity, or
Marx's relationship to Hegel particularly. Perhaps the pivotal example is

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

221
Postone’s equation of Marx's concept of capital with Hegel's Absolute, an
equation I will discuss below.
First, Postone presents Marx's analysis of the "fetish" character of the
commodity as the intermediate stage between the young Marx's concept of
alienation, still on the basis of a transhistorical concept of labor, and the fully
“unfolded" concept of capital. In the latter, abstract labor "shapes” concrete
labor. Abstract labor "subsumes" the worker. Postone, unlike Habermas,
recognizes the structure of Marx's analysis where, in addition to transformation
of concrete labor into abstract labor, there is a transformation of abstract into
concrete. He, in fact, grants to the latter movement the distinguishing feature of
capitalism. In this way, his analysis surpasses TCA, wherein Habermas views
the conceptual movement, at least in respect to labor, as a movement from the
concrete to the abstract only. But Postone situates his own analysis of "abstract"
labor and alienation-in so far as it grasps Mane's concept of labor as a concept
of social mediation--in respect to debates around Habermas's early KHI. These
included the question of whether Marx's concept of labor was,
sufficiently synthetic to fulfill all that Marx demanded of it, or whether the
category of labor needed to be supplemented conceptually with a sphere
of interaction (Postone 1993, 158).

Remaining within such a framework necessarily confines a reinterpretation of
Marx's theory to capturing the essential features of existing society. This is the
level of social theory as critique, or critical theory, but does not grasp Marx's
appropriation of Hegel's negation of negation in terms of the potentiality of
revolutionary social transformation.
Recall that in a previous chapter (see Chapter Three) I discussed
Habermas's analysis of the movement of a "subterranean” Marx (from the 1844
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Manuscripts to the Grundrisse). In respect to this analysis, I showed the power
of Postone's re-interpretation of Marx's concepts of labor and wealth in its ability
to criticize Habermas's approach. The power of Postone's approach was
manifest not only in its ability to criticize particular arguments of Habermas
having to do with Marx, but in its implication that Habermas's own theory was
shaped, in crucial respects, by mistaken conceptions of Marx's ideas.
Much of Postone’s analysis of Habermas's treatment of Marx was
centered on a criticism of texts in KHI, where Habermas explicitly analyzed
Marx's works. Postone's analysis of TCA does not and cannot so directly
engage Habermas's treatment of Marx's basic concepts. As I have already
described in respect to TCA, in contrast to KHI, there is an explicit tension
between, on the one hand, Habermas's statement of his intentions in respect to
Marx's theory, along with the form of his subsequent presentation (in which
there are no direct references to Marx's text) and, on the other hand, his actual
argument. Thus, at least immediately, it seems unquestionable when Postone
does not directly address the circumstance that Habermas's analysis of Marx in
TCA takes as its starting point the relation of concrete and abstract labor, the
dual character of the commodity as its product, fundamental to Marx's theory.
Postone's presentation implies that his criticism of “Marxism as Critique" and
KHI is sufficient in respect to Habermas's treatment of these concepts. Yet,
Habermas's "new" approach in TCA, particularly the affinity with Postone of his
analysis of the young Marx, is crucial for grasping Postone's decision to not
break from the Critical Theory tradition, while leveling the strongest possible
critique.
The consistent failure of “traditional" Marxism (where Postone's own
analysis implies even Critical Theory belongs) to grasp the categories abstract
and concrete labor and their implications for overcoming “state" capitalism is a
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central theme of Postone's work. Surprisingly, however, Postone does not
note, let alone directly analyze, this new, unprecedented development in
Habermas’s approach. Following from this, I want to examine whether his not
doing so is somehow related to the limitations of his argument concerning
Marx's "social appropriation" of Hegel versus a "traditional" materialist
appropriation, that is, is sufficient in terms of possible conceptions of the HegelMarx dialectic.
Essence and Notion in Postone's Critique of Critical Theory's Approach to
Marx's Theory
In Postone's analysis, a “social appropriation" of Hegel's dialectic refers
to Marx's "explanation" of Hegel's philosophy, the latteris concepts of Essence
and Notion, especially the Absolute's situation in the latter. In Postone's view,
determinate social relations issue forth forms of objectivity and subjectivity.
Generally, Postone's analysis proposes to develop a socio-historical
epistemology in which subject/object relations themselves characterize
specifically capitalist social relations. Thus, Hegel's philosophy, Hegel's selfunderstanding notwithstanding, can be understood as the philosophy most
adequate to a particular socio-historical form of society, the capitalist. Marx, in
specifying this social form, was able to situate and explain the "universality"
characteristic of Hegel's Absolutes. In Postone's view, contrary to traditional
Marxism, wherein the proletariat was the subject, and capital was the object (or
in the radicalized, critical perspective of Lukacs, where implicit in the proletariat
was subject/object identity) Marx analyzed capital as the Subject of history, the
unfolding Absolute subsuming difference in realizing itself. As Postone cites
Marx in Capital, when it has reached its mature form, capital is a "self-moving
substance" which "moves itself" (Postone 1993, 75).
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Postone's type of analysis implies a sufficiency of merely deepening
what he sees as Marx's own trajectory-secularization of Hegel's mystified
dialectic-despite decades of a Marxist tradition presumably already expert in
that procedure. Postone implies (in substantial accord with Habermas) that
Marx’s 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts did not go beyond Feuerbach,
and he explicitly, "rejects the humanist reaction to structuralist neo-objectivism,
which fails to recognize the major changes in the development of Marx's
analysis" (Postone 1993, 74).
In connection with this, in a comparison of Marx's relationship to
Feuerbach's and Hegel's thought within the 1844 Economic-Philosophic
Manuscripts, I criticized Habermas's view that Marx did not really "go beyond"
Feuerbachian materialism in the 1844, "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and
Philosophy in General". I pointed out that in these manuscripts Marx already
made clear that Feuerbach's "naturalistic" inversion of Hegel was itself
inadequate, though it did represent for Marx the only truly critical approach to
Hegel's philosophy among the radical Young Hegelians. According to Marx's
manuscript, it was not sufficient to demonstrate that in religious representations
could be found projections of man's natural conditions, or that his social
relations were reflected in mystified, religious or metaphysical forms.
Postone's argument concerning Hegel's Absolute is similar to (while
developing) the one I showed Marx criticized in Feuerbach, propelling Marx to a
return to Hegel, a movement undetected in Habermas's analysis as well.
Postone’s argument is essentially that Marx explained Hegel's dialectic, outside
Hegel's own consciousness, as merely a reflection of the movement of capital.
This is contrary to Marx's own assessment of the power of Hegel's philosophy,
specifically the concept of negativity, even within the 1844 manuscripts, where
Hegel was also strongly criticized.
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In the 1844 "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", Marx returns to an idea of
the preeminence of Hegel after appreciating Feuerbach's criticism of him. Key
passages, which describe how Marx preserved Hegel's original dialectic, and
which I singled out earlier, included Marx's references to, on the one hand,
labor (where Marx sees a fundamental similarity in Hegel and political economy
in their inability to grasp its "negative" side) and, on the other hand, Hegel's
notion of negativity when it is consistently developed, ie; not separated from an
analysis of labor's specificity, its dual character in capitalism. Then Marx grasps
Hegel's concept of negativity as the "creative and moving principle of Hegel's
dialectic", transcendence as objective, what Marx conceived (before, within and
after 1844) as adequate to a "revolution in permanence" (Dunayevskaya 1991),
necessary for overcoming capitalism. Following this, when Marx analyzes
Absolute Knowledge in Hegel's Phenomenology, he indicates that, in addition
to a dual concept of a labor and a philosophy of negation of negation, a
dialectical concept of revolutionary social organization is suggested in Hegel's
thought (See Chapter Three).
Now, with consideration of Postone's counter-posing of the alternatives
of Marx's "materialist" or "social" appropriation of Hegel, it becomes possible to
look again at the further importance Marx already (even in the same text
following his appreciation of Feuerbach's approach in 1844, and before fully
working out his concept of Capital) attributed to Hegel's Absolute, and therefore
the necessity of explaining (appropriating) it. Such an appropriation, as
conceived by Marx, meant the need for its re-concretization in each new
presentation of his theory. In the 1844, "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" recall
that Marx's return to Hegel, after appropriating Feuerbach's criticism, was
already at the level of Hegel's Absolute (Absolute Knowledge in the
Phenomenololgy). In this context, Marx grasped the core of Hegel's philosophy
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as "negation of negation," appropriating the transcenent movement of Hegel’s
dialectic. At the same time, Marx criticized Hegel's making an abstraction of
nature, including the natural attributes of man. This is clearly the identical form
in which Marx later (in Capital) developed concrete and abstract labor, as well
as an idea of the shaping of the former by the latter. Hence, the form of Hegel's
negation of negation is central in both the early and late expressions of Marx's
theory, in that it appropriates the internal movement of Hegel's Absolute. Marx
criticized in Hegel's philosophy the de-humanization not only of that which was
external to philosophy, but philosophy (and the philosopher) as well. This
particular criticism was at the core of Marx's own concept of a dialectical
working out of philosophy and non-alienated forms of organization (in
attempting a relationship to mass social movements) which aimed at
overcoming this dehumanization, no longer merely contigent but as crystalized
in the movement of the developing social form itself (See Chapter Three).
Postone's outline of a socio-historical epistemology (derived from Marx's
Grundrisse and Capital) implies an identity of chronological and theoretical
"maturity" in Marx's development of concepts. But while Marx may indeed have
sharpened over time a socio-historical theory of knowledge, such a conception
reflexively moved to the center of his social theory early humanist concepts,
rather than (as Postone holds) merely kept them as "concerns" while further
"secularizing" his approach in the interest of an adequate "critical theory" of
capitalist society, a perspective (in tune with the critical theory tradition
generally) which denies Marx's theory contained a worked out dialectic of
philosophy and organization, either social or political. Postone considers the
implications (for social and politcal organization) of his own re-interpretation of
Marx in his concluding chapters, but seems to believe that these are
contemporary issues outside Marx's concerns as expressed in his "mature
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critical theory". Both Postone and the critical theory he attempts to criticize and
develop fail to see that such a concept of philosophy and organization was
intrinsic to Marx's theory. In fact, it is perhaps the strongest link between the
early and mature Marx (Dunayevskaya 1991). According to my analysis,
neither Marx's 1844 critique of Hegel, nor particularly Marx's concept of
alienation, can be fully explained as superseded by attribution to him of a later
more fully devloped perspective of a socio-historical epistemology, the core of
which was a qualitatively developed concept of labor, that is, merely stripped of
Marx's early supposed transhistorical assumptions. Further consideration of
this is possible by briefly continuing to follow Postone’s analysis, in Part II of his
work, of Marx's concept of the commodity. In "Abstract Labor and Alienation",
Postone writes,
...it is clear that Mane's mature critique succeeds in grasping the "rational
core" of Hegel's position-in this case that objectification is alienation--by
analyzing the specificity of labor in capitalism. I noted earlier that a
"materialist appropriation" of Hegel's thought on the basis of an
historically undifferentiated notion of "labor" can apprehend socially
Hegel’s conception of the historical Subject only in terms of a social
grouping, but not in terms of a suprahuman structure of social relations.
We now see it also fails to grasp the intrinsic (albeit historically
determinate) relation between alienation and objectification. In both
cases, Marx's analysis of the double character of labor in capitalism
permits a more adequate social appropriation of Hegel's
thought... (Postone 1993, 160).

In the following section, "Abstract labor and the fetish", Postone
concludes his analysis of abstract labor and Marx's "social appropriation of
Hegel" by referring to the final part of Chapter One of Marx's Capital, "The
Fetishism of the Commodity and Its Secret". He begins by recalling that in his
own initial section on abstract labor he had noted the problem of explaining why
Marx (in Volume One of Capital) began his own discussion of abstract labor
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(characteristic of capitalism) by presenting it as physiological labor. Postone
attributes this to Marx's immanent analysis:
The appearance of labor's mediational character in capitalism as
physiological labor is the fundamental core of the fetishism of capitalism
(Postone 1993, 170).

This judgement follows from a several page analysis in which he depicts
Chapter One of Capital on the commodity as, on one level, a deliberate
appropriation of Hegel by Marx. Postone’s view of Marx's critical "immanent
analysis", here of the commodity as a form of appearance of labor in general
(transhistorical) as socially mediating, implies that Marx's "fetishism of the
commodity" section (in merely negating this appearance) did not, and could not,
"appropriate" (Hegel's) Notion (in which the Absolute appears). Since Postone
identifies only the fully developed concept of capital with Hegel's Absolute, for
him commodity (as fetish) refers only to Hegel's concept of Essence. (Here it is
necessary to recall that Hegel's Logic unfolds the Absolute from Being through
Essence to Notion, the latter containing the section on the Absolute Idea).
According to Postone, Marx's "social appropriation" of Hegel, as opposed to
traditional Marxism's "materialist appropriation" (which Postone, remarkably,
equates with the young Marx) is distinguished in that while traditional Marxism
looks "behind" the commodity and finds mere expenditure of labor as
constitutive of value, actually Marx's analysis identifies the constitution of value
as the function of socially mediating labor, which is specific to capitalism.
Marx's immanent mode of presentation itself explains the widespread
misapprehension characteristic of attempted "materialist appropriations” of
Hegel:
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The fetishized appearance of labor's mediating role as labor in general,
taken at face value, is the starting point for the various social critiques
from the standpoint of “labor" I have termed "traditional Marxism". The
possibility that the object of Marx's critique can be transformed into what
traditional Marxism affirms with its “paradigm of production" is rooted in
the circumstance that the core of capitalism, according to Marx, has a
necessary form of appearance that can be hypostatized as the essence
of social life...(Postone 1993, 170).

Postone introduces this point earlier with his observation that,
It is labor's unique role in capitalism that constitutes labor both as an
essence and as a form of appearance. In other words, because the
social relations characterizing capitalism are mediated by labor, it is a
peculiarity of that social formation that it has an essence (Postone 1994,
166).

Thus, Postone, in effect, argues that Hegel's categories of essence and
appearance--and Hegel's key philosophical argument that "essence must
appear" (and that, therefore, appearance is no less essential than essence)are adequate categories for illustrating Postone's interpretation of Marx's
procedure of "social appropriation" of Hegel's dialectic at the categorical level of
Marx's “Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret". Here it can be pointed out
again that in Postone's own immanent analysis (after assessing traditional
interpretations of Marx), in his reinterpretation of Marx's mature critical theory,
he begins to analyze the commodity, followed by capital. The last chapter in his
section on the commodity (which I am analyzing here) first takes up Habermas's
KHI, then "Marxism as Critique", followed by TCA.
In an earlier chapter (See Chapter Three), I highlighted the power of
Postone's critique of Habermas's analysis of Marx in KHI. His analysis of
Habermas's failure to recover and develop Marx's concept of the two-fold
character of labor as characteristic of the capitalist social formation, and his
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related inability to distinguish between value and material wealth, led me to
investigate in even more detail Habermas's analysis of the Gmndrisse,
especially the way in which he related it to Marx's 1844 Economic and
Philosophic Manuscripts. My study uncovered other points on which to
question Habermas's reading of Marx, while allowing for an opportunity to
suggest alternative interpretations. In retrospect, it also becomes clear,
Postone's critique-unequalled in disclosing the theoretic barrier constituted by
an historic inability of Critical Theory to grasp Marx's concept of labor and social
mediation--is importantly shaped, and therefore limited by, Postone's notion of
Marx's "social appropriation" of Hegel. The main reason for this is Postone's
failure to discern Marx's concern with a dialectical concept of "organization" that
was inseparable from his socio-economic explanation of philosophy and, in
fact, led him back into dialectical philosophy. (Besides Marx's "return" to Hegel
within "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General", the most
striking example is the Hegelian language permeating the Gmndrisse itself).
For Habermas, and thus for Postone's critique of the latter, at issue is the
the idea of capital as an automaton, a "moving force that moves itself (a
description which also fits well Hegel's Absolute, and thus the social
implications for the control and regulation of "society" following from it).
Specifically, while Postone (in his re-interpretation of the Gmndrisse) criticizes
Habermas's conflation of value and wealth, and cogently points out that Marx
criticized precisely what Habermas suggests he affirms (automatic regulation of
social relations), Postone does not refer to the parallel analysis in the further
developed Capitals Chapter One section on "fetishism of the commodity and its
secret". Marx’s theoretical position there is that only the coming into being of
"freely associated" relations among people abolishes the fetishism of the
commodity.
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This suggests that already within Chapter One of Capital, intrinsic to his
analysis of the commodity, and preceding his unfoldment of the concept of
capital proper, Marx has already appropriated not only Hegel's "Essence", but
Hegel's "Notion", as well (Dunayevskaya 1991, 144), here again (thirty-three
years after “Critique of Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General") as a
"humanism"-a humanism which can be seen as unfolded from his initial
determination in 1844 I discussed in an earlier chapter (Chapter Three).
Internal to the commodity form, Hegel's Notion, as appropriated by Marx as a
humanism, is an expression of the most developed contradiction—that between,
on the one hand, the automatic regulation of production and society along with
the predominance of the social relations between things and objective relations
between persons and, on the other hand, "freely associated" relations, the
impact of which penetrates even material production. The potential basis for
the latter was now viewed as creation of material wealth, in place of value.
Such a perspective places at the center the potentiality of the development of
individual capacities and talents, rather than wealth in general as the aim of
production.
Postone's chapter on Habermas considers in greater detail than
anywhere else in the book the contradiction between value and material wealth
Marx outlined in the Gmndrisse. Yet, oddly enough, it does not directly tie the
Absolute Marx described explicitly in the Gmndrisse to how he more fully
worked it out in Chapter One of Capitah Already in the Gmndrisse, Marx writes:
Do we never find in antiquity an inquiry into which form of landed
property etc. is the most productive, creates the greatest wealth? Wealth
does not appear as the aim of production...The question is always which
mode of property creates the best citizens. Wealth appears as an end in
itself only among the few commercial peoples-monopolists of the
carrying trade-who live in the pores of the ancient world, like the Jews in
medieval society. Now, wealth is on one side a thing, realized in things,
material products, which a human being confronts as subject; on the
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other side, as value, wealth is merely command over alien labor not with
the aim of ruling, but with the aim of private consumption etc. It appears
in all forms in the shape of a thing, be it an object or be it a relation
mediated through the object, which is external and accidental to the
individual. Thus the old view, in which the human being appears as the
aim of production, regardless of his limited national, religious, political
character, seems to be very lofty when compared to the modem world,
where production appears to be the aim of mankind and wealth as the
aim of production. In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is
stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of individual
needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces etc., created through
universal exchange? The full development of human mastery over the
forces of nature, those of so-called nature as well as humanity's own
nature? The absolute working out of his creative potentialities, with no
presupposition other than the previous historic development, which
makes this totality of development, i.e. the development of all human
powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined
yardstick? Where he does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but
produces his totality? Strives not to remain something he has become,
but is in the absolute movement of becoming?...(Marx 1973, 487-488).

Postone's criticism of Habermas makes clear the severe consequences, for an
understanding of Marx's theory, of a failure to grasp the two-fold character of
labor specific to the capitalist social formation. But Postone directs the reader to
Part III (specifically on capital) of his own work in order to see how Marx unfolds
his critique of the "automatic regulation of production and society". It is thus
implied that Part III, "Toward a reconstruction of the Marxian Critique: Capital, is
the only really appropriate place for a discussion of the mature Marx's treatment
of the Absolute. Postone writes,
...emancipation would require not the realization but the overcoming of
the consequences of this mode [capitalist] of social constitution.
Overcoming the contradiction outlined in the Grundrisse does not, then,
imply emancipation from hunger and toil alone; overcoming the capitalist
relations of production, as expressed by the categories of value and
capital, also entails overcoming the automatic regulation of society...
Postone 1993, 236-237).
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But Postone's analysis here does not yet return to the individual, to Marx's
humanist dialectic of the "social individual".
Recall that at this point Postone has already finished considering
Chapter One of Capital (on the Commodity and Money), an analysis of which
composes (along with the chapter on Habermas) the entire Part II of his book.
The significance of the structure of his argument, then, can be seen in one of
Postone's most original substantive claims—that Marx rooted the possibility of
overcoming the automatic regulation of production and society in the potentiality
of "dead labor", exclusive of "living labor" (which he equates with a social
existent~“proletarian labor").
In his consideration of TCA, in opposing Habermas's contention that
Marx's critique of capitalism was essentially romantic in its misguided nostalgia
for destroyed traditional (including proletarian) forms of life, Postone writes,
Marx's vision of emancipation, which follows from his analysis, is
precisely opposite of what Habermas attributes to him. Jumping ahead
for a moment, I shall show that, far from conceiving of socialism as the
victory of living labor over dead labor, Marx understands dead labor-the
structure constituted by alienated labor-to be not only the locus of
domination in capitalism but also the locus of possible emancipation.
This makes sense only when Marx's critical analysis of capitalism is
understood as one that points toward the possible abolition of
proletarian labor ("living labor"), not toward its affirmation (Postone 1993,
256)

Yet, according to Postone's own analysis, all the categories Marx develops in
Capital presuppose the fully developed concept of capital. This is a strikingly
different feature compared to the "preparatory" Grundrisse. In Capital, within the
section on commodity fetishism, after he discusses the essence and
appearance of the commodity (so incisively described by Postone, including the
observation that capitalist society's specificity consists in the fact that it has an
essence), Marx proceeds (in a further analysis which Postone does not notice)
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to the realm of the Hegelian Notion, which culminates in the Absolute Idea.
Marx's analysis in the commodity fetishism section does indeed implicitly
incorporate "dead labor", or the structure of alienated labor. However, here
Marx's appropriation of the concept of the Absolute (as containing the highest
contradiction) unfolded by Hegel in the realm of the Notion (which follows
Essence in the Science of Logic), does not exclude “living labor" in the
abolition of proletarian labor. Marx, in fact, explicitly demonstrates the
specificity of the abolition of capitalism in comparison to the overcoming of
previous socio-historic forms in terms of social organization of "living labor" in
thought and activity. After an account of capitalism ("fetishism of the
commodity") Marx describes the primitive (Robinson Crusoe) and feudal forms
of production, as well as the religious representations in accord with them. He
then writes:
Let us imagine, for a change, an association of free men, working with
the means of production held in common, and expending their many
different forms of labor power in full self-awareness as one single social
labor force (Marx 1977, 171-173).

This should be seen as Mane's further working out of the contradiction he
outlined in the Grundrisse, not only between value and wealth, but between
conscious social organization and "automatic regulation" of production and
society. In constrast with both Habermas and Postone, I traced the latter
problematic's inception to Marx's 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts
where, in fact, it was already immanent.
By now it should be clear there is indeed a connection between
limitations of Postone's powerful critique of the earlier Habermas (up to 1968)
and his seemingly inexplicable failure to discuss in a direct manner the later
Habermas's return (in TCA) to analysis of Marx's Capital. Postone's account of
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Habermas’s early treatment of the Grundrisse should have led Postone’s own
analysis to what Marx had worked out in the later Chapter One of Capital, the
concept of historic possibility of “freely associated" relations, their effect on
material production, as the necessary condition for overcoming the
contradiction intrinsic to the value form of wealth; Marx, in the development of
this point in Chapter One, went "beyond" the Grundrisse (and later chapters of
Capital itself), presenting it as the "secret" of the "Fetishism of the Commodity".
Yet, as I have just shown, Postone characterized Marx’s commodity
fetishism as a socio-historic situation of Hegel’s concept of Essence alone. This
is related to Postone’s overall thesis that Marx unfolds capital from the
commodity (as Hegel unfolds the Absolute from Being), two key steps of which
are the "formal subsumption of labor", followed by the “real subsumption of
labor" (Postone 1993, 182). The latter refers to chapters of Capital (subsequent
to Chapter One) wherein is described the shaping of concrete labor by abstract
labor. These constitute the basis for Postone's position that Marx, in positing
the abolition of proletarian labor (which Postone equates with "living labor"),
thus posits "dead labor” as, "not only the locus of capitalist domination, but of its
possible transcendence" as well. Postone's pursuit of an idea of Marx's
presentation of a concept of capital as a socio-historic explanation of Hegel's
Absolute obscures the dialectical presentation fully present in Chapter One of
Capital, which provides the basis of the resolution of the problem Marx
identified (or re-identified, considering the 1844 Economic-Philosophic
Manuscripts) in the Grundrisse.
It is important to see in connection with this that Postone does not directly
consider Habermas's return to Marx's Capital in TCA. While it is true, as I
pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, that Habermas takes up Marx in a
very circumscribed manner (especially so in regard to Capital, where he refers
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exclusively to its interpretations by other contemporary Critical Theorists) his
analysis in that work tries to critically appropriate what can be described to be
an understanding of Capital as a socio-historical interpretation of Hegel,
different from Postone's and, in fact, preceding it by a full decade. Yet, neither
Habermas (with his acceptance, at least for argument’s sake, of Lohmann's
idea of capital as a “negative totality"), nor Postone (who understands Marx's
approach to Hegel in terms of an explanation of the latteris absolute as capital)
saw the absolute “as new beginning" (Dunayevskaya 1989) Marx already
embedded in the first Chapter of Capital.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CRITIQUE OF AN INCIPIENT PUBLIC SPHERE: DIALECTIC OF HABERMAS'S
INTERVENTION IN THE JOURNAL PRAXIS INTERNATIONAL
It is a remarkable that, when viewed from within the post-world War II
Critical Theory tradition, the attempt to grasp Marx's theory in light of
contemporary conditions began and concluded with a lack of consensus
concerning his concept of labor. What makes this doubly remarkable is that
within Marx's own lifetime he already noted that his concept of labor had been
"bungled" (Marx 1972, 11), even within the organization whose theoretical
tendency was in support of his ideas generally. In Critique of the Gotha
Programme Marx viewed as serious social "retrogression" (Marx 1972, 18) an
attempt to form a unified German social democratic party on the basis of, or
despite, such a "bungled” concept. Not a redeemable categorical
misunderstanding (which might be resolved with organizational unification)
Marx characterized the proposed programme's theoretical core, derived from its
mistaken concept of labor, as an historical "crime" (Marx 1972, 24) and
indicated he wished to disassociate from its knowing subordination of
theoretical achievement to supposed organizational requisites.
As I have demonstrated in previous chapters, Habermas wrote on Marx
for at least two decades before he found his way to a direct confrontation with
Marx's concept of the dual character of the commodity, and the two-fold nature
of the labor which produced it, as the differentia specifica of the capitalist social

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

238
formation. Yet the very inception of Habermas's theory included proposals for
renewing Critical Theory on the basis of a break from Marx's concept of labor.
More precisely, the development of Habermas's social theory retained, as a
permanent feature it turned out, a critique of a concept that, according to even
his own evolving account, must have miscontrued Marx's theory.
But a decade after the publication of TCA, and also from within the
Critical Theory tradition, Moishe Postone re-interpreted Marx's “mature critical
theory", developing labor as the social mediation specific to capitalist society. In
doing so he provided a convincing up-to-date critique of contemporary
capitalism and Critical Theory, most extensively Habermas's. On one level,
Postone formulates his difference with Habermas, in respect to interpretation of
Marx's theory, as a problem of reflexivity. According to Postone, Marx's
concepts of labor and capital were developed along with a socio-historic
epistemology. Aware that an understanding of labor as transhistorical
amounted to a fundamental barrier to a grasp of the capitalist social formation,
Marx restricted his own basic concepts to a particular set of social relations.
From the standpoint of his idea of a deepening of the secularization of
philosophy, Postone attempts to explain subsequent misunderstandings at the
core of traditional Marxism. Moreover, he attempts to show how these
misunderstandings are constitutive of limitations of oppositional practice, ie; the
labor movement, Social Democratic and Communist parties, etc., where
traditional Marxist thought has been influential (Postone 1993, 371).
But Postone's critique of these forms of opposition to features of
contemporary capitalism (though sufficient to discredit the traditional Marxism
integral to them) are derived exclusively from his re-interpretation of what he
delineates as Marx's "mature critical theory". Thus, Postone cuts away Marx's
own conceptualization of the relation of philosophy and organization, which
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(though more implicit in his earlier writings) can be traced from "Critique of
Hegelian Dialectic" (1844) to its most focused treatment in the post-Capital
Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875). This conceptual development had
internal to it a continuous return to the dialectic in Hegel's philosophy.
Postone’s interest in the Marx-Hegel relationship is exhausted with a "secular"
explanation of the latter by the former.
In my examination of the journal Praxis International, where practical and
theoretical discourse intersected, I will argue that Habermas's intervention
shaped an incipient public sphere in line with his critique of Marx and Marxism.
The core of this critique was an attempted theoretical reconstruction of the
relation of labor and social organization (with implications for the self
organization of Critical Theory itself) following from more than one experimental
separation of Marx from Hegel, the two of which, in the end, he rejoins and
abandons as inimical to an adequate contemporary social theory.
The central purpose here is to deepen my analysis of Habermas's
peculiar relationship to Marx’s thought. As Postone has remarked, Habermas’s
mistaken conceptions of Marx's ideas blunted the critical edge of his own
theory. He understood the latter, contrasted with the former, as adequate to
contemporary society; but, since his grasp and presentation of some of Marx’s
basic ideas are problematic, this self-understanding is thus rendered
questionable. My analysis will attempt to make clear that Habermas's
projection of his self-understanding of the distinctiveness of his own theory vis a
vis Marx's, as it emerged in the 1980s, achieved its goal in many respects; but
in the process the independent cogency of Habermas's theory was rendered
even more clearly problematic. This is only partly due to the fact that
Habermas's critique of modernity and Marxism loses much of its pull along with
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the disintegration of the political and economic power (in East Europe and the
Soviet Union) associated with the traditional Marxism Habermas assumed.
Praxis International was the descendant of the semi-underground
dissident international Marxist Humanist journal, Praxis, published in the former
Yugoslavia. However, the historical and theoretical landscape was shifting
rapidly. Habermas's TCA appeared in 1981, as did the journal, but now in
England rather than in the former Yugoslavia. Just when the fact that nonStalinist Yugoslavia had long since found itself unable to tolerate a dissident
Marxist tendency represented by Praxis might have seemed to point to the
power and long term determination and prospects of the ruling regimes, not
only in non-aligned Marxist Yugoslavia, but in the aligned Marxist East bloc
generally, the Solidarity movement burst on the scene and shattered the Polish
Communist Party. Martial law descended upon the land. Perhaps 20 million
workers went out on strike in an oppositional social movement in some ways
unparalled in the post-World War II period. In my concluding chapter I will
return to this congruence of pivotal events--the publication of TCA and the
emergence of Polish Solidarity. Here I just want to note that the historical
simultaneity of TCA, Polish Solidarity and the disintegration of Communism in
central and eastern Europe, including the Balkans and the Soviet Union itself,
presents a potentially instructive challenge for any attempt to grasp the
relationship between Habermas's theory, Marx, Marxism and social revolution
in the post-World War II world.
Though rarely noted, Habermas contributed substantially to the founding
of Praxis International. Richard Bernstein (an American), along with Mihailo
Markovic (a Yugoslav) were the journal's founding editors. In his Introduction to
Habermas and Modernity (Bernstein 1985), a collection of 1980s writings which
appeared in the journal and were concerned with Habermas's theory, Bernstein

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

241
wrote that Habermas, “epitomizes the ideals of Praxis International' (Bernstein
1985, 32).
Quite likely unknown to Bernstein, Habermas was developing nearly
simultaneously a theoretical presentation of his radical separation from the
"praxis philosophers", in the series of lectures, published under the title,
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas questions praxis philosphy's,
"connection with the conception of reason" (Habermas 1990a, 75).
In contrast, Bernstein concluded his introduction to Habermas and
Modernity (where he projected a growing "unity" of Habermas and praxis
philosophy) with a passage taken from Habermas’s "Reply to My Critics", an
earlier exchange (Thompson & Held 1981, 221): "...[the claim to reason
develops a] stubbornly transcending power, because it is renewed with each
act of unconstrained understanding," and with, "each moment of living together
in solidarity".
Recall for a moment Habermas’s several (somewhat puzzling) illusions
to Stalin's theory in "The Reconstruction of Historical Materialism". Habermas
identifies it as the tendency among the varieties of Marxism which was in "need
of reconstruction". Habermas described theory reconstruction as, "taking a
theory apart and putting it back together in a new form" (Habermas 1979, 95).
Such a description seems to imply a "reformist" approach to what many have
regarded as the most vulgar, if not sinister, perversion of Marx's thought. Recall
also that "Reconstruction of Historical Materialism" dismissed the young Marx
as well as Adorno as representing theories which precluded "levels" in terms of
social analysis and, as such, were not viable subjects for Marxism's potential
“reconstruction". Also, as early as in his major essay on Marx in Knowledge
and Human Interests Habermas rather bluntly dismissed thinkers such as
Marcuse and the Czech dissident Marxist philosopher Karel Kosik, arguing
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(among other issues) that they misunderstood the young Marx's concept of
labor which, according to Habermas at the time, was a key concept of Marx's
"metacritique of Hegel". Here, and later, Habermas viewed Marx’s theory as
essentially a materialist (if not economistic) theory of social evolution, which
included a materialist appropriation of Hegelian logic (Habermas 1979, 96).
If Bernstein, in his introduction to a volume of essays concerned with
Habermas's theory, seemed a pains to present a united front of dissident
Marxist Humanism with Habermas's theory, this was consistent with the peculiar
manner in which he portrayed "praxis philosophy's" attitude as essentially
conformist in respect to the social relations which prevailed in Tito's Yugoslavia
on the eve of that country’s social collapse, its plunge into a nightmare of
genocide:
The Praxis group considers themselves loyal and comitted members of
Yugoslav society working in the tradition of Marxist humanism (Bernstein
1985, 31).

The implications of such an assessment are numerous, including a surprisingly
positive assessement of prevailing social conditions, and the possibility of
maintaining a genuinely critical stance in the shadow of Communist Party
domination in the former Yugoslavia. Thus, as late as 1985, a thinker of the
stature, and in possession of the theoretical links, of Richard Bernstein appears,
at least with the hindsight of the late 1990s, in a dizzying position of
disorientation. It seems that all the theoretical and practical discourse in the
world failed to steer this milieu generally from its descent into a morass of
illusory self-confidence and progressive intellectual "unity". Though the thrust of
my analysis has been critical in respect to Habermas's long journey of
confrontation with Marx’s thought, it is evident in examining the inception of his
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approach to PI that he, compared to other theoretical tendencies, was clearly
more prepared to present a coherent explanation—whether or not one accepted
it—of the contemporary status of Marx's theory. None the less, here I am not as
concerned with comparing varying diagnoses of the state of contemporary
theories as I am with examining how Habermas's theory in particular depended
upon, and was molded by, inadequacies in his grasp of Marx's concepts.
Keeping this in mind, I want to turn now to a necessarily brief analysis of
Habermas's "intervention" in PI, the intent not all difficult to discern with a careful
reading of Albrecht Wellmeris article, "Reason, Utopia, and the Dialectic of
Enlightenment" (Wellmer 1985, 35-66), as well as Habermas’s own initial
contribution in memoriam to Herbert Marcuse, "Psychic Thermidor and the
Rebirth of Rebellious Subjectivity" (Habermas 1985a, 67-77).
Next, I will turn to the 1984 symposium in the journal dedicated to
discussion of Habermas's ideas. In that special section, Habermas replied
directly to several essays discussing his work. In the context of the evolution of
PI, this might have represented a high-point of Habermas's achievement. None
of the symposium participants challenged (directly, at least) the coming into its
own of Habermas's critique of Marx. (Thomas McCarthy, only in a later essay
(McCarthy 1991), seemed to sense, with reservations, Habermas's vulnerability
in this respect).
The third part of my consideration of PI, while noting the theoretical and
historical cross-currents involved in the journal's break from its identification
with Marxism, specifically Marxist humanism, will assess the outcome in terms
of the status of Marx's theory, taking into account Habermas's TCA critique of
Marx.
Habermas's Critique of Marcuse and "Praxis Philosophy"
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"Psychic Thermidor and the Rebirth of Rebellious Subjectivity", a
transcript of a 1980 talk delivered at University of California at San Diego to
honor the memory of Herbert Marcuse, was included as Habermas's first
contribution to the re-established PI, its first number appearing in April, 1981.
He begins by establishing that, compared to other critical theorists of his
generation, Marcuse (according to his own description) was, "an absolutely
incurable and sentimental romantic" (Habermas 1985a, 70). This is best seen
in how Marcuse "praised negativity" (Habermas 1985a, 67) (as had other critical
theorists). Yet, according to Habermas, Marcuse (among them all) was the most
"affirmative"; he made, "appeals to future alternatives". The question, then,
which Habermas proposes to address in his talk, is whether this characteristic
was a "personality trait", or was due to a theoretical position (Habermas 1985,
70). I want to single out two key points he makes on his way to answering this
question. While not obviously political, they assume a practical/theoretical
meaning in the context I have just described in respect to the at least implicit
tensions at the very inception of P I. First, Habermas states,
Since he first joined the Institute, Marcuse had made the most "orthodox"
contributions to Critical Theory. This is true of his essays in the Zietschrift
where Marcuse was chosen to write the article, “Philosophy and Critical
Theory", counter-point to Horkheimer’s famous position paper on
"Traditional and Critical Theory". But it is also true of his later writings
including the very last: in Reason and Revolution, in One-Dimensional
Man and in The Aesthetic Dimension, Marcuse elaborated themes and
arguments, pursued lines of reasoning, which were more or less shared
by the whole group (Habermas 1985a, 69).

A few pages later, however, Habermas states that in the years following
the 1937 "Philosophy and Critical Theory",
...Marcuse elaborated the classical position of Critical Theoiy in careful
studies of Hegel and the rise of social theory. At the same time,
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Horkheimer and Adorno, who had moved to Santa Monica, had already
taken a somewhat different line. With Dialectic of Enlightenment they
definitely lost their trust in the revolutionary dynamic of the productive
forces, and in the practical impact of negative thinking...(Habermas
1985a, 73).

What might seem obvious in a comparison of these two passages is that
Reason and Revolution in the first, classified as just one among several of
Marcuse's "orthodox" (shared by the whole group) contributions to Critical
Theory, is the very same work referenced in the second as Marcuse's, careful
studies of "Hegel and the rise of social theory" (which is, in fact, the subtitle to
Reason and Revolution), written at the same time (in the midst of the Nazi
Holocaust) as Horkheimer's and Adorno's radically divergent Dialectic of
Enlightenment Now, the implication here is that Horkheimer's and Adorno's
Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) represented a fundamental break from
"orthodox" Critical Theory, while Marcuse's Reason and Revolution: Hegel and
the Rise of Social Theory represented its continuity.
This analysis overlooks key facts. Marcuse's 1941 Reason and
Revolution, the first work in English to analyze Marx's hitherto virtually unknown
1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, represented a further development of
Marcuse's break with his own philosophic past. Thus, Reason and Revolutions
essential continuity with the tradition of critical theory was not in general (or the
elaboration of an "orthodox" position), but only with Marcuse himself. Recall
that Marcuse, less than a decade earlier (1932) (Marcuse 1972, 1-48) had been
the first to analyze Marx's 1844 manuscripts when they initially appeared in
their original German. In a further development, Reason and Revolution was
the, "first systematic published analysis of Hegel's major works from a Marxist
standpoint in any language" (Anderson 1993, 244).
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Habermas's 1980 lecture in honor of Marcuse suggests that neither the
initial appearance of Marx's Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts themselves
(which Marcuse first interpreted) nor their potential for clarifying the relationship
between Marx's theory and Hegel's philosophy in the interest of a contemporary
critical social theory, which Marcuse attempted to further develop in Reason and
Revolution, represented an alternative basis for the orientation and direction of
an incipient contemporary Critical Theory. However, what is at issue in the
context of my analysis is not so much the young Marcuse's philosophic stature
and orientation vis a vis Marx's thought (compared to Horkheimer and Adorno).
Rather, the main issue here is the significance of Habermas's 1980 attempt to
pinpoint chronologically a lasting impact of Heidegger on Marcuse, “in terms of
personal loyalty...as in terms of philosophical motivations" (Habermas 1985a,
71).
Aside from its condescending tone—perhaps difficult to fully appreciate as
it is couched in terms of an informal talk-the substance of Habermas's
argument is that Marcuse's analysis of the "Paris Manuscripts" in no way
represented a break from Heideggerian philosophy, much less from Critical
Theory’s incipient neo-Marxism, which Habermas soon intends to show failed
completely. To the contrary, according to Habermas, Marcuse's analysis
represented no more than the beginning of existential phenomenology's
appropriation of the young Marx. The informality, and the affectionate tone of
the lecture, served to veil its seriously critical quality. For such an informal talk,
to honor Herbert Marcuse, Habermas reports going to some extraordinary
lengths. He says,
For the preparation of this lecture Leo Lowenthal lent me a copy of
Hegel's Ontologie, and in this old copy I found a yellowed cut out from
feuilleton of the Vossiche Zeitung with a long and intense review of the
three volumes of Karl Jasper's Philosophie, written by somebody with the
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initials H.M., dated Dec. 14,1933. It is in this context of a criticism of
Jaspers that we find a passage which indicates, still guarded by clauses,
Marcuse's detachment from Heidegger. Here, Marcuse insists that the
formal properties of historicity conceal rather than disclose the substance
of history. He raises the question, "whether it is not the case that
particular and contingent situations can destroy the authenticity of human
existence, can abolish freedom or transform it into sheer illusion." Any
talk about historicity, he continues, "must remain abstract and
uncommitted until the analysis focuses on the concrete, 'material'
situation.
The term "material" is printed in quotes, thereby inconspicuously referring
to an earlier article of the same author on the recently discoverd Paris
Manuscripts, not by Karl Jaspers but by Karl Marx. This article shows
how young Marcuse appropriated the young Marx from the viewpoint of
existential phenomenology, taking the very notion of Praxis and
Lebensweit as guidelines for the liberation from alienated labor.
Marcuse was the first Heideggerian Marxist, anticipating the later
phenomenological Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre, Karel Kosik, Enzo Paci,
and the Yugoslav Praxis philosophers (Habermas 1985a, 71-72).

Habermas's lecture reached deeply into recently emergent theoretical
and practical problems. His connection of Marcuse's Marxism to Heidegger,
and implicitly to the Marxist humanist tendency with whom Habermas had just
collaborated in reconstituting the "only Marxist humanist" theoretical journal,
fulfilled but the first step (A) of Habermas's "ABCs" of what amounted to a
broadly sketched, though fundamentally based, reminder of his position on the
past, and (more importantly) virtually non-existent future, of Marx and Marxism
for the development of a contemporary critical social theory.
Step B, to a part of which I already alluded, has Marcuse himself consign
to the past his work of the 1930s and early 1940s (Reason and Revolution).
Step C briefly reconstructs Marcuse's acceptance of Adorno and
Horkheimer's "eclipse of reason" while, unsuccessfully, attempting to
reconstruct a "rebellious subjectivity" outside of reason, that is, in the instincts.
Habermas summarizes the thesis of Eros and Civilization, "the most
Marcusian one" (Habermas 1985a, 74):
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Once instinctual repression loses its function for necessary selfpreservation the two conservative powers [Eros and Thanatos] behind
the scenes of civilization form a coalition and demand the recalling of
energies from alienated labor (Habermas 1985a, 75).

Then, higly suggestive of the critique of Critical Theory generally, fully
worked out in TCA, which appeared in the following year, Habermas explains,
This [Marcuse's] theory has the weakness that it cannot consistently
account for its own possibility. If rebellious subjectivity had to owe its
rebirth to something that is beyond~a too deeply corrupted—reason, it is
hard to explain why some of us should at all be in a position to recognize
this fact and give reasons in defense of it...However implausible the
argument may seem, it had the function to preserve in Herbert Marcuse
one of his most admirable features-not to give in to defeatism...He felt
the obligation to give theoretical explanations and thereby to ground
action in reason (Habermas 1985a, 75-76).

However, such attempts (and Habermas concludes with a couple of examples
where Marcuse appealed to universal morality) are implied to be inconsistent
with Marcuse's theory.
As I have indicated, it is possible to interpret Marcuse’s approach to
Marx, especially the work of the 1930s, including Reason and Revolution, in a
radically different manner. A different interpretation, with an eye to what it might
still contribute to a contemporary critical theory, would pay closer attention to
Marcuse's analysis of the Hegel-Marx relationship. (Anderson 1993). My
purpose here, however, is simply to demonstrate how, at its very inception,
Habermas's intervention in PI suggested a fundamental opposition not only to
any notion of a continuing relevance of Marx's theory for today's problems, but
of either of the two most sophisticated Marxist tendencies as they had hitherto
developed, Marxist Humanism and Critical Theory itself.
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Wellmer's Programmatic Appropriation of Late Habermas's Social Theory
Albrecht Wellmer's "Reason, Utopia, and the Dialectic of Englighenment",
placed as the first article in the Bernstein collection, actually appeared a couple
of years after Habermas's own contribution on Herbert Marcuse in the journal's
first number. Aside from any advantages Bernstein may have seen in
disregarding the chronology, for purposes of my study his doing so raises
interesting questions. The fact is, though a chronological presentation of
theoretical "events" is not intrinsically superior, Bernstein's collection, in not
providing dates of publication of the various articles, obscures the dialectic of
the intervention of Habermas and his supporters into the discussion of Marx and
Marxism at the opening of the 1980s. Habermas's piece was prepared and
presented before the publication of TCA. Habermas's fundamental "turn away"
from a full consideration of the Critical Theory tradition's analysis of Marx, and
its foreshadowing of Habermas's controversial assessment of the breaking
apart, or differentiation, of individual thinkers and periods within the Critical
Theory tradition, was for the most part suggestive and highly implicit.
Albrecht Wellmer's piece, prepared after the publication of TCA, can be
seen as the first systematic (or perhaps programmatic) presentation of the
results of TCA in respect to Habermas's conclusions on the status of Marx.
Habermas has now come to terms with the distinctiveness of his own theory
versus the entire "critical" tradition, broadly defined. Thus, in placing Wellmer's
article prior to Habermas's, while perhaps facilitating the comprehension of
Habermas's earlier analysis of Marcuse, Bernstein closes off an important
perspective on the internal movement of ideas without which the significance of
his own journal cannot be understood.
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More than a decade earlier, Wellmer, an early student of Habermas,
performed a function similar to that represented by his 1982 PI article. His
Critical Theory of Society (1971) extracted the fundamental critique of Marx
implicit in Habermas's early work, principally the essays collected in Theory and
Practice and in the volume, Knowledge and Human Interests.
Because of its apparently programmatic character, I will summarize
“Reason, Utopia, and the Dialectic of Enlightenment" in some detail. Its
presentation of Habermas's then current critique of Marx in view, the article
attempts to demonstrate that Habermas's critical theory, contrasted with Marx's,
is adequate to a goal of radicalization of democracy in its grasp of the “positive"
potential of the normative basis of modem social structures.
Divided into five sections, the thirty-one page article attempts a great
deal. The first part attempts to present Marx's theory in the context of its time.
This is supposed to be appropriate to a "strategy" of immanent critique. That
Wellmer is deeply sensitive to "strategy" can be seen clearly in the approach to
his last section where he writes (in reference to his entire preceding analysis)
that,
Of course, these statements should be taken with a grain of salt: I am not
talking here about the substantive content of either Marx's theory or
Critical Theory as a whole, but about problems of conceptual strategy,
about problems of depth grammar, as it were...[T]hese metatheoretical
problems of conceptual strategy evidently have a bearing on the content
of theoretical analysis as well; it is for this reason that sometimes a
revision of conceptual strategies appears necessary to save the truth
content of great theories (Wellmer 1985, 51).

The first section on Marx in his time argues that Marx did not overcome
the limitations (also present in competing theories) he himself identified as
necessary to overcome in order to produce an adequate critical theory of
society. In summarizing this section, I will pay particular attention to arguments
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already familiar from my previous analysis of Habermas's work. In addition, I
will "read back" into this first section of the essay an idea of "conceptual
strategy" Wellmer only reveals in his last section. The question here is whether
Wellmer actually employs in the beginning the notion of “conceptual strategy"
he reveals only near the end of the article and, if so, to what effect. Finally, this
will lead to a concluding consideration of whether Wellmer's "conceptual
strategy" is reflective of Habermas's own approach. Alternatively, if Wellmer's
analysis is inaccurate in respect to Habermas's theoretical intentions in respect
to Marx and Marxism I expect to find that misunderstanding the object of critique
in Habermas's ongoing clarification of his theory. Approaching Wellmer's
article in this way might make it possible to trace Habermas's own orientation
and trajectory both in respect to Marx's theory and in terms of his use of a public
sphere in the interest of crystalizing his self-understanding contrasted with any
other, including even those who support his basic positions in the way
supporters generally treat a "founder".
Wellmer begins the first section of his article with a thesis concerning
Marx's self-understanding of the uniqueness of his theory. Marx, in a lesson
learned from Hegel, avoided the "futility of opposing ideal, utopian counter
images to the bad reality of an existing society" (Wellmer 1985, 35). Marx
distinguished his ideas from ideal conceptions of the future held by socialists
and anarchists of his time, as well as from what he saw as the mere formulation
of a problem in, "the reconciliation of opposites in Hegel's theory [which] was for
Marx only a reconciliation in thought, while in fact it had still to be brought about
practically" (Wellmer 1985, 35). This description is found in the opening
paragraph and sets the structure for the ensuing critique of Marx, which is with
an eye to an idea of Habermas's theory (at least its conceptual strategy) as a
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solution to the aporias of critical theory originating with Marx and extending
practically all the way to the 1980s.
Certain weaknesses are immediately apparent in Wellmer's argument.
Contrary to Wellmer's understanding of Marx's critique of Hegel, the "problem",
in view of my earlier analysis of Marx's 1844 "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic”,
including the latter text’s permanent ramifications in the development of Marx's
theory, was not merely that a reconciliation of opposites was in Hegel confined
to thought. The "secret" (Marx 1967b, 320) of Hegel's reconciliation of
(accomodation to) state and society, despite the "thoroughly critical" quality of
his philosophy, was that there was to be found none the less a principle of
accomodation in his dialectic. Recall that Marx, when analyzing
Phenomenology of Mind, criticized Hegel's Absolute Knowledge, exemplified in
Hegel's phrase, "at one with itself in its other as such". This indicated that
Marx's critique of Hegel's philosophy stood independently, that is, did not
require (though it did include) a reference to practice generally, much (ess to
"society".
According to Wellmer, Marx's relationship to Hegel is characterized by a
sort of division of labor, familiar in the antinomies of "bourgeois society" itself.
Hegel first achieved the reconciliation in thought Marx sought to carry out in
practice. But Marx’s text provides evidence that Marx objected, from the start, to
Hegel's dialectic in thought, at the categorical level. Marx then developed the
implications of such a critique for thought and practice. I have already
described how Marx appropriated Hegel's negation of negation, identifing it as
the revolutionary element in Hegel's philosophy (see Chapter Three). Here it is
necessary to focus more on its implications for Marx's concept of practice (or the
practice of philosophy)-a concept which can hardly be fully understood on the
basis of Wellmer's initial description of Hegel's reconciliation as a model Marx
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employed to imply a future "society". Recall that in connection with an earlier
discussion of Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere I also emphasized
Marx's appropriation of Hegel's negation of negation in his analysis of the
intrinsically contradictory relationship of civil society and state at the basis of the
peculiarly bourgeois social formation. In view of Mane's critique of Hegel's
Philosophy of Right (and Marx's critique of Hegelian dialectic proper in 1844 it
preceded) Wellmer now commits a double mistake.
First, by implication, he attributes to Marx the positivistic presupposition of
a “sphere" of civil society, the fact of its independent, transhistorical existence
presumably outside the pale of critical thought. Thus, Wellmer writes that Marx
merely aimed at a practical negation of the, "loss of 'ethical' life in the sphere of
civil society" (Wellmer 1985, 36). As I demonstrated in the earlier chapter,
Marx's critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right was both more fundamental than
this and at the same time inclusive of an affirmative Hegelian moment, an
appropriation of the latteris negation of negation. Marx, contrary to Wellmer's
understanding, did not aim to restore in the future the "ethical life" of a civil
society, but rather demonstrated the alienated essence, and the dialectical non
viability of civil society itself, owing to its intrinsic relation to the state.
In the following paragraph, related to how he earlier argued that Marx
believed that “privatism", or pursuit of individual interest, (or an ethical void) was
at the basis of capitalist civil society, Wellmer now writes,
The end of capitalism, however, ie; the abolition of private property, will
according to Marx result in the establishment of a classless society
(Wellmer 1985, 36).

As I have argued in connection with discussion of Habermas's own texts, Marx
(as early as 1844) uncovered the possibility that alienated labor was the cause
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of private property (and the oppressive class structure arising from it), instead of
the reverse. Moreover, Marx wrote that an abolition of private property (or the
establishment of what he called vulgar communism) could not be the goal or the
end; rather, Hegel's own dialectic implied non-alienated social relations, what
Marx termed humanism. Wellmer argues that Marx’s theory—distinguished both
from Hegel's abstraction from practice and utopian socialism's abstraction from
theory-is characterized primarily by an attempt to demonstrate, "that
the...conditions of the communist society were already forming themselves in
the womb of capitalist society..." (Wellmer 1985, 36). The key words here are
"forming themselves".
Wellmer writes, again following Habermas's lead (see Chapter Two) in
appealing to an idea of Marx's insufficient articulation of his own ideas, "Marx, in
other words, had to transform socialism from utopia into a science, as Engels
later put it" (Wellmer 1985, 36).
Thus, Marx is rendered scientistic, naturalistic, and deterministic in his
failed attempt to move beyond "idealism", both of the Hegelian and utopian
socialist varieties. He fails to specify a normative basis for his critique:
Marx in fact is led back to the impasses of utopian thinking-only now
they appear in disguised form. For Marx cannot really show that the
planned economy which he predicts for the time after capitalism will take
the form of a communist society; consequently, the idea of communism
remains as much a utopian ideal in his theory it was for earlier socialists
and anarchists (Wellmer 1985, 36).

His attribution to Marx of an idea of "conditions of the communist
society...already forming themselves in the womb of capitalist society", is the
basis for Wellmer's implication that Marx, just as Hegel and the utopian
socialists before him, failed to develop the conceptual tools necessary for
breaking through an historical impasse. In fact, Marx's supposed solution
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seems worse than Hegel's idealism or socialism's utopianism because, though
he really gets no further than his predecessors, the impasses of his theory are
more difficult to detect: they, "appear in a disguised form" (Wellmer 1985, 36).
Hence, Wellmer (in a return to an analysis made by Habermas twenty years
earlier) tries to demonstrate that, due to Marx's unsuccessful attempt at an
immanent critique of "capitalist commodity production", his vulnerability in
respect to an adequate concept of social organization can easily be made
manifest. Or, perhaps more precisely, supposedly it can be demonstrated that
since Marx's understanding of social transformation is not limited to a concept of
normativity in respect to social organization, his theory in some ways falls short
of Hegel's concern (in Philosophy of Right) with an institutionalization of
freedom, and has little positive to offer beyond typical socialist and anarchist
ideas.
Utilizing the exact passage from Engels quoted by Habermas twently
years earlier, Wellmer writes,
With the abolition of capitalism, people will no longer be forced to
"externalize" their social powers into institutions which then confront the
individuals with an independent existence and with a logic and power of
their own. With the background of such assumptions Engels has spoken
about the transfromation of the domination of humans over humans into
the administration of things, and Lenin has predicted the, “withering away
of the state" in the coming communist society (Wellmer 1985, 38).

I have already criticized in connection with Habermas's argument twenty years
earlier the idea that a formulation from Engels (especially in such a crucial
context) can substitute for an analysis of Marx (see Chapter Two). Here it is
clear that Wellmer's reference to Lenin in order to supplement this argument is
to Lenin's recovery of Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme, virtually
undiscussed by Marxists since it had been issued nearly a half century earlier.
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Lenin's analysis of it in State and Revolution on the eve of the Russian
Revolution notwithstanding, Marx’s 1875 Critique of the Gotha Programme in
demonstrating the specifically capitalist social organization and the demands of
a dialectic of theory and organization necessary to overcome it, remains one of
the "undigested" writings of Marx to the present day (Dunayevskaya 1991;
Meszaros 1997).
The fundamental error from which Wellmer's argument unfolds consists
in his misunderstanding of the relationship of Marx's theory to Hegel's thought.
Marx did not criticize Hegel merely for a reconciliation which was confined to
thought but, to the contrary, criticized that very reconciliation within thought. At
the same time, Marx saw a revolutionary element developed in Hegel's
philosophy, potentially constitutive of revolutionized social relations succeeding
those of capitalism. The fundamental point of Critique of the Gotha Programme
was that revolutionary organization take responsibility for an articulation of this
element--as its primary task. Marx found Hegel’s principle of accomodation in
Hegel's thought, and purposely distinguished himself from the other "young
Hegelians" in this respect (Marx 1967b, 316); he therefore certainly did not
attempt to extend this mode of reconciliation to practice or to a (future) society.
In Marx's view, Hegel's reconciliation in thought constituted a principle of
accomodation with existing society.
Wellmer argues that a political "strategy", entailing the mere abolition of
private property thought to lead inevitably to a classless society and a "planned
economy" (what he identifies as an intended concretization of Hegel's abstract
reconciliation), long associated with obvious failures of Marxism, is fully
consistent with the fundamental core of Marx's theory.
Here Wellmer introduces the concept of "associated individuals". Since,
even in the space of a lengthy essay, he cites a text of Marx on only one
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occasion, this concept’s origin and context in Marx's work is not made clear.
However, in view of his exposition it is quite likely that he is referring primarily to
"freely associated men", introduced by Marx in "The Fetishism of the Commodity
and its Secret" section of Chapter One of Capital. Wellmer relates the concept
to what he supposes to be Marx’s notion of a communist society which would
have, "brought [human] metabolism with nature under their conscious and
rational control" (Wellmer 1985, 36).
But, as should be clear by now, Marx's concept of "freely associated
humanity" does not refer to "nature". Recall that Marx introduces the concept in
a disclosure of the commodity's secret—the perspective needed to "see" the
specificity of social relations of capitalism, while disclosing a real potential to
overcome them. Recall that in the previous chapter (Chapter Four) I
documented that Marx's analysis, already in the first chapter of Capital, critically
appropriates not only Hegel's philosophic concepts of essence and
appearance, but notion as well. There I argued that Marx's appropriation of
Hegel's philosophic concepts demonstrates how they point to a society with
social relations not only different from, but opposite to, those characteristic of
capitalism. This illustrates how Marx’s critique of Hegel was not simply from the
plane of practice; rather, Marx makes clear that the revolutionary quality of
Hegel's philosophy escapes what Hegel understood to be the social bounds.
Hence, it is impossible to conceive, as Wellmer attempts to, the significance of
Marx's "freely associated humanity" in terms of "associated individuals" whose
only barrier to freedom, after the abolition of private property and the institution
of a rational economic plan, is their metabolism with nature (Wellmer 1985, 37).
Labor, mediating itself and social relations generally only in capitaiism-though
appearing to be material and transhistorical-was not, Marx argued, intrinsically
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a mere means of life, in other words, the mediation of humanity and nature,
determinate of social relations in some ontological sense.
Rather, in a passage in Critique of the Gotha Programme (see p.214)
Marx demonstrated that, while it is possible (even for Marxists attempting to
write an organizational programme) to exploit labor in new ways (La Salle's
concept of the state) in order to once again subsume the individual under the
social, Hegel's concept of negation of negation points to a potential opposite of
this. Marx analyzes labor's potential transition from from a “mere means of life"
and the mediation of social relations, to life's “prime want" or need. In this
transition, labor need not be and, in fact, cannot be, the “essence" of a society.
Even Wellmer's own argument (its strategy), despite his intentions, points
to the overriding significance of Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme in how
it might inform a conceptualization of the relation of speficically capitalist social
relations and the requirements of organization of "critical theory" which
ostensibly aims to overcome them. If Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme
could be summarized in a word, it would say that "practice", or its organization,
when permitted to subsume the fullness of the critical idea already achieved in
Marx's appropriation of Hegel's dialectic, demonstrated the need to spell out, in
fully critical terms, negation of negation. After Capital, Marx wanted no part of
an only apparent opposition (to capitalism) intrinsic to which was something
other than that philosophic concept (the continuous reappearance of which I
have traced in Marx) worked out in terms of specifically capitalist social
relations. But in conceiving the relation of Marx to Hegel, that is, in terms of
categorical development, Wellmer situates Marx below the achievement of
Hegel:
As far as the coordination of social interaction and the formation of a
common will is concerned...Marx, in contrast to Hegel, does not develop
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the categories which would allow him to articulate the idea of a free
association of individuals—given the conditions of modem, industrialized
societies-beyond its most abstract formulation. Consequently this idea
[freely associated labor] is abstractly opposed to the system of class
domination which was the object of Marx’s analysis. Since, however, it
plays the "theoretical" role of signifying the type of postcapitalist social
formation which, according to Marx, is already immanent in capitalist
society, this idea of a free association could only be understood via a
built-in category mistake...as also spelling out the organizational
principle of a communist society... (Wellmer 1985, 38).

If it is recalled where Marx first introduces the concept of “freely associated
humanity", Wellmer's critique of Marx's “abstract formulation", and his failure to
“develop the categories" cannot be accepted. As I already discussed, Capitats
categories certainly elaborate “the conditions of modem industrialized
societies", as well as provide the basis for grasping “freely associated labor* as
the only concrete perspective for an overcoming of these conditions.
Moreover, while class domination was an object of Marx's analysis it was
very far from the object. Class domination long predated capitalist social
relations, the fundamental object of Marx's analysis. Wellmer's “conceptual
strategy" (which he indicates he borrows from Habermas) is driven (though
hardly intentionally) by attribution to Marx of precisely what Marx criticized.
Wellmer writes,
Basically one could say that Habermas has translated the project of
critical theory of society from the conceptual framework of a philosophy of
consciousness, geared to a subject-object model of cognition and action,
into the conceptual framework of a theory of language and
communicative action. This basic move enabled Habermas to
distinguish categorically between types of rationality and action—in
particular between instrumental and communicative rationality and
action-which for conceptual reasons neither Marx, nor Weber, nor
Adorno and Horkheimer could clearly keep separate from each other...
(Wellmer, 1985, 51).
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This passage confirms Wellmer's lack of a grasp of Marx's concept of labor in
capitalism without which it becomes plausible to postively attribute to Marx's
theory affirmation of aspects of the social determination of the unity which
structures capitalism itself. The basis of the latter is a relation of concrete and
abstract labor, constitutive of an abstract form of social domination. Postone
has explained Wellmer's type of limited interpretation of Mane's theory by
focusing attention on the assumption of traditional Marxism, unexamined by
Critical Theory, that a future non-capitalist society differs from a capitalist society
primarily (and merely) in that the socially constitutive role of labor is direct and
transparent in the former, indirect and obscured in the latter (Postone 1993, 10).
Praxis International Symposium on Habermas's Social Theory on the Eve of
the Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe
A certain perspective can be gained in viewing the symposium on
Habermas's theory, which appeared in 1984, against the preceding
background of Habermas's 1981 contribution in the opening number of PI and
Wellmer's piece contributed a couple of years later (the two reversed in
Bernstein's collection). One might have anticipated extensive discussion of the
status of Marx's theory in a symposium on Habermas ("Modernity and
Postmodemity") in the aftermath of the publication of TCA, and in the context of
the fundamental nature of the critique of virtually all forms of Marxism levelled
by himself and a closest collaborator. Recall that PI, at its inception, described
itself as the only "Marxist Humanist" journal. What is remarkable about the
symposium is that there is virtually no mention of Marx's theory or of
Habermas's critique of Marx and Marxism, let alone any challenge issued to the
latter. The simplest explanation of this might be that the four authors found
nothing new in Habermas's up-to-date critique of Marx and Marxism, or found it
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non-controversial. Moreover, they might have shared an assumption that
Habermas (and the times) had left Mane and Marxism behind.
Perhaps even more surprising is Habermas's reply, titled "Questions and
Counter-Questions" (Habermas 1985b, 192-216); it is as if he detected an
unwarranted attitude underlying the various approaches, an attitude not
conducive to full comprehension of precisely how, and with what
consequences, he believed that had moved beyond Marx's theory in particular.
Before taking up Habermas’s reply, I will briefly mention the basic themes
of the other four contributions to the symposium. Richard Bernstein’s
introduction to Habermas and Modernity, while it was not previously published
in the PI symposium, none the less prompts Habermas in his "Questions and
Counter-Questions” to include consideration of Bernstein's current work. Also, it
should not be overlooked that U.S. theorists supplied all the contributions to the
symposium. This is relevant in respect to Habermas's subtle but key critique of
the fact that none of the contributors noticed his fundamentally new approach to
the concept of “alienation". Habermas writes,
What is perhaps specifically German is the philosophic concept of
alienation, both in the Hegelian-Marxist version and the early Romantic
version taken up by Nietzsche.
And, perhaps related to this, Habermas remarks,
An added difficulty is that only McCarthy directs his remarks to my
more recent works (Habermas 1985b, 197-198).

In a general characterization of the symposium, Habermas writes,
Rorty puts in question the entire undertaking of the theory of
communicative action. As opposed to this form of questioning, the
reservations of Martin Jay, Thomas McCarthy, and Joel Whitebook are
directed toward particular steps in its execution. These authors direct
their attention to complications in my attempt to work out the concept of
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communicative rationality. Jay points out an under-illuminated aspect;
McCarthy touches upon a central difficulty; Whitebook deals with a
problem which emerges as a consequence of the theory (Habermas
1985b, 198).
While, on the one hand, Habermas seems to question the void in
discussion in respect to the "specifically German" philosophic theme of
alienation, on the other hand, in attempting to draw up a balance sheet, or
coherently summarize the various contributions, he concludes that all of them,
except Rorty, concede a great deal of the claim he has attached to his working
out the theory of communicative rationality, including (at least implicitly) its
critique of Marx.
An examination of Habermas's response as a whole (and to Rorty in
particular) might demonstrate that Habermas implicitly serves notice on the
participants, including Bernstein (and excepting only Jay), that while refraining
from issuing wholesale rejections of Habermas's theory, none was immune to,
or lacking potentially important affinity with, Rorty's position. Motivating this
subtle, but actually potentially far more fundamental counter-critique, is
Habermas's aspiration to vitalize a critical public sphere in line with a diagnosis
of a dissipation of Marxist energies (an assessment perhaps also derived from
the threadbare contributions from Marxist humanists in prior issues of the re
born journal), and a resulting critical theoretic void. An article by Mihailo
Markovic, Pi's co-editor at the time, illustrates the weakness of the Marxist
humanist response to Habermas's theory (Markovic 1982). If a symposium in a
Marxist Humanist journal could take place in which none were prepared to
counter (or seriously assess) Habermas's critique of Marx and Marxism
(including the neo-Marxism of the Frankfurt School from which he traced his
own departure) and how it was fundamental in shaping his own theory, then
was this in itself demonstrative of an exhaustion of critical energies as such, that
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is beyond too specialized and/or merely current intellectual, or political,
interests?
The "problem" Whitebook brings to the fore (Whitebook 1985, 140-160)
as a consequence of Habermas's theory of communicative rationality is
"materialism". Both Whitebook and Habermas used the term as something of a
theoretic code for Marx and Marxism. Whitebook, in tracing the incorporation of
Freud in the theory of the original Frankfurt School's neo-Marxism, and its basic
alteration in Habermas's theory, suggests that the price of this alteration is the
loss of much of the claim to originality of the Critical Theory tradition. He sees a
danger in Habermas's theory of giving up the individual, subjectivity, and the
concrete, which had previously served to "fill-in" Marx's too objectivistic theory
of classes.
Thomas McCarthy's contribution, "Reflections on Rationalization in the
Theory of Communicative Action" (McCarthy 1985, 176-191) provokes by far the
most extensive response from Habermas. Connected to this is the fact that it is
the one symposium contribution which takes up the recently published TCA.
More precisely, it takes up two elements of TCA. According to Habermas’s own
characterization, McCarthy succeeds in touching upon, "a central difficulty" of
"communicative rationality". In dissecting a schema, presented in Volume One
of TCA, of "rationalization complexes" derived from Max Weber's view of
societal rationalization, McCarthy puts in question both the core of Habermas's
claim to have developed a concept of rationality adequate to a contemporary
social theory (White 1989), as well as the status of critical theory, even if a
successful appropriation of Weber is granted Habermas. When it is recalled
that Habermas's sharpest critique of Marcuse (though it was presented in a form
of special appreciation) was that the tetter's theory lacked a concept of
rationality and, in effect, was the result of an "abandonment of reason", the full
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significance of McCarthy's questioning of Habermas's own concept of rationality
can be discerned. It should be added, however, that McCarthy by no means,
directly or indirectly, suggests that what might be seen as his implicit attempt at
melioration of Habermas's critique of Marcuse and perhaps other more
"subject", or praxis-oriented forms of Marxism, points to a need for re-evaluation
of the potential of Marx's theory, or of Habermas's interpretation of it in
particular. In short, Habermas's description of McCarthy's approach-"touching
upon a central difficulty of communicative rationality"~as well as Habermas's
title to his reply-“Questions and Counter-Questions"—accurately reflect the
carefully circumscribed quality of McCarthy's critique. Yet, in so far as
Habermas stakes so much on his appropriation, "from within Western Marxism",
of Weber's theory of rationality, McCarthy's focused attack on this appropriation
clearly provokes what seems to be a sort of emotional quality in Habermas's
reply.
Only in some respects McCarthy continues the role he assumed several
years earlier with the publication of The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas
(McCarthy 1978). The pioneering character of the latter work is reflected in the
fact that, among the symposium participants, McCarthy's PI piece was the only
one that focused on Habermas's latest work. But, in contrast to his earlier
comprehensive study, McCarthy, from the outset, casts doubt on Habermas's
theoretical direction. In this primarily critical approach, McCarthy highlights,
with references (McCarthy 1985, 190) the central criticisms of Habermas's early
work, specifically Knowledge and Human Interests, which were present in the
1978 study.
McCarthy's critique of Habermas centers on the letter’s presentation (in
Chapter Two of TCA) of a schema he says is derived from Weber's "Religious
Rejections of the World" (Habermas 1984). In Weber’s study Habermas finds
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an analysis of cultural modernity and societal rationalization. Habermas
interprets Weber’s analysis as disclosing differentiated rationality complexes
characteristic of the West. A reason split into its various parts exists as
differentiated value spheres-science, morality and art. Connected to these are
formally defined worlds-the objective, the social and the subjective—and
corresponding basic attitudes: objectivating, norm-conformative and expressive
(McCarthy 1985, 177).
In a dense and compressed examination of Habermas's schema,
McCarthy does not question the interpretation of Weber from which it is derived.
Rather, he poses questions on the level of the possibility of the internal relations
the schema delineates. Then, in order to explain the numerous weaknesses he
finds, he turns to Habermas's discussion of the logic of Verstehen
(understanding meaning) in Chapter One of TCA: McCarthy writes,
Habermas attempts to establish the very strong thesis that meaning,
intelligibility and understanding are in the final analysis inseparable from
validity, rationality and assessment, that, "access to the object domain of
social action through understanding meaning makes the rationality
problematic unavoidable. Communicative actions always require an
interpretation that is rational in approach...(McCarthy 1985, 183).

McCarthy quotes a long passage in TCA in which Habermas explicates the
internal relation of the rationality problematic and the, "paradigm case of a
speech act oriented to reaching understanding" (McCarthy 1985, 183-184).
The basic idea is that interpretation depends on familiarity of the conditions
under which the validity of a speech act is acceptable or would have to be
acknowledged by a hearer. The only way to gain this knowledge is from the
context. In this an interpreter must reflect on the reasons a speaker would offer
in the defense of the validity of an expression. Thus, an interpreter is, "drawn
into the process of assessing validity claims" (McCarthy 1985, 183). McCarthy
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questions what he calls the "very strong thesis" that interpretation requires
judgement of validity claims. He writes,
Habermas does...allow for a reaction of "abstention”, of leaving the
validity claim "to one side as not yet decided"...lt might appear that his
type of suspension of judgement is nothing else than Weber’s
Werturteilsfreiheit (value freedom);...but...Weber...thought that questions
of value were ultimately undecidable in any rationally binding
sense...Habermas is not a skeptic in such matters. For him normative
validity claims, no less than truth claims, admit of rationally motivated
consensus...But even if one grants Habermas's version of cognitivism in
matters ethical, and even if one agrees that the social scientist can, may,
and even should adopt a critical stance toward validity claims, the
questions remains: Must he or she? (McCarthy 1985, 185).

McCarthy's principal objection is to the "methodological consequences"
(McCarthy 1985, 183) of Habermas’s interpretation and appropriation of
Weber’s concept of rationality. This criticism turns on Habermas's analysis of
the schema, which presents nine possible world relations. Habermas states
that only six of these are "suitable for the accumulation of knowledge", and thus
rationalizable (McCarthy 1985, 178). The differentiation of just these six world
relations characterize the West.
Thus, after raising questions concerning Habermas's theory of
“understanding meaning", McCarthy returns to the schema itself. He concludes
by arguing that the three world relations not admitting of rationalization
(according to Habermas's interpretation) might actually not be fundamentally
different than the six Habermas analyzes as rationalizable. McCarthy traces
what he sees as the fallacy of Habermas's position to Habemas's implicit
admission of "complementary" attitudes in the relations he designates as
rationalizable, while denying the same potential to the relations he excludes
from rationalizability.
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McCarthy's criticism continues themes present in his original study of
Habermas’s early theory; Habermas elaborated his differences with McCarthy
in Critical Debates (1981). These revolve around the social relationship to
nature, principally Habermas’s view that only an objectifying relation to nature
can be "theoretically fruitful". Here McCarthy returns to his earlier objection,
expanding it to the two other relations Habermas now identifies and excludes
from rationalizability, based on his interpretation of Weber’s “Religious
Rejections of the World". Essentially, McCarthy is looking for a stronger
hermeneutic dimension in critical social theory than Habermas appears ready
to admit. After taking up Martin Jay’s contribution, I will return to some further
implications of McCarthy's critique in my consideration of the full significance of
Habermas's reply to the symposium participants.
Martin Jay's “Habermas and Modernism" (Jay 1985, 125-139) traces the
treatment of aesthetic experience from Walter Benjamin through Adomo and
Marcuse. Against this background, he then gathers together Habermas's
scattered statements on the subject, arguing that, while cohering slowly, an idea
of the aesthetic has emerged as a central, unresolved issue in Habermas's
theory. Jay pays special attention to the importance of this theoretic dimension
in assessing the prospects for both filling out Habermas's theory generally, and
as pivotal in responding to recent critiques of Marxism and neo-Marxism
(including Critical Theory), such as those of Jean-Francois Lyotard and Andreas
Huyssen. In addition, Jay indicates with a reference to Thomas McCarthy's
arguments with Habermas, that even within Critical Theory one of Habermas's
least clarified themes was that of aesthetic experience.
As I noted earlier, Habermas's response to the various contributions to
the symposium ("Habermas, Modernity and Postmodemity"), appearing in
Volume Three of PI, seemed implicitly critical of an apparent lack of awareness

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

268
of the significance of his critique of Marx, and his assessment of the status of
Marx’s theory, for an understanding of his own theory. An equally important
aspect of his reply was that it contained not only a serious individual criticism of
each of the participants (with the possible exception of Jay) but also suggested
an internal link among apparently quite disparate approaches. Finally,
Habermas's reply suggested that it was only the maturation of his own theory
which provided the perspective necessary to forge the unity he ascribes to the
various contributions, the background against which the particularity (that is, the
universality) of his own theory could be projected.
That, in a Marxist Humanist journal, no symposium participant chose to
discuss in a direct manner the relationship of Habermas's ideas to Marx’s, and
that it was Habermas who flagged this, seemed to serve to round-out and
extend Habermas's initial position in the very first issue of the journal: 1) Neither
Marxist Humanism (nor praxis philosophy which Habermas believes is
traceable to Marcuse’s "Heidegerrian Marxism"), nor Critical Theory in the mold
of Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s, were adequate to a contemporary standard of
rationality; and, 2) that there was no alternative to a grasp of his own theory of
communicative action and reason as a whole in confronting this unavoidable
rationality problematic.
To begin with, it would have been difficult for Habermas to pose in a
sharper manner his theoretical difference with the co-editor of PI, Richard
Bernstein. This issue might be approached in view of Hegel's Science of Logic,
where the absolute idea contains the "highest degree of opposition" (Hegel
1976, 824), ie; the practical and and the theoretical idea.
The structure of the beginning of Habermas’s "Questions and CounterQuestions" (Habermas 1985b, 192-216) is the key to grasping the way he
shapes the symposium as a whole. Habermas begins with some general
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comments aimed at establishing a minimum commonality among all the
symposium participants, including himself. They are, "concerned if not with the
same problems, then at least with the same themes" (Habermas 1985b, 192).
He contrasts this situation with controversies among adversaries who, “feeling
that their identity is threatened by the other’s fundamental convictions, struggle
with rhetorical weapons" (Habermas 1985b, 192). It is this latter condition,
Habermas then argues, which charaterizes “the modem experience", or what
he says Hegel called the shattering of naive consensus as an impetus for "the
experience of reflection" (Habermas 1985b, 192). In this way Habermas views
the symposium self-reflexively. According to this philosophic/historic approach,
then, the symposium can be viewed either as a function of modernity (in so far
as Habermas adds that, "In the framework of our culture, invested as it is with
reflection, the thrust of this experience had to be worked through politically but
also philosophically") (Habermas 1985b, 193), or its negation: “We cannot
simply wish this experience away; we can only negate it" (Habermas 1985b,
193).
Habermas’s starting point is philosophy. From the vantage point of the
mid-1980s, the "modem experience" has the fluidity of a spectrum, running from
historicism to transcendentalism. These two poles are also in tension. In
characterizing the state of philosophy in this manner Habermas also selects out
from among the symposium participants the philosophers. In comparison to
himself, then, he begins his response with a consideration of the views of
Richard Rorty and Richard Bernstein. Commenting that no one who gives the
situation of a tension between historicism and transcendentalism, "much
thought would want to be left in this bind" (Habermas 1985b, 193), Habermas
states that he, Rorty and Bernstein react to it in different ways.
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In a comparison of Rorty and Bernstein, Habermas concludes that Rorty
(in seeing philosphy itself as the sickness whose symptoms it previously and
unsuccessfully tried to cure) absolutizes the perspective of the observer while
Bernstein (who, "refuses to regard the procedural unity of rationality within the
historical and cultural multiplicity of standards of rationality as a question that is
accessible to theoretical treatment...") absolutizes the perspective of the
participant (Habermas 1985b, 196). While he does not directly pose it as a
conclusion, the idea seems to be that neither Rorty nor Bernstein, from their
respective standpoints of observer and participant, escape the bounds of the
historicism/transcendentalist spectrum.
More importantly, in his description of Rorty's advice (that, "philosophers
need only recognize the hybrid character of their controversies and give the
field over to the practicioners of science, politics and daily life to be rid of the
problem") (Habermas 1985b, 193-194) and Bernstein's conclusion to Beyond
Objectivism and Relativism (Bernstein 1983) (that the utility of philosophy is
restricted to the horizon of practical reason) (Habermas 1985b, 196) Habermas
might be understood to be saying that only his own theory offers an alternative
to the “end of philosophy" thesis, taken up most directly and extensively in
postmodernist theory. Rorty and Bernstein, certainly aware of the "bind of
historicism and transcendentalism", propose symmetrical, though each
unsatisfactorily one-sided solutions. Next, in a single paragraph, Habermas
makes a succinct case for precisely how his own theory (which he calls a third
path) is superior to that of either Rorty's or Bernstein's, or their theories in
combination, and overcomes particularly Bernstein's restriction of the potential
of theory and, by extension, philosophy. The main emphasis in the paragraph
is, again, the problem of rationality. Habermas writes of his “third path" ("my
theory of communicative action”) that, "...philosophy surrenders its claim to be
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the sole representative in matters of rationality and enters into a nonexclusive
division of labor with the reconstructive sciences" (Habermas 1985b, 196).
(These include theories of the development of human competencies, eg;
learning and moral development in Piaget and Kohlberg, respectively). Further
down in the same paragraph, Habermas adds,
This revisionary self-understanding of the role of philosophy marks a
break with the aspirations of first philosophy (ursprungphilosophie) in
any form, even that of the theory of knowledge; but it does not mean that
philosophy abandons its role as the guardian of rationality (Habermas
1985b, 196).

Then, in a comparison of science and philosophy, which serves to justify
the autonomy, and reason for existence, of the latter, Habermas refers, with a
footnote in the text, to the final chapter of TCA: "Unlike the sciences, it
[philosophy] has to account reflectively for its own context of emergence and
thus its own place in history..." (Habermas 1985b,196).
While a response to Rorty and Bernstein is the immediate occasion for
these remarks, it is clear that they are directed more broadly to the symposium
as a whole, especially to the criticisms developed in Thomas McCarthy's
contribution. In fact, in both these "introductory" remarks and in his reply to
McCarthy Habermas refers to precisely the same page in the final chapter of
TCA. Thus, there is a clear indication that Habermas believed that his recently
completed TCA went some way toward answering questions, implicit and
otherwise, raised in the symposium as a whole. Interestingly, as I indicated in
Chapter One, an analysis of the metatheoretical implications of Marx's
approach to labor in the Grundrisse served as the model for Habermas's selfunderstanding of "the context of emergence and thus its own place in history" of
his own theory.
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Habermas is hostile to Rorty's "bid adieu" to philosophy as such. It is
apparently Rorty's judgement that Habermas's approach does little to alter a
situation of an exhaustion of philosophical discourse. Habermas attributes this
to Rorty's notion that Western logocentrism defines the potential of philosophy
as such, rather than the specific manner in which a full spectrum of rationality
potential present in the modem lifeworld has been cut-off by a “restriction of
reason to its cognitive-instrumental dimension" (Habermas 1985b, 197). Here,
Habermas adds parenthetically, "...a dimension, we might add, that has been
noticeably privileged and selectively utilized in processes of capitalist
modernization" (Habermas 1985b,197).
The mode of presentation of his position here is key to my attempt to
illuminate his dual aim in the symposium to both emphasize the importance of
the Marxist perspective in order to gain a full appreciation of the potential of his
critique of it, and bring to the foreground the singularity of the achievement of
his own theory. Habermas appears to concede Western "logocentrism" and
even accept it as an indication of an exhaustion of philosophical discourse, at
least as one possibility. He in fact states that the alternative is nothing less than
a transformation of philosophy (Habermas 1985b, 197). However, it is
Habermas’s view that Rorty attributes to “philosophy as such" not only
conceptual limitations, or limitations of the conceptual, but destructive practical
effects. Habermas sees Rorty particularizing the modem need for self
reassurance in, that first, he attributes to intellectuals creation of a capricious
problem and second, identifies the latter with Germany especially. Habermas
believes that Rorty's argument, that an unnecessary problem is created by the
response, the weltshmerz, of small circles of intellectuals to the loss of a world
along with the religious beliefs of their fathers, implies an unmistakably
conservative attitude toward critical thought and is associated with serious
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political ramifications. Yet, Habermas does not approach the issue directly
through a discussion of any political differences he might have with Rorty.
Rather, he raises the question of whether Rorty's diagnosis of the times is based
on a misplaced theoretical specification. Habermas argues that both German
idealism and the best of American pragmatism were motivated by the attempt to
find an equivalent in reason for the social integrative powers of the religious
tradition, which were shaken by the Enlightenment. Since Rorty identifies
himself with thinkers in the tradition of American pragmatism, Habermas’s
observation both serves to open to question Rorty's apparent attempt at a
separation of himself from his object of criticism, and point to the objectivity of
the direction philosophy has taken, contrary to Rorty's interpretation, an
interpretation nearly completely subjectivistic and culturally-bound, in a too
narrow, restrictive sense.
Habermas's key point here is that there is, however, something
"specifically German" relevant to the problem which concerns Rorty. In
identifying it as "the philosophical concept of alienation", Habermas intends to
strongly dispute the idiosyncratic quality Rorty attaches to what Habermas
regards as the necessary and positive features of critical social thought. This
philosophic dimension was not an imposition from outside the vanishing of an
old world and the beginning of a new, but rather was intrinsic to it. Furthermore,
the world is neither done with the problem by philosophy washing its hands of it
and moving on, nor by an "intellectuals as a new class" explanation. Rather,
Habermas indicates, the problem is still central and unavoidable. It has affected
contemporary politics in different ways in Germany and the U.S. The
philosophic concept of alienation has, in one way or another, basically defined
the current situation in so far as both postmodernism and its target are rooted in
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the concept, that is, "the Hegelian-Marxian version and the early Romantic
version taken up by Nietzsche" (Habermas 1985b, 197).
Habermas concludes this opening section of his reply, which focuses
mainly on Rorty's contribution to the symposium, by suggesting that the latter
confuses cause and effect:
Do not these and similar signs [the uneasiness with the direction of
modernity and the prominence of postmodern themes in France since the
1960s, as well as neo-conservative movements in the U.S. and
Germany] indicate that intellectuals articulate shifts in mood, which they
in no way invent, but which have instead palpable social and often
economic causes? (Habermas 1985b,198).

As I previously noted, in both his reply to Rorty, whom he designated as
the one symposium participant who "put in question the entire undertaking of
the theory of communicative action" (Habermas 1985b, 198), and his
engagement with McCarthy, who provoked by far his most extensive response,
Habermas referred to the final pages of TCA. Recall that in the case of Rorty the
issue was the defense of philosophy, particularly the continuity of its role as the
"guardian of rationality". In contrast to the sciences, now philosophy must,
"account reflectively for its own context of emergence and thus its own place in
history" (Habermas 1985b, 196). With regard to McCarthy, rationality is again
what is generally at issue. But here, instead of emphasizing the centrality of
philosophy, Habermas demonstrates a need for its self-limitation. Habermas
interprets McCarthy's criticism as implying that Habermas's theory of
communicative action bars, "all substantive moments from [a] concept of
procedural rationality" (Habermas 1985b, 211). In countering this, Habermas
suggests that the concluding arguments in TCA have not been fully digested.
First, he points out,
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...science, morality and art have not only been differentiated from each
other, they also communicate with each other. But within the boundaries
of each expert culture, the different moments of reason come into contact
with one another in such a way as to avoid violating the inner logic of the
dominant form of argumentation specialized either in truth, normative
correctness, or aesthetic harmony. This is one concern of the last
chapter of The Theory of Communicative Action...(Habemas 1985b,
209).

Next, Habermas argues that two other separate questions are involved,
questions he says McCarthy conflates with the first. These are
...how the knowledge produced in expert cultures can be mediated with
everyday practices...and second, the question of whether we can provide
an equivalent for the meaning of traditional worldviews-for their function
o f“sinngebuncf (Habermas 1985b, 209).

Habermas describes how the three moments of a differentiated reason have
produced similar problems. In the case of science, the question is of a relation
between theory and practice; of morality, its relation to ethical life; and, finally,
the relation of art to life.
In the final two paragraphs of his reply to McCarthy Habermas
circumscribes the capacity of philosophy, referring for the second time to an
idea he first presented in the final pages of TCA on the relationship of his
philosophy to that of Marx's. Habermas notes that discussions of morality and
ethical life, theory and practice, art and life, all center around the “idea of a non
reified everyday communicative practice". In his most direct suggestion of an
active role for Critical Theory, he writes that the possibility of a
form of life with structures of an undistorted intersubjectivity...must be
wrung from the professional, specialized, self-sufficient culture of experts
and from the systems-imperatives of state and economy which
destructively invade the ecological basis of life and communicative
infrastructure of our lifeworld (Habermas 1985b, 210).
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The self-sufficient culture of experts-presumably including the reconstructive
sciences with which philosophy forms a relationship of a "non-exclusive division
of labor" (as described in his reply to Rorty)—representsf on a par with state and
economy, the potentially reifying forces of contemporary society.
In a reinforcement of Albrecht Wellmer's analysis I criticized earlier,
Habermas next tries to distinguish his Critical Theory from Marx's theory by
attributing to the latter dependence on an utopian element absent in his own,
demystified approach. First, what he shares with Marx, he says, is an "intuition":
This same intuition [a form of life with structures of an undistorted
intersubjectivity] is expressed in Marx's utopian perspective on the
realization of philosophy: to the extent that the reason expressed in
Hegel's philosophy can be embodied in the forms of life of an
emancipated society, philosophy somehow becomes pointless. For
Marx, philosophy realized is philosophy aufgehoben (Habermas 1985b,
210).

However, in contrast to Marx's supposed attempt to have life conform to an idea,
Habermas claims to have turned things around, to have given the idea of the
realization of philosophy "another reading" (Habermas 1985b, 210). Here
Habermas claims that his theory of communicative action makes good the goal
present in the "intuition" it shares with Marx's theory. Habermas suggests an
incompatibility of Mane's practical intent and the possibilities of theory in the
context of the modem structures and understanding of the world. The utopian
element of Marx's theory consisted in the wish, or expectation, that the reason
expressed in Hegel's philosophy was irresistible in its pull on society. In so far
as the reason of philosophy was embodied in society, the impulse responsible
for philosophy--the diremption between idea and social reality-would dissipate.
Habermas claims to have radically revised this approach in locating an already
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(at least in a certain way) realized unity of reason in communicative action. The
"certain way" is defined as only in so far as "we have an intuitive knowledge of
it". There is no direct access to it, nor any prospect of bringing it to full
realization, "on the level of cultural traditions in terms of a substantive world
view, but only on this side of the expert cultures, in a non-reified, communicative
practice of everyday life" (Habermas 1985b, 210).
Habermas classifies McCarthy with Marx, that is, with a discredited and
outmoded theoretical approach, when he, at the conclusion of his remarks in
response to him writes,
A philosophy that wants to bring this intuition to a conceptual level must
retrieve the scattered traces of reason in communicative practices
themselves, no matter how muted they may be. However, it cannot
simply repeat the attempt, long since discredited, to project some
theoretical picture of the world as a whole.
I think that I have learned from the tradition of Hegelian-Marxism, from the
history of critical social theory from Marx to Benjamin, Bloch to Marcuse
and Adomo that any attempt to embed the perspective of reconciliation in
a philosophy of history of nature, however indirectly it is done, must pay
the price of dedifferentiating forms of knowledge behind whose
categorical distinctions we can no longer retreat in good conscience
(Habermas 1985b, 210-211).
A Habermasian Turn in Critical Social Theory?
The PI symposium on Habermas’s theory, what Ferrara later called the
"Habermasian turn" in critical social theory (Ferrara 1989), actually transversed
three editions of the journal, covering nearly the whole of 1984. The articles of
Jay, Whitebook and Rorty appeared in April; McCarthy’s in July; Habermas's
reply in October.
One of the complexities involved was that while Habermas himself
observed that only McCarthy discussed his latest work (TCA), translated into the
English the same year by the latter, the fact of the matter was that Habermas
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was set to present a second major work of the still young 1980s: Der
philosophische Diskurs der Modeme: Zwolf Vorlesungen was published in
Frankfurt in 1985.
It was the latter work (first prepared as a series of lectures in Paris, then
later in the United States), which most directly criticized what Habermas
regarded as the remaining vestiges of a credible, contemporary Marxism,
namely the "praxis philosophy" he associated with Marcuse, as well as Kosik
and other East European theorists. The work, however, is far more often
recognized for its confrontation with the theories of Nietzsche, Heidegger,
Foucault, and the contemporary postmodern theories based upon them.
As late as 1988, Richard Bernstein was confronted with this issue during an
interview with Duja Melcic (Melcic 1989). Bernstein explained that,
We had a symposium on Habermas's work in the journal and it was the
idea of the publisher of the journal to collect the contributions to that
discussion. Since the publisher made this suggestion when I decided to
resign as editor of the journal, Habermas and Modernity was a farewell
present to the journal (Melcic 1989, 209).

In substantial sections of the long interview, Bernstein's overall tone is not
always approving of Habermas and his supporters. Initially, he refrains from a
directly critical approach when the interviewer recalls Bernstein's statement in
the introduction to Habermas and Modernity. "Habermas epitomizes the ideals
of Praxis International. Consequently, the journal has served as a vehicle for
the expression and critique of his views". She then asks, "Do we see here a
sign of how the spirit of the journal has changed according to a new historical
situation?" (Melcic 1989, 209). Bernstein replies,
Its true that the social theory of Habermas has been one of the most
outstanding topics of the journal, but nevertheless it is important to
realize that there have also been many other types of discussion,
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including the issue (in my opinion one of the best) on feminism and
critique. Indeed the guest editors of this issue, Seyla Benhabib and
Drucilla Cornell, have published a book, Feminism as Critique, based on
this issue...There have also been many other social theories and
movements discussed, such as the work of Foucault and the political
movements of the Third World...(Melcic 1989, 209).

This reply does not, of course, respond to the interviewer's obvious
inference that since the departing editor's 1984 perspective that Habermas
epitomized the ideals of PI, conditions had changed so radically by 1988 it
would be far more accurate to state that PI now epitomized the ideals of
Habermas's (and his supporters') social theory. Bernstein's reply also ignores
the important fact that in the issue on “Feminism and Critique" the dominant
topic was the implications of Habermas’s "discourse ethic" for feminist theory.
In addition, it was an article of Seyla Benhabib, "The Marxian Method of
Critique: Normative Presuppositions" (Benhabib 1984), appearing in the same
issue of the journal as Habermas's reply to Rorty, Jay, Whitebook, McCarthy
and Bernstein, which served as the focal point for the special issue on feminist
theory (January, 1986) for which Benhabib served as guest editor. Finally,
before that year (1986) is out, Seyla Benhabib (along with Svetozar
Stojanovic), in a new Editor's Introduction to PI, writes,
When Praxis International was launched over five years ago...the
programmatic spirit behind it was expressed as follows: "At the moment
there is no journal of Marxist humanist orientation, despite the increasing
urgency for it...
...discussions among members of the Editorial Board, usually taking
place in conjunction with the course on "Philosphy and the Social
Sciences" at the Inter-University Center at Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, have
led to some reformulations and revisons in these original statements. A
consensus has eventually emerged that the dominant orientation of the
journal would be best characterized not as "Marxist humanist" but as
“democratic socialist", since Marxist humanism is one among a number
of theoretical orientations compatible with goals and aims of democratic
socialism...
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...since the beginning of this decade, a growing sense of being at the end
of a process, at times named "modernity", at others "industrial society",
and even the "Enlightenment" has spread. Post-modem, post-industrial,
post-Enlightenment, post-structuralist, post-analytic, post-empiricist, and
post-Marxist are by now familiar terms of intellectual discourse in
Western Europe and North America...lf, as some have argued, Marxist
theory is very much shaped by the experience of capitalist modernity; if
Marxism endorses the naive faith in scientific-technological progress and
in the emancipatory content of production relations; if Marxism as a classbased theory has remained insufficiently sensitive to forms of opression
deriving from gender, race, ethnic, linguistic and religious identity, can it
still serve as the primary theoretical framework for an emancipatory
social praxis?...
...the intellectual climate of the 1980s can best be described as that of an
"interparadigmatic struggle", when Marxism itself has been radically
challenged by the post-structuralist, hermeneutic-contextualist, and post
modernist epistemology and political theory. It will be important for
Praxis International to address this "inter-paradigmatic struggle" in
contemporary science and philosophy, and to encourage critical
exchanges between varieties of Marxist and non-Marxist theories of
social and political emancipation... (Benhabib & Stojanovic 1986, 251255).

Hence, the next two concluding parts of my analysis of an incipient public
sphere, importantly shaped by Habermas and his supporters in line with the
former's critique of Marx and Marxism, which he initiated at least a quarter
century earlier, will first take up the inaugural article of the soon-to-be new
editor of PI, Seyla Benhabib, in the journal, "The Marxian Method of Critique:
Normative Presuppositions" (Benhabib 1984). Following this, I will analyze the
conceptual linkage of this article with a contribution of Georg Lohmann's,
"Marx’s Capital and the Question of Normative Standards" (Lohmann 1986,
353-372), a work which appeared in the first edition of Benhabib's editorship of
PI, and contained original theses in reference to which Benhabib had, in her
just cited article in PI which preceded his, noted, "I am much indebted to Georg
Lohmann's insightful analysis..." (Benhabib 1984, 298). Recall that Habermas's
final chapter in TCA, where he at last takes up Marx's theory of the two-fold
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character of labor In capitalism, relied heavily for this on a perhaps too-selective
appropriation of Lohmann’s theses. However, it should be clear with a careful
reading of his PI article that Lohmann is fundamentally critical of Habermas's
notion of Marx’s theory of capitalism, since Habermas views the latter as a
"subtheory" within a broader evolutionary theory of historical materialism. To
the contrary, Lohmann views any theory of historical materialism as internal to
Marx's critique of capitalism.
Seyla Benhabib and Habermas’s Critical Social Theory as an Incipient
Political/Philosophical Tendency
If there were indeed a "Habermasian turn" in critical social theory, the
real substance of which was a level of consensus, even if expo facto, involving
a concession to the idea of a positive replacement with Habermas's theory of
Marx's critical approach to contemporary society, then Benhabib’s “The Marxian
Method of Critique: Normative Presuppositions" should be judged to be
exemplary of that new direction.
The first thing to notice is that Benhabib’s article was not included in the
original symposium on Habermas's theory. However, it did appear in the issue
of the journal which contained Habermas's reply to the symposium articles
assigned to assess his theory. Consequently, Habermas did not consider
Benhabib's article.
The real affinity of Benhabib's contribution is with Albrecht Wellmer's,
"Reason, Utopia and the Dialectic of Enlightenment", which preceded the
original symposium on Habermas's theory. (As I have shown Bernstein
included the latter in Habermas and Modernity, though it was not either
officially part of the PI symposium on Habermas's theory, having appeared in
the journal several years earlier).
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Though a rise in the stature of Habermas’s theory and of his critique of
Marx particularly were results of the symposium, an equally important point was
that each of the symposium participants seemed ready to place some distance
between himself and Habermas. Yet, both Wellmer’s (pre-sympopsium) and
Benhabib's (post-symposium) articles implied a more or less wholesale
embrace of the fundamental basis of Habermas theory and the "project" it
suggested. This project proposes a process of reasoned argument for a
displacement of Marx from the center, implied or otherwise, of a critical theory of
contemporary society.
A significant difference between the pre-symposium and post-symposium
programmatic-type appropriations of Habermas's theory as a publicly-reasoned
separation from Marx's critique of capitalism was that Albrecht Wellmer had
been Habermas's student in Germany, while Seyla Benhabib’s background
was American. It is interesting to consider Habermas's remarks, made in his
reply to the symposium participants (all of whom were American) that what was
specifically German in respect to the development of modem social theory was
the "philosophical concept of alienation". As I noted earlier, Habermas's
implication was that none of the U.S. theorists had confronted this pivotal
philosophic concept in terms of the question of its contemporary status in critical
social theory. Coincidentally or not, Benhabib's posf-symposium piece
confronted the concept directly, as had Wellmeris article which had appeared
several years earlier-before the Habermas symposium.
While McCarthy, for example, suggested that Habermas had given up too
much of the holistic quality of Hegel's philosophy for Kanfs distinctions, and
thereby fell short of providing an adequate replacement for the HegelianMarxian attempt at social concreteness, and Whitebook saw the weakness of
Habermas's theory in its lacking a material substitute for the role an
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interpretation of Freud played in the original theory of Horkheimer and Adorno,
such criticisms failed to get inside the deeper motivations of philosophy which
had driven the Hegelian Marxian dialectic. It was necessary to recognize and
confront the latter in order to comprehend Habermas's solution to this still
contemporary problem. Hence, both “Reason, Utopia and the Dialectic of
Enlightenment" and "The Marxian Method of Critique: Normative
Presuppositions" attempt to develop Habermas's basic position on the
outmoded quality of Marx's approach to contemporary society. They share the
position that it can be shown that what they view as Marx's fundamental
appropriation of the Hegelian dialectic of exteriorization and re-intemalization,
the movement of consciousness in Hegel and labor in Marx, is not adequate to
the complexity of contemporary society. However, the position they share is
linked to how both authors understand Marx's critique of capitalism. Both
believe it pivots on property relations and the market.
Consistently, Benhabib follows Habermas when she selects strategically
from Lohmann's theses. As Lohmann's subsequent (1986) clarification of his
analysis of Marx’s Capita! makes clear, Benhabib's attempted appropriation of
Lohmann's theses notwithstanding, even after the maturation of Habermas's
social theory, their remains a critical residue in Marx's presentation in Capital.
This remained unrecognized by Habermas and Benhabib. Thus, Benhabib
writes of Marx's Capital,
There is by now a long debate on the methodolgical significance of [the]
historical observations and digressions...whereas the main analysis itself
proceeds from a systematic abstraction called "the capitalist mode of
production", the historical digressions rely primarily on the English case
and the development of the English working class. Are these historical
digressions illustrations of the systematic analysis, or is there a sense in
which the main analysis itself is historically specific and expresses the
development of capitalism in one particular case only? For the purposes
of my argument, I need not get involved in this debate. The dual
perspective displayed in Capital through historical observations, on the
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one hand, and systematic analysis, on the other, corresponds to the dual
quality of labor-power as a commodity. In the historical passages the
subjects are the laborers themselves as owners of concrete labor power,
whereas according to the systematic analysis capital itself is the subject;
from the standpoint of capital, labor-power is simply what is paid in the
form of wages, ie; variable capital. This dual perspective of the text
reflects the unresolved struggle between laborers as subjects and capital
that objectifies them (Benhabib 1984, 293).

With the completion of this paragraph, Benhabib writes in a footnote, "I am much
indebted to Georg Lohmann's insightful analysis" (Benhabib 1984, 293), in
reference to "Gesellschaftskritik und normativr Masstab", which had appeared in
a 1980 collection, Arbeit, Handlung und Normativitat, edited by A. Honneth and
U. Jaeggi. I must first briefly remark here on two important considerations.
The first, seemingly minor, is perhaps telling in respect to Benhabib's
apparent reliance on an indirect grasp of Marx's Capital. While referring
several times to "passages" and "digressions" to describe Marx's attention to the
"lived crisis" contrasted with his main analysis of a "systematic abstraction", on
exactly two other occasions Behnabib describes them as "chapters" (Benhabib
1984, 288; 293).
Georg Lohmann's PI article, "Marx's Capital and the Question of
Normative Standards" is best understood as an argument constructed to raise
doubts about 1) Habermas's assessment of Marx prior to TCA; 2) Habermas's
new attempt (in TCA) to apply the social-theoretic categories heretofore
developed to an appropriation, as well as a surpassing, of Marx's analysis in
Capital particularly; and, 3) Benhabib's utilization of his [Lohmann's] analysis,
because it suggests a lack of understanding, or a disregard on her part, for the
significance of his thesis at this level. It is in respect to the third point that a first
consideration should be kept in mind in assessing the quality of the
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"Habermasian turn" in critical social theory, viewed through PI.

Lohmann, in

"Marx’s Capital and the Question of Normative Standards", writes,
these historical observations [in Marx’s Capital which should make it
possible to correct the...objectivism of the Marxian conception of history
internally, concerns the pursuit of transcendent critique throughout
Capital. As an aspect of immanent exposition this occurs through the
contrasting historiographic passages which finally lead to a separate
chapter (Lohmann 1986, 366).

Thus, Benhabib, in suggesting that Lohmann's analysis of Marx's Capital
supposed a division of chapters between "systematic abstraction" and "lived
crisis", is clearly mistaken.
The second consideration goes to the core of the misconceptions
underlying Benhabib’s attempted critique of Marx from the standpoint of
Habermas's social theory. The last sentence of the passage taken from her PI
article I just quoted refers to “concrete labor power”. This latter, by virtue of its
being owned, is said to constitute the possibility of a perspective, developed by
Marx in Capital, of workers as subjects. Benhabib contrasts this with simple
"labor power" viewed, from the perspective of capital as the subject, as "what
is paid in the form of wages, ie; variable capital" (Benhabib 1984, 293). Thus,
according to Benhabib,
the dual perspective displayed in Capital through historical observations,
on the one hand, and systematic analysis, on the other hand,
corresponds to the dual quality of labor power as a commodity (Benhabib
1984, 293).

The starting point such an analysis represents as a normative
assumption in Marx's theory is precisely what Marx fundamentally criticized.
Marx, in his analysis of capitalism, develops the implications of a two-fold
character of labor, concrete and abstract, not labor viewed from two varying
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perspectives, ie; on the one hand, each commodity with an owner and, on the
other, its representation by capital as merely what is paid in wages. The latter
views Marx's critique to be from the standpoint of "labor" (human relationship to
nature), making central property ownership and the market. Postone, for
example, in criticizing this traditional misconception of Marx's approach, writes,
The difference between an analysis based on the notion of "labor”, as in
classical political economy, and one based on the concept of the double
character of concrete and abstract labor in capitalism is crucial; it is, in
Marx's phrase, "the whole secret of the critical conception"...It delineates
the difference between a social critique that proceeds from the standpoint
of “labor”, a standpoint that itself remains unexamined, and one in which
the form of labor itself is the object of critical investigation. The former
remains within the bounds of the capitalist formation, whereas the latter
points beyond it (Postone 1993, 57).

Postone's analysis could be referring to Benhabib's argument as the
paradigmatic case of where the constructions of even the most sophisticated
attempts of traditional Marxism, necessarily leads. I can demonstrate this by
following Benhabib's argument from her questionable appropriation of
Lohmann's insights into Marx's method, including the significance of the
"historical chapters", through her conclusions on the contemporary status of
Marx's theory. Benhabib, after explaining the "dual perspective" in Marx's text
as merely an identification of two opposing standpoints, next criticizes the
central problem as involving a lack of "mediation" between, “...these points of
view. The text weaves in and out of both without an explicit guidance as to what
is involved" (Benhabib 1984, 293). This "missing" mediation has, she writes,
theoretical and normative implications.
In Benhabib's explication of the theoretical implication can be found what
amounts to a brief recapitulation of a central element of Jurgen Habermas's
argument in Volume Two of TCA. What is peculiar, however, is that in
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identifying modem social theory's, “distinction between social integration and
system integration", Benhabib first refers to Habermas's 1973 work,
Legitimation Crisis, and then to an article written by Claus Offe for a collection,
edited by Habermas, titled, "The Spiritual Crisis of the Age", which she notes
was translated into the English in 1984. The passage she takes from Offe
reads:
All social systems reproduce themselves through the normatively
regulated and meaningful action of their members on the one hand, and
the effectiveness of objective functional contexts on the other. This
differentiation between "social integration" and "systems integration",
between followed mles and rule-like regularities that assert themselves
beyond subjects, is the basis for the entire sociological tradition
(Benhabib 1984, 294).

In a summary virtually identical with a statement found in Habermas's analysis
in Legitimation Crisis, Benhabib writes,
We certainly cannot take Marx to task for not having developed the
social-theoretical means of analysis by which to integrate these two
perspectives (Benhabib 1984, 294).

Benhabib relies heavily on Habermas’s critique of Marx without
reference to TCA, upon which it apparently relies. Since Habermas's work was
published in 1981, while her own article appeared in 1984, TCA must have
been available to her. What makes her lack of acknowledgement of TCA
especially puzzling is the central role the theses developed in Lohmann's 1980
article piays in her analysis; there is no indication of an awareness that
Habermas had already clearly highlighted the importance of Lohmann’s work
for the entire conception of his most recent (TCA) critique of Marx. As a result,
there appears to be no requirement for Benhabib to take into her account this
crucial step in Habermas's theory development. Given the serious if somewhat
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unrecognized tensions (which only became public and widely apparent a few
years later) at the inception of PI, the creation of an impression of some distance
from Habermas's current project, including critique of Marx and Marxism,
especially in an article which proved to be "programmatic", probably served well
the process of replacing the "Marxist Humanist" orientation of PI. Whatever the
reasons for the form of Benhabib's presentation, the remaining paragraphs of
her article basically follow the outline of Habermas's three-decade long critique
of Marx. Thus, after describing the "theoretical" implications of Marx's failure to
provide "explicit guidance" as to what mediated the "two points of view" in
Marx's Capital, Behabib turns to the normative implications.
First, the normative implications are "consequences" of the unresolved
theoretical problem, particularly the lack of explicit guidance from Marx in "what
is involved" in the shifting of standpoints noticeable in Capital. What is really
involved, according to Benhabib, is Marx's positive evaluation of the "process of
the constitution of workers into a class" (Benhabib 1984, 294). The capitalist
infliction of misery on the workers, which forces them into collective struggle and
identity, is alone what can bring into being a consciousness of class interests,
the latter knowable only with the ascriptive abilities of a "thinker-observer".
Thus Marx, in an immanent critique, while demonstrating a dual perspective of
“lived" experience and the systemic aspect of capitalist society, finally,
adapted [sic] exclusively the point of view of the thinker-observer,
ignoring the very social experiences of collectivity and plurality
(Benhabib 1984, 295).

Benhabib offers the explanation for this in Marx's inheritance from
classical German Idealism and its philosophy of history, the “dual perspective of
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humanity as an empirical subject and as a normative goal" (Benhabib 1984,
296). She writes,
Marx often conflates the two principles and writes as if what is a
regulative idea in history-the idea of humanity-is also operative in
history as an agent-history as an empirical subject" (Benhabib 1984).
Marx, due to a consistently immanent analysis, identifies the proletariat
as the universal class, "representing" humanity generally: "Marx thereby
commits the fallacy of 'representational logic'", which Benhabib says he shares
with the bourgeoise:
This allows for some of the most objectionable equations of traditional
Marxism. If the working class represents the universal interest of
humanity, then the Party represents the universal interests of the working
class, and the Central Committee represents the universal interest of the
Party. Authoritarian, substitutionalist politics, while not being deducible
from, is not incompatible with, this point of view (Benhabib 1984, 297).

Recall that Habermas, thirteen years earlier, issued a practically identical
critique of Marx, tracing the Leninist or political concept of the Party, through
Lukacs's philosophical justification, back to the opening left by Marx's
appropriation of Hegel's dialectical logic (see Chapter Three, p. 100). In fact, in
reaching the conclusion to her analysis Benhabib refers twice, not to classical
German idealism generally, but to Mane's appropriation of Hegel's negation of
negation. And, interestingly, in drawing her conclusions, she amplifies an
interpretation of a passage in the Grundrisse (which I reproduced in Chapter 4,
p. 58-59) she quotes extensively in an earlier part of her analysis. Shortly, I will
describe these references, primarily in order to make clear the “programmatic"
intentions of Benhabib's article.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

290
In her argument concerning Marx’s method in Capital Benhabib cites the
German Ideology in order to prove that much earlier in his theoretical work
Marx understood that class was only a,
meaningful social category for analyzing those social systems in which
stratification is not ascriptive, in which birth, age, blood-lineage, and
profession no longer determine social rights and priviliges, and where
social integration is achieved primarily through the free market of wage
labor...(Benhabib 1984, 294).

As I have indicated, it is fruitful to compare Benhabib’s conclusions to
Lohmann's when it is first understood that Lohmann's PI article, which
appeared a couple of years after Benhabib's, is most properly seen as, firstly, a
critique of Habermas's approach to Marx (which Lohmann himself indicates at
the beginning of his article) and, secondly, a rejoinder to Benhabib's attempt to,
if not carry Habermas's criticism further, at least make it more specific in a
programmatic sense. But, both Lohmann and Benhabib attempt to identify a
theoretical barrier Marx could not (or did not) cross at a point where he then
merely evokes Hegel's "negation of negation". This critique they share of
Marx's phrase is no less interesting, in fact it is even more so, considering the
widely divergent texts of Marx to which each respectively refer.
In contrast to the main text of her article, Benhabib writes in the footnote
referring to the 1845 German Ideology I quoted above, that Marx was,
critical of the subsumption of individuals under the category of "class",
but has blind faith in the power of double negation (Benhabib 1984, 298).

Marx believed, as a matter of "faith", that the historical process of subsumption
of individuals under the category of class was necessary and ultimately
desirable for the realization of humanity. Her central criticism is, then, that Marx
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understood that the category of c\ass-interest could only be "ascriptive". Yet,
modem social systems are distinguished from the pre-modem precisely in that
stratification, "is not ascriptive...birth, age, blood-lineage, and profession no
longer determine social rights and priviliges, and...social integration is achieved
primarily through the free market of wage labor (Benhabib 1984,.294). Thus,
class interest can be ascribed only though an objective analysis of the social
system itself. It presupposes that, at the subjective level,
what is supposed to "bind" members of a class together is their "objective
interest", ie; the preservation of their material and power status within the
system of production...(Benhabib 1984, 294).

Benhabib, then, before proceeding to its philosophical basis,
summarizes her critique of Marx at this more conventional level:
There is...no such purely "objective" analysis; the determination of socalled "class interests" requires us to specify what we see as just or
unjust, as exploitation or domination, in social relations. If the concept of
class interests is to designate more that just a statistical regularity of the
behavior of large human groups, and is to be used as a normative
measure as to how real groups ought to act, then one's normative
standards must be indentified previously and not subsequently to
"objective" class analysis...[Marx] was wrong in ascribing normative
status to the only mode of collective identification that capitalism seemed
to create...(Benhabib 1984, 295).

According to this, Marx consistently approached the question of future
social relations fundamentally different from capitalism's on the basis of a
concept (taken over from Hegel) of negation of negation, appling it religiously
(with blind faith) even after the critical, socially specific categories developed in
Capital. I have already described in some detail (see Chapter Three) the depth
of Marx's discussion (as early as 1844) of Hegel's concepts. I have also
discussed Postone's reinterpretation (including its limitations) from within the
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Critical Theory tradition of Marx's appropriation of the Hegelian dialectic
(Chapter Four). Even considering its limitations, Postone's reinterpretation of
the Hegelian Marxian dialectic certainly contain original and persuasive
arguments concerning the contemporary potential of Marx's radical
secularization of Hegel's dialectic, incompatible with Benhabib's cryptic
description of its "blind faith".
In her conclusion, Benhabib also attempts another, deeper analysis of
what she sees as Marx's basic mistake. It follows her attribution to Marx's
theory the concept of organization strongly associated with traditional Marxism,
as well as with the Communist parties which until recently held power in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. A persuasive argument of these points
might be expected to have debilitating consequences for anyone thinking of
taking up Marx's theory anew. But, beyond this, Benhabib does not specify
which~if any-theory might be admissable. She is for, "a form of universality in
ethics and politics that does not deny the otherness of the Other(s)“ (Benhabib
1984, 297). She writes, in reference to her just completed interpretation of his
basic ideas, that Marx's was, "a move that pre-empted in theory the kind of
universality and commonality of interests that could only derive from practice"
(Benhabib 1984, 297).
Recall that Habermas's reply to the PI symposium participants included
a direct reference to Richard Bernstein's latest work. Habermas explicitly
rejected the tatter's elevation of the "Practical Idea". In this context, Habermas
offered a strong defense of theory, and of the necessity of philosophy. He
implies that a grasp of his own theory entails, at the least, a continuing
engagement with the conditions of modernity to which was traceable the key
concept of the age— the "philosophical concept of alienation", whether found
developed in the Hegelian Marxian dialectic, or in the early Romantic version
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taken up by Nietzsche. In addition to Habermas himself, recent criticisms of
"post-Marx Marxism" from within the Marxist humanist tradition have moved to
the center Hegel's assessments of the limitations of the Practical Idea
(Dunayevskaya 1989; Anderson 1995).
Benhabib’s second reference to Marx’s negation of negation is indirect.
Immediately prior to her attempt to link Marx’s theory to "traditional Marxism",
she quotes Jean Cohen's Class and Civil Society (1982) This is supposed to
buttress an argument linking Marx's theory to the authoritarian, single party, and
presumably to the states which have ruled through these forms:
The concept of the universal class and the identification of one
historically produced, empirically existent group as the bearer of
universality rests on the problematic attempt, derived from Hegel, to
present history as positive and rational. The universal class, the
subject/object of history, the negation of the negation, are concepts in
Marx's thought that imply a return to Hegel's absolute through the
substitution, first of species for Geist, second, of the class as the general
representative of society for the species. The concept of the universal
class subjugates the contingencies of historical praxis, and the plurality
of potential actors to the demands of "reason"--to the demands of a logic
that seeks to discover its own operations on the level of human praxis...
(Benhabib 1984, 296).

To fully understand the implications of Benhabib's argument here it must
be recalled that she is writing in a "Marxist Humanist" journal, rooted in the
dissident Marxist movement which opposed not only totalitarian Stalinism, but
Tito's anti-Stalinist state as well. Recall that as early as the 1844 "Critique of
Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General", Marx criticized Hegel’s
"exemplary" phrase, the dialectic concept, "at one with itself in its other as such".
Earlier, (Chapter Three) I interpreted this critique as the ground for Marx’s life
long development of a concept of revolutionary social organization which would
not subordinate in practice an idea of freedom, but would make its full
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development possible. The full potential of Hegel's concept of negativity,
transcendence as objective (Marx 1967b, 321), which Marx in the same essay
termed, "the great thing", the, "productive and moving principle of Hegel's
dialectic" (Marx 1967b, 321), has its potential realization in a new relationship of
philosophy and social organization.
Benhabib bases her denouement on Cohen's analysis of the "universal
class...the negation of negation", pairing Marx with Hegel precisely where the
former identified "the lie of Hegel's principle" (Marx 1967b, 329). Marx's intent
was to apprehend the revolutionary core of Hegel's dialectic, not restricted to
the realm of religion and the individual philosopher, an intent I have suggested
is not entirely incompatible afterall with, for example, the last pararagraph of
Hegel's Phenomenology, and the final three "syllogisms" of Hegels
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, in the Philosophy of Mind
(Dunayevskaya 1989).
On one level, Marx's consideration of Hegel's phrase, which appears in
the final, Absolute Knowledge chapter of the Phenomenology, criticizes the
purely abstract character of Hegel's dialectic. This dialectic fails to alter its
object. The object of Hegel's dialectic is consciousness. The other, the object
(non-philosophy), is not altered, is not brought through the potentialities
inherent in it to the level of its concept, just as the philosopher, in contact with its
object, is not himself altered. In a phrase Marx seemed to borrow from the last
words of Hegel's Phenomenology, the philosopher is, hence, "solitary and
alone" (Marx 1967b, 326). Marx attributes the latter to a fundamental alienation
which "separates thinking from the subject" (Marx 1967b, 335). This alienation
is originally found both in and by Hegel, though the latter did not recognize its
full social implications.
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I have argued that Marx's concept of social organization, developed
along with his participation in a series of revolutionary organizations
(Dunayevskaya 1991), followed from his 1844 "Critique of Hegelian Dialectic".
Marx's concept of social organization developed from a critique of Hegel's
dialectic specific to the problem of abolishing capitalism "Critique of Hegelian
Dialectic", and is perhaps the single most "undigested" moment in Marx's theory
(Dunayevskaya 1991; Meszaros 1997).
Marx's confrontation with, "at one with itself in its other as such" is
actually the paradigmatic critique of what Benhabib (on the authority of Cohen)
attributes in a positive sense to Marx: subjugation of "the plurality of actors to the
demands of 'reason'-to the demands of a logic that seeks to discover its own
operations on the level of human praxis..." (Benhabib 1984, 296). Benhabib’s
conclusion attributes to Marx's "purely immanent" critique of bourgeios political
economy an inability to point toward a fundamental shift in the relationship of
theory and practice which could fully realize the potential of modernity-“overcoming modernity through a fuller and deeper modernity", a phrase she
borrows from Marshall Berman (Benhabib 1984, 291).
In contrast, Lohmann opposes with another-transcendent-critique an
interpretation of Marx's Capital structured upon immanent critique. Before
describing Lohmann's implicit argument with Benhabib's conclusions, I need to
include one other of Benhabib's references to Marx. Her intention is to expose—
from the standpoint of widespread disillusionment with modernity irrespective of
its various political or historical forms-the philosophical limitations of Marx’s
theory. Benhabib presents the passage from Marx's Grundrisse which I quoted
in another context (see p.232). In this passage Marx asks a series of questions,
exploring the socio-historic specificity of the concept of wealth.
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Benhabib's interpretation includes an understanding of Marx's analysis
of capitalism as opposing to the limiting relations of production the forces of
production, which the bourgeoise has unleashed and which will underlie as
well the non-capitalist future. At present, the relations of production are selflimiting in the form of a bourgeois civil society structured on the opposition of
two classes. The universality immanent to civil society will first be realized by
the coming into its own of the proletariat.
This fails to consider an important dimension of the uniqueness of Marx's
critique of capitalism. It is rooted in an analysis of value as the form of wealth
intrinsic to it. Marx's critique is not primarily a counter-position of the future
potential of bourgeois civil society to its historical form, or a matter of an
internalization at the level of each individual of its linear, developmental
dynamic. In analyzing value as the specific form of wealth in capitalism, Marx
demonstrates that the material and value forms of wealth in that social formation
are not merely different; they can even be opposites. Value, the specifically
capitalist form of wealth, has its magnitude measured in abstract labor time. An
increase in average productivity, while increasing material wealth, does not
change the total value created in equal periods of time:
...if average productivity doubles, twice as many commodities are
produced in a given time period, each with half the previous value
(Postone 1993, 193).

In fully developed capitalist production, direct labor becomes
increasingly superfluous in the production of material wealth, while value
remains dependent on the expenditure of this labor. However, value is not
constituted by the mere expenditure of this labor. Value is constituted by labor's
mediational role in the capitalist social formation. As opposed to a
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transhistorica! concept of labor, which posits labor as the mediation of nature
and humanity, I have discussed how labor mediates itself, the dialectic of its
abstract and concrete dimensions, and constitutes social relations, not
generally, but in capitalism. With this in mind, consider that Benhabib believes
that the passage in Marx’s Grundrisse "expresses in a nutshell the normative
ideal underlying Marx's critique of capitalism" (Benhabib 1984, 291). Benhabib
understands the passage such that it affirms the potential of "capitalist civil
society", its dynamic of "change and growth" versus ail previous societies, the
basis of whose ideologies was order and stability. In fact, Benhabib writes, for
this reason Marx demanded that the bourgeoise is, "not to be rejected, but
sublated" (Benhabib 1984, 291). Here Benhabib misquotes the very passage
from the Grundrisse she has just herself reproduced. Once again, Marx writes
in the Grundrisse,
In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what
is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities and
pleasures, productive forces, etc., created through universal exchange?

In contrast Benhabib, in elucidating the idea that the passages demonstrated
that Marx believed the “bourgeoise was not to be rejected", reproduces a part of
the quoted passage thusly:
For in bourgeois society the “true (my emphasis, RR) universality of
individual needs, capacities and pleasures" is identified with a limited
form (Benhabib 1984, 291).

The word "true", which she includes between quotation marks with the rest of
Marx's sentence, is Benhabib's own addition to Marx's passage she had just
quoted otherwise (and accurately) on the preceding page. Adding the word
"true" apparently seemed legitimate to Benhabib based on an interpretation of
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Marx which does not take into account the way Marx analyzes the value form of
wealth. In Marx's theory, this (value) form does not merely constitute a limit on a
non-contradictory content, but is in fact capitalism's fundamental core, the result
of a long historical process. It is what differentiates, or particularizes, the
capitalist vis a vis all previous social formations, including “needs”, capacities
and pleasures. Thus, when Marx refers to the "limited bourgeois form" of wealth
he is not affirming its “true" content, which is presently obscured and/or
contained by its limited form. Illustrative of his critique, which is far more radical
and shows how deeply implicated the "bourgeois form of wealth" is in the core
of the social formation it underlies, Marx writes in the sentence directly following
the passage Benhabib quotes:
In bourgeois economics-and in the epoch of production to which it
corresponds-this complete working out of the human content appears as
a complete emptying out, this universal objectification as total alienation,
and the tearing down of all limited, one-sided aims as sacrifice of the
human end-in-itself to an entirely external end. This is why the childish
world of antiquity appears on one side as loftier...(Marx 1973, 488.)

Clearly, Benhabib's interpretation, which holds that Marx's idea of the
"limited bourgeois form" refers merely to "wealth in the sense of the mere
accumulation of material objects" (Benhabib 1984, 291) fails to grasp the depth
of Marx's critique of capitalism. Marx criticizes how an opposition of material
wealth and the value form of wealth, following from the two-fold nature of labor
within the "bourgeois" social formation constitutes its social relations,
characterized by an abstract form of domination which does not appear social at
all. Therefore the object of Marx's critique is not the opposition of form to
content, but the the social content itself, which is characterized by internal
contradictions. Consequently, Benhabib's conclusion, that Marx's critique of
modernity held within it normative presuppositions also intrinsic to his object of
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criticism—bourgeois society and production~is dependent on a
misinterpretation of Marx's texts, as well as a selective utilization of the studies
of the contemporary Critical Theorist, Georg Lohmann, to whom I shall now turn.
Lohmann's Attempted Appropriation of Marx's Capital as a Radicalization of
Habermas's Critical Theory
Lohmann, though original in developing a detailed analysis of Capital
with the use of Habermas's categories and even, to some extent, turning
Habermas's critical categories against the letter's own theory, mistakenly puts at
the center, as does Habermas himself, Marx's negative view of capitalist
property relations. Due to his misplacement of the centrality of Marx's critical
categories, an error he shares with Habermas, several aspects of the tatter's
critique of Marx are positively affirmed, or simply left standing. In addition, some
of Lohmann's own analyses of Marx can not make sense of theoretical
developments after Marx's Capital, especially Critique of the Gotha Programme
(Dunayevskaya 1991) and writings on the potential of "pre-capitalist", or "noncapitalist" lands to bypass the capitalist path of social development (Shanin
1983); more importantly they tie his hands in respect to his attempt to present an
interpretation of Marx adequate to contemporary social and political conditions.
Lohmann writes that Marx analyzes, through the "normative, legal and
voluntary relations accompanying commodity exchange", the ideas of freedom
and equality of Locke's state of nature, recapitulated, "in part word for word in
Hegel’s theory of abstract right" (Lohmann 1986, 360). Marx specifies in
reference to exchange relations the "abstract right” concepts of "person” and
"private owner". A reifying self-relation of person and individual wherein the
latter exists in a relation of indifference is the point of reference of social
integration. The self-relation of person and individual is the basis for, or makes
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possible, with purchase and sale of labor power, interpersonal relations
becoming a pure relation of ownership and property:
Just as the reifying self-relation is based on indifference to oneself, so
too, relations among persons are indifferent to their respective
individuality...
...This graduated inner structure of private owners to one another and to
their respective selves is based on the mediation of all their relations
through property. It is this domination of mediating property (my
emphasis, RR) that specifically restricts the integrating norms of freedom
and equality. These are formal and universal in their claim but are in fact
internally related to private property. They are hence abstract norms of
freedom and equality, valid only because indifferent to one's own
individuality and that of others. A reconstruction of the fulfillment of their
validity claims would therefore have to make these limits explicit and this
would be the task of transcendent critique (Lohmann 1986, 361).
Related to this, near the conclusion to his article Lohmann alludes
dismissively to the integration of “negation of negation" into Marx's analysis.
Moreover, his disappointment with this concept is coupled, somewhat
elliptically, with how Marx brings in organization. He suggests, in his situation
of the philosophic negation of negation and Marx's concept of organization at
the point where transcendent critique begins in Capital, that both can be
explained by historical limitations in the conceptual tools which were available
to Marx. Still, among the most interesting aspects of Lohmann's analysis is the
idea (which he does not take as far as he might) that modem social theoretic
concepts, which Habermas has been among the most important in developing,
often driven by his perception of Marx's objectivistic or economistic theory, are
in some cases already found, and in others, at (east implied, in Marx's Capital.
Moreover, often these can provide the basis for a fundamental critique of
Habermas's supposedly more developed theory.
So, while Lohmann does indeed incorporate in to his own analysis much
of Habermas's critique of Marx, as well as adds some additional criticisms of his
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own, the real significance of his article lies in how he shows that Marx’s Capital
contains many of the elements adequate for a critical approach to contemporary
society, opening to doubt many of the basic assumptions upon which Habermas
bases claims for innovations in his own theory. It is precisely this properly
critical side of Lohmann’s analysis Benhabib obscures, while leaving an
impression that her own views are-in the most crucial respects—in basic accord
with those of Lohmann, as well as Habermas.
As I mentioned in my discussion of Benhabib, it is difficult to explain,
Benhabib does not indicate that Habermas, in TCA, already had taken up in
some detail (and in a crucial place) Lohmann's new and original insights into
Capital. It is puzzling, in fact, that Benhabib never refers to TCA. In that work,
Habermas not only relies heavily on a consideration of Lohmann's analysis for
the structure of his own most up-to-date critique of Marx. In addition, when
Habermas comes to the “concluding reflections" of his final chapter he refers to
an article writtten by Benhabib, an article he finds exemplary of the idea that
cultural countermovements to unity, as opposed to the radically differentiated
moments of reason characterizing modernity, "might be established this side of
expert cultures, in a non-reified everyday practice" (Habermas 1987, 398). Two
pages later, in the concluding paragraphs of Volume Two of TCA, he returns to
the basic issue of Marx's method, particularly to a passage in Marx's Gmndrisse
which remarks on abstract labor and "indifference", concepts basic to
Lohmann's analysis. Habermas had extensively utilized these a few pages
earlier. Thus, it is highly unlikely that Benhabib was unaware of these
theoretical developments when she published her own "programmatic" critique
of Marx, heavily reliant on Habermas and Lohmann individually.
Since I have already discussed the importance of Lohmann's ideas for
Habermas's TCA, and for what turned out to be Benhabib's programmatic
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article in the transitional edition of PI containing Habermas's reply to the
participants in the symposium on his social theory, here I want to just briefly
consider Lohmann's analysis of Max's "transcendent critique", as a proposed
radicalization of Habermas's critical social theory. It is an appreciation of Marx's
theory, which specifies perceived inadequacies. Both of these aspects of
Lohmann's argument imply sharp disagreement with Habermas's original
appropriation of Lohmann's views, as well as with Benhabib's independent
attempt to do likewise.
My purpose here is to mark the limits of the dialogue stimulated by
Habermas's critique of Marx in the light of what was widely understood to be a
major breakthrough in contemporary thought, Habermas's social theory.
Habermas's critique of Marx was arguably the central theme, though until now
only implicitly so, of a key theoretical journal, international in character, which
brought into the open, into a public sphere, the question of the contemporary
viability of various competing interpretations of Marx. While, at the beginning of
the 1980s decade this could have been prospectively conceived as principally
a dialogue between the Critical Theory tradition and Marxist Humanism, or two
forms of neo-Marxism, my analysis has already indicated that Habermas’s
Critical Theory was just at the point where a substantial break from his own
tradition might be justified, while the Marxist Humanist tendency virtually
perished, with few important exceptions (Dunayevskaya 1984, 1988), in the first
few years of the decade.
Discussion of Habermas’s social theory, which in many ways long pre
supposed the lack of contemporary social or political relevance of Marx's ideas,
eventually overwhelmed any and all other themes taken up by the journal.
Thus, it was not until the early 1990s, specifically Moishe Postone's work, that a
comprehensive (and credible) challenge to Habermas's critique of Marx
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appeared. I have already discussed in some detail specific points of Postone's
challenge to Habermas's presentation of Marx's ideas. I have emphasized the
importance of the fact that Postone's critique is developed from within the
Critical Theory tradition. In respect to this, I have raised the question whether
the nature of his critique even implies, despite his own lack of attention to the
issue, Postone's own break from this tradition. In the concluding chapter, which
follows this one, I will discuss further the implications of Postone's critique of
Habermas from within the Critical Theory tradition, as well as the significance of
its form of presentation, given recent discussions of Habermas’s concept of a
public sphere, following from the first English translation in 1989 of Structural
Transformation of the Public Sphere, a work written in 1962.
I am concluding the present chapter with further consideration of
Lohmann's PI article because, as I mentioned, it marks the limits of the type of
discussion of Marx's ideas founded on Habermas's social-theoretic concepts.
Lohmann's discussion leads ail the way into, but does not succeed in passing
beyond, the impasses in Habermas's consideration of Marx which then shaped
his social theory such that it blunted its critical edge. As I will show, Lohmann's
interpretation, which attempted to preserve the idea of Marx's theory of
capitalism as critical through and through, is still such that Habermas utilized it
to reinforce his notion that Marx's ideas are of the past.
Besides this, however, I will show that Lohmann, in taking up the ideas of
immanent and transcendent critique in Marx's Capital, is confronted with the
problem of the relationship between Marx's philosophic concepts and his
concept of organization. Lohmann does not resolve this issue, primarily
because he does not fully recognize the problematic he has uncovered.
In the passage I reproduced earlier (see p.299) Lohmann suggests that
Marx's analysis of capitalism, structured on immanent critique, has a
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transcendent critique internal to it. The latter critique, according to Lohmann,
appears in "historiographic passages" dispersed throughout Marx's dominant
abstract narrative. Only with "Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation",
Marx is confronted with the difficulties of his own presentation. Since he has
depicted capital as an inexorable force, subsuming socio-historical lifeworids,
while presenting in scattered passages the struggle to preserve their "unitary
claims", Lohmann asserts that Marx had to "bear the cost" (Lohmann 1986,
364).
After the fully developed concept of capital Marx, in an "astonishingly thin
chapter" (Lohmann 1986, 364) , merely evokes "negation of negation" at the
point where transcendent critique begins. Lohmann states that whereas the first
edition of Capital, at this point in the text, put forth the "category of the 'free
laborer* as a creation of the creation of the capitalist era", the second edition
substituted, "for this idea a reference to the 1848 Manifesto of the Communist
Party" (Lohmann 1986, 364). (I will put aside for now the issue of the meaning
of Communist "Party" as Marx understood it, and the meaning it assumed later).
Lohmann argues that the ambiguity expressed in the contrasting editions
indicates that Marx is, "competing with the systematic intentions of his own
critique" (Lohmann 1986, 366). This is due to Mane's "inadequate means"
(Lohmann 1986, 366). Here, Lohmann evokes aspects of Habermas's critique
of Marx. Marx's
understanding of processes of development...underdefine the relation to
historical agents by hypostatizing them as "subjective earners" of
development, whose subjectivity is then only interpreted within the
framework of strategic or purposive rational behavior while treating them
moreover as a collective singular (Lohmann 1986, 366).
Lohmann believes that certain of Habermas's theories, unlike Marx's,
allow for theoretically explicit consideration of the normative content of historico-
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social lifeworlds. Habermas's idea of reconstruction of competencies (in what
Lohmann describes as the later version of Habermas's theory), "tries to bring
history into play...as a process of enlightenment of all participants", based on a,
"practical discourse between concerned persons". Lohmann believes that
something similar can already be found in Capital but, "where the whole of
capital-formation is not yet thematic" (Lohmann 1986, 369). Lohmann writes,
...under the topic of the "Abolition of Critique by a Practical Turn"...Mane
gives a paradigmatic version...He changes from the retrospective stance
of a describer and narrator into the present voice of dramaturgy...in
which, "the voice of the worker, which had fallen silent in the storm and
stress of the production process...'suddenly‘" is raised. The worker
makes his claims and argues for them on the basis of prior development.
He is thus still ignorant of the exchange of equivalents, so that his
argumentation still shares its limitations and one-sidedness: But it is a
practical turn of critique that leads thus to a "struggle for the limitation of
the work day" (Lohmann 1986, 370).

Unlike Benhabib, Lohmann is sufficiently critical of Habermas's basic
approach to Marx to allow him to reject the idea that the latteris theory is
inadequate to contemporary standards of critique. Rather, he holds that in
some senses elements of Habermas's theory are necessary supplements to
Marx's still viable critical approach. Yet, like Benhabib, his criticisms of Marx,
taken largely from Habermas, lead him to subordinate theory to practice. This
follows from his idea that Marx's later reference to the Manifesto of the
Communist Party in Capital suggests that Marx's idea of conscious
organization was congruent with an idea of the vanguard party whose selfappointed task was to represent (from the outside) the interests of the proletariat
and, by extension, humanity.
Clearly, from Chapter One of Capital, Marx made clear that only "freely
associated men", integral to which was his own analysis of the specificity of
capital's form of social domination, including its abstact dimension, might
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dissolve the fetishism of the commodity. This anticipated social relations
radically different from, or opposite to, the dehumanized form constituting
capitalism. Let me conclude this part by offering an alternative interpretation of
the link between Marx’s "Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation"
(Chapter 32 in the English Pelican edition), and the reference to his 1848
Manifesto of the Communist Party. In connection with this, Lohmann argues
that a modification in the second edition of Capital, which replaced Marx's
formulation of the "free laborer" as the "creation of the creation of the capitalist
era" with a citation of the Manifesto of the Communist Party, reflected Mane's
broader, unresolved theoretical difficulty. It shows that Marx was,
again competing with the systematic intentions of his own critique, by
presenting political and evolutionary considerations which approach the
problem from the outside (Lohmann 1986, 364).

Lohmann simply mentions Marx's citation, which appears after the last
sentence of "The Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation". He does not
summarize the content of Marx's citation, thus implying that the Manifesto of the
Communist Party represented an "external" critique of capitalism. This
discloses that among the presuppositions of Lohmann's approach is the notion
that Marx's theory of the overcoming of capitalism did not encompass Marx's
own working out of the dialectic of philosophy and organization as a necessary
element of it. The very short (five pages) chapter at issue here summarizes the
specificity of capitalist private property as the historical negation of individual
private property. The negation of this negation,
does not re-establish private property, but it does indeed establish
individual property on the basis of the achievements of the capitalist era:
namely co-operation and the possession in common of the land and
means of production produced by labor itself (Marx 1977, 929).
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At the end of this chapter, Marx quotes the Manifesto of the Communist
Party:
The advance of industry, whose involuntary but willing promoter is the
bourgeoise, replaces the isolation of the workers due to competition with
their revolutionary combination, due to association. The development of
large-scale industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very
foundation on which the bourgeoise produces and appropriates products
for itself. What the bourgeoise, therefore, produces, above all, are its
own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally
inevitable... (Marx 1977, 930).

In mentioning the title of the text referenced by Marx, while not
characterizing the specific passage, Lohmann leaves an impression of Marx's
inability to satisfactorily resolve two levels of his analysis. As I have previously
shown, Habermas consistently, though with some variations, presented
essentially the same argument. Lohmann states that Marx,
at the very beginning of his critique, flings at the faces of the bourgeois
economists as an unmasking dictum, that, "there once was a history, but
there no longer is" (Lohmann 1986, 364).

But when Marx arrives at the end of his analysis, after his "critical exposition", or
immanent critique,
the capitalist system portrays itself as an eternal, unhistorical formation
of society, with contingent beginnings, and unsurpassable rationality, to
which there is no future alternative

At this point, Marx can only appeal to "negation of negation" and fall back on the
Communist Party.
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Why, if Lohmann's article is strongly critical of both Habermas’s approach
to Marx, and Benhabib's programmatic use of it, does Lohmann seem
compelled (just like Benhabib) to refer dismissively to Marx's small conceptual
phrase, "negation of negation"? Here I will examine more closely the respective
contexts in which each refer to this concept.
Lohmann, in section III of his PI article, "Immanent and Transcendent
Critique Reinterpreted", pinpoints "Historical Tendency of Capitalist
Accumulation", writing that it marks the "end of immanent exposition", even
though, "immanent exposition structures Capital as a whole" (Lohmann 1986,
365). Prior to this chapter, the immanent exposition includes historiographic
passages, according to Lohmann, which appear as constrasting to the "systemconstitutive processes" (Lohmann 1986, 364). Transcendent critique begins
with "Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation". Lohmann writes,
At the end of immanent exposition the object is considered in its totality,
as the reproduction process of capital. Marx explains this to be the
reproduction of the capital-specific precondition, namely the separation
of capitalists from wage-laborers. Capital has become its own
precondition, and no longer bothers with historical preconditions that are
alien to it (Lohmann 1986, 365).
With this, Lohmann believes, there is a clear indication in Marx's text that his
method of immanent critique creates a great difficulty in presentation of history:
Since in the systematic construction of his critique, Marx undertakes a
mimetic recapitulation of capitalism in order to achieve a unity of critique
and exposition, he must also bear the cost: the capitalist system portrays
itself as an eternal, unhistorical formation of society, with contingent
beginnings and unsurpassable rationality, to which there is no future
historical alternative. "Thus there once was a history, but there no longer
is"...This conclusion which Marx, at the very beginning of his critique,
flings at the faces of bourgeois economists as an unmasking dictum
forces itself upon him at the end of his critique: the astonishingly thin
chapter on the "Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation", where it
would all have to unfold, itself operates with the make-shift category of
the "negation of negation"; in the second edition the category of the "free
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laborer” as a creation of the creation of the capitalist era is
eliminatecL.and the 1848 Manifesto of the Communist Party is cited.
Again Marx is competing with the systemic intentions of his own critique,
by presenting political and evolutionary considerations which approach
the problem from the outside (Lohmann 1986, 364).

Lohmann and Benhabib are in accord with the notion that Marx's
"negation of negation" covers over a conceptual inadequacy in his attempt to
specify a society different from capitalism in terms of his own immanent critique.
Prior to Lohmann's reference to "negation of negation" as it appears in the
concluding pages of Marx's Capital, Benhabib had cited its appearance in an
altogether different, far less "mature" work of Marx, the 1845 German Ideology.
Marx's method of immanent critique of capitalism obliged him to uncritically
accept features of modernity contemporary critical thinkers have apparently
since learned to abhor without reservations.
From my previous analysis, it can be recalled that, from the start, that is,
Chapter One of Capital, the section on the "Fetish of the Commodity and its
Secret", Marx suggested the possibility of freely associated social relations, on
the basis of previous historical development, including their negation of labor
mediated social relations. Lohmann's thesis is that because he did not have
accessible to him the socio-theoretic concepts developed in response to "late
capitalism", the unfoldment of Marx's systematic categories overcame his critical
intentions. Yet, to the contrary, very much like in the first chapter of Capital, in
the climatic section Lohmann describes, Marx links the overcoming of capitalist
social relations to a form of "association" possible in view of present capitalist
social relations, and as the negation of them.
In Chapter One, Marx refers to an "association of free men", and "freely
associated labor”. In the final part of Capital, in his citation of the Manifesto of
the Communist Party, the reference is to "revolutionary combination, due to
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association". Lohmann, in his conception of the link of the beginning to the end
of Volume One of Marx’s Capital, in terms of Marx’s own self-understanding,
attributes an implausible contradiction to Marx's presentation. An alternative
interpretation might focus on the question of Marx’s concept of organization, its
normative and revolutionary dimensions. As I mentioned at the outset of this
chapter, with Capital's completion, Marx attempted (especially in Critique of the
Gotha Programe) to clarify as far as possible his critique (immanent and
transcendent) of the concept and practice of social organization, particularly its
revolutionary potential, not only its normative dimension. This was in light of,
and inclusive of, the theory Capital represented.
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CHAPTER SIX
HABERMAS, MARX AND POST-COMMUNISM
If in the previous chapter I found, somewhat surprisingly, that Habermas
noted a lack of interest in discussion of Marx (or more precisely in the approach
to the latter adopted in Habermas's theory) this certainly did not seem to
stimulate new attention to Marx in Pi's next major symposium (Passerin
d’Entreves & Benhabib 1996) this one on Habermas's work, The Philosophical
Discourse of Modernity (1990a) The various contributions focused on
Habermas's analysis of those thinkers taken up most extensively in postmodern
social theory-Nitetzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida and Francois Lyotard.
Since the journal did not carry a response from Habermas, such as I
described in respect to the earlier symposium, I do not have the advantage of a
direct exchange on which to base my starting point for this chapter, which seeks
to extend the analysis of the Habermas-Marx relationship into the 1990s. I will
demonstrate that in the 1990s he claims a substantial theoretical continuity with
the early 1960s inception of his critique of Marxism (as well as its
practical/political character). His 1980s intervention in PI, a theoretical journal
rooted in an internal opposition to established Communism (even if
independent of the Soviet bloc) is significantly associated with his subsequent
analyses of, a) the collapse of Communism; b) dissident, Left Marxism; as well
as, c) the historical self-understanding of his own theory, which developed from
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1960 through the mid-1990s. Examination of these issues will serve as
something of a summation of this study of Habermas's relationship to Marx's
ideas, a relationship I have attempted to demonstrate throughout Habermas
attempted to make constitutive of a public sphere, the success of which he
understood to be critical to the coming into its own of his own theory.
That is, with the 1990s it is clear Habermas believes that he has not only
replaced Marx's theory with his own. In contrast to the the 1960s and 1970s, he
has now done so in a form adequate to the standards of the emergent theory
itself—in a public dialogue, the context for which was an international forum
comprised of interested persons from both "state socialist" as well as “late
capitalist” historical and, perhaps most importantly, political backgrounds. By
now Habermas is confident that he has definitively established his own theory
as the one capable of fulfilling the role—the "guardian of rationality"~he had
assigned to philosophy. This had practical implications I will discuss in more
detail when considering his important article, "What does socialism mean
today?: The rectifying revolution and the need for rethinking on the Left"
(Habermas 1990b). This established, it is none the less troubling that
Habermas, unlike his counter-parts in discourse, was still not satisfied with the
understanding (including his own) of the status of Marx in contemporary theory.
After briefly characterizing Habermas's approach to Marxism in PDM I
will examine Habermas's political analysis of the revolutions in Eastern and
Central Europe, an analysis published on the eve of the collapse of
Communism in Russia itself. Attention to this article is fitting here in so far as,
internal to it, Habermas summarizes his several decades-long analyses of Mane
and Marxism. He suggests that his theory represents its rightful heir.
Finally, I will address Habermas's re-assessment of the status of his
concept of the public sphere, especially in respect to the question of how one
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should now approach Marx and Marxism. Habermas remarks extensively on
this issue in a 1992 symposium. On his study of the public sphere (thirty years
after its original publication), the symposium was organized around the
occasion of its English translation as Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere (Habermas 1989a).
In Chapter Five, I considered the curious circumstance that a symposium
on Habermas's theory featured (over the course of nearly a year) in a Marxist
Humanist intellectual journal consisted of virtually no discussion of Habermas's
interpretation of Marx's theory. The main exception was Habermas's own
reflections on the topic. I analyzed this situation in detail, leading to the
conjecture that the symposium marked the collapse of a tendency of Marxist
Humanism and a concomitant definitive "Habermasian turn" in critical social
theory. This Marxist Humanism was not only politically significant in its internal
critical relationship to Communism, but historically (and theoretically) important
through its connection to Marx's 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscipts,
writings available in the German since 1932, but not before the late 1950s in
English, concurrent with Habermas's initial writings on Marx's theory. Seyla
Benhabib, who (by the mid-1980s) sought to develop Habermas's specific
critique of Marx's theory, soon assumed co-editorship of PI, which (I have
noted) only a few years earlier was re-founded as the world's only "Marxist
Humanist" journal.
Several years later, Richard Bernstein, an editor of Praxis International at
the time of the first Habermas symposium, mentioned in an interview published
in the same journal, that Habermas was developing for publication an explicit
critique of "praxis philosophy". Bernstein noted that the current editors of PI
were planning a new symposium on that work, Philosophical Discourse of
Modernity. Recently, the contributions to that symposium were published in
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book form (Passerin d'Entreves & Benhabib 1996). Yet, among the nine
contributors to this volume, no one so much as mentioned Habermas’s
extensive critique of, in turn, Hegel, Marx and Marx's philosophical relationship
to the former. What makes this especially puzzling is that PDM contains a
sweeping philosophical critique precisely in terms of an approach to Marx's
theory which grants a "praxis" interpretation, often referred to as "Marxist
Humanist" (Rockmore, 1989)~at least within the East European dissident
millieu during the period of Communist party domination.
In the period of the two PI symposiums on the development of
Habermas's theory in the 1980s, none of those involved had anticipated the
imminent collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
Yet, it is interesting to imagine that Habermas foresaw this possibility.
Consequently, the politicization of his theory in PI might be seen to have been
motivated by the wish to dispel any illusions (or pre-empt any notion) that a
dissident or, if one prefers, any reinterpretation of Marx's theory, offered a
potentially viable "post-Communist" alternative (for either East or West).
Imagine-putting aside for a moment the certain distortions of vision resulting
from the knowledge we have in the present which was precisely what we lacked
in the moment under consideration—that Habermas's intuition was that the
question of Marxism (or an alternative Marxism) possessed an immediate
practical dimension in the late 1980s (while his PI interlocutors had developed
a tone-deafness on the whole subject). What might that indicate about what I
have argued was among Habermas's most forceful and focused political
interventions? In this intervention (a major motivation for which was his newly
developed critique of left Marxism) he wanted to make effective a notion of
critical social theory which has changed from monological to a dialogical
paradigm.
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In a sense, given the role Habermas had assigned to Critical Theory~the
philosophy which mediates expert cultures and the lifeworld—and the paradigm
shift defined in part in its change to a dialogical from a monological approach to
theory, Habermas's intentions would have been sorely disappointed. For
example in his discussion of T h e Rectifying Revolution", Habermas
experienced considerable difficulties explaining the spontaneous mass revolt
against Communism, in no way connecting it to his analysis of the "new social
movements" he describes in TCA (Habermas 1989); at the same time, he over
emphasizes the role of the state, principally Gorbachev's reform policies. Also,
it can be argued that Habermas's presentation in PDM takes (however
reluctantly) the ground defined by the discussions of "postmodemity". He
seems to only hope that development of these discussions might proceed on
the basis of his long-sought recognition of (and take into account) his particular
critique of Marx and Marxism; evidence emerged in the event that the
participants really had no pressing interest in the latter. Hence, at most it might
be concluded that interpretation of Marx's theory, rather than having been
conceded to Habermas, was simply abandoned. If this were the case, it should
be expected that Marx's critique of capitalism will again move to the center of
attention, as many questions were left untended. Though Habermas failed to
stimulate much discussion of his fully developed critique of Marx and Marxism
(particularly of the "praxis philosophy", attributed to what has often been
referred to as Marxist Humanism), the more general aim I have argued was
integral to Habermas's theory formation-the replacement of Marx's theory with
a "critical theory" which could dispense with Marx-seems to have succeeded.
For example, consider two prominent represenatives of the type of "Left"
Marxism Habermas brought into focus as he developed his social theory,
increasingly understanding the latter to be the only viable critical theory
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alternative in the 1980s and 1990s. He took issue with Agnes Heller
(Habermas 1981), associated with the Budapest School, inspired by the work of
Lukacs. He then continued his criticism of her theory in PDM ("On the
Obsolescence of the Production Paradigm"). However, several years later he
noticed a significant shift in her position, along with Andrew Arato's; Habermas
pointed out that the two of them had adopted the central features of his theory in
their recent work (Habermas 1992a).
In a more graphic negative example, Mihailo Markovic, one of the
principal theorists of dissident Marxist humanism in the Communist partydominated European countries (and the one who leveled the most explicit
critique of Habermas's theory in PI in the 1980s) joined the Serbian nationalist
movement of Slobodan Milosevic, serving in the Yugoslav government during
the genocidal war initiated by Serbia in Bosnia in the 1990s.
These examples both point backward (to the beginnings of Habermas's
challenge to dissident, non-Communist Marxism) and forward (to the collapse of
an important strand of Marxism which critiqued Communism philosophically
and politically, but collapsed along with it—its ostensible opposite). The late
1980s unexpected collapse of Communism, the perhaps even more shocking
collapse of the dissident Marxism which opposed it, followed by a “barbarism in
the heart of Europe"--the 1990s war in the former Yugoslavia while the
“triumphant" West and NATO stood by passively for several years- made more
problematic than ever the question of a theoretical and practical alternative to
"private" capitalism or "state socialism". These observations form the
background for the following brief consideration of the “Excursus" in PDM
(Habermas 1990a, 75-82).
The "Overcoming" of Western Marxism
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"The Obsolescence of the Production Paradigm" might be conceived as
Habermas's "great divide", separating his historical situation of the postmodern
problematic from his discussion of those thinkers from whom its adherents draw
their inspiration. This "great divide" essentially argues that the failure of
Marxism is pivotal to a crisis in social theory which is assumed to require a
critical dimension at the same time there is, a) the self-understanding of
postmodern social theory that Marx and Marxism is hardly relevant to more
pressing concerns; and, b) a persistence of Marxism even when it implicitly
concedes the "obsolescence of the production paradigm".
Recall that in a little noticed footnote which appeared as early as in his
discussion of Marx in Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas dismissively
referred to the theories of Marcuse and Karel Kosik, asserting that their
"phenomenological Marxism", "governed the interpretation of Marx in several
socialist [sic] countries" (Habermas 1972,29). Earlier, when I referred to this I
questioned what seemed to be a rather pointed attempt to, at the least, play
down the serious political transgression, and veritable threat, a philosophic,
dissident Marxism represented in the Communist countries (which Habermas
calls "socialist", "peoples democracies", or later, "state socialist"). Recall that (in
addition to a philosophical, active dissident Marxism) these countries had
experienced spontaneous mass revolts practically from the moment of Stalin's
death in 1953.
In any case, at the moment of publication of Knowledge and Human
Interests, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia, overseeing the
dismantling of "socialism with a human face". The humanist Marxism of
dissident intellectuals like Kosik, who was imprisoned in the wake of the
invasion, was integral to this somewhat neglected 1960s freedom movement.
In retrospect, it is difficult to find in Habermas's voluminous writings criticisms of
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the Soviet Union and East European Communist regimes, or much recognition
of those dissident Marxists who developed critical concepts from a re
interpretation of Marx in those countries before 1989. Moreover, it is only in the
post-1989 period that the dissident Marxism, that is, contemporary Marxism to
the left of established Communism, really becomes a focus of Habermas's
critical attention.
"The Obsolescence of the Production Paradigm" includes a remarkably
compressed summary of Habermas's understanding of the aporias of Western
Marxism unseparated from the solution he believes his own theory-especially
TCA-offers. In line with an assumption of "praxis philosophy's" interpretation of
Marx, which serves as the foil throughout PDM, Habermas proposes to
complete his earlier analysis of Western Marxism by extending his critique from
the "Weberian Marxism" of Lukacs (and its development in Horkeimer and
Adorno) to that strand of Marxism initially derived from the way Marcuse
appropriated the concept of the lifeworid in his, "dissertation on the
philosophical concept of labor" (Habermas 1990a, 76).
Two rather dramatic points remain relatively undeveloped in this
"Excursus". Habermas begins by offering a thesis which states that Marx's
"theory of value", when compared to the "philosophy of reflection" with which
Hegel attempted to link an idea of rationality or reason with a theory of
modernity,
still intermesh[es]...the normative contents of the notions of practice and
reason, productive activity and rationality...though not in a wholly
perspicuous fashion (Habermas 1990a, 74).

Underlying this lack of clarity, Habermas writes, is that,
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As long as the theory of modernity takes its orientation from the basic
concepts of the philosophy of reflection-from ideas of knowledge,
conscious awareness, self-consciousness—the intrinsic connection
with the concept of reason or rationality is obvious. This is not as
evident with the basic concepts of the philosophy of praxis, such as
action, self-generation and labor (Habermas 1990a, 74).

With this thesis Habermas grounds the 1920s inception of Western
Marxism, which,
brought the originally practical meaning of the critique of reification to
bear against the economism and historical objectivism of the Second
International (Habermas 1990a, 74).
Habermas's idea is that Western Marxism's (primarily Lukacs's) critique of
reification was qualitatively different than the "originar-that what Habermas
believed to be Marx's original practical intention (to bring back into the horizon
of the lifeworid through revolution that part of societal integration which had
been systematized) was overlaid (and thus perhaps forgotten) with Western
Marxism's theoretical challenge to established Marxism's hegemony.
Habermas's account leaves out a crucial (if academically marginal)
consideration. Recall that the Second International, in which the German
Social Democratic Party predominated, already collapsed in all but name when
the latter supported war credits to the Kaiser, opening the door for World War I.
Lenin, preceding Lukacs, was ironically perhaps the first "Western Marxist"
(Anderson 1995). Already, in 1914, Lenin broke philosophically with Second
International Marxism, which he himself had previously supported uncritically.
Lenin's 1914 Conspectus on Hegel's Science of Logic (Lenin 1961, 85237) provides evidence of this philosophic break. It consists of a sometimes
detailed analysis of the three sections of Hegel's Logic-Being, Essence and
Notion. Lenin's consideration of the Notion (which culminates in Absolute Idea)
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makes up the greater part of his notes and commentaries. With observations
such as, "Consciousness not only reflects the objective world, but creates it"
(Lenin 1961, 212) he is clearly breaking with his own philosophic past, as well
as from the "economism and historical objectivism" of established Marxism.
Lenin's 1917 State and Revolution (completed in the hours immediately
prior to the beginning of the Russian Revolution) then returns to Marx (primarily
the Critique of the Gotha Programme) with new, Hegelian eyes. This is seen
most clearly in how Lenin, in the spirit of Hegel's concept of negativity (despite
Hegel's own accomodation to the state), posits the abolition of the state to be
the goal of the Russian Revoluton. However, curiously enough, Lenin's new
look at what is essentially Critique of the Gotha Programmes uncompromising
critique of LaSalle's mode of politicization of secular, philosophical ideas in
their relationship to social organization and the state~or more precisely Marx's
warning of the implications of an institutionalization in (socialist) party form of
ideas which retrogress below Hegel's concept of second negativity—does not
bring to Lenin's attention in his State and Revolution even a glimmer of a
philosophy/organization problematic. This is difficult to explain in respect to
someone previously so closely associated with the thesis of the revolutionary
party as had been Lenin, and the particular, controversial subject matter of
Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme.
It is then even more difficult once the depth of Lenin's philosophic re
organization is recognized; Lenin alone among the Marxists of the time
achieved that type of re-organization at such a pivotal point in the gathering
crisis of capitalism and its ostensible opposite, socialism. Raya Dunayevskaya
attributes both Lenin's originality in re-establishing the dialectic in Marxist
thought, and the limitation of it which subsequently became clear, to Lenin's
interpretation of Hegel’s Notion (Dunayevskaya 1989a; 1991). Lenin believed
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that, in Hegel's constellation (in the Notion) of the practical and theoretical idea,
primacy was ultimately granted the former. Dunayevskaya, in contrast,
demonstrated that a complete understanding of Hegel's Absolute Idea was
contingent upon following Hegel's direction in the final paragraph of the Logic.
There Hegel, after earlier criticizing the Practical Idea, as while greater than the
Theoretical Idea, was still inadequate without the theoretical moment; at that
precise point, Hegel insists (Hegel 1976, 843-844) that the reader follow his
philosophy through the Philosophy of Nature (Hegel 1970) and the Philosophy
of Mind (Hegel 1973). In fact, the final three syllogisms of Philosophy of Mind,
which were added to the work only in the last year of Hegel's life, "drop" the
Logic altogether (Dunayevskaya 1992, 10). Dunayevskaya depicts the
movement of the last three syllogisms (of Philosophy of Mind) as adequate to a
concept of Absolute Idea "as new beginning" (Dunayevskaya 1989a, 3-46).
She distills from Hegel's Philosophy of Mind a dual movement-from practice
and from theory-under Hegel's categories of a "self-bringing forth of liberty",
and a "self-thinking idea" (Dunayevskaya 1989b, 13). In these latest of Hegel's
concepts Dunayevskaya detects the philosophic precursor of a dialectical social
transcendence of capitalism and its political party form, as well as what she
terms ’state-capitalism" (in reference to the Communist states Habermas, and
most others on the Left, usually referred to as "state socialist").
Lenin, though first among "Western Marxists" in returning to the
revolutionary potential of Hegel's dialectic, was unable to break with the
concept of the vanguard party, or even to pose its problematic nature in terms of
the abolition of the specifically capitalist social formation. Though he certainly
wanted little to do with the ideas prevalent in the Second International, he
continued to share the concept of the Marxist party prevalent within it, a
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veritable fetish not unlike the one Marx described as "attached" to the
commodity-form of production.
Habermas overlooks the question of Lenin’s 1914 philosophic break with
both his own past and Second International Marxism (Jay 1984); in doing so, he
mistakenly narrows to Lukacs's 1919-23 relationship to Max Weber’s ideas the
scope of the inception of Western Marxism. Following from this, it can be
argued (contrary to Habermas's account in the passage which follows) that
Western Marxism must be traced to, and can only be understood in the context
of, Lenin's pioneering, though incomplete, break from Second International
Marxism:
Two different lines of tradition developed within Western Marxism,
one determined by the reception of Max Weber, the other by the
reception of Husserl and Heidegger. The early Lukacs and Critical
Theory conceived of reification as rationalization and developed a
ritical concept of rationality on the basis of a materialistic appropriation
of Hegel, but without appealing to the production paradigm for this
purpose...
On the other hand, reading the Marx of the Early Writings in the light of
Husseriian phenomenology and developing a concept of practice with
normative content, the early Marcuse and later Sartre renewed the
production paradigm, which had been washed out in the meantime,
but without appealing to a concept of rationality for this purpose
(Habermas 1990a, 75).
This development of Habermas's conceptualization through
disassemblement of the Western Marxist and Critical Theory tradition is
remarkable. I pointed to its significance in his earlier work (Habermas 1985),
where the idea seemed to first emerge. One major implication, noticeable as
well in the earlier piece, is the removal of Marcuse (at least his "early" work)
from the Critical Theory (though not the Western Marxist) tradition.
Habermas's abrupt claim for his own mature critical theory is even more
dramatic:
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These two traditions start to converge only with the paradigm shift
from productive activity to communicative action and the reformulation
of the concept of the lifeworid in terms of communications theory-a
concept that had been connected in various ways with Marx's
concept of practice ever since Marcuse's dissertation on the
philosophical concept of labor. That is to say, the theory of
communicative action establishes an internal relation between
practice and rationality (Habermas 1990a, 76).

Before I comment further on this claim, Habermas's other significant point
must be mentioned. While Critical Theory developed from the early Lukacs's
relationship to the ideas of Max Weber, “praxis philosophy" attempts to "stay
alive", or gain new life, from the ideas of the later Lukacs. The detailed account
of Lukacs's work an assessment of this observation would require is beyond the
scope of this study; what is crucial here is that, according to Habermas, all
Hegelian, Western Marxism is indebted in one way or another to Lukacs. This,
of course, ignores Lenin's philosophic re-organization. Again, Habermas
continues,
This paradigm shift [from productive activity to communicative action]
is motivated by...the fact that the normative foundations of critical social
theory could not be demonstrated along either of the traditional lines I
have analyzed the aporias of Weberian Marxism elsewhere. Here I
would like to discuss the difficulties of a Marxism that renews the
production paradigm while depending on phenomenology in
connection with two works that have come out of the Budapest
School. Ironically enough, the late Lukacs already paved the way for
an anthropological turn and a rehabilitation of the concept of
practice in terms of the "world of everyday life" (Habermas 1990a,
76).

It should immediately be noted that Habermas implies here that the
difficulty present in contemporary Marxism is identical with social theory as a
whole. Elsewhere, Habermas has argued for the utility of a bilevel concept of
society on the basis of the inadequacies of either system or action-oriented
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approaches in modem social theory. Later, Habermas develops this
implication-that his social theory is significantly different, compared to
traditional ("bourgeois") ideas, Marx's critique of the latter, and the "unflinching
critique" (defined by the trajectory of Western Marxism) of Marx's theory
(Habermas 1990b, 11).
More specifically, there appeared (from the 1920s) two principal strands
of (Hegelian) Western Marxism Lukacs and Marcuse seemed to have moved
between. On the one hand, the early Lukacs—concerned with Weber's
rationalization thesis-represents the genesis of Critical Theory, while the late
Lukacs kept alive the "praxis philosophy". On the other hand, early Marcuse
opened the door for "praxis philosophy", while the late Marcuse (with his
acceptance of the thesis of instrumental reason and one-dimensionality) carried
forward Critical Theory's (Weberian) Western Marxism. Again, an investigation
of the relationship of the ideas of Lukacs and Marcuse (particularly an attempt to
explain the role of their interpretations of Hegel and the young Marx in the
peculiar mirror-image reversals of their utilization of the concept of the lifeworid)
would take this study beyond its necessary focus on Habermas's relationship to
Marx's ideas. I intend to continue to trace what I have conceived to be
Habermas's attempt to shape the history of Critical Theory such that his own
social theory is seen to emerge solely available for contemporary development;
here I can only indicate that what is centrally at issue, even for Habermas in the
mid-1980s, is discussion of the Practical Idea, and the relationship of Marx to
Hegel, particularly an idea of a "materialist appropriation" (Habermas 1990a,
75) of the latter by the former. In Chapter Four, I considered in some detail how
an alternative interpretation (though not without its own limitations) of Marx's
social appropriation of Hegel's dialectic is not only superior to Habermas's
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imputation to Marx of a materialistic appropriation, but points to serious
difficulties of important elements of Habermas’s justification of his own theory.
Meaning of Socialism Today
"What does socialism mean today?: The rectifying revolution and the
need for rethinking on the Left* (Habermas 1990b) contains, on the one hand,
what appears to be a mere recapitulation of Habermas's various critiques of
Marx and, on the other hand, an attempt to provide a new dimension to that
critique in light of the collapse of Communism in Eastern and Central Europe.
Thus, in the contingency of historical events, the article argues for an essential
consistency of successful development of Habermas's critique of Marx. It
affirms the soundness of Habermas's approach to Marx's theory over the course
of several decades, but also suggests that events in Eastern and Central
Europe (and perhaps Russia) pointed specifically to his own theory, the only
available alternative for a Marxism (now either Eastern or Western) facing total
political annihilation. The new dimension of Habermas's approach contains a
thesis that the difference between his own theory and others is more basic (and
emancipatory) than that which can be found, a) between Marx's theory and
those typical of the "bourgeoisie" he criticized; b) between traditional Marxism
and Marx's theory and, c) within Marxism, eg; between East and West.
If this an accurate assessment of Habermas's intentions in the article,
then the crucial next step for him would be to demonstrate; in addition to the
significant distinction of his theory, its own relevance for the constitution of a
new beginning in any effort to alter the stubborn preponderance of certain
features of modem societies Habermas holds are socially destructive but
alterable.
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Hence, after considering his preliminary comments on Marx's Communist
Manifesto, I will turn to the content of a list of theoretical arguments Habermas
presents which he insists "form the sole basis on which impulses from the
Marxist tradition can be taken up today" (Habermas 1990b, 14). In conjunction
with this point, I intend to show that Habermas, in lifting points, virtually
unchanged, from his 1960 article, "Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism
as Critique", argues for the future of his theory by prominent reliance on a
retrospective view. This view presupposes a design for the replacement of
Marx's theory and of Marxism at the very inception of his own theory. This is
perhaps the closest Habermas comes to actually offering for consideration such
an intention. I have argued throughout this study that the replacement of Marx's
theory and of Marxism was a consistently motivating factor in the constitution of
Habermas’s theory from its inception. Finally, I will assess Habermas's most
difficult task. Putting aside the question of the success or failure of the two
previous tasks, Habermas must attempt to demonstrate the immanence of the
liberating features of his own theory in current political events.
In a sense, the opening paragraph of "Rectifying Revoluton" already
includes the conclusion to Habermas's analysis of the unfolding events in areas
of Europe dominated by the Soviet Union. Yet, this opening paragraph
contains an interesting ambiguity. Habermas begins,
The revolutionary changes in the Soviet bloc have taken many
different forms. In the land of the Bolshevik revolution itself, a reform
process is underway that was introduced from the top, from the upper
echelons of the Communist Party (Habermas 1990b, 4).
Thus, initially, Habermas seems to propose to highlight a variety of actual
and potential oppositions to the Communist status quo, the form which
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originates from above merely one of several. Yet, the paragraph's concluding
sentence asserts,
It [the reform process introduced from the top of the Communist Party]
created the preconditions for the changes in eastern Central Europe
(including the Baltic states' declaration of independence) and in East
Germany (Habermas 1990b, 4).
Then, in briefly considering each country in turn, Habermas begins with a
description of Poland: there, "the revolutionary changes were the result of the
sustained resistance of Solidarity supported by the Catholic Church"
(Habermas 1990b, 4).
What is somewhat inconvenient, then, for the structure of Habermas's
argument, is that the Polish Solidarity movement began a full decade before the
revolutionary events he is describing. Empirically, a more telling argument is
that the Polish Solidarity movement "created the preconditions" for Mikhail
Gorbachev's turn to glasnost and perestroika. The East European dissident
movements often including tendencies of Marxist Humanism antithetical to the
the ruling Communist parties, were an important feature of the Left in the postWorld War II period. With Solidarity at its height, and 20 million workers on
strike, the Communist Party in Russia (as well as in Poland) calculated it had
perhaps its last chance to reform-or else perish. As it turned out, of course,
while it attempted the former, the latter was, in effect, its fate anyway.
Habermas, when he refers to Solidarity, describes it as "solidarity
supported by the Catholic Church" with an apparent intention that the phrase
should practically be pronounced as a single word, thus obscuring the Polish
revolt's basic continuity with the history of East European dissidence from under
Communism, with and without the Catholic Church. The curious fact is,
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, at least, one would be hard-pressed to find in
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Habermas's theoretical writings any positive recognition of East European
dissident Marxist thinkers, or reference to the rather full history of workers' revolt
against the Communist status quo. In contrast, the interior of the opening
paragraph already puts Habermas's own theory at the center of what Habermas
presents as revolutionary events, though only immediately, with no reference to
their own history.
Contrasted to the opposing pulls of administrative political modernization
from above (Russia), and the impulse for a return to pre-Communism from
below (Poland), Habermas writes of the reform process that,
Its results, and, more importantly other unintended consequences,
condense to form a process of revolutionary development, to the
degree that changes occur not just at the level of general social and
political orientation, but in essential elements of the power structure
tself (of particular importance are changes in the mode of legitimation
as the result of the birth of a political public sphere) (Habermas 1990b,
4).

As will become clear in my consideration of Habermas's theses on Marx
and Marxism, he argues that a clear perspective on the meaning of the
overthrow of Communism, including the prospects for what happens after, is
seriously compromised due to fundamental asssumptions of Marx and Marxism,
among not only the more Stalinist or Leninist Marxists, but among what he
characterizes as the non-Communist Left; the latter, wittingly or not, share
fundamental asssumptions of Marx and Marxism. Habermas believes that his
theory is uniquely situated to expose those assumptions, the first step, at least,
toward the needed adoption of his own theory. In fact, Habermas's central
intention is to demonstrate both the urgency of his theory, and its historical
vindication vis a vis its critique of Mane and Marxism in the analysis of
immediate events. The events themselves afforded a unique opportunity for
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such a demonstration. All forms of Marxism (as well as the full spectrum of other
theoretical and political tendencies) could hardly avoid accounting for
themselves in the epocal changes so rapidly unfolding.
Habermas's theoretical and practical critique centers on the "nonCommunist Left". This is perhaps because, among those guided (wittingly or
unwittingly) by Marxist assumptions, they are the most likely to be saivagable for
the continuation and development of his own theory. In line with his most
general thesis (that his theory vis a vis its critique of Marx and Marxism has
been vindicated and is the latter*s only viable, critical alternative) he makes an
initial claim that, at least in the case of East Germany,
...voters here have definitely not ratified what the opposition had in
mind when it overthrew the Stasi-oligarchy with the slogan "We are the
people"; but the vote they cast will have profound historical effects
as it interprets this overthrow-as a rectifying revolution. They want
to make up for all the things that have divided the Western half of
Germany from the Eastern for forty years—its politically happier, and
economically more successful development (Habermas 1990b,
5).

This claim emphasizes that the vanguard (the opposition which took to
the streets and overthrew the stasi-oligarchy) of "revolutionary changes" which
gather force and become “revolutionary events", had a different orientation,
perhaps to their surprise, than the East German masses afterall. Consequently,
only the distinctiveness of Habermas's theory and the spontaneous expression
of the masses eager to trade Communism for the "form of an affluent Western
society with a democratic constitution" (Habermas 1990b, 5) remains after the
overthrow of Stalinist Marxism, and the very feeble interpretations offered by
other tendencies, both socialist (characterized by Habermas as Leninist and
reform-communist) and anti-socialist (post-modern, anti-communist and liberal)
(Habermas 1990b, 5-8).
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Next, Habermas prefaces his explicit enumeration of the "errors and
defects" (Habermas 1990b, 11) of Marx and Marxism with a critique of Marx's
Communist Manifesto. A novelty of this critique consists in its implication of
Marx in an assessment of other recent political phenomena-disintegration of
totalitarianism in Spain and Portugal which preceded the East and Central
European events. This was accompanied by "development of a market
economy independent of the political system", suggesting a, "surge in the
modernization process reaching out towards Central and Eastern Europe"
(Habermas 1990b, 9).
The implication of Marx in this is established by attributing to a passage
in the Communist Manifesto a "triumphalist variation" (Habermas 1990b, 9) of
interpretation of this process of modernization—Habermas's explanatory
variable-superseding any question how analyses in the CM fits into Marx's
theory. Habermas presents the following passages as proof that Marx and
Engels, "hymn the revolutionary role of the bourgeoisie". In doing so,
Habermas takes the liberty of moving the concluding sentence of Marx's prior
paragraph to the end of the paragraph he quotes. Below, the sentences in bold,
following the ellipsis, actually appear as the concluding sentences of Marx's
prior paragraph in the text of the CM.
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of
production, by the immensely facilitated means of communications,
draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap
prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters
down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians'
intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all
nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production;
it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, that
is, to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after
its own image...And as in material, so also in intellectual

production. The intellectual creations of individual nations
become common property. National one-sidedness and
narrowmindedness become more and more impossible, and
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from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises
a world literature.(Habermas 1990b, 9).

In response, Habermas writes,
It would be hard to arrive at a better characterization of the mood
indicated by the replies that capitalists, eager for investment
opportunities, gave to the last questionnaire circulated by the German
Chamber of Industry and Commerce. Only the phrase "what it calls",
qualifying the term “civilization", betrays reservations (Habermas
1990b, 9).

First, and most important for my current focus, this presentation and
interpretation of the passage serves to support the dominant theme of
Habermas's article-that Mane and Marxism share more with their object of
criticism than Habermas's theory shares with any of the three. (The
presentation itself consists in moving several sentences of the original text from
the end of one paragraph to the end of the one which follows).
Second, in view of Marx's fundamental critique of the "bourgeois mode of
production" generally, and of the Communist Manifesto's specific intent, which
was to hasten its abolition, an alternative interpretation seems far more
plausible. This would not take Marx's “so-called" as indicating a subordinate
"reservation" within a triumphalist hymn. Rather than suggesting a mere
reservation, the "so-called" indicts not only “Western" society, which is
dominated by capital, but the prevailing self-understanding of that society.
Marx's description here of social form, and corresponding forms of
thought, is both reminiscent of his 1844 “Critique of Hegelian Dialectic" (where
he criticized Hegel's dialectical phrase, "at one with itself in its other as such")
and anticipatory of his "fetishism of the commodity" section of Capital.
Previously (Chapter Three) I argued that as early as in his 1844 "Critique of
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Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy in General* Marx's examination of the
Phenomenology chapter on Absolute Knowledge, Marx saw in the greatness of
philosophy’s achievement its deepest alienation. Thinking was separated from
the subject and, even more intriguingly, from the thinker (philosopher) himself.
“At one with itself in its other as such"-absent any further development-left the
philosopher "solitary and alone". Finally, I pointed out that-though Marx did not
say so—Hegel himself had already been aware of this implication and prospect;
Hegel uses the same phrase ("solitary and alone") in the Phenomenology's
final paragaraph.
Four years after “Critique of Hegelian Dialectic", in the passage of the
Communist Manifesto Habermas quotes, it is not difficult to see that Marx's
phrase, "creates a world after its own image", develops the earlier insight in a
new field, or context, that of the unleashing of a powerful world historical force,
apparently not necessarily accessible to the understanding of its "agents".
While Habermas (in this instance) is not concerned to read Marx's analysis
philosophically, he clearly endorses a primarily economic approach to
interpretation of its meaning for today. In fact, in-taking the liberty to move
Marx's description of what Habermas would regard as Marx's understanding of
bourgeois "superstructure" so that it follows Marx's analysis of the role of cheap
commodities battering down all Chinese walls, Habermas falsely renders
Marx’s approach as the type of economic determinism he consistently attributed
to it
However, in view of my earlier reading of Marx’s "Critique of Hegelian
Dialectic", the Communist Manifesto can be seen, in addition to its economic
and politcal aspects, primarily as an attempt to work out the dialectical relation
of philosophy and organization (or the social organization of philosophy)
necessary for the abolition of capitalism. For this revolution, conceived as
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opposite to, not constitutive of, bourgeois universality, Marx was no "left
opposition" (as Habermas seems to want to place him for the purposes of his
present argument) serving as "civilization's" social conscience.
To look into this, it is necessary to examine more closely the section
Habermas heads, "Marx on the logic of “civilization" (Habermas, 1990b, 9).
First, consider the expression, "...Marx and Engels hymn the revolutionary role
of the bourgeoisie". The passage from the Communist Manifesto Habermas
quotes (which I reproduced on p.330 above) follows several paragraphs after
Marx's introductory sentence of his argument concerning the bourgeoisie's
"revolutionary part". From the very beginning of Marx's description, it is clear
that Marx neither affirms nor condemns this "part". Perhaps even more critically,
Marx seems to imply that the playing of the part is at the same time its
destruction. Hence, an interpretation which acknowledges only "reservations",
or "doubts" (Habermas 1990b, 9, 10) within an overall "hymn* is simply
implausible. Marx begins ironically:
The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part.

He then continues,
The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to
all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly tom asunder the
motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors", and has
left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked selfinterest, than callous "cash payment". It has drowned the most
heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of
philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has
resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the
numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single
unconscionable freedom-free trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled
by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless,
direct, brutal exploitation (Marx 1964, 62).
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At least one more thing is immediately clear from the foregoing. Marx has no
transhistorical, positive bias for revolution as such. Marx seems interested in
assessing the bourgeiosie (and its connection to social revolution) only in so far
as knowledge of it might assist in the transcendence of the virtually asocial (or
dehumanized) "civilization" its predominance implies. Moreover, Marx not only
qualifies bourgeois civilization with "what it calls". A few paragraphs after that
"qualification" Marx indicates that there is no actual strict division between
"civilization" and "barbarism", given capital’s growing predominance. He writes,
It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical
return put on trial, each time more threateningly, the existence of the
entire bourgeois society...Society suddenly finds itself put back into a
state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war
of devastation had cut off the supply of every means of
subsistence...(Marx 1964,.67).

Finally, in respect to the passages Habermas quotes from Marx’s CM, I
have noted that, though appearing in close proximity in Marx's text, Habermas
(using an ellipsis) reverses their order.
The conclusion of Marx’s original paragraph suggests that the universal
quality of the agency the bourgeoisie (in so far as it is essentially the
personification of capital) represents is illusory. In the destruction of national
and traditional characteristics, what appears is not a potential inhering in them.
What appears is not even the result of a "synthesis" of the foreign and the
indigenous; rather, the bourgeoisie, "creates a world after its own image", which
implies that what appears is not even a world after its actual substance~or that
its self-image is essentially constitutive of its "substance".
Habermas, in his moving the concluding sentence from the previous
paragraph, attaching it instead to the end of the one following so that it
succeeds the phrase, “after its own image", alters the sense of Marx’s critique,
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and does not grasp its depth, in Habermas's reconstructed version of the CM
Marx is made to appear to endorse an idea of the autonomy of a sphere of
bourgeois sociality and culture, perhaps potentially as “universal",
"revolutionary" and effective as capital (or the economy) itself. To the contrary,
Marx's conclusion—"creating a world after its own image"—incorporates this
dimension of the capitalist social formation from the start, pointing to the
particularism, and primarily self-referential (not alone self-serving) character of
an only apparently limitless expansiveness which carries along in its wake the
bourgeoise.
Habermas connects his analysis of Marx's Communist Manifesto to
contemporaneity with an argument which suggests that even what Habermas
has identified to be the remaining critical element in Marx's exposition, while
arguably adequate in terms of what should be opposed even today, is no longer
sufficient (or has lost its relevance) for posing (and answering) questions about
what one should be for. He offers two observations in support of this.
First, implicitly appealing to his own critical appropriation of systems
theory and expanding his interpretation of Marx's modifier, "so-called", he writes
that the latter refers to a,
fundamental doubt as to whether a civilization can afford to
surrender itself entirely to the malestrom of the driving force of just
one of its subsystems-namely the pull of a dynamic, or, as we would
say today, recursively closed, economic system which can only
function and remain stable by taking all relevant information,
translating it into, and processing it in, the language of economic value.
Marx believed that any civilization that subjects itself to the imperatives
of the accumulation of capital bears the seeds of its own destruction,
because it thereby blinds itself to anything, however important, that
cannot be expressed as a price (Habermas 1990b, 9).
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This recasts Habermas’s consistent position that labor and interaction or system
and lifeworid were quasi-ontologicaily separate societal dimensions, which
Marx (despite his wishes) was never successful in theoretically unifying.
Next, Habermas then rapidly undermines the relevance for today of what
he has designated to had been, at bottom, Marx's concern. Marx, in his time,
"put so squarely on the map...the agent (my emphais, RR) of expansion...the
bourgeoisie of 1848" (Habermas 1990b, 9). But, Habermas writes, today the
agent is, "an anonymous, internationally operating economic system that has
ostensibly severed any ties it might once have had with an identifiable class
structure" (Habermas 1990b, 9).
The implication is that Marx's (now generally outmoded) critique
assumed the centrality of class; Marx's critique, then, was of a moment (now
passed) of “civilization” and, strictly immanent, appealed to a potential intrinsic
to it. In this interpretation, Marx's critical intention was to reverse the places of
the universal (morality) and particular (the economy) by unmasking the tatter's
appearance as the former. Moreover, according to Habermas's interpretation,
Marx's solution required the assumption of a clearly identifiable historical
"agency" (or subject). Marx, when Habermas mistakenly attributes to his
economic theory a transhistorical view of labor, could be interpreted to have
believed, quite simply, that the bourgeoisie's opposite, the proletariat, could
assume the former's role, and “complete" the historical Enlightenment project.
Much of my analysis of Habermas's approach to Marx has been concerned with
demonstrating that Marx's critique of capitalism penetrated structures at a
deeper level than an analysis of social classes alone would permit.
Keeping in mind the range of texts (both Habermas's and Marx's), and
their periodicity, I have already taken up in this respect, it is clearly not the case
that in this 1990 article I am considering now Habermas is restricting his
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characterization of Marx's argument to a specific phase (1848) in his (Marx's)
theoretical development. Moreover, I shall show, while Habermas on occasion
granted (in fact, even insisted) that Marx did historically restrict his own theory,
Habermas usually follows this with criticism of how it was appropriated
transhistorically, not without reasons for which Marx could, or should, himself be
held responsible. Before I take up that argument in the article's section on
Marx's and Marxism's "errors and defects", it is necessary to note Habermas's
second observation directed at demonstrating that the critical element in Marx's
description of modernity has lost its relevance.
Habermas, after pointing out that today's international economy seems to
have uncoupled from class structure, argues that not only have western
societies, in terms of distribution of material wealth, made Engels's description
of "Manchester misery" obsolete (Habermas 1990b, 9), but that it is precisely
Marx's critical "piece" of description of modernity which is constitutive of the
"welfare state compromise" characteristic of those "western" societies. The
"welfare state compromise" is the "answer" to the "stark words of the Communist
Manifesto..." (Habermas 1990b, 10).
Even so, Habermas next observes, in the collapse of Communism, there
arises,
the ironic circumstance that Marx should still offer us the quotation [in
the Communist Manifesto] that most aptly describes the situation in
which captial scrambles into markets corroded by state socialism, in
search of investment opportunities...(Habermas 1990b, 10).

(Contemporary "state socialism” has "paved the way" for capitalism—or
least its revitalization).
...just as thought-provoking as the fact that Marx's doubts have
themselves been incorporated in the structures of the most advanced

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

338
capitalist societies...Does this mean that "Marxism as critique"...is as
exhausted as “actually existing socialism?“(Habermas 1990b, 10).

Here Habermas refers to his own "Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism
as Critique", first published in the German in 1960, and writes in a footnote,
"This is the title of an essay in which I dealt with Marxism systematically for the
first time" (Habermas 1990b, 10).
Recall that a central feature of that essay was consideration of a “law of
value", which was not a refutation but a proposal for revision. It argued that the
extension of state intervention to spheres previously guarded and thought to be
justly “self-regulating” (and immune to social deliberation) had, ironically,
preserved captialism, despite its own self-destructive tendencies. Habermas
attributed this, despite the orthodox Marxist denial of its possibility due to an
assumption of the crisis tendencies following from a fall in the rate of profit, to a
defect in Marx's analysis of a labor theory of value. Essentially, Habermas
argued that Marx ignored as "unproductive” that type of labor (technical,
scientific) which, while not productive in terms of material objects, allowed for
the modem explosion of the productivity of the labor which was so productive.
Moreover, in referring to passages in the Grundrisse, Habermas
suggested that Marx had recognized the decreasing role of direct labor in the
production of wealth, as well as the increasing role of the application of science
in increasing economic productivity, suggesting a need to revise the orthodox
law wherein value depended on direct labor alone. Marx is said to have
retained the latter position in his final theory (contrary to theoretical advances in
his prior Grundrisse).
The development of social democracy-which Habermas advocates
politically in what is otherwise a highly technical presentation--is said to permit
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a rational distribution of a sufficiently growing mass of surplus value which,
under the presuppositions of Marx's original labor theory of value, would have
plunged the economy into crisis. Marx's central mistake, in not appreciating the
real potential of social democracy, was to give up the practical side of critique;
Marx succumbs to a "scientistic" tendency when he understands his economic
theory as the discovery of "laws" which underly its (self-destructive) dynamic.
Marx's theory represents a replacement of the potential of philosophy with
science, instead of their mediation, which Habermas at this point (beginning of
the 1960s) assigns to a revised Marxism, one which picks up a path Marx
himself unfortunately abandoned. Habermas, then, through a proposed
revision of the law of value, intends to restore to critical theory its "practical"
potential. This, he makes clear, is only possible through the consolidation and
strengthening of the social-democratic welfare state. Against this background
the question Habermas now asks is whether the resurgence of an “unbridled
capitalism" in the wake of Communism's dissolution, and the fact that Marx's
Communist Manifesto, ironically, seems best to explain it, makes obsolete his
much earlier analysis in “Marxism as Critique". Perhaps Marx's "law of value” in
what Habermas understands in its unrevised form, anticipates and best
explains, contemporary developments, at least from the perspective of the
potential consequences for the masses in the formerly Communist countries.
The section which follows in Habermas's article, "Errors and Defects", is
a strong warning against any prospective utility in a return to Marx's theory. The
critical substance of Marx's theory has already been "incorporated in the
structure" of those countries which have reached the "economic summit" of the
system. The revolutionary masses (in central and east Europe, perhaps
including Russia) want to catch up. In addition, certain other features of
modernity preclude the application of Marx's theory, despite other contemporary
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empirical features which might suggest the return of its relevance in the wake of
Communism's collapse.
In Part II of the article Habermas prefaces his section on the "Errors and
Defects" of Marx and Marxism by positing a quandary in which the "non
communist Left in West Germany" finds itself in the wake of the mass overthrow
of Communism. On the one side, there is the tendency of some to have
preferred “the bird in the hand"; on the other, there stand the "idealists" who
treat socialism as an "idea abstractly confronting reality". The latter are rightly
"convicted of the impotence of the moral 'ought' (not to mention the total
contempt for humanity evident in any attempt at its realization)" (Habermas
1990b, 10). None the less, according to Habermas, neither tendency need let
"guilt by association be foisted on it for the bankruptcy of state socialism it has
always criticized". They must, however, ask, "how long an idea can hold out
against reality" (Habermas 1990b, 10). Among these tendencies (implied to be
exhaustive) Habermas seems to find the "idealists" more salvagable. A section
of the "non-communist Left" has connected to its "abstract idea confronting
reality" the,
normative intuition of a peaceful coexistence that does not provide for
self-realization and autonomy only at the expense of solidarity and
justice, but rather along with them (Habermas 1990b, 10).

It is clear that Habermas's approach here recapitulates his critical
response to Thomas McCarthy in the Praxis International symposium I
discussed in detail earlier (see Chapter 5). There Habermas decisively
reduced to a "shared intuition" any affinity with Marx's theory his Critical Theory
might retain (after TCA). More importantly, now he repeats his admonition of
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McCarthy (thus confirming that his original remarks were anticipatory and
directed at a broader theoretical tendency, rather than an individual), that,
the socialist tradition ought not to explain this intuition by the direct
approach of a normative theory, in order to set it up as an ideal
opposing an opaque reality (Habermas 1990b, 10).

In addition, Habermas uses the occasion to add the following recommendation,
not present (or at least far more implicit in his comment four years earlier):
It [a normative theory] should instead be the basis of a perspective
from which reality can be critically observed and analyzed. During
the course of the analysis, the normative intuition should be both
developed and corrected, and thus at least indirectly tested against the
power of theoretical description to disclose reality and convey
empirical content (Habermas 1990b, 11).
While it would be difficult to object to such an injunction, and other
aspects are in need of elaboration in these prefatory remarks to the section,
"Errors and Defects”, one particularly glaring question already arises: why does
Habermas choose the descriptive term, "non-communist Left", instead of "nonMarxist Left"? I have already indicated part of the answer. Habermas believes
that even those on the Left who are not, in a theoretical sense, Marxists
nonetheless share, even if unwittingly, “Marxist" assumptions. Hence,
Habermas is suggesting that these assumptions be uncovered, examined, and
discarded. "Errors and Defects", then, opens with an introduction to a
theoretical tradition which, Habermas indicates, provides something of a model
for this task. He writes,
Western Marxism has used this criterion since the twenties to
subject itself to an unflinching critque that has left little of the
theory's original form remaining (Habermas 1990b, 11).
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Here, in a second indication of a recapitulation and development of his
analysis in the Praxis International symposium, Habermas refers to Martin Jay's
Marxism and Totality (1984). In the introductory remarks to his symposium
comments, Habermas had noted his regret that he had not had available to him
Jay's just-published work. As it turned out, Jay's contribution (on Habermas's
aesthetic theory) was the one among several which did not draw out serious
critical reservations in Habermas's response to the symposium participants.
In addition to Habermas's notification that he will only "go over a few of
the ways" it has become apparent the Marxist tradition, "remained rooted in the
original context and limited scale of early industrialism", the major point to hold
in mind in assessing the six "errors and defects" is the specification that here his
critique is directed not at generations which followed Marx's, but at, "Marx and
his immediate successors" (Habermas 1990b, 11). In many of Habermas's
previous analyses it has not always been clear what, if any, distinctions should
be drawn between Marx and Marxism. In some contexts, aspects of Marx's
original theory were vital, eg; in the sense all classical theory might serve as a
source for re-thinking contemporary problems, while much, or all, of the Marxist
tradition which followed failed to keep up with either "reality" or developments in
other areas, or disciplines, concerned with social theory. In different contexts,
the neo-Marxist tradition, eg; some moments of Critical Theory itself, where
Habermas sometimes places his own work, was especially qualified to
adjudicate among all theories-including a judgement of Marx's own as
specially (and objectionably) materialist (Rockmore 1989). The confidence with
which Habermas assumed this role was primarily on the basis of a modem
concept of rationality, which he had brought into its own. Since, in the several
chapters preceding this one, I have treated in detail the substance of the six
"errors and defects" Habermas proposes to "go over" here, I will merely indicate
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the central theme of each point, and briefly issue reminders about the problems
I find with his positions.
The first three “errors and defects" are identified as a result of
Habermas's critique of the notions (attributed to Marx) that, a) industrial labor,
and its social organization, provides the model for a future (socialist) society,
superior to the existing one, which has superimposed on it an exploiting class;
b) Hegel's basic concepts can be reformulated in a “scientific spirit”, and with
their application constituting a critique of political economy, the process of
capital accumulation, thus exposed as an illusion, can be dispelled, opening
the way for society's rational re-organization; and, c) conflict rooted in opposing
social classes, in a concrete sense, are usable for analysis upon which theory
bases its calculations. Habermas holds that the latter notion is no longer viable,
since in increasingly complex societies there are, "no straightforward
connections between the social, subcultural, and regional surface structures, on
the one hand, and the abstract deep structures of a differentiated economic
system (intertwined with complementary state intevention) on the other..."
(Habermas 1990b, 12).
In respect to a): I have argued that intrinsic to Marx's theory was the
notion that "industrial labor" belonged to, was specific to, capitalist society.
Marx's capital aimed to demonstrate that "proletarian" labor could, and should,
be abolished, opposite in conception to Habermas's attribution to Marx of an
idea of industrial labor serving as a "model" for the kind of society which might
follow the capitalist; b) After Moishe Postone, I have recognized a perspective
which finds in Marx a sociohistorical epistemology. Hegel's dialectic
philosophy, explained such that while society per se is not grasped as a totality,
capitalist society alone is so structured, on the basis of social relations mediated
by labor; c) More specifically, the relation between abstract and concrete labor
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constitutes the deep, abstract structure of the capitalist social formation,
compared to the concrete expression of social classes, property ownership and
the market.
Habermas draws a sharp distinction between, on the one hand, the three
criticisms listed above, and the three which follow. The fourth (e) in particular
holds that Marx's,
restricted and functionalist analysis of constitutional democracy has had
far more serious practical consequences than the defects discussed so
far...he retained a purely instrumental attitude to its institutions. The
Critique of the Gotha Program tells us in no uncertain terms that Marx
understood a communist society to be the only possible realization of
democracy (Habermas 1990b, 12).

In the context of Habermas’s article, an analysis of the collapse of
Communism with attention alternately focused on the practical and theoretical
dimensions characterizing it, there is little room for any other interpretation of
the statement just quoted than that Habermas believes that the Communist
governments just overthrown not only represented a practice that legitimated
itself with reference to Marx's theory, but did so on the basis of a substantially
correct interpretation of that theory. This seems due to Habermas's consistent
position that the efficacy for social revolution of the abolition of private property
in the means of production represented the core of Mane's theory.
Recall that in his Critique of the Gotha Programme Marx severiy criticized
two competing tendencies whom proposed to unite in an histortically first
German Social Democratic party. His critique of the proposed unity program of
the Lasalleans (after Ferdinand Lasalle) and Eisenachers (the ostensible
Marxists) was written in the form of marginal notes to the draft party programme.
Much of the severity of Marx's criticism of the program was directed at Lasalle's
not-so-subtle attempt to re-write Marx's theories such that they appeared
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relatively innocuous, not only for the powers that be, but to party activists with
varying theoretical orientations. Lasalle's apparent goal was to insinuate the
incipient revolutionary organization into a niche in Bismark's 'social state".
In this, Marx, far from "instrumentalizing" constitutional democracy,
recommended that the two tendencies, rather than compromise O’ust to achieve
"unity") on the conceptual breakthroughs represented in his recently completed
Capital, simply agree upon a common strategy for practical reforms. Among the
principles Marx did not want compromised for immediate political expediency
was the concept of labor I have discussed at length in the preceding chapters,
as well as the very concept of revolutionary organization itself.
In a word, Marx was willing to dispense with socialist "unity", if it meant
the institutionalization of an organization uncoupled from the conceptual
achievement Capital represented. Compared to Habermas's strong criticism of
Marx for instrumentalizing constitutional democracy, it seems more accurate to
say that the thrust of Marx's marginal notes to a proposed instrumentalization of
constitutional democracy was to warn of the lack of utility in such a course, and
to resist the "instrumentalization" of theory (his own).
Habermas's fifth point (e), similar to Albrecht Wellmeris approach I
described in Chapter Five, proposes to critique Marx's theory by, in addition to
pointing out specific defects in its content, attempting to demonstrate basic
"errors" in theoretical strategy as well.
These "errors" are meant to be understood as theoretical
"presuppositions" unconsciously held, or insufficiently examined, by the
theoretical founders and compounded in their impact by his or her followers
whose stake becomes a matter of faith in and/or commitment to dogma. In this
case, Habermas holds, Hegel's teleology of "Being" is replaced with that of
"History": "The secretly normative presuppositions of theories of history are
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naturalized in the form of evolutionary concepts of progress". The "secretly
normative presuppositions" result in a concealment of the "margin of
contingency within which any theoretically guided practice is bound to move"
(Habermas 1990b, 12). Habermas explains this point by concluding:
By abolishing any sense of risk in those who will have to bear the
consequences of action, it also encourages a questionable type of
vanguardism. On the other hand, a totalizing knowledge of this sort
feels in a position to make clinical evaluations of the degree of
alienation, or success, of particular forms of life in their entirety. This
explains the tendency to see socialism as a historically priviliged
concrete ethical practice, even though the most a theory can do is
describe the conditions necessary for emancipated forms of life. What
concrete shape these take is something for those eventually
involved to decide amongst themselves (Habermas 1990b, 12).
As is clear from the conclusion to this point, Habermas understands
Hegel's dialectic, Marx’s critical social theory, and the development of Marxism
such that, at a sufficient level of abstraction, they can all be grasped in their
limitations with a single concept: with the maturation of Habermas's critical
social theory, the negative implications of a "monological" theory can be fully
appreciated such that a "dialogical" theory of communicative action and reason
would be thought to be irresistible.
The final point (f) makes virtually irrelevant any remaining question of
whether further examination of Habermas's previous research might yield
productive insight into any positive relevance of Marx's theory for
contemporaneity. In another reconnection to 1960 of the present article's
theoretical summation of the status of Marx's theory, Habermas argues for a
credible conceptual continuity from "Marx and Engels" (apparently a single
perspective) to "codification by Stalin" (Habermas 1990b, 12). Recall that in the
article, 'some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Practice" (Habermas
1973, 1-40)-which served as the introduction to the English version of Theory
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and Practice (the collection where "Marxism as Critique" first appeared in book
form)—Habermas linked Marx to Stalin through a concept of organization, said
to have been "introduced" by Lenin politically, then later justified philosophically
by Lukacs. Here, in respect to this issue, Habermas refers to Marcuse's Soviet
Marxism (1961). This reference is designed to both ameliorate the implications
of the continuity he has just proposed to establish, and to tie together the
threads of this part of his analysis. Recall that he had introduced this section
with the comment that Western Marxism (since the twenties) had subjected itself
to an, "unflinching critique that has left little of the theory's original form
remaining" (Habermas 1990b, 11).
Soviet Marxism, while certainly distinguishing between Marx's theory
and Stalin's, nonetheless does not account for Stalin's theory as a
transformation of Marx's theory into its opposite (Dunayevskaya 1992, 109).
Thus, Habermas is able to reference Soviet Marxism as documentation of his
claim that, at least with the passage of time, and the development of practice,
nearly as much affinity as difference can be found in the theories of Marx, on the
one hand and post-Stalin Soviet Marxism on the other. In view of the foregoing,
and in return to the question I posed at the beginning, on what grounds can
Habermas justify his conceptualization of a salvagable "non-communist" Left,
relevant and appropriate to his intention, instead of a "non-Marxist" Left?
It is clear Habermas considers it crucial that at least one major neoMarxist theoretical tradition-Critical Theory-the one, in fact, with which he has
himself identified, has since the twenties, "left little of the theory's original form
remaining" (Habermas 1990b, 11). As I have already noted, Habermas
believes that the relevant critical element still traceable to Marx, has already
been incorporated in the structure of Western capitalism. (For now I will put
aside a major contention of my analyis preceding this chapter, that it has been
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far from decided whether, even as late as the present decade, Western
Marxism, or Critical Theory in particular has, in the first place, ever-prior to
Moishe Postone (1993)--satisfactorily grasped and presented Marx’s “mature
critical theory").
In order to refine a view of Habermas's estimation of the status of Marx in
the 1990s, it is necessary to consider in greater detail why Habermas-even
after the implications of his theoretical critique of Marx and Marxism, which goes
so far as to ask, in so many words, how fundamental a theoretical difference
there is between Marx and Stalin—does not focus on the existence, possibility or
prospects of a non-Marxist Left, which he might hope his theory would infuse
with a new vitality, instead of a non-communist Left.
In "The Price of Social Democracy", the section which follows "Errors and
Defects", Habermas notes that though Marxists achieved "indisputably their
main success" in their contribution to instituting a "welfare state compromise"
(Habermas 1990b, 13), and, it was not the welfare state that proved to be an
illusion, a problem arose in the, “expectation that one could use administrative
means to arrive at an emancipated form of life". Phenomenon such as the
absorption of political parties by the state has, "kept a non-communist Left to the
Left of the social democrats" (Habermas 1990b, 13).
The "non-communist Left", in reaction to this problem, clings to a concept
of a "self-managing socialism". It has a difficulty in, "distancing itself from a
holistic conception of society, and giving up the notion of a switch from a
market-led to a democratically controlled production process" (Habermas
1990b, 14). Habermas concludes,
This was the best way of keeping the classical link between theory
and practice intact, but also the best way of ensuring that theory
became orthodox, and practice sectarian.
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The same fact of institutional differentiation-besides that of the economy and
state—makes its presence felt theoretically as well.
Marxism has become one other, more or less marginal, method
of
research among the many that make up academic life. This
process of academicization has brought about long overdue
revisions, and cross-fertilization with other theoretical approaches.
The fertile combination of Marx and Max Weber shaped the field of
sociological discourse as early as the Weimar period. Since then, the
self-criticism of Western Marxism has been completed largely in
universities, producing a pluralism mediated by academic
discussion...As a tradition [Marxism's] perspective benefits from being
stereoscopic; it does not concentrate on purely superficial aspects of
the process of modernization, and, equally, is not confined to the near
side of the mirror of instrumental reason, but is sensitive to the
ambiguities in the process of rationalization that plough through
society...Many have learnt from Marx, each in his or her own way, how
Hegel's dialectic of enlightenment can be translated into a research
programme. However, the reservations I enumerated in sections (a) to
(e) form the sole basis on which impulses from the Marxist tradition can
be taken up today (Habermas 1990b, 14).

The increasing complexity of modem society—in addition to differentiation
of the economic and political systems—makes itself felt as well in the form in
which Marxism appears today. Political/practical impulses are distinguishable
from Marxism's academic mediation, the former apparently in urgent need of
infusion from the latter, which is fully explained in TCA. Recall that in that work
Habermas explained his approach to social theory, characterizing it as the
second attempt from within Western Marxism to appropriate Max Weber.
Consequently, the vitality of the "Marxist tradition" is highly abstract, its limited
potential recognizable only with a certain type of theoretical mediation of its
differentiated social instantiations. At this point, Habermas counts his preceding
analysis as an effective historical summation of, "the position in which the non
communist Left found itself when Gorbachev ushered in the beginning of the
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end of state socialism" (Habermas 1990b, 14). Given the events of 1989, he
asks, "Must people on the Left now retreat to a purely moral standpoint", is
socialism still a goal? (Habermas 1990b, 14). Habermas's answer to the latter
question is certainly not,
if understood in the romantic, speculative sense given it in the “Paris
Manuscripts", where the dissolution of private ownership of the means
of production signifies "the solution to the riddle of
history..."(Habermas 1990b, 15).

What follows in Habermas's text is an abrupt characterization of Marx's
1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, proposing once again that, "the
dissolution of private property" represented the core of early Marx's philosophy.
Moreover, Habermas links Marx's "romantic socialism" to Stalin's forced labor
camps, holding that Marxism's ostensible belief in the controlling effects of an
end to private property had already been theoretically discredited before,
"recent critiques of the false totalizations of the philosophy of reconciliation
...or...Solzhenitsyn..." (Habermas 1990b, 15). Again, re-stating theses in TCA,
Habermas holds that what is relevant in 1844 Marx is evidence of a "romantic
socialism" which harks back to by-passed forms of social integration-"the
family, the neighborhood and the guild", and "Janus-faced...looks forward to a
future dominated by industrial labor" (Habermas 1990b, 15). I have already
commented extensively on Habemas's interpretation of Marx's 1844 EconomicPhilosophic Manuscripts. What needs to be asked here is what utility
Habermas might see in linking the early Marx, in particular, to the Stalinist
regimes just overthrown, the object of his present article.
After discrediting what he believes to be Marx's "concretist" interpretation
of socialism, Habermas proposes an alternative, an idea of "radical abstraction".
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In the section, "The Presupposition of Rationality", Habermas argues that
solidarity
in the framework of a society with a large-scale political
integration...is only available in the form of an abstract idea...a
legitimate, intersubjectively shared expectation.
Everyone should be justified in expecting that the institutionalization of
the process for the non-exclusive formation of public opinion and
democratic political will can ratify their assumption that the processes of
public communication are being conducted rationally and effectively
(Habermas 1990b, 15).

Much of the remainder of Habermas's article argues for the vitalization of public
spheres as a counter to, and as vehicles for pressure upon, the other
differentiated spheres, the economy and state.
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere--Revisited
Hence, I will begin to conclude this study with a look at Habermas's
contribution to a symposium organized for the occasion of the publication of
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Habermas 1993), the English
translation. There he reflects on the development of his theory generally, and
that of the public sphere, including their relationship to Marx and Marxism.
A first thing to notice is Habermas's contrasting characterizations of his
relationship to Marx and Marxism evident, on the one hand, in his lengthy
formal contribution to the conference (thirty-six pages, excluding notes)
(Habermas 1992a, 421-461) and, on the other hand, in his participation in the
summation of the conference entitled "Concluding Remarks" (Habermas 1992b,
462-479) in the published volume. In “Further Reflections on the Public
Sphere" (his formal contribution) Habermas centers self-critical remarks
(directed at STPS) on what he claims was a mistaken "ideology-critical
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approach" (Habermas 1992a, 430) and, "...the weaknesses of a HegelianMarxist style of thought, all wrapped up in notions of totality...” (Habermas
1992a, 435). In the section titled, "A Modified Theoretical Framework",
Habermas writes,
From that time on [since TCA] I have considered state apparatus and
economy to be systematically integrated action fields that can no longer
be transformed democratically from within, that is, be switched over
to a political mode of integration, without damage to their proper systemic
logic and therewith their ability to function. The abysmal collapse of
state socialism has only confirmed this. Instead, radical
democratization now aims for a shifting of forces within a “separation of
powers" that is itself to be maintained in principle. The new equilibrium
to be attained is not one between state powers but between different
resources for societal integration. The goal is no longer to supersede an
economic system having a capitalist life of its own and a system of
domination having a bureaucratic life of its own but to erect a dam
against the colonizing encroachment of system imperatives on areas of
the lifeworld. Therewith we have bid a farewell to the notion of
alienation and appropriation of objectified essentialist powers, whose
place is in a philosophy of praxis. A radical democratic change in the
process of legitimation aims at a new balance between the forces of
societal integration so that the the social-integrative power of
solidarity-the "communicative force of production“--can prevail over the
powers of the other two control resources, ie; money and administrative
power, and therewith successfully assert the practically oriented
demands of the lifeworld (Habermas 1992a, 444).

In contrast, in his informal remarks, Habermas states, that in revising the
"frame of ideology critique" in the years since STPS, he sees a challenge to,
especially social theory in the Marxist tradition, which I've quite fiercely
decided to defend as a still meaningful enterprise...! mostly feel that I am
the last Marxist. I think, in fact, that there is a definite need to counter
those imperatives that are still reproduced according to the capitalist
mode of accumulation and come from a highly bureaucratized capitalist
nation, to cope with and reverse them, at least to modify these
imperatives. These should grow from what I would like to call
autonomous publics of an Offentlichkeit type, so that we can have a
lifeworld-system interaction that redirects the imperatives in such a way
that we can contain, from the system's perspective, those side effects that
not only make us suffer but almost destroy core areas of class and
racially specific subcultures. Now let me lay out how it should work
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(why I think that it could work is even less believable). I don't think that
there can be any type of revolution in societies that have such a degree
of complexity; we cant go back anyway, in spite of all the romanticist
antimovements. For academics, revolution is a notion of the nineteenth
century (Habermas 1992b, 464, 469).
Moishe Postone correctly restated the original intention of the book,
which I now see more clearly than at the time. Structural
Transformation moved totally within the circle of a classical Marxian
critique of ideology, at least as it was understood in the Frankfurt
environment (Habermas 1992b, 463).

In consideration of these remarks there is a sense of having returned (in
the 1990s) to what I pointed out was already evident in the relationship of
"Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as Critique" and Structural
Transformation of the Public Sphere (in the early 1960s). The "ideologicalcritical approach", what Habermas apparently considers to be most
characteristic of Marx's theory, he claims for STPS as well. Recall that in
Chapter Three I had noted that after utilizing a concept of radical democracy in
criticizing Marx's and Marxism's labor theory of value in “Between Philosophy
and Science: Marxism as Critique", in Structural Transformation Habermas, in
the reverse, posed Marx's analysis of bourgeois political economy such that it
impinged on questions of authentic democracy. In this sense, the two works
seemed to aim at a synthesis of two traditions which appeared at the time (the
height of the cold war) to be mutually exclusive and, in fact, locked in a battle
which could lead to mutual destruction. Here Habermas implies that Marx's
“ideology-critical approach" led Habermas to an idea of,
a society that administers itself, that by means of legal enactment of
plans writes the program controlling all spheres of life, including its
economic reproduction...integrated through the political will of the
sovereign people (Habermas 1992a, 443).
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However, recall (as I showed In Chapter Two) that this theory was
presented as an alternative to what Habermas held was Marx’s notion of the
idea of a public sphere left with only the task of an "administration of things”.
Consequently, Habermas now is not criticizing what he regarded to be the
specific content of Marx's theory, but rather its "presupposition", primarily the,
"holistic notion of a societal totality in which the associated individuals
participate like members of an encompassing organization..." (Habermas
1993a, 443).
Conversely, in his informal remarks, where he views himself as the “last
Marxist", Habermas focuses upon, "imperatives of a capitalist mode of
accumulation" (recognition of which is implied to be characteristic of Marx's
theory). While the “imperatives" arising out of a capitalist mode of accumulation
might be "countered", "redirected", "coped with", "modified", or even "reversed",
Habermas does not admit that they might be eliminated, because he has never
fully grasped the deep structures of labor which are intrinsic to (value)
production, and define capitalism's specificity. Marx's theoretical perspective
on capitalist accumulation cannot be understood without reference to the
specific nature of capitalist labor and production. According to Habermas, the
task of revitalized public spheres is the alleviation of suffering due to the side
effects of systematically integrated action fields (state and economy). In
addition, these public spheres are charged with defending against destruction
of, "core areas of class and racially specific subcultures".
From the 1960s-1990s, Habermas is generally consistent in an approach
to Marx which views the latteris standpoint to be that of accumulation (or
distribution), instead of through Marx's concept of labor, the contradictory form it
assumes in mediating capitalism's social relations. Moreover, in connection
with this, he holds fast to the one-dimensionality thesis of the older Critical
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Theory. In the example just shown, this seems to construct an insuperable
barrier between social theory and freedom as when he projects a principal goal
of the former to be the defense of "core areas of class".

Conclusion
A close reading of his major works brought to view Habermas's
consistent concern with a proper understanding of the status of Marx's theory.
From the 1960s through the 1970s his own theory did not develop so much in
addition to his attention to a description of Marx's theory in the context of social
theory generally. Rather, I have characterized Habermas's critique of Marx's
theory as constitutive of his own theory. Moreover, while Habermas's earlier
theory formation in the 1960s and 1970s remained importantly motivated by his
search for the meaning and potential of a public sphere, a search informed by
his understanding that Marx's critique of capitalism was essentially of the limited
bourgeois idea of the public sphere, there was a marked shift in the period of
TCA and its aftermath. From that point, Habermas, with remarkable persistence,
attempted to articulate the public sphere as a vital concept, rather than as an
historical artifact, or even as a recoverable ideal which was still, in its most
important significances, extrinsic to his own theory. The fundamental break
effected from the inception of the 1980s decade concerned the question of a
constellation of the lifeworld, economy, state, and of Habermas's crystalized
theory, itself now viewed as internal to the meaning and potential of the public
sphere. In this, Habermas attempted to move his theory into the center of a
public sphere, or in fact to realize his theory as constitutive of such a public
sphere. Although understood as only one of a plurality of (existing or potential)
public spheres, Habermas clearly viewed this, the one he participated in
shaping as a fruitful critique of Marx's theory, as the most crucial of all. This has
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wide-ranging implications. In respect to Marx's theory in particular, Habermas's
critique, while maintaining a substantial continuity, became more precise and
explicit. For example, already in STPS Habermas had indicated that Marx's
theory was, at least in one major respect, inferior to (or left behind by) the
"bourgeois ideology” Marx criticized. According to Habermas, while Marx still
held open the potential of the public sphere to replace power with reason,
bourgeois theory became "realistic”. Instead of continuing to burden the public
sphere with the task of such an absolute social transformation (the replacement
of power with reason), thinkers such as John Stuart Mill began to view the
public sphere as one of several formative social forces, specifically assuming
the function of a "check" on state power, instead of as it potential replacement.
In 1990, Habermas retains an idea of the regressive character of Marx's theory.
But in 1990, compared to 1962, Habermas now has his own theory, one which
had not been available to Marx or Mill nor, for that matter, to himself. In 1962
Habermas weighed the idea that Marx simply brought an idea of the public
sphere to its logical conclusion. In this sense, according to Habermas, Marx's
critique was superior to the mere ideology of the property-owning citizen. By
the inception of the 1990s and the availability of an alternative critical social
theory adequate to modem society's complexities Habermas, while offering
more nuanced arguments in support of a view of the backwardness of Marx's
theory, essentially argued that Marx, in "instrumentalizing constitutional
democracy", disqualified his theory as where political or social action might
today be grounded.
On a deeper level, the above involves a subtle, largely undiscussed,
major shift in Habermas's understanding (and presentation) of the coherence of
Marx’s theory. For example, within STPS, the early Marx (when he was most
explicit about his relationship to Hegel and German Idealism generally) is
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represented by Habermas’s analyses of his pre-1844 writings, while leaving out
entirely the 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts. With this approach, the
young Marx's work could be presented as the purest expression of the potential
of the principle of modem society, authentic democracy and social
inclusiveness, adequate however only to early, not "late", capitalism.
The beginning of the 1960s' STPS's inadequate analysis of Marx's
theory was already implied in Habermas's own radically different approach to
the same theory at the end of the 1960s in KHI. Crucially, analysis of Mane's
theory in STPS was bound by Habermas's central theme (which he was none
the less to retain all the way in to the 1990s). That is, Marx 1844 EconomicPhilosophic Manuscripts, with their detailed discussion of philosophic concepts,
labor and social alienation, were not, of course, entered into the public sphere
during Marx's lifetime-which covered an important time-span of the period to
which Habermas’s theoretic concept of the public sphere corresponds
historically. The situation changed radically in the 1960s, when it became
increasingly evident that Marx’s 1844 manuscripts were achieving a major
influence on an understanding of Marx's theory, including comprehension of his
"mature theory". Even in themselves they represented an important contribution
to an explanation of many of modem society’s (both Communist and capitalist)
pathologies. Furthermore, this turn of theoretic events appeared to be gaining
some practical, even political, significance, particularly in Hungary, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. In the face of this, and in view of his lack of
focus in STPS on Marx's concept of labor, Habermas (in KHI) developed the
novel argument (which, however was ambiguous) that the "non-public sphere"
character of the 1844 manuscripts (especially their fulfillment in the
contradictory “unoffical" and "official" versions of Marx's theory of labor in the
Grundrisse) represented the inception of a failed strategic, "narrow

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

358
appropriation" of Hegel's dialectic. Here "strategic" is used in the sense of the
application of a monological theory (characteristic of instrumental reason) to
intrinsically dialogical social relations (interaction).
Within TCA, and in its aftermath, Habermas (with an approach opposite
to his ignoring them in STPS) categorically denounces the young Marx of the
1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts. However, new interpretations of
Marx's Capital still figure in the constitutive process of Habermas's theory. The
significant difference is not that he had viewed Marx's 1844 writings favorably
in, for example, the KHI chapters, the key point there being that he took them up
in some detail. Rather, now he takes the offensive in rejecting wholesale the
philosophical basis of these writings in themselves, as well as what he saw as
the philosophy embedded in them slipping through the back door into Marx's
later writings. What made these 1844 writings vital was their continuing
practical, political potential-first discovered by Marcuse in the 1930s, and
extended in the Marxist humanist tradition in East Europe as a critique of
Communism, as well as in a different way, and with considerably more
consistency, though with less apparent impact, even in the U.S., primarily in the
writings of Raya Dunayevskaya.
Habermas's bi-level social theory of modernity salvages as
"contemporary" only Marx’s Capital, in so far as the latter attempts to link what
Habermas terms the system and lifeworld levels of modem society. He casts
Marx's 1844 manuscripts as at best naive and, at worst, wholly backward and
regressive. Habermas conceives Marx's theory of society, which I have argued
is rooted in these 1844 writings in a different way, as clandestinely based on an
"expressive" model of labor, that of a social subject, which in producing objects,
“realizes" itself—in the way any artist's self-expression comes about through the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

359
creation of his or her art. To this unity of objective and subjective, transferred to
a notion of society as a whole, Habermas of course objects whole-heartedly.
Habermas's specific interpretation notwithstanding, the implication of the
analysis in the preceding chapters is that Habermas understood more clearly
than others the following: that even if it is granted that the theory of society
Habermas developed over several decades constitutes a successful (and
progressive) critique of Marx's theory, and communicative action an adequate
alternative to Marx's expressivist conception of labor, that is far from sufficient.
Habermas, beginning in the late 1970s, and especially in the 1980s, seeked to
find avenues for communicative action which supported the thesis that unless a
critical social theory which retains universalist claims is grasped socially, that
theory is as effectively inadequate as the one it criticizes. It is at this level of
abstraction where the most is to be learned from Habermas. The old bi-polar
world of competing state powers has dissolved along with the little credibility
which remained that events could be satisfactorily explained, on a one-to-one
basis, solely in terms of any existing critical social theory. Even more difficult is
the identification of the underlying deep structures of social domination, which
seem to remain in place even after immense, epocal political transformations on
a global scale, which have been witnessed in the last couple of decades. This
is reason enough to take with the utmost seriousness the changed
constellation, implied in the preceding chapters of this study, in which the public
sphere and theory are aligned (and re-aligned).
While it is suprisingly undetailed and abbreviated, Habermas's analysis
of "new social movements" in TCA is a crucial element in his justification of the
theory of communicative action as a "progressive" critical social theory,
compared to Marx's. There he refers to the women's, youth, Black, and
ecological movements. These have come about in tandem with the process of
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the "colonization of the lifeworld". The state as well as the economy have
attained a level of systematization, grounded in a logic which no longer admits
any prospects of social or political integration. Parallel to what he believes
Marx had already perceived in respect to labor, what Habermas characterized
as the “monetarization of labor power", the concrete content of social integration
and co-ordination was eroding in the face of the strategic logic of political power
and capital accumulation.
Along with this diagnosis in the TCA, Habermas proferred advice in the
direction of the "new social movements". These movements were symptoms of,
reactions to, the "mediatization" of the lifeworid, the role of money and power,
constitutive of the differentiated subsystems of economy and state. The latter
were separated out from the lifeworid (itself structurally differentiated), and
integrated society in a functional sense. In contrast, the other type of societal
integration, from the perspective of the lifeworid, was social; that is, it was
communicatively achieved. These differentiation processes had their
counterpart in a fragmentation of consciousness, suggesting the limits of
philosophy which corresponded to it, what Habermas, linking it to labor, terms
the "philosophy of consciousness". The "new social movements", which existed
at the boundaries of system and lifeworld, were unlike the older, directly political
party-forms, exemplified in the social democratic labor movements. The former
are intrinsically "defensive" against the encroachment of the system on the
autonomy, identity and aspirations of self-realization. These "new social
movements" were more about particular "forms of life", which defended against
a colonizing system. While explaining the defensive inclinations of these
movements as following from the logic of his anaiyis of modernity generally,
Habermas warned against their assuming a "strategic" stance in the face of the
political system. These movements should remain "defensive" and "self-
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limiting". The danger of attempting to act otherwise was a pull into the very form
of strategic integration against which their own movement arose in the first
place.
While Habermas analyzes these new social movements as intrinsic to
late capitalism, and how they seem to confirm his diagnosis of the times, what
became clearer by the 1990s was the implication that Habermas believed his
theory was, in important ways, intrinsic to these movements. When he
suggested that these “new social movements", though acting defensively, and
in a "self-limiting" way, publicly articulate the validity of their existence, despite
countervailing systemic imperatives, Habermas implied that his own theory (in
so far as it represented a more or less fully worked out communicative reason)
was ultimately constitutive of the potential success of this public sphere.
What is most valuable in Habermas’s approach to critical theory is his
development of, and commitment to, the idea that the theoretical success of a
social critique does not necessarily lead to an end to social domination, and
can even lead to its intensification. Although such a notion can already be
found in the older Critical Theory, Habermas made publicly available a detailed
analysis of Marx’s theory, and suggested precisely where in that theory these
consequential defects might be found. He also implied that a grasp of his own
theory, while leaving open the question of the current (practical or theoretical)
relevance of at least some of Marx's ideas, led beyond them. In any case, close
attention to Habermas's own consistent return, over a long period of time, to
Marx’s theory, even where he is most critical or in his major works focused on
elaborating his own theory, yields a view of the full array of issues of social
domination in contemporary society.
Even though the view of Marx's theory I have developed (with a large
debt to Postone's arguments from within a Critical Theory tradition which has
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absorbed Habermas’s theory) in a discussion of Habermas’s various
approaches to it is not compatible with Habermas's assessment, this does not
imply a turn to "action'' which could supposedly directly abolish labor (as it has
shaped capital and, in turn, been shaped by it). I have argued that labor is not
exemplary of just one of modem society’s modes of societal integration; labor is
central to the capitalist formation-both its early and late stages-because,
unique to that social formation, it functions as its social mediation. In accord
with Habermas's concern with the unique potential of a social grasp of an
emancipatory critical theory, the need is for the development and enhancement
of even newer social movements, which include and deepen those identified by
Habermas. Habermas's critique of Marx, in so far as it has contributed, however
ironically, to the re-emergence of an idea of the current potential of Marx's
theory, needs to be made available to, and infuse, these movements from the
start. Recent recognition of the relevance of Marx's "mature critical theory"
(especially since it appears after many decades of relative neglect within the
Critical Theory tradition itself) might imply the potential for this type of mature
social movement.
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